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ABSTRACT 
Problems, Puzzles, and Paradoxes for a Moral Psychology of Fiction 
By Katherine Tullmann 
 
Adviser: Dr. Jesse Prinz 
The goal of my dissertation is to provide a comprehensive account of our psychological 
engagements with fiction.  While many aestheticians have written on issues concerning art and 
ethics, only a few have addressed the ways in which works of fiction offer problems for general 
accounts of morality, let alone how we go about making moral judgments about fictions in the 
first place. My dissertation fills that gap. I argue that the first challenge in explaining our 
interactions with fiction arises from functional and inferential arguments that entail that our 
mental states about fictional entities are non-genuine. This means that our mental states during 
our engagements with fiction are different in kind from typical beliefs, emotions, desires, etc. 
that we have in real-life contexts. I call this position the Distinct Attitude View (DAV). In its 
place, I propose a common-sense, standard attitude view (SAV): the idea that our psychological 
interactions with non-real entities can be explained in terms of the intentional content of those 
states as opposed to a distinct type of mental state. In expanding the SAV, I develop several 
independent accounts of social cognition, emotions, and moral judgments. I also show how the 
SAV can dissolve standard problems in the philosophy and psychology of aesthetic experience: 
the paradox of fiction, the problem of imaginative existence, and the sympathy for the devil 
phenomenon, amongst others. 
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Chapter 1: The Distinct Attitude View 
 
 
 
1. Stranger than Fiction 
 
You wake up early one morning and turn on the television. A newscaster informs you of a pair of 
brothers, known on the streets as “the Saints,” who have committed multiple murders in the name 
of God. You haven’t heard of the Saints and you are intrigued. The newscaster describes how the 
brothers only kill “bad people”: Russian mobsters, murderers, hitmen, and the like. You then watch 
as the newscaster interviews people on the streets of your city. Their reactions to the Saints vary 
widely, from open approval of their actions (“Where can I sign up?”, “Love the Saints, man! I 
think they’re doin’ a great job!”; “They’re making the world a safer place”) to revulsion (“Who 
are they to be judge and jury?”; “Killing for good?!”; “This is going to create something so much 
worse…”) to fear (“I’m afraid to leave my house at night!”), and even social awareness (“You’re 
giving them the power!”; “You’ll walk into a kid’s bedroom, it’s gonna’ be there—Batman, 
Superman, and the Saints”). 
You, too, develop an opinion of the Saints as the broadcast continues. Maybe you think 
that their vigilante crime-fighting is good for society. After all, it’s not like they are killing innocent 
people. Or maybe you are appalled by the hypocrisy of religious fanatics “playing God.” Or 
perhaps you just worry about even more crime in the city. The thought of a mob war or 
underground street fight fills you with apprehension and anxiety for your own safety.  
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Then the screen cuts to credits. Slightly abashed, you realize that the news story was just 
that—a story. As the credits role, you discover that the newscast was a scene from a film called 
The Boondock Saints, a story about two Bostonian, Irish-Catholic brothers who decide to take the 
law into their own hands after the murder of a close friend.  
Your interpretation of the Saints broadcast has changed. You now know that the events 
portrayed are a part of a fictional story. Before you believed that the Saints and their actions were 
real; now you know that they are not. You realize that the people and future consequences that you 
were afraid of are not actual threats.  But what about your appraisal of the Saints? Has that changed 
as well? Say that you decided that the potential cost of the Saints’ vigilante justice outweighs the 
benefits. While watching the clip, you pronounced a moral judgment that their actions were wrong. 
Now, after the clip is over, are you forced to accept that this moral judgment was not a real 
judgment? 
There are some philosophers (Walton 1990, Currie 1995, Currie and Ravenscroft 2002, 
amongst others) who would answer this question with a resounding “yes.”  Our moral judgments 
of fictions—as well as our beliefs, desires, and emotions—are not genuine judgments. Rather, our 
evaluation of the Saints is a pretend, imaginary, or judgment-like mental state. This claim leads to 
a peculiar, yet surprisingly popular, interpretation of the previous example. When we watch a 
fictional film, read a novel, or see a play, the beliefs, desires, judgments, and emotions that we 
experience are not standard or stereotypical beliefs, desires, judgments, or emotions. Yet, when 
we consider a similar—even an almost exactly similar—event on BBC or in The New York Times, 
our mental states are stereotypical simply because their object is part of the actual world. 
I will call this the Distinct Attitude View (DAV; based on Schroeder and Matheson’s 
Distinct Cognitive Attitude View, or DCAV. See Schroeder and Matheson 2006).  The DAV holds 
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a dominant position in both the philosophical and psychological work in aesthetics. As we will 
see, some versions of the DAV claim that our mental states towards fictions are not ordinary states 
because they arise from functionally and inferentially different input and result in distinct cognitive 
and behavioral outputs from analogous real-life scenarios. We can contrast this view with a 
standard attitude view, or SAV, which states that we utilize the same types of mental states during 
our engagements with fictions and real-life; differences in behaviors and responses to fictions can 
be explained in terms of the content of standard beliefs, emotions, judgments, etc. I will defend a 
version of the SAV in this dissertation. 
Proponents of the DAV typically focus on the nature of our emotions or beliefs about 
fictions. I am interested in our moral evaluations of fiction, like our judgment of the Boondock 
Saints. While many philosophers and psychologists have accepted some form of the DAV, few 
have considered its implications for moral issues and moral psychology—Gregory Currie’s 1995 
paper, “The Moral Psychology of Fiction” and Elisabeth Camp’s unpublished work “Perspectives 
in Imaginative Engagement with Fiction” are exceptions. Indeed, my project here is largely a 
critical response to these papers. Furthermore, many aestheticians have written on issues 
concerning art and ethics, but only a few (e.g. Currie 1995, Nussbaum 2001) have addressed the 
ways in which works of fiction offer problems for general accounts of morality, let alone how we 
go about making moral judgments about fictions in the first place. Finally, moral psychologists 
ask questions concerning our moral judgments of real-life people and events.  Although they utilize 
fictional cases and thought experiments in their studies, few have discussed how the ontological 
status of these cases may affect the participants’ responses. Ironically, the way in which we know 
about real-life/standard/typical mental states is through psychological studies that often utilize 
fictions in their experiments.  
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This dissertation attempts to fill these gaps. In doing so, I offer a comprehensive moral 
psychology of fiction. As we will see, determining whether our mental states towards fictions are 
stereotypical or not will be paramount to our understanding how we judge fictional characters, 
how we act on those judgments, and the propriety of those judgments. The questions I will address 
in the following chapters are very similar to those found in papers on “real-life” moral psychology. 
For instance: do moral judgments involve conscious reasoning? What role do emotions play in our 
moral judgments? Can we make unconscious moral judgments? Moral psychologists also ask 
questions concerning how people acquire moral values: can we use our reason to come to an 
evaluation? Are moral values culturally-constructed or innate? Finally, are we always motivated 
to act on our moral evaluations of a person or situation? I will spend the majority of the following 
chapters evaluating potential responses to these questions. I argue that fictions often pose unique 
problems for moral psychology, but that these problems can be avoided if we base our moral 
theories on adequate accounts of emotions, moral judgments, and social cognition.  
In the present chapter, I will analyze the implications of the DAV in greater detail. Along 
the way, I will highlight the explananda of a moral psychology of fiction, the basic features of our 
interactions with fictions that any adequate account should address. In §2, I discuss the “puzzles 
of fiction,” a set of intriguing problems that have been taken to suggest that there is an asymmetry 
between how we respond to real life and analogous fictional scenarios. §3 illustrates two versions 
of the DAV in greater detail: a theory of make-believe and theory of imagination.  §4 evaluates 
three arguments that are typically used to support the DAV: arguments from the functional and 
inferential roles of mental states and another from research in cognitive neuroscience. In §5, I raise 
four further challenges to the DAV. I conclude by providing a sketch of my own view— the 
standard attitude view, or SAV—and a look ahead to the following chapters. 
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2. The puzzles of fiction 
 
Some of the most persuasive evidence for the DAV stems from the asymmetries between our 
responses to analogous real-life and fictional scenarios. Some of these asymmetries are captured 
by the following puzzles of fiction.  Since Plato’s Republic, philosophers and psychologists have 
taken these puzzles to present problems for theories of our mental attitudes towards fiction. One 
of my goals in this dissertation is to diffuse these puzzles; I will show why they are not really so 
puzzling to begin with. In this section, I will give a brief overview of the different puzzles that we 
will encounter in the chapters to come. 
First, the paradox of fiction concerns whether we may have genuine emotions towards 
fictional entities and states of affairs. It is largely understood that emotions play a significant role 
in an organism’s survival by tracking features of our environment that may impact our well-being 
(see Damasio 1994; LeDoux 1996; Currie 1995; Prinz 2004a, etc.). Yet, this point seems difficult 
to reconcile with the claim that we experience genuine emotional responses towards fictional 
objects. Perhaps we can broaden our notion of “well-being” in terms of an object’s general impact 
on our mental or physical state. But even this seems problematic for fictional objects, for we know 
that what happens in a fiction generally has little impact on us at all—and, even if it does impact 
us in some way, we still need an explanation of why and how. There are three different issues that 
must be untangled here: the question of whether fictional objects have an impact on our well-being, 
the nature of our emotions about fictions, and, finally, the scope of the behavioral and cognitive 
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dimensions of our emotional responses to fictions. Any adequate solution to the paradox of fiction 
should address all three. I will discuss the paradox of fiction more thoroughly in chapter 5. 
There are several further puzzles that arise primarily in respect to our moral judgments of 
fiction: the puzzle of disparate response, the sympathy for the devil phenomenon (Carroll 2004 and 
Camp, in preparation for terms), the puzzle of imaginative resistance (Walton 1994, 2006; Gendler 
2000, 2006; Currie 2002; Moran 1994), the puzzle of moral motivation (indirectly addressed in 
Walton, 1990), and the question of moral learning. The puzzle of disparate response covers the 
asymmetrical mental responses that we have to fictions and real-life people. This includes a 
character’s moral indiscretions. The most obvious examples of this can be found in fictions that 
portray violence and law-breaking in a positive light, such as mafia and heist films like The 
Godfather, Ocean’s Eleven, and Le Cercle Rouge. Westerns like The Searchers or The Good, the 
Bad, and the Ugly romanticize violence and portray “heroes” with whom we probably would not 
want to be friends in our real lives. Even superheroes and vigilantes would enrage many audiences 
if they were discovered in their own cities (an issue interestingly explored in films like The 
Boondock Saints, Watchmen, and The Dark Knight). 
The sympathy for the devil phenomenon is a special instance of the puzzle of disparate 
response. This puzzle concerns why we have positive responses (identification, empathy, 
sympathy, concern, etc.) to anti-heroes and villains in a fiction, characters that we would abhor in 
the actual world. Both historical and contemporary fictions abound with examples of alluring anti-
heroes, from Milton’s charismatic Satan in Paradise Lost, to Nabokov’s Humbert Humbert, and 
Breaking Bad’s Walter White. In each case, we cheer on and have positive emotional and moral 
responses to these characters whose real-life counterparts we would find repugnant. I will address 
the sympathy for the devil phenomenon in chapter 7. 
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The puzzle of imaginative resistance describes a similar phenomenon. Fictions often 
present us with highly improbable or metaphysically impossible scenarios (maybe even logically 
impossible ones), such as time travel, the ability to create and enter another person’s dream, and 
the existence of vampires. Most audiences take these impossibilities in stride. We accept that time 
travel, dream invasion, and vampires are possible in the fictional world. Yet there seem to be some 
fiction/real world inconsistencies that an audience member will not (and maybe should not) accept. 
These include moral actions, and values that are positively portrayed in a fiction, but we would 
not endorse in real life (see, e.g. Currie 2002; Gendler 2000 & 2006; Hume, 1757/1994; Moran, 
1994; Walton 1994 & 2006; Weatherson, 2004).  Tamar Gendler describes the puzzle of 
imaginative resistance as: “the puzzle of explaining our comparative difficulty in imagining 
fictional worlds that we take to be morally deviant” (2000, p. 56). I will return to this puzzle in 
chapter 8. 
Another moral puzzle I will consider has received only tangential treatment in the 
literature, but will nevertheless play a considerable role in the chapters to come. We tend to think 
that our moral judgments are motivating; if we believe that a certain action is morally wrong, then 
we generally will not perform it and we may take measures to prevent the action from occurring. 
Yet we are not motivated to act on our moral judgments about fictions. This is the problem of 
moral motivation. If morals are necessarily (or even only usually) motivational, why do we rarely 
act upon our moral judgments of fictional characters and situations? For example, witnessing 
horrific gang violence in a film rarely leads one to call the police. The easy answer to this is that 
we know that fictions are not real, so we know that we cannot call the police in a story to report a 
fictional crime. Another, more pressing question is whether the recognition of a morally bad action 
in a fiction should somehow cross the ontological boundary into real-world judgments, and 
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influence subsequent real-world behavior.  Part of this puzzle rests on issues concerning the 
functional role of our mental attitudes towards fictions; I will address this in §4 of this chapter, 
and again in chapter 6. 
Finally, I will consider the possibility of learning about morality from fictions. It may seem 
strange that we can learn anything about the actual world from works of fiction. After all, fictions 
generally do not purport to tell the truth. Yet many people would argue that fictions are an 
important resource for learning about other perspectives and cultures, even if the characters and 
places are not real. It also seems like we can develop our knowledge of folk psychology and 
morality by the scenarios fictions present, and we can hone our emotional and moral abilities by 
“practicing” on fictions. These positive accounts of learning from fiction need some explanation 
of how we can learn about the real world from fictional material. I will consider several positive 
accounts of learning from fictions (Lamarque 2009, Nussbaum 1995, Robinson 2005) as well as 
several arguments against this idea (Currie 2013) in the final chapter of this dissertation.  
The puzzles of fiction comprise a serious challenge to a moral psychology of fiction. Any 
adequate theory of our psychological interactions with fiction must account for them. Indeed, the 
puzzles of fiction are often taken to be so problematic that philosophers have concluded that we 
need to reinterpret how we understand our mental attitudes about fictions and even propose new 
types of mental attitudes. I reject this move. For now, though, let’s explore the adversary’s position 
in more detail. 
 
3. The Distinct Attitude View 
 
Imagine that you are reading The Hobbit. Tolkien introduces you to a strange new world where, 
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amongst other magical occurrences, you fictionally encounter dragons. Your responses to Smaug 
are probably nothing like what they would be if you encountered the wily beast in real life; you 
would fear Smaug rather than feel curious or intrigued by him and you would run away from the 
creature rather than remain in your comfy chair. Indeed, we often do not physically react to the 
objects we see on a screen or read about in a novel. Our desires concerning the fate of a fictional 
character have a different relation to our other beliefs, thoughts, and desires than they would if that 
character was a real person.  Call this the asymmetry problem: we behave and respond differently 
to fictional entities than we would to their real-life counterparts.  We draw different cognitive 
inferences and make different emotional and moral judgments of them. What explains these 
differences? 
 
3.1. Two interpretations 
There are two general ways we can explain the asymmetry problem. One is to suggest that the 
content of our mental attitudes towards fiction is different than the content of our mental attitudes 
towards real-life objects. Call this the content-based view; this will be the basis for my SAV. The 
other account urges that we have different types of mental attitudes towards fictions and real-life 
events and objects. This is the distinct attitude view (DAV). In this section, I will present the 
general outline of both views and offer several reasons why we should prefer the former. In §4, I 
will expand upon, and reject, three typical arguments given in favor of the DAV. 
 The content-based view holds that our engagements with fictions and their real-life 
counterparts result in different behaviors and cognitive inferences due to a difference in the 
intentional content of our mental attitudes about each. In other words, our thoughts, beliefs, 
desires, emotions, etc. have different types of objects than they would in real-life situations.  When 
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we engage with a fiction, we recognize that what we encounter is not real; the events in a fiction 
generally do not or did not actually happen. For example, when I see a production of A 
Midsummer’s Night Dream, I recognize that the actors on the stage embody fictional characters 
that do not physically exist in our actual world.  This recognition informs our further mental 
engagements with the fiction, both consciously and unconsciously.  
The content-based view also requires that we tacitly employ a fictional operator when we 
speak about fictions. When I say “I believe that Demetrius treated Helena very poorly” I mean “I 
believe that Demetrius treated Helena very poorly [in the fiction]” (see Kripke 2011 and 
Thomasson 1999). The same holds for our mental attitudes; the fictional operator is implicit in our 
beliefs, thoughts, and desires about fictional entities (see also Matravers 1991 & 2014, Neill 1993). 
The recognition that the object of our mental attitudes does not exist is the backdrop against which 
they are formed. So I may have a belief “that Smaug is a wily beast [in the fictional world]” but 
not “Smaug is a wily beast” tout court. 
There is quite a bit more to be said about the nature of our mental states and speech acts 
concerning fictions, as well as the metaphysical implications of the content-based view. I will 
expand upon some of these issues in chapter 3. For now, it is enough to note the differences 
between this type of view and the DAV. Importantly, the content-based view maintains the 
possibility that our mental attitudes towards fictions are not different in kind from those about 
actual objects. We treat characters as fictional objects, but we nevertheless have standard beliefs 
about them. The DAV, on the other hand, holds that a solution to the asymmetry problem requires 
a distinctive cognitive attitude that we employ in our engagements with fictions. 
The nature of the distinct attitude varies by the theorist. Quite often, they posit a mental 
“box” or mechanism that we utilize exclusively when considering non-actual objects, including 
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fictional ones (see, for example, Nichols & Stich 2003), but also hypothetical and counterfactual 
thought, mental activities involving deliberation and decision-making, mental imagery, and 
mindreading (attributing mental states to other people).  
Alternatively, we may use largely the same mental processes as in real-life situations, but 
these processes are run “off-line,” disconnected from their typical functional and inferential output. 
The result is a different kind of mental state than we would have if we considered a real-life/actual 
object. The result is that we adopt pretend (Searle 1975; see also Kripke 2013), simulated (e.g. 
Walton 1996, Currie & Ravenscroft 2002), or imaginary beliefs, desires, emotions, and thoughts 
toward non-actual objects (e.g. Schroeder & Matheson 2006, Weinberg & Meskin 2006). These 
states are isomorphic to genuine mental attitudes and may even be phenomenologically 
indistinguishable from them. Still, we cannot say that they are the same type of state due to their 
distinct functional and inferential roles.  
I want to resist this move. I will argue that a content-based view of our mental attitudes 
towards fiction can fully solve the asymmetry problem. This means that we do not need to posit a 
distinct cognitive attitude in the first place. Note that the content-based view does not entail that 
our experiences with fictions and real-life are exactly the same.  Of course we respond differently 
to an actual, face-to-face snarling dog than we would to one that we encounter on a movie screen. 
The challenge will be to explain how, on my view, we can explain the behavioral differences if 
the mental states are of the same type. 
 The content-based view also does not imply that we have the exact same kinds of thoughts 
about fictional and real-life objects. A mental state’s inferential role—what mentally causes it or 
what further mental processing it results in—could be roughly the same whether its object is non-
actual or real. However, the mental state’s intentional content differs in each case. This difference 
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may account for asymmetrical behaviors and cognitive inferences. The content-based view implies 
that our knowledge that fictional objects are fictional informs our mental attitudes towards it, but 
does not imply that the attitude is no longer of the same kind. It only implies that the attitude is 
about something different.  
 
 
3.2. Make-believe 
I will now present two versions of the DAV: a theory of make-believe and a theory of imagination. 
According to a theory of make-believe, our engagements with fiction draw on our capacities for 
imagination and pretense. While reading a novel, for example, we play a game of make-believe, 
creating a “fictional world” in which the propositions presented in the novel are fictionally true. 
So, in contrast to the content-based view, the mental state type during our engagements with fiction 
differs from real-life situations, but we treat the intentional content in each case the same—as if 
the object is a real one. 
On this view, each reader is the participant and creator of her own fiction-based game. 
Fictional worlds are similar to the imaginary worlds that children create during their pretend play 
(Walton 1990; Currie 1990, Harris 2000). For our purposes, pretense is the activity of acting and 
thinking as if some proposition or state of affairs is true, while knowing that it is not. In their games 
of make-believe, a child may pretend that a couch is a house, the underneath of a dining room table 
is a dungeon, and a baseball bat is a magnificent sword—all while knowing that none of these are 
actually the case. 
 Theories of make-believe hold that something similar occurs when adults engage with 
fictions, but this time the props are largely imaginative. While reading the Harry Potter series, we 
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pretend that there is a world similar to our own in which witches and wizards go to a secret school 
called Hogwarts, and there’s a Dark Lord lurking in the shadows. The novel itself acts as a prop, 
each line feeding into our fictional world and adding layer upon layer of detail to our game of 
make-believe. The game of make-believe extends to our psychological states: we pretend to 
believe that Harry Potter defeated the Dark Lord at the tender age of one and we pretend that it is 
true that Harry is the youngest Quidditch seeker in over one hundred years. Furthermore, we have 
fictional feelings about Harry and his crew and fictional desires for the young wizard to vanquish 
the Dark Lord. 
 A theory of make-believe attempts to explain two things: the ontology of fictions and the 
nature of our psychological states about them. Both rely on engaging in pretense-based games. 
Let’s begin with the ontological question. Do fictions and fictional characters exist? What are 
fictional entities such that we can think about them, speak about them, etc.? Theories of make-
believe have a ready response to these questions: fictional entities do not, strictly speaking, exist 
outside of one’s game of make-believe. Instead, when we discuss fictional entities, we make 
merely pretend illocutions concerning pretend objects. Like an actor in a performance of Hamlet, 
we do not make genuine assertions when we speak about the goings-on of fictions.  We merely 
pretend to do so as a part of the game (see also Searle 1975). Fictional entities are not objects that 
can be found in space or time, even if the images or words used as props can be (a painted figure, 
a film image of a person, or words that describe a villain).  
Walton contrasts his view with a realist Meinongian theory, according to which fictional 
entities exist eternally as abstracta, similar to Platonic forms (1990; see also Sainsbury 2010 and 
Wolterstorff 1980). On this view, fiction entities are not created, but rather drawn upon and put 
together in creative ways by authors, filmmakers, dramatists, etc. Meinongian theories have come 
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under strong attack, and rightly so. However, contrasting a pretense theory with the Meinongian 
position ignores the more fine-grained concerning the existence of fictional entities. The middle 
ground includes other broadly realist theories, such the possible objects view (Lewis 1974) or the 
abstract artifact view favored by Kripke (2011 & 2013), Salmon (1998), Schiffer (1996), and 
Thomasson (1999). 
Importantly, neither a realist nor pretense-based ontology entails that our mental states 
about fictions are distinct in type. It could be that we merely pretend that fictional objects exist 
when we think about and discuss them. Our mental states about those objects are the standard 
mental states, about something fictional. That is one possible way in which to understand the 
ontological and psychological questions of fiction: an anti-realist ontology of fictional entities 
coupled with a genuine attitude view of mental states. Unfortunately, this view raises a host of 
questions concerning the possibility of referring to nonexistent objects. 
For this reason, many anti-realists about fictional entities do not go this route. Instead, they 
favor the DAV according to which our mental states towards fictional entities are not stereotypical 
mental states. One popular way in which to ground a psychology of make-believe is to adopt some 
form of simulation theory (ST). ST is typically used in cognitive science as a way to explain how 
we attribute mental states to others, especially to predict their behaviors and understand their 
emotional state (see Goldman 2006, Gordon, 1986, Currie & Ravenscroft 2002, Nichols et al 1996, 
Prinz 2002). Currie and Ravenscroft (2002) argue that imagination essentially involves the 
capacity to put ourselves in the place of another or our self in another place or time. Importantly, 
both Walton and Currie/Ravenscroft hold that the mental attitudes we adopt in our imaginings are 
substitutes for genuine ones; we have imaginative or fictional beliefs about fictions instead of 
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beliefs simpliciter. On their view, imagining simulates the role of other states, such as the role 
beliefs play in inferential processes (ibid, 49). 
The upshot of a theory of make-believe—combining anti-realism about fictional entities 
and ST to explain our psychological states towards them—is that is allows proponents of the DAV 
a theoretically cohesive and elegant means in which to solve the puzzles of fiction. For example, 
we can solve the paradox of fiction by arguing that we do not possess ordinary types of beliefs 
about fictional entities. We feel “sympathy for the devil” because that emotion is distinct from our 
normal cognitive processing, which allows us to experience unique emotional and moral responses 
towards entities that do not match how we would respond to their real-life counterparts. And so 
on. However, if the theory of make-believe entails that our mental states towards fiction are non-
stereotypical, then this proposal is not available to those who dismiss the DAV. The content-based 
view needs some alternative method to explain, or explain away, the puzzles of fiction. 
 
 
3.3. Imagination 
The proponent of a content-based view seems to be at a disadvantage in explaining another aspect 
of our engagements with fiction. Note that theories of make-believe rely heavily on our capacity 
to imagine things that are not the case. It is often assumed that imagination draws upon our powers 
of pretense and mental simulation. Another version of the DAV holds that imagination is necessary 
for our experiences with fiction; fictions call us to imagine certain propositions and states of 
affairs; this may include distinct, imaginary kinds of mental states. Since imagination seems to be 
involved in both the creation and enjoyment of fictions, then, on this logic, pretense or simulation 
must be as well. But if imagination requires pretense, and pretense requires distinct attitudes, how 
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can the content-based view explain this extremely important facet of fictions? 
It is worth asking whether our imaginative capacities do, in fact, require pretense. I think 
that this is doubtful. Some imaginative engagements do not require that we hold some non-actual 
proposition to be true.  We may imaginatively entertain a proposition, consider an alternative state 
of affairs, or “call to mind” an object without automatically holding that it is the case. Entertaining, 
considering, and calling to mind may not require pretending that the given state of affairs is true. 
Perhaps this is the case with fiction; we consider or entertain fictional propositions but do not 
accept their truth in the actual world. 
The act of imagination is also sometimes thought to require simulation. On this view, when 
we imagine that something is the case, we run our mental states off-line, disconnected from their 
typical functional and inferential roles. We simulate typical mental processes. ‘Imagining that X 
is true’ means that we simulate that X is true. Again, I think that it is a mistake to equate 
imagination and simulation. Perhaps imagining that something is the case sometimes involves 
simulation.  But simulation is not required for imagining in general. We can consider or entertain 
non-actual states of affairs without simulating mental processes as if that they are actual. 
If I am right here, then we must take care to distinguish between imagination, pretense, and 
simulation. Unfortunately, we are now left with the question of what imagining actually amounts 
to, if not one of these other capacities.  
Neil van Leeuwen (2013) helpfully distinguishes between three types of imagining, each 
of which may (but arguably need not) be involved in our experience with fictions. The first type 
is constructive imagining. This kind of imagining involves developing the content of mental 
representations, such as objects, ideas, premises, etc. (ibid, 221). We create the objects of our 
mental states. This kind of imagining could be involved when an author writes a novel, or even 
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when a scholar pens an article. But constructive imagining could also be involved on the recipient’s 
(the person who reads the novel or the article) side. We often do much more than casually entertain 
thoughts concerning fictional characters. We consider implications for a character’s future or we 
may consider what the story would be like if some event had or had not occurred. For example, 
we may wonder whether the boy will ever get the girl or if the vampire has a heart after all. We 
may also imagine what it would be like to be Elizabeth Bennett when she first arrives at Pemberley 
or Bruce Wayne when he learns the truth about Bane’s past.  
Van Leeuwen’s second type of imagining is attitude imagining. Here, we regard the content 
of our imagination as fictional rather than as describing the world as it really is. I take it that this 
is the most important type of imagining that needs to be discussed. This type of imagining is also 
sometimes called propositional imagining; we are imagining that something is the case. 
 Lastly, imagistic imagining is when we visually, auditorily, or in some other way use 
mental imagery to represent some intentional content. We can close our eyes and imagine the 
opening measures of Beethoven’s Eroica or picture a character from our favorite novel enact her 
most daring exploits. This type of imagining is not greatly at stake in my discussion. I will, 
however, briefly discuss this type of imagining in §4 since it is sometimes used as evidence in 
favor of the DAV. 
Despite its widespread popularity in theories of fiction, I reject the claim that imagining—
and especially attitude imagining—is necessary to explain our interactions with fictions. This is a 
hard line to sell, but one that I think is acceptable if we keep the distinctions I’ve made in this 
section in mind. I deny that constructive imagining and imagistic imagining are necessary for our 
engagements with fiction, although the former may be required for the construction of fictions 
(writing a novel, creating a film, etc.). And although we may often have a great deal of mental 
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imagery involved in our experiences with fiction, we do not need to. It may not be a part of our 
conscious experience of fictions that we imagistically imagine what Jane Eyre looks like, for 
example. 
Some philosophers argue that some kind of imagining is required in order for us to make 
sense of a fictional story (Camp, unpublished manuscript). Imagining in this sense means “holding 
in mind objects or states of affairs that are not present to us.” This is roughly equitable to 
considering, supposing, or entertaining a proposition.  My claims in this dissertation are 
compatible with the imagination thesis if this is all that is meant by imagining. However, those 
who support the DAV typically take imagining to mean more than merely considering or 
entertaining a proposition–they make claims concerning the nature of the mental states or 
processing involved, often appealing to imaginary, offline mental states. I object to this aspect of 
the imagining thesis. Finally, it is important to distinguish this kind of imagining (if it is imagining) 
is different from both pretense, make-believe, and simulation, all of which make stronger claims 
concerning the types of mental activity involved in  these processes. 
I do not deny that these further kinds of imagination can play a role in how we engage with 
fictions. Rather, I argue that imaginative engagement is not necessary for our engagements with 
fiction (see also Matravers 2014).  I will take a neutral stance on the ontology of fictional 
characters, although in general I favor an abstract artifact view. I think that my SAV is compatible 
with most ontological theories of fictional entities. In contrast, the proponent of the DAV generally 
holds that questions concerning the nature of fictional entities go hand in hand with how we think 
and feel about them. Non-actual objects need to be understood in terms of atypical mental states. 
I will return to this in chapter 3. For now, though, let’s consider several arguments in favor of the 
DAV. 
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4. Three arguments for the DAV 
 
The main theoretical support for the DAV stems from a folk psychological and functionalist 
understandings of the nature of mental attitudes. Beliefs, desires, judgments, etc. have 
characteristic behavioral and inferential roles, understood in terms of inputs from stimuli and their 
cognitive and behavioral outputs. Real-life beliefs and their imaginative counterparts might utilize 
much of the same causal and inferential pathways to bring about certain responses, but they employ 
significantly different inputs and result in very different output (see, e.g. Currie 1990, Currie & 
Ravenscroft 2002, Weinberg & Meskin 2006, Schroeder & Matheson 2006). Furthermore, 
research in psychology and cognitive neuroscience seems to support the idea that engaging with 
non-actual objects utilizes many, but not all, of the same neural pathways as our mental activities 
concerning actual things (Kosslyn 1997; Kosslyn, Thompson & Ganis 2006). These studies help 
to explain why our reactions to imaginative activity are often so robust, but may also suggest that 
we utilize a distinct attitude in our engagements with fiction (Damasio, 1994; Schroeder & 
Matheson 2006). 
 In this section, I will present and critique three arguments in favor of the DAV: the 
argument from functional role, the argument from inferential role, and the argument from 
neuroscience. Doing so clears the path for my own content-based view by eliminating the main 
motivation behind positing a distinct cognitive attitude to begin with. 
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4.1. The argument from functional role 
Proponents of the DAV argue that mental states such as beliefs and desires can be identified in 
terms of their characteristic functional roles. Consider beliefs. It is generally understood that our 
beliefs about real-life and non-actual objects utilize many of the same causal and inferential 
pathways. However, they have significantly different inputs and result in very different outputs. 
Our real-life, everyday beliefs are about things that we can see, touch, and hear— things that exist 
spatio-temporally (concretely). These objects act as the input for our everyday, stereotypical 
beliefs. In contrast, beliefs about fiction (and other non-actual objects) do not take actual, concrete 
objects for their input. Rather, they are about fictions, however that is cashed out ontologically. 
The output of our mental processing about actual and fictional objects is also different; they result 
in different kinds of behaviors. So while our beliefs about real life and our beliefs about fictions 
are similar in many ways, proponents of the DAV hold that they are different enough to constitute 
a distinct kind of mental state. The result is that we have belief-like attitudes towards the content 
of fictions, but not beliefs simpliciter.  
A folk-psychological account of mental attitudes helps to motivate this claim.  Standard 
belief-desire psychology holds that a belief that X, together with a desire to Y, motivates action, all 
things being equal. This position is echoed in the literature on fiction. Proponents of the DAV take 
it as a basic fact about our cognitive processing that beliefs generally motivate action (see Walton, 
1990; Currie & Ravenscroft, 2002; Schroeder & Matheson, 2006; Weinberg & Meskin, 2006). If 
there is no resulting motivation to act, then we do not have a stereotypical belief.  We will see that 
the same idea applies to other mental states, including emotions. As Walton argues: “Fear 
emasculated by subtracting its distinctive motivational force is not fear at all” (1990, 202).  
This statement captures the neo-behaviorist, or “purely motivational” conception of belief.  
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David Velleman describes this view as follows: “all that’s necessary for an attitude to qualify as a 
belief is that it disposes the subject to behave in certain ways that would promote the satisfaction 
of his desires if its content were true” (Velleman 2000). The problem with this view, as Velleman 
notes, is that it cannot account for a variety of cases that we want to describe as instances of belief. 
For example, there may be cases in which a subject “believes that P, but this belief does not bring 
with it a disposition to act in P-concordant ways because of some feature of the subject” (Gendler 
2008, 653; emphasis added). Another possibility is that the subject believes that P, but does not 
act in P-concordant ways because the belief lacks behavioral implications altogether. Finally, there 
are cases in which a subject is disposed to act in P-concordant ways, but does act on them because 
she lacks other required beliefs (ibid, 653). 
Each of these three cases may apply to our interactions with fictions. Perhaps I am not 
disposed to act on a belief about a fiction because I lack the relevant desire. Or maybe my belief 
about a fiction simply lacks any behavioral implications. My belief that Sherlock Holmes lives at 
221B Baker Street does not necessarily motivate me to do anything.  Finally, I could lack other 
relevant beliefs for action, such as the belief that Sherlock Holmes is a flesh-and-blood person.  
Of course, there are different ways in which we can understand the nature of belief besides 
the neo-behaviorist conception (see Tullmann & Buckwalter, forthcoming). For instance, L. 
Jonathan Cohen argues that the belief that x is the disposition to feel that x is true (Cohen 1989). 
This notion of belief could work for our engagements with fictions if we take the truth condition 
to be true according to the fiction, as we saw in the previous section. For now, let’s assume that 
the functionalist picture of belief is correct. Does it necessarily entail the DAV? I will argue that 
it doesn’t; we can also evaluate the motivational role of belief in terms of the state’s content.   
Consider Currie and Ravenscroft’s (2002) argument for imaginary mental states. They 
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maintain that beliefs serve as part of an inferential network, motivating not only action, but also 
other beliefs, desires, and thoughts. The authors posit that beliefs about a fiction are run “off-line,” 
disconnected from their normal behavioral and cognitive networks. The same goes for other 
activities with non-actual content, such as hypothetical thought and pretend play. These states are 
not stereotypical beliefs, but rather imaginative ones, because stereotypical beliefs are understood 
in terms of the behavior that they produce. 
If Currie and Ravenscroft are correct, then we do seem to have a distinct attitude for 
fictional and other activities. Before we accept this conclusion, however, I want to explore two 
other possible interpretations of the functional data that do not entail the DAV. First, note that the 
main charge against a content-based view is that we do not have the right kind of behavioral 
responses to fictions; our “beliefs” about them do not play the right kind of functional role for 
motivating action. In contrast, I argue that we do have genuine beliefs about our imaginative 
activities, but we do not act because due to the influence of other facts and judgments that we have 
(that the object is not real, for one)—even if we are motivated to on some subconscious or 
precognitive level. 
Second, our beliefs about non-actual objects do sometimes result in actual behaviors. This 
is especially clear in cases of hypothetical deliberation and pretend play. For example, a child 
pretending to have a tea party will go through the motions as if she was really having a tea party; 
someone deliberating on an important decision may go through some of the actions she would 
need to perform in order to test a potential outcome, as if she were really going through with that 
outcome.  I will make the case for acting on the basis of beliefs about fictions as well. 
If I’m right, then we are at least sometimes motivated to act on our beleifs about fictions, 
even though we know that the object of our belief is not real. Let’s begin with my second claim:  
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we sometimes act in response to fictions. There are two ways in which fictions might motivate 
actions the first relates a fictional scenario to an analogous real-life situation; the second has to do 
with judgments of the fiction qua fiction. According to the first kind of motivation, there may be 
cases in which engaging with a fiction and imaginatively considering it will shape our future 
actions in our daily lives. For example, after watching Blood Diamond, I make sure that the jewelry 
I purchase comes from legitimate sources that do not utilize slave labor. It may be quite common 
for fictions to shape our lives in this way; we “export” information from the fiction and apply it to 
real-life. In this respect, beliefs about fictions can play a role in our everyday behavioral networks. 
An obvious response to this account of fiction-based action is that it does not really address 
the relevant type of behavioral motivation. We need some account of our behavioral responses to 
fictions qua fiction. It may seem like it is extremely rare that we are ever motivated to act in this 
way. For example, we are seldom motivated to attempt to speak to or walk alongside a fictional 
character. I am typically not motivated to punish a fictional villain for his crimes that take place in 
the fiction, and will not leave a theater demanding that justice be served (if it is not in the narrative). 
But there are other ways in which we may actually act towards things that we know are not real. 
This is especially true if we consider acting out of an emotion. I cry for Jane Eyre when I find out 
about Mr. Rochester’s wife; I would cry for her too if she were my actual best friend.  When I 
watch a scary film I clutching my armrests, cover my face with my hands, I yell at protagonist to 
“watch out!”  These are all types of actions—and they are all performed even though I know that 
the character, monster, etc. do not actually exist. Of course, we do not act in the exact same way 
that we would if that fictional monster were in our town. But we cannot say that beliefs and other 
mental states about fictional objects do not yield any functional output. Nor can we say that the 
functional output is always distinct in kind. At least some of our actions-out-of-emotion towards 
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fictional entities will match those we would perform towards real-life people. 
 I take it that the proponent of the DAV will not be wholly satisfied with this (admittedly) 
limited response. So let’s consider my first claim: we are often motivated to act on the basis of our 
beliefs about fictions, even if those actions are not carried to fruition. On this account, it is possible 
that we are motivated to act in response to our interactions with fictions even if we do not follow 
through with the action.  Perhaps my belief that there is a monster oozing towards the screen (think 
Walton’s Green Slime) may dispose me to act. Again, some of these behaviors are carried out—I 
gasp and worry my hands in anxiety. Other behaviors are not; I do not run screaming towards the 
exit, yelling for the other characters to go hide. Why does my belief that there is a green slime 
terrorizing the town motivate me to act in some ways but not others?  
I hold that some motivated actions do not come to fruition because they are inconsistent 
with my recognition that the slime is not real. My belief that the green slime is going to harm me 
may have unconsciously primed me to act; my motor system may have been activated and prepared 
for flight. In the neo-behaviorists’ terms, I am disposed to act. But that action is ultimately blocked 
from occurring due to other beliefs and thoughts that I may have—most importantly, the disbelief 
in the slime monster’s actual existence. 
 Whether or not unconscious, automatic behavioral priming does, in fact, occur is a question 
for empirical investigation. We can imagine a study in which we compare a participant’s 
behavioral reactions to beliefs about fictions to analogous beliefs and actual, carried-out behaviors; 
if the relevant neural circuitry matches, even in part, we would have some evidence that we are 
primed for action based on our beliefs about fictions. Indeed, there is some evidence that this is 
the case (see, for example, Freedberg & Gallese 2007).  
The psychologist Paul Harris (2000) provides further evidence for this view, particularly 
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in terms of our emotional responses to imaginings. Very young children tend to be overcome by 
the emotions caused by their imaginative activities—e.g. fearing the monster under the bed or 
witches that they saw in a movie—even if they know that the fiction is not real. Older children and 
adults are generally able to regulate and override these emotions, but still may often become 
absorbed in their imaginative activity. We get “lost” in a film or novel and experience strong 
emotional reactions, emotions that color our real-life activities.  
One way to explain these reactions is to consider the evaluative process of emotions. 
Emotions are inherently value-laden insofar as they represent objects in our environment that may 
affect our well-being. Harris points out that we “do not appraise the inputs from a perspective 
outside of that imagined framework” (ibid, 66). Rather, we appraise an imaginative activity from 
within the imaginative framework itself. In that respect, we may be at least motivated to act, even 
if it is on an unconscious or subpersonal level. Typically we do not act, though, because other 
regulatory processes kick in (what Harris calls “control processes”). For example, we remind 
ourselves that the scary scenario is just a fiction or focus on how the story was produced instead 
of its scary content.  These are ways of detaching ourselves from the fiction. Doing so overrides 
the standard functioning of our ordinary emotional responses. 
 I think that something similar is going on in a great deal of our interactions with fictions. 
We may be have low level motivations to act on but generally do not because of other regulatory 
thoughts, judgments, and beliefs. The motivation to act may not be able to override these other 
factors, especially the knowledge that what we encounter does not actually exist. So our mental 
states towards fictions still have their characteristic functional role, but it is blocked by some other 
attitude. Our dispositions to act sometimes do not result in action.  Having the belief that fictional 
objects are not real may act as a kind of traffic light for behavior, stopping some behaviors from 
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ever coming to fruition while allowing others to proceed. This does not mean that the beliefs 
involved in actually motivating those behaviors are any different in kind from ordinary, real-life 
beliefs. It does imply that there is some deterring factor (namely, some other mental state) that 
allows for some behavior while barring others. 
 
 
4.2. The inferential role argument 
Even if I am right that the functional argument for the DAV fails, one could still claim that there 
is a difference in the inferential role of mental states about actual and non-actual objects. This 
difference is enough to claim that mental attitudes about fictions are different in kind from those 
about actual things. A mental state’s inferential role includes both its meaning and relation to other 
mental states. For example, on conceptual-role semantics, for a state to possess the content that it 
does is simply for it to play a certain role in cognition. A belief that X will play a role in bringing 
about further thoughts, beliefs, desires, etc. The belief is also caused by other mental states. 
Importantly, the difference between the inferential role of a stereotypical belief about an actual 
object, and a belief-like state about a fiction, may be a difference that makes a difference. We do 
not have stereotypical beliefs concerning fictions because our real-life and fictional beliefs play 
different types of inferential roles. They are caused by, and result in, different types of states and 
so possess different meanings. I will show that this conclusion is unfounded.  
To begin, one could argue that the difference in inferential role results from a difference in 
intentional content. If that is the case, then we have an explanation for why the real-life and 
fictional beliefs seem to play different inferential roles: they are beliefs about different things! 
Consider the following example. When you watch the film American Psycho, you witness Patrick 
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Bateman’s dalliances from one exorbitantly-priced dinner to another, examining and trading 
business cards, discussing the merits of Versace versus Gucci suits, and picking up prostitutes to 
torture and kill. You form certain beliefs about Patrick: “Patrick is a superficial maniac”; “Patrick 
is a product of our materialistic culture”; “Patrick is a moral monster.” These beliefs were caused 
by other beliefs, thoughts, emotions, etc. and in turn cause other beliefs, thoughts, and emotions. 
Now imagine that you encounter someone just like Patrick in your real life: a superficial, 
charming, handsome Wall Street exec that you discover has a secret passion for torture and murder. 
Your beliefs about this Wall Street exec play roughly the same inferential role as those in the 
fiction because they have roughly the same content. We believe that this Patrick is a superficial 
maniac, etc., and this causes further beliefs, thoughts, and judgments. However, no matter how 
similar this real Wall Street exec is to Patrick, he is not exactly the same. Specifically, our belief 
about the fictional Bateman has a fictional operator; we believe “that Patrick Bateman is a Wall 
Street exec [in the fictional world of American Psycho].”  This difference could make the 
difference in terms of the state’s inferential role: different mental content, different belief, different 
inferential role.  
 It could be argued that it’s possible for a fictional scenario to have the exact same content 
as a real-life one. The proponent of the DAV could argue that even if the content were exactly the 
same, our beliefs about fictions and a real-life counterpart would play distinct inferential roles. 
We can vary the American Psycho example slightly to highlight this point. The fictional 
story of Patrick Bateman is the same, but this time imagine that, unbeknownst to Bret Easton Ellis 
(the author of American Psycho) there is, in fact, a real Patrick Bateman who is exactly like the 
Patrick of the story. The proponent of the DAV would have to show that in this case our mental 
states still play distinct inferential roles, despite an exact similarity in content. But it is not clear 
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how one could make this argument. In this case, it is just an accident that the Patrick Bateman of 
the fiction is exactly the same as the Patrick Bateman of the actual world. A reader would still treat 
the fictional character as a fictional character because she does not know any different. Even if the 
reader finds out about the real Patrick, she may still have different types of mental states about 
them—namely, that the first one is Patrick of the story, and the other is Patrick of the actual world.    
In fact, I think that it is generally impossible for a fictional and real-life scenario produce 
the exact same mental content. If they did, it is not clear what would separate the fiction from the 
non-fiction—what would make the fiction fictional? Wouldn’t we just call American Psycho a 
non-fiction? Now, one could respond that it is just a coincidence that Ellis wrote a story that exactly 
imitates the life of a real person. That does not make his work any less a fiction (Borges’ “Pierre 
Menard, Author of the Quixote” comes to mind here). Moreover, we might speak of the Napoleon 
of Tolstoy’s War and Peace as if he is the actual Napoleon, for example, and so equating the two 
in our mind. But this is a mistake. Here we have a fictional portrayal of a (once) actual person, but 
differs in important ways from the actual Napoleon. Even in this case, as with the two Patrick’s, 
we are left with a difference in intentional content, the difference of being in a fictional story versus 
the actual world. This results in two different mental states. We do not need to bring in a distinct 
mental attitude to explain a difference in inferential role. 
There is a further response we can make against the DAV, one similar to my second claim 
concerning the functional role argument.  Just because the mental state has different behavioral or 
cognitive output does not mean that it is a distinct type of state or that there are distinct cognitive 
mechanisms involved in their processing. The distinct inferential role may be taken as evidence 
for the DAV, but it does not entail it. Regardless of the fictional/real-life mental attitude’s content, 
it will still play some inferential role. We can explain this role in the same way we would a belief 
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with actual content, in terms of the mental attitudes it causes. The resulting difference between the 
real-life and fictional intentional roles can be explained by the other beliefs, desires, thoughts, and 
emotions that brought it about. This will generally include the belief that a particular character or 
scenario is not real or only exists in the fictional world. This places the belief in a distinct role, but 
does not seem to require that we adopt a whole new cognitive mechanism. 
I conclude that the argument from inferential role does not entail the distinct attitude view. 
A difference in content likely explains the inferential differences in our mental attitudes towards 
fictions. Moreover, we do not need to posit a distinct cognitive attitude even if the content is 
exactly the same. 
 
 
4.3. The argument from neuroscience 
The functional and inferential role arguments are the most common justifications for the DAV. 
Some DAV proponents, however, also believe that research in cognitive neuroscience supports 
their view. Here I will briefly consider some of this research and how it has been utilized by various 
philosophers, in particular, Timothy Schroeder and Carl Matheson (2006). My response to their 
arguments is quite similar to my response to the previous two: there are multiple interpretations of 
the neuroscientific data, and these interpretations are either just as plausible as the distinct attitude 
interpretation, or more so.  
 First of all, we must clarify what the neuroscientific research is best suited to explain. It 
seems clear that much of the neuroscientific research on imagining concerns van Leeuwen’s third 
category, imagistic imagining. For example, Stephen Kosslyn argues that about two-thirds of the 
processes utilized in vision are also employed in visual imagery. The similarity arises because 
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mental imagery relies on previously organized and stored information; the difference arises 
because some of the low level processes involved in actual perception do not occur in imagistic 
“seeing,” “hearing,” etc. (Kosslyn 1997). Alvin Goldman (2006) argues that there is also evidence 
that we use many of the same processes when we imagine a face as when we actually see it 
(O’Craven and Kanwisher, 2000). The fusiform gyrus is activated in both cases; lesions to the 
fusiform face area impair both face recognition and the ability to imagine faces (Damasio et al. 
1990). Finally, Goldman argues that there are neural similarities in motor execution and motor 
imagination. Imagining a moving hand utilizes the same neural mechanisms that would normally 
be used when we actually move that hand (Parsons et al. 1998, Freedberg & Gallese 2006). 
 This research provides evidence for the similarities and differences between imagistic 
imagining and actual perception or movement. I doubt that anyone would deny that there is a 
difference between mental imagery and actual perception—and, furthermore, that at least some 
different cognitive and neural mechanisms are involved in each. But this is not the kind of 
imagining that is at stake in the distinct attitude debate. Rather, the significant question seems to 
be whether, in spite of their similarities to real-life situations, we need to posit a distinct mental 
state to explain our attitude and constructive imaginings about fictional content.  Again, based on 
the previous two arguments, it is unclear that we do.  
Nevertheless, Schroeder and Matheson build on the neuroscientific imagistic data in order 
to account of our emotional reactions towards fictions in a way that supports the DAV. Their 
arguments are similar to Goldman’s; research in cognitive neuroscience shows that we employ 
mental attitudes that are “akin to beliefs [etc.] in structure and in some of their effects, but 
distinguished from beliefs in others” (2006, 20). Their task is to clarify these similarities and 
differences.  
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To begin, the authors discuss how sensory and quasi-sensory representations are produced. 
The stimulation of the sensory organs produces neural signals that then produce patterns of activity 
in the brain known as unimodal sensory representations (ibid, 26). These unimodal representations 
are thought to come together to form multimodal representations that can be evoked through 
multiple sensory systems. Multimodal representations portray things like snakes, trees, and other 
objects in our environment that can be experienced by the use of more than one sensory modality. 
Our semantic memory contains dispositions to token representations of these objects. These are 
activated by sensory stimulation just as unimodal representations are (ibid, 26). 
 Importantly, multimodal representations are signaled to a number of different neural 
targets, including the orbitofrontal cortex, the affective division of the striatum and the amygdala 
(ibid, 26; see Rolls 2000, Mello & Villares 1997 and LeDoux 1996). Each of these areas is involved 
in producing affective responses and emotional feelings. The orbitofrontal cortex is largely 
involved in the “discrimination of rewarding and punishing stimuli, in order to influence feelings, 
visceral responses, and decision-making” (ibid, 27). The affective division of the striatum is 
involved in producing reward signals that affect emotional feelings. Finally, research by the 
neuroscientist Joseph LeDoux suggests that the amygdala is involved in basic emotional responses 
to stimuli, resulting in bodily reactions such as the increased heart rate, sweating, breathing, and 
facial expressions characteristic of fear and other emotions (ibid, 27; see also LeDoux 1996). 
 Schroeder and Matheson argue that not only are these affective areas stimulated in real- 
life situations, they are also activated in our imaginative activities, including engagements with 
fictions.  In fact, there are no distinct anatomical mechanisms involved in our emotional responses 
to actual or non-actual objects (ibid, 28). For instance, our uni-and-multimodal representations are 
activated when we perceive something scary in a film. This information is sent to the affective 
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regions of the brain just as if we encountered something frightening in our actual environment. 
The same applies to what the authors call “free-floating imaginative stimuli” not directly caused 
by external stimuli (ibid, 29). There is some neuroscientific evidence to support this claim (see 
Kosslyn et al, 1993). For example, research suggests that a monkey’s representational systems 
respond powerfully to puppet faces and even “extremely schematic two-dots-over-a-line-faces” 
(Schroeder & Matheson 2006). 
 The authors take this evidence as powerful support for the DAV. I agree that it certainly 
establishes the first half of their claim: our emotional responses to fictions are akin to those about 
actual objects. But they have not yet established the second, crucial part of their claim that our 
emotional responses to fictional and actual objects are inherently different kinds of states. What is 
their argument for the distinct attitude? It should look familiar. The authors argue that “although 
fictional and otherwise imaginary stimuli have many of the same effects as ‘real’ stimuli do, they 
obviously do not have all the same effects, or else people would leap onto stages in order to prevent 
murders, and so on” (ibid, 29). They continue: 
 
Perhaps, then, coming to have an imaginative faculty as a [distinct cognitive 
attitude] comes down to learning to treat representations that one creates oneself, 
or representations created by what one grasps to be fictions or the like, as not 
warranting the sorts of behavioral responses that they would were the 
representations created externally by non-imaginary events and objects: learning, 
that is, to give such representations a distinct functional role (ibid, 34). 
 
So rather than explain the necessity of a distinct cognitive attitude in terms of data from cognitive 
neuroscience, Schroeder and Matheson fall back on the same kind of functional differences we 
have already considered. This is essentially the same argument that we discussed above and it is 
subject to the same kind of critique. The functionalist argument does not entail the DAV. The 
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differences can be explained purely in terms of the intentional content of the mental state. 
Alternatively, we could be disposed or motivated to act towards fictions, but other judgments, 
beliefs, and regulatory processes prevent us from doing so.  
Interestingly, these explanations are compatible with a further point that Schroeder and 
Matheson make concerning the influence of background knowledge and dispositions on our 
responses to imaginative activity. It may be that these factors, including top-down judgments about 
the ontological status of fictions, keep our behaviors in check even if we are subpersonally and 
automatically primed or motivated to act or respond emotionally to them. This is consistent with 
the neuroscientific data the authors present. Engagements with fiction (and other non-actual 
objects) can generate actual emotional responses because they employ the same neural 
mechanisms as real-life situations do. It is also quite possible that the uni-and-multi-modal 
representations involved in emotional responses do not “pay attention,” as it were, to the existence 
of the thing that they represent before signaling the relevant brain areas. Recognizing that the 
object of our interaction is not real requires top-down judgments from different cognitive pathways 
(see Damasio 1994, Harris, 2000 & LeDoux, 1996). The emotion goes through. 
This section constitutes my preliminary remarks against the DAV, clearing the way for my 
own standard attitude view.  I will return to these arguments in the following chapters.  
  
 
5. Resisting the DAV 
 
The DAV could provide us with a unified explanation of our psychological interactions with 
fictions, accounting for all of the puzzles of fiction in terms of one general approach. Furthermore, 
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work on the imagination and simulation lends the view empirical credibility and a potential 
integration with broader psychological theories. 
I have already rejected the three main arguments in support of the DAV: arguments 
concerning the functional role, inferential role, and neural processing of our mental states 
(particularly beliefs) do not entail a distinct cognitive attitude. What I have not shown is why we 
should prefer a content-based, or standard attitude view, over a distinct attitude view. I will spend 
the next four chapters attempting to show why the SAV is preferable to the DAV. Here are several 
preliminary suggestions.  
First, one concern with the DAV is that many accounts build their theory on a flawed notion 
of the nature of the mental states in question (particularly emotions).  If we get things right on in 
terms of the ontology and psychology of mental states (or at least put forward the best view we 
can) then it is unlikely that a distinct attitude is warranted to begin with. 
The second critique is related to the first. Those who argue in favor of a distinct attitude 
rarely explain what, exactly, the distinct attitude amounts to.  As we’ve seen, theorists generally 
try to explain the distinctness of our imaginative attitudes in terms of functional role (behavioral 
outputs) or inferential role (mental outputs); our mental states towards fictions do not lead to the 
kinds of thoughts and behaviors that they would for real-life objects. This problematically assumes 
a straightforward functionalist view of mental states that, while attractive in terms of folk 
psychology, does not accurately capture the nature of how mental states motivate action or 
inferential processes. I will argue against this assumption in my dissertation. Doing so undermines 
the motivation behind the DAV to begin with; if mental states are not individuated in terms of 
functional role, then we may in fact have standard mental states towards fictions, despite the fact 
that we do not act towards fictional objects as we do towards real-life ones. 
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Third, one can argue from a principle of parsimony that there is no need to posit a distinct 
mental attitude if typical ones have the same explanatory power. I will attempt to show that we 
simply do not need to posit a DAV if we adopt an appropriate view of emotions and moral 
judgments, as well as suitable explanations for the puzzles of fiction.  
Finally, the DAV (especially one utilizing a theory of make-believe or simulation theory) 
does not seem to be able to account for our actual phenomenological—that is, conscious, possibly 
introspectible—experiences with fictions. Our emotions, beliefs, desires, and other mental states 
towards fictions feel natural and relatively automatic, not like we are playing a game of make-
believe, or simulating a possible course of action. In fact, our mental states about fictions often do 
not seem any different than those about actual things.  
The proponent of the DAV may dismiss the phenomenological worry by arguing that the 
game of make-believe or simulation takes place unconsciously and, after some practice, quite 
rapidly.  Some of the imaginings involved in a game of make-believe are often deliberate and 
consist in conscious, occurrent mental states. But others are spontaneous, unconscious, and 
automatic. We do not tell ourselves to begin imagining what is going to happen to our favorite 
television character. We simply do it, sometimes without realizing it. Walton says that when this 
happens our imaginings “have a life of our own” and we feel less like an author than a spectator 
to the imagining (Walton 1990, 14). I grant that this may be true for simulation (an issue I’ll return 
to in chapter 4). But it is hard to imagine that we engage in an unconscious game of make-believe—
how would the game work? What would the rules be, and how would it be initiated? Walton and 
other theorists of make-believe claim to have a theoretical answer these questions. What they do 
not seem to be able to explain is the phenomenology of our actual experiences.  
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6. The Standard Attitude View 
 
Based on my discussion so far, we can isolate four questions that an adequate moral psychology 
of fiction must address: 
 
1. Why do we often have asymmetrical psychological responses to analogous fictions 
and real life situations? Call this the asymmetry problem. 
2. What is the nature of our mental attitudes toward fictions, especially those involved in 
moral judgments? Call this the fictional attitudes problem. 
3. How, and to what extent, are we motivated to act in response to fictions, especially 
morally? Call this, as we have seen, the problem of fictional motivation. 
4. What psychological theory can adequately account for our actual phenomenological 
experiences toward fictions, particularly in terms of our moral judgments? Call this the 
experiential problem. 
 
The issues that I have raised against the DAV in the preceding sections should at least 
suggest that a different approach to a psychology of fiction is in order. I will argue for a standard 
attitude view (SAV), which, as the name suggests, holds that we form standard mental states 
concerning fictions. This implies that we can understand our mental states about fictions in much 
the same way we would any actual context—a simple enough claim, but one that has been strongly 
challenged by proponents of the DAV. Arguing for this position requires that I explore the alternate 
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interpretations to the functional, inferential, and neuroscientific data typically employed to support 
the DAV that I offered in the previous section. 
 It is a tall order for any theory to answer each of the above four questions. Nevertheless, 
in what follows I will argue that my SAV can explain them just as well or better than the competing 
DAV theories. Some of the different versions of the DAV and SAV may be able to address several 
of these questions, but I will show that only my view can adequately account for them all. 
 I will develop my own moral psychology from the “ground-up.” To begin, I will discuss 
one further potential worry against the SAV: the illusion theses, the idea that we are under either 
a cognitive or perceptual illusion while engaged with fictions. However, developing my moral 
psychology of fiction does not only require that I debunk the DAV. I must also develop a theory 
that can explain our actual moral experiences with fictions. In chapter 3, I introduce a key concept 
for doing so: the fictional stance.  I will then sketch a picture of my own theory of how we 
understand the mental states of fictional entities in chapter 4 in terms of a modified theory-theory 
for mindreading, while also critiquing other potential theories. In chapter 5, I will address the 
unique problems that emotions pose for a psychology of fiction. This will involve a discussion of 
the paradox of fiction, the nature of emotions, and the intelligibility of these responses. In so doing, 
I will develop my multi-level appraisal theory of emotions, which will serve as the backbone of 
my theory of moral judgments about fictions. I will take up that issue in Chapter 6 in which I argue 
for a sentimentalist, multi-level appraisal theory of moral judgments. I will also summarize my 
conclusions from the previous chapters and weaving together the various strands into my SAV. 
The remaining three chapters will each discuss a different puzzle of fiction: the puzzle of 
disparate response/sympathy for the devil phenomenon in chapter 7, the puzzle of imagination 
resistance in chapter 8, and the question of moral learning in chapter 9. I will also return to the 
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four questions from this section and show how I have resolved them with my SAV. 
 While my arguments predominantly apply to our interactions with fictions, they also carry 
over into other areas of philosophy and cognitive science. Indeed, our mental states towards 
fictions are often important counterexamples to general theories of emotions, perception, and 
mindreading. So it is important to take them into account when we develop our general 
psychological and philosophical theories. But there are three other ways in which the underlying 
question of this dissertation—the DAV versus the SAV—is philosophically significant. First, there 
is an independent question of whether we should explain aspects of human behavior in terms of 
the content of our mental states or in terms of new mental attitudes. If both content and attitude-
based views have a great deal of explanatory power, then how should we adjudicate between them? 
I take my work here to cast a mark in favor of the content-based approach. 
Second, individuating and defining mental states is a complicated and controversial area 
of philosophy of mind. Fictions provide us with interesting, complex, and challenging examples 
and counterexamples for theories of mental state individuation. Finally, this dissertation covers 
very broad range of philosophical topics, from the nature of perception and belief to moral learning 
and emotional rationality. Indeed, I will sketch several positive theories in the following chapters: 
the modified theory-theory, an appraisal theory of emotions and moral judgments, and a theory of 
emotional responsibility. Indeed, this dissertation is as much an exploration of the nature of our 
mental states as it is an examination of our experiences with fictions. 
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Chapter 2: The fictional illusion theses 
 
 
 
1. The “magic” of fiction 
 
This chapter focuses on a potentially perplexing aspect of our interactions with visual 
representations, and especially visual fictions (including film, paintings, pictures, even video 
games): it seems like, in some cases, that visual fictions can play tricks on us. We may “suspend 
our disbelief” while engaged with fictions so that we come to believe that fictional objects are real 
and events actually occur. 
 The notion of suspending disbelief was first introduced by the British Romantic poet 
Samuel Coleridge, who argued that we suspend our disbelief in the nonexistence of fictional 
objects during our engagement with fictional stories (Coleridge 1817). This supposedly explains 
our emotional responses to fictional entities; we emotionally respond to them because we believe 
that they actually exist!  
 While it’s certainly true that we sometimes become very absorbed in fictions, it is a genuine 
question whether we actually forget or are tricked into believing that fictional characters and events 
actually exist. For example, watching Christopher Nolan’s 2006 film The Prestige, we may come 
to believe that the two magicians—Robert Angier and Alfred Borden—are real people, that their 
magical rivalry actually occurred, and maybe even that their illusions are real. Generally speaking, 
we know that the objects in fictional film are nonexistent, just like we know that magician’s 
“magic” isn’t real. The question is whether we can we be tricked, perhaps momentarily, into 
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believing otherwise.  
Following Noël Carroll (Carroll 2008), let’s characterize this challenge as the illusion 
thesis: we fall prey to some kind of illusion during our engagements with fiction. So far, we have 
been discussing one type of illusion, concerning belief. Carroll characterizes two types of potential 
illusion: 
1) The Cognitive Illusion Thesis (CIT): one might come to believe that fictional events, 
characters actually occur or exist. This would mean that when I watch The Prestige, I 
come to believe that Angier and Borden are real and the events in the film actually take 
place. 
 
2) The Perceptual Illusion Thesis (PIT): we are committed to the existence of the 
represented fictional objects on a perceptual level. This implies that we perceive 
fictional entities like Angier in the same way that we do real-life objects and, further, 
that our perception is somehow implies the existence of the perceptual object. 
 
 
Different artistic media may commit us to one or both of these illusions. For example, 
reading a novel might subject one to a cognitive illusion, but not a perceptual illusion. Perceptual 
illusions generally apply to visual fictions, although we can imagine someone listening to an 
audiobook in her car falling prey to the perceptual illusion that the narrator is an actual person.  
Many philosophers reject both versions of the illusion thesis out of hand. Indeed, what is 
the motivation behind them? One potential argument in favor of the illusion thesis comes from our 
dispositions to act on the basis of our beliefs or perceptions of fictional objects. In chapter 1, I 
argued that we may be motivated to act while we are engaged with a work of fiction. However, 
many of our motivated behaviors will never come to fruition because of competing judgments 
concerning the fictional status of the work. This argument formed the basis of my attack against 
the DAV (distinct attitude view), in favor of the SAV (standard attitude view). Our beliefs about 
fictions are ordinary beliefs that play typical functional roles, even if those beliefs do not 
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necessarily lead to action.  
Interestingly, one could argue that any motivation to act in response to fictions, even if that 
motivation is entirely unconscious and never amounts to actual behavior, implies that we believe 
in the existence of the fictional object. This would suggest that my SAV position is committed to 
the CIT, and perhaps the PIT as well. Doesn’t any kind of emotional response imply that we believe 
in the existence of fictional entities, either on a perceptual or cognitive level? Of course, it’s worth 
pointing out the functionalist assumption behind such claims, as I noted in the last chapter. If we 
assume strong version of functionalism about mental states, such that beliefs and percepts can be 
individuated and identified primarily in terms of functional role, then our low level behavioral and 
emotional responses may suggest that we believe that a zombie (for example) is real, or that we 
perceive it as such.  
I want to resist the illusion theses, partly by resisting their functionalist assumption. I face 
the challenge of developing an alternative explanation for these subconscious motivations to act, 
an explanation that does not appeal to an illusory belief in the existence of fictional entities. 
Furthermore, one may be tempted to think that illusory attitudes do not count as standard beliefs, 
desires, and emotions, or that they are unstable grounds for further genuine attitudes about fictions. 
Such views could open the door to a pretense theory of fiction; a suspension of disbelief in the 
nonexistence of fictional entities could imply that the viewer is engaged in some kind of pretend 
play or game of make-believe; we pretend that fictional objects are real. This would be problematic 
for the SAV.  
I grant that we may be victims of some illusions while engaged with fictions. Most 
prominently, we might be under the illusion that objects actually move while we watch a film due 
to the speed of the projection (see Carroll 2008). We might also be under the illusion that a 
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particular actor has changed appearances (with makeup or prosthetics) or that we witness a magic 
trick (as in The Prestige). I do not deny that we are often “victims” of these kinds of illusions. 
Such illusions are commonplace, and generally easy to explain in terms of the material and 
construction of fictions. It is also possible that sometimes we are under more general illusions 
while engaging with fictions such that we perceive or believe that the fiction is real. Perhaps we 
encounter a performance of a play that takes place in the streets of our city and, being unfamiliar 
with the play, we do not realize that those are actors.1 This would be a genuine case of a cognitive 
illusion.  
In this chapter, I will argue that both the illusion theses are false if we think of them as 
general accounts of our experiences with fiction. It is not a part of our general experience with 
fictions that we believe or perceive fictional objects as existing. To make this argument, I will 
begin by drawing out further implications of the illusion theses and provide some preliminary 
remarks against them, beginning with the CIT. I will argue that we do not fall prey to the CIT, but 
that standard remarks made against the thesis are inadequate. In fact, there are three versions of 
the CIT; standard responses against the CIT can only account for two of them. The third version 
of the CIT is, I argue, actually a form of the PIT. This means that the CIT boils down to a question 
about perception and perceptual content. I will explore the PIT in §3 and §4. §5 addresses the 
possibility of the cognitive penetration of perception and how it may bear on the illusion theses. I 
will conclude by briefly presenting an alternative explanation of the behavioral and emotional 
responses that served as motivation for the illusion theses, and explanation that is compatible with 
the SAV. 
 
                                                          
1 Many thanks to John Greenwood for pressing me on this point. 
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2. The cognitive illusion thesis 
 
 Carroll presents and critiques both illusion thesis in his book, The Philosophy of Motion Pictures. 
He characterizes the CIT as follows: during the duration of a movie, the viewer believes that the 
objects she encounters are real, so she treats them as she would any real object. As we’ve seen, the 
CIT essentially constitutes a suspension of disbelief in the objects and events of the fiction 
(Coleridge 1817, Hurka 2001).  For example, a viewer suspends her disbelief in the nonexistence 
of the magician Angier while she watches The Prestige. Doing so allows her to recognize fictional 
objects as real things. This leads to some low level (subpersonal, automatic, non-deliberate) 
behavioral and emotional responses towards fictional entities. 
What is the nature of the belief implied by the CIT? This question is not typically addressed 
in the literature on this topic. The assumption is that we’re discussing inferential beliefs, which are 
traditionally ‘cognitive’ in nature; they result from inferential processes working together with 
current content, information about the world, and stored background knowledge (see Lyons 2005). 
This includes beliefs like “Moscow is the capitol of Russia.” Some beliefs, however, arise directly 
from perceptual capacities. We may believe that the sky is grey (for example) by merely perceiving 
a grey sky, without further inferential processing. These are perceptual beliefs. I will show that 
both types of belief maybe subject to the CIT. 
  The CIT could potentially explain a wide-range of our experiences with fictions, including 
how we recognize objects in fiction as well as our cognitive interactions with them (emotions, 
thoughts, desires, etc.). However, most philosophers seem to think that it would be patently absurd 
to accept the CIT, since it seems to entail that we would act towards a character in just the same 
way that we would act towards a real person. As Katherine Thomson-Jones points out: 
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I am able to appreciate the vivid depiction of an army of zombies surging forward with 
arms outstretched, the use of special effects or highly emotive music, the importance 
of the scene for the narrative, and so on. Surely, if I had suspended my belief that the 
zombies are fictional, I would be too frightened to appreciate film in this way (2008, p. 
107).   
 
The problem is that the majority of our behaviors towards fictions (or lack thereof) are inconsistent 
with the idea that we even temporarily suspend our disbelief about the reality of a fiction. We do 
not act as if we believe that the fiction is real. The same idea works for other mental attitudes, such 
as desires and emotions. Moreover, our conscious experience of watching a film is also antithetical 
to the cognitive illusion thesis. If asked, we would deny that fictional entities are real. We would 
also deny that we were tricked into believing otherwise. 
These remarks comprise the standard responses to the CIT: we do not act as if we believe 
that fictional objects are real and we do not have the conscious experience of believing that they 
exist. The standard response provides adequate evidence against the CIT much of the time, 
especially if we accept the functionalist idea that beliefs have certain functional and inferential 
roles that often lead to behavior; if the relevant behavior is missing, then the belief probably is too. 
However, there is a way to interpret the CIT that makes it much more of a challenge than 
writers typically acknowledge. In fact, I think that there are three ways to cash out the CIT:   
CIT#1). We have a conscious belief that the objects of fiction actually exist (spatio-
temporally). E.g. I have a conscious belief that Hamlet exists. 
 
CIT#2). We have an unconscious belief that the objects of fiction actually exist 
(spatio-temporally). E.g. I unconsciously believe that Hamlet exists. 
 
CIT#3). We have an unconscious perceptual belief that the objects of fiction 
actually exist (spatio-temporally). E.g. I have a perceptual belief that Hamlet exists. 
 
We now have to ask ourselves whether the standard responses to the CIT still work in light of this 
reinterpretation. Only CIT#1 entails that we consciously believe in the concrete existence of 
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fictional entities. A film viewer would actually believe, while watching a zombie film, that those 
very zombies are out there somewhere. Now, if this is true, then surely the standard responses 
would be correct—we would run screaming from the movie theater. We do not, so CIT#1 fails.  
The same basic argument applies to CIT#2. It is generally accepted that both conscious 
and unconscious beliefs can influence and motivate behavior (see Rosenthal 2008). Indeed, our 
motivations for action are often unconscious; we are not always consciously aware of what feature 
of our thoughts or environment causes us to speak or act. For example, consider what unconscious 
beliefs are in play when you choose an apple at the grocery store, type a paper on your laptop, or 
ride your bike to work. This implies that unconscious thoughts, judgments, and beliefs can cause 
behavior. If CIT#2 is right, then an unconscious belief in the existence of an object of fiction may 
often motivate behavior. For example, we may have an unconscious belief that the zombies on a 
screen are real, and so we may be motivated to run screaming from the theater. The fact that we 
do not run screaming from the theater suggests that we have neither a conscious nor unconscious 
belief in the existence of the zombies—if we grant the functionalist assumption. So CIT#2 also 
fails. 
 What about CIT#3? Do the standard responses count against it?  Unfortunately, they do 
not. CIT#3 rests on the idea that we can have perceptual beliefs that may contradict our consciously 
held inferential beliefs. So, for example, I may consciously (cognitively) disbelieve that Hamlet 
exists, while at the same time I have a perceptual belief that he does (see Quilty-Dunn, 
forthcoming, for a defense of CIT#3). I watch a zombie film and perceive the images on the screen 
as zombies. It could be that the processes involved in seeing the image and judging it to represent 
a zombie involves a belief that we are in the presence of an actual zombie. Perhaps recognizing an 
image of a certain object automatically commits us to a perceptual belief that we are in the presence 
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of that object. We have a perceptual belief that the zombie exists. Recall that perceptual beliefs 
are formulated directly from perceptual evidence and not from inferential cognitive processes. For 
example, I may directly formulate the belief that it is raining outside from looking out of my 
window; I do not need to draw any further inferences to believe this. 
 This means that our perception of the zombie-images causes us to have the perceptual 
belief in their existence. And perceptual beliefs may in turn motivate some actions and emotional 
responses. This interpretation of the CIT is compatible with my suggestion in chapter 1 that we 
may be primed, disposed, or motivated to act on the basis of fiction even if these actions do not 
result or manifest in actual behaviors. After all, if the functional role is fulfilled, aren’t we 
experiencing some kind of belief, one that motivates our low level responses towards the fictional 
entity? For instance, it could be that perceptual beliefs explain how one’s motor cortex primes for 
action while face to face with real people, but also when faced with paintings and statues of people 
(see Freedberg & Gallese 2007, Gallagher 2013; see Goldman 2006 for an overview). Perhaps we 
form an unconscious perceptual belief that the person in a painting or statue is real. This belief 
does not manifest in actual behavior (running from the theater) since it is blocked by other beliefs 
and judgments. But the illusion still occurs. 
I will explore an alternative explanation of the low level behavioral and emotional data in 
the last section. For now, it’s worth noting how we have reinterpreted the CIT. The standard 
responses worked against the notion of global cognitive illusion, but, at the same time, the CIT 
was clearly false. My reinterpretation of the illusion theses is more charitable towards pro-
illusionists and more philosophically and scientifically interesting. The CIT boils down to a 
question about perception, about whether we perceptually experience fictional entities as existing 
before us. I will now examine this claim. 
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3. The perceptual illusion thesis 
 
The PIT states that we have the perceptual experience of seeing real things while engaged with a 
visual fiction.  We perceive the material of which the fiction is constructed in a non-illusory way—
e.g., the image on our television or computer screen, or the paint on a canvas. We also perceptually 
recognize representations on a screen or canvas as being of particular objects: people, trees, 
animals, places, etc. The question is whether we perceive these objects in an illusory way. Carroll 
compares our visual experience of motion pictures to traditional perceptual illusions such as the 
Müller-Lyer illusion or perceiving a straw in a glass of water as bent when it is really straight 
(Carroll 2008). In each case, our visual system leads us to perceive something in the world as being 
some other way than it actually is. In the case of fiction, we would perceive the objects represented 
as real objects. 
There are two criteria required to get the PIT off the ground. First, our visual experience of 
the illusory object must be sufficiently similar to the object it represents. So, for example, our 
illusory perception of a person must be very similar to our perception of that person in the actual 
world. I do not think that the illusory experience must be perceptually indistinguishable from 
perceiving the analogous object. But they must be similar enough to trick our visual system into 
perceiving the illusory object as if it were the real thing. This may manifest in the behavioural 
motivations that we have discussed. Second, the PIT implies that the object’s reality is a part of 
our visual experience. That is, we see the object as existing. This follows from the CIT#3: our 
perceptual experiences cause us to be disposed to believe that the fictional object exists.  
  Many visual representations meet the first criterion for the PIT. Traditionally created 
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motion pictures create a physical record of actual objects. And many paintings, photographs, and 
drawings are remarkably life-like. But that does not necessarily mean that we perceive these 
objects as existing, as meeting the second criterion.  
Carroll rejects the PIT, arguing that it our visual experiences do not meet the first criterion.  
Our perception of movie screens and actual objects are not identical, or even sufficiently similar 
to the perceptual experience of real-life objects. There are surface interferences—scratches and 
dirt on a film strip, hair on the projector slide, the size and shape of the screen, etc.—which make 
the viewer aware of the screen and remind her that the objects in the movie are not really in front 
of her. Carroll also points out that we typically perceive edge phenomena; we can see around the 
edge of an object as we move. We do not experience edge phenomena in our visual perception of 
film. We cannot look around a character to see what is going on behind her. We can give the same 
sort of explanation for other fictional media. We do not perceive plays in the same way that we do 
real-life people and events, because of the stage and other spatial and physical discrepancies 
between them. Pictures are always framed and are not subject to edge phenomena, just like films.2 
Even listening to an audiobook will probably not sound identical to listening to real people give 
an account of their lives. Each of these aspects of our experience of fiction block the first criterion 
of the perceptual illusion thesis.  
Carroll thus rejects the perceptual illusion thesis and argues for a recognition prompt thesis 
to explain how we come to recognize objects in a motion picture.  He claims that “humans acquire 
the capacity to recognize pictures, including moving pictures, naturally, rather than conventionally, 
at the same time that they acquire the capacity to recognize the objects that pictures represent” 
                                                          
2 See Derrida 1987 and Foucault 1970 for interesting discussions of the relevance of frames and 
framing for how we experience paintings. 
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(ibid, 109). This means that we can recognize representations of real things in a motion picture; 
motion picture shots are “natural recognition prompts” (ibid, 110). We recognize the airplane in a 
picture of an airplane; we recognize Abe Lincoln in his portrait. We may also recognize unreal 
entities like vampires, not because vampires exist in our world, but because we are familiar with 
the concept of a vampire and, probably, have seen pictures of vampires before. Importantly, the 
prompt allows us to recognize the object that it represents but does not force us to perceive the 
fictional representation as existing. This means that our general experience of fictions may fail to 
meet the two criteria for the perceptual illusion thesis.  
 I am sympathetic to Carroll’s recognition prompt thesis.  Indeed, I think that something 
like this theory can explain how we perceive objects on a movie screen or in a picture. It can also 
explain the basis of our emotional and moral responses to fictional entities. I will return to this 
point in the following chapters. For now, though, I want to point out a potential problem for this 
proposal. Perhaps in most cases (maybe even all cases) there is enough similarity between a 
represented object and its real-life counterpart for us to recognize the representation as a 
representation. In most cases there are also sufficient visual differences between our perceptual 
experiences of the fictional and real-life objects, so that we do not perceptually confuse the two 
(barring some trompe l’oeil paintings).  But there are two points worth making here. First, it is at 
least conceptually possible that a film could be in every way visually identical to a real-life 
experience. Suppose, for instance, that sometime in the near future we will be able to enter into 
virtual realities that are perceptually indiscernible from the actual, physical world. If this is true, 
then our perceptual experience meets the two criteria for a perceptual illusion. 
 Carroll takes pains to point out that his recognition prompt thesis concerns our everyday 
experiences with actual films—not a possible virtual reality like the one I just mentioned. 
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Nevertheless, I think that the virtual reality example highlights something missing in his critique 
of the illusion thesis, something that must be accounted for if we are to fully reject it. My second 
point is that the very recognition of fiction objects is a kind of low level sensory illusion. One 
could argue that, in terms of basic sensory information, our perception of visual fiction is 
sufficiently similar to those of real-life objects in order to motivate action. This would imply a 
perceptual illusion at very early stages of visual processing even if later judgments concerning the 
reality of the perceptual object block any kind of behavioral or cognitive reactions to the fictional 
object in terms of an actual thing. Neither Carroll’s critique of the PIT nor the recognition prompt 
thesis can adequately explain this.  
 
  
 
4. The perceptual dilemma 
 
Imagine that you are standing along the wall of a narrow, rectangular bedroom. What do you see? 
The walls are a pale blue, the only window a light mint green. Several portraits line the wall next 
to the door. A landscape painting teeters over a large, wood-framed bed covered by a bright red 
blanket. Chairs, towels, and dressing tables scatter the little remaining space. Now imagine that 
you are at the Van Gogh Museum in Amsterdam. Standing in front of the painting Bedroom in 
Arles (1888), you encounter the same scene—only smaller, of course, and in the style of the Post-
Impressionist painter. Once again, you perceive a rather awkward arrangement of furniture and 
wall-coverings.  
 What’s the difference between our perception of these two scenes which, let’s imagine, are 
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identical in terms of the objects, colors, proportions, etc.? The van Gogh painting will never trick 
a viewer into thinking that it really is the bedroom, due to both its size and style. Stylistic 
differences will act like motion pictures’ edge phenomena, keeping us from seeing the painting as 
a real scene.  But imagine that someone took a color photo of van Gogh’s bedroom in Arles and 
made the print large enough to match the size of the actual room. What then? The main difference, 
of course, is on the one hand we perceive a representation of a bedroom, while on the other we see 
the bedroom itself. Surely we would not be tricked into thinking that we actually see the painter’s 
bedroom. The context is all wrong, the light in the scene will never change, we can’t move in that 
space, etc.  
 We do not see an actual bedroom in front of us. Yet it doesn’t seem strange or out of place 
to say that we nevertheless see a chair, bed and landscape in the painting (see Lopes 2005).  What 
do we see when we visually perceive a painting, film, cartoon? Indeed, what sorts of things do we 
actually perceive, in general? An investigation of this question will help us to make sense of the 
illusion thesis and determine whether it is plausible that we perceive visual fictional objects as real 
objects.  
There are two questions worth addressing here. First, we want to know what kinds of 
objects and properties we perceive—in other words, what kind of properties we visually represent.3 
According to many theories of perception, we only perceive very basic kinds of properties, such 
as shapes, colors, depth, motion, location, and illumination (e.g. Clark 2000, Brogaard 2013, 
                                                          
3 I assume that some version of representationalism is correct (see Byrne 2001, Harman 1990, Tye 
1995, amongst others). An interesting extension of my argument here would be to examine how 
the illusion thesis bears on disjunctivist theories of perception (see Fish 2009, Martin 2004, 
McDowell 1982, etc.). 
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Dretske 1995,Tye 1995; see Siegel 2010 for an overview).4 It’s another question whether we 
actually perceive depth or illumination in a two-dimensional screen or painting as opposed to 
colors that merely suggest depth or illumination. So the contents of our perception of the van Gogh 
painting, then, only include the blueness of the walls, the greenness of the window, redness of the 
blanket etc. On this view, we do not perceive objects, but rather just the surface of objects (Clark 
2000). Low level properties result from retinal stimulation; all other visual properties, including 
objects or object types, are the result of later cognitive processing—thoughts or judgments—of 
this basic sensory information (O’Shaughnessy 2000).  
Other theorists hold that we perceive properties beyond color, shape, etc. (e.g. Bayne 2009, 
Peacocke 1992, Siewert 1998, Siegel 2006). On this view, we can perceive natural and/or artificial 
kind properties (animal, dog, or chair), causal properties (that A causes B), emotional properties 
(being happy or angry), and semantic properties (hearing a word’s meaning). For example, Siegel 
argues that there are cases in which a knowledgeable subject encounters a visual stimulus of a pine 
tree and she sees not only an array of shapes and colors at particular locations, but also a pine tree. 
This may suggest that our background knowledge, beliefs, and abilities can influence our 
perceptual experience (Siegel 2006). As we will see, the high and low level theories of perceptual 
content will have different implications for the illusion thesis, but neither implies that the object 
of our perception exists. That is, we do not perceive things as existing or not existing. 
The second question concerns whether or not there is a difference between our capacity to 
perceive actual objects and representations of objects.  We literally see the paint that van Gogh 
used to create Bedroom in Arles. But do we also see a bed? There is a vast literature on the 
                                                          
4 Although it is debated whether causal properties and objecthood are perceptually low or high 
level. 
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transparency of photographs which states that, due to the mechanistic nature of the production of 
photographs, we literally see the objects represented in a photograph (Lopes 2003 & Walton 1984; 
see Currie 1990 & Carroll 2008 for critiques of the transparency thesis). Photographic transparency 
may also carry over to the transparency of film and digital media, so that we literally see the objects 
being filmed/recorded. Of course, paintings and cartoons are not transparent even if photographs 
and film are, so some other account is required to explain how we see objects in them. 
Alternatively, it may just be a natural fact of our perceptual system that we see represented shapes 
as objects, as Carroll’s recognition prompt thesis holds (see also Lopes 2005 & Wollheim 1980). 
A painting or film does not need to be transparent in order for us to recognize objects as being 
represented.  
 I will return to this question in the following chapter but, for now, I will remain largely 
silent on it. I do not think that the recognition of a represented object requires that the 
representation be transparent (so that we really do see through the representation to the object 
itself; see Walton 1984). It is enough to show that we can recognize the representation of an object 
on a screen or canvas. The question is whether our recognition of objects amounts to a perceptual 
illusion. I think that answering this question depends on how we respond to the first: which kinds 
of properties are represented in perception? I argue that both the high and low level positions pose 
serious problems for the illusion theorist. Let’s begin with the idea that we perceive high level 
properties. 
 
 
Option 1: we perceive higher-level properties 
First point, what kinds of high level properties must we perceive in order for the illusion thesis to 
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be true? Remember that the perceptual illusion thesis claims that we are “tricked” into perceiving 
the visual objects of fiction as actual objects. It is not enough that we recognize fictional objects 
as objects. We also need to perceive them as actual, existing things—that they are perceptually 
present to us (see Dokic 2012, Noë 2006, Siegel 2010). 
Here’s an example. Imagine that you are walking down the street and you see a neighbor 
walking her collie puppy. On the current view, you perceive the puppy as belonging to a particular 
kind: “animal,” “dog,” and maybe even “collie,” besides also seeing the object’s shape, size, 
motion, color, etc. Similarly, when you are watching an old Lassie rerun, you may perceive the 
dog as an “animal,” “dog,” or “collie” due to visual recognitional cues, along with other low level 
properties.  Importantly, in both the real-life and fictional cases, we perceive the dog as a dog. The 
question is whether the fact that you perceive an object at all implies that you see it as an actual, 
existing thing. This would require that we perceive the neighbor’s collie as possessing a property 
of existing—or, similarly, that we are in its presence. The PIT further requires that we also perceive 
Lassie as existing, even while we know that she doesn’t. 
Do we have the perceptual experience of objects as a) existing or b) present to us?  Let’s 
consider the first possibility. There are ways to understand this. First, it could be that our default 
position is to perceive all objects as existing, as possessing the property of existence. This means 
that we perceive represented objects in paintings, films images, etc. as existing by default and we 
form a perceptual belief in the existence of the object. Thus, we would be under both a perceptual 
illusion and a cognitive illusion. Of course, other judgments, beliefs, and knowledge about the 
fictional status of the object may undermine this. We may discard or override the perceptual belief 
so that we never come to believe that the fictional entity is real. These other judgments, etc. could 
prevent our actually behaving as if the object exists, but not necessarily our early stages of 
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behavioral motivation or priming. 
One issue with this interpretation is that it makes the perceptual illusion thesis trivially true. 
We perceive representations of objects as existing, but that’s because we perceive everything as 
actually existing. We would never perceive fictional things as “being fictional” because we 
perceive everything as actually existing. The question is whether our perceptual abilities are 
actually equipped to perceive things as existing, as possessing the property of existence. Note that 
even philosophers of perception who do argue in favor of high level perceptual properties (such as 
Susanna Siegel) do not claim that we perceive complex properties like “existing.” Indeed, the most 
these philosophers claim is that we can perceive kind properties. If so, then we do not, strictly 
speaking, perceive objects as existing or not existing; we judge them to be so. 
The second possibility complements this last claim.  We do not perceive an object 
possessing properties like “existing” or “nonexistent.” Attributing those properties to an object 
must be the result of cognitive processing, not perceptual processing. On both interpretations, the 
perceptual system does not distinguish between fictional and non-fictional objects. The difference 
is that, on the former view, we default by perceiving the object as actually existing. On the latter, 
we default by suspending judgment as to the ontological status of the object, because existence is 
not the kind of property that we can perceive without cognitive mediation. In both cases, we may 
be motivated to act based on our perception due to direct behavior links that do not require 
cognitive processing, such as a cognitive belief.  
The difference between these two positions is subtle, but quite important. On the second 
position, cognitive processing is required to interpret the object as non-existent, as a representation 
on a canvas or screen. Perception alone cannot indicate that something is non-actual.  
The “no distinction in perception” position implies that the PIT fails, at least on the reading 
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that we perceive that fictional objects exist. It’s possible, however, that we perceive fictional 
objects as “in our presence”—as in front of us spatially, just as we would real things. This seems 
unlikely. On most accounts of perceptual presence, we are perceptually present with an object if 
that object is in our egocentric space (Dokic 2012, Noë 2006 and Siegel 2010; see also Evans 1982 
on direct reference). This means that we are disposed to act in certain ways towards the object, and 
such actions will affect how we perceive it. For example, a tomato is perceptually present to us if 
we can orient our body in relation to it. This isn’t the case for visually represented objects; as 
Carroll notes, represented objects lack edge phenomena and other egocentric perceptual capacities.  
I conclude that we do not perceive fictional objects as existing; our visual experience of 
fictions does not meet the second criterion of the perceptual illusion thesis. And if we do not 
perceive fictional objects as existing, then we will not be disposed to cognitively believe that they 
exist either. That means that CIT#3 fails as well.  
  
Option 2: we only perceive low level properties 
Perhaps the question of whether we can perceive objects as existing is a moot point. After all, 
many philosophers of perception argue that we only perceive low level properties (color, shape, 
location, illumination, motion, depth, etc.), not high level ones and certainly not properties like 
“existing.”  This means that thoughts and judgments that allow us to process perceptual 
information as objects of particular kinds (Stokes 2014).  
Let’s illustrate this in terms of the Lassie example. When I’m walking down the street and 
I see my neighbor’s collie, all that I actually perceive is a particular color, shape, size, motion, and 
location in my visual field. Later cognitive processing puts this information together and informs 
my experience of it; now I see that this thing is a dog that is walking towards me and, if I’m a dog-
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sophisticate, that this particular dog is a collie. But properties like “dog,” “collie,” and even 
“object” may not feature into my basic perceptual experience. Now consider my perception of 
Lassie on TV. Here, too, I perceive an image in front of me that transmits information like color, 
shape, motion, and location. I do not represent the properties of dog, collie, or Lassie until more 
cognitive processing has taken place. 
So where is the perceptual illusion? On this position, there is none! We do not perceive 
objects, real or unreal. We only judge, in some way, that we see an object. In other words, our 
perception in this cases passes the first criterion for the perceptual illusion, but fails to meet the 
second. It is very likely that our perception will be informed by other cognitive beliefs and concepts 
that indicate that this thing we see on the television screen is a fictional entity. An exception to this 
would be if we are completely ignorant of whether the image we see is real or not, as in a perfectly 
indiscriminable virtual reality. I am willing to grant that this would be a perceptual illusion. 
 
 
5. Cognitive penetrability & the illusion thesis 
 
It is possible that the perception of high level properties is mediated by top-down beliefs and 
judgments—specifically, knowledge about the fictional status of the object we perceive. If so, then 
it may also be possible that our beliefs about the nature and properties of an object may shape how 
we perceive it. On this view, we might actually perceive objects as existing or not existing because 
of a cognitive mediation from beliefs and judgments about the ontological status of the object. One 
basis for the cognitive judgment that a fictional object is nonexistent stems from the visual 
discrepancies between visual representations and real-life objects that we discussed above: two-
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dimensionality, screen/canvas/photographic obstructions, etc. These differences cause us to judge 
that the object we perceive does not actually exist. That judgment, in turn, shapes how we perceive 
what is represented on the screen, in the sense that our experience is not sufficiently similar to 
perceiving a real-life object (criterion 1) and that we do not see the object as existing (criterion 2). 
This would mean that our perception of a visual representation is cognitively penetrable; 
our thoughts, beliefs, and knowledge about an object may influence how we actually perceive it. 
This is an interesting, though controversial, possibility. If true, it may be possible that we perceive 
fictional things differently than we perceive real things. Combined with Carroll’s points 
concerning the visual differences between visual fictions and real objects, the possibility of 
perceiving fictional entities as real objects never arises in our everyday experiences.  
The cognitive penetrability thesis holds that our knowledge, beliefs, and thoughts about an 
object can influence how we perceive it. I address this issue separately since cognitive penetrability 
can apply to either high or low level perceptual properties. Importantly, if cognitive penetration of 
perceptual experience actually occurs, then our beliefs and thoughts about the status of the fictional 
object might help us to literally see the object as not actual. I will not argue for or against the 
cognitive penetrability of perception. My goal here is to simply explore its implications for our 
perception of visual representations.  
Carroll’s account of the perceptual illusion theory implies that perception is cognitively 
impenetrable.5 This means that, no matter what we believe or know about an object or illusion, our 
perception of it will remain the same. The dog expert and novice will have the same visual 
experience of the collie. In contrast, Siegel states that:  
 
                                                          
5 Carroll borrows this notion from Zenon Pylyshyn’s arguments on cognitive impenetrability 
(Pylyshyn 1999). See also Jerry Fodor’s modularity thesis (1983). 
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if visual experience is cognitively penetrable, then it is nomonologically possible 
for two subjects (or for one subject in difference counterfactual circumstances, or 
at a different time) to have visual experiences with different contents while seeing 
and attending to the same distal stimuli under the same external conditions, as a 
result of differences in other (including affective) states (Siegel 2012, 4). 
 
 Dustin Stokes (2014) argues that cognitive penetrability has interesting implications for 
our evaluation of artworks. Someone who possesses a great deal of knowledge about an artwork 
(its artist, historical context, genre, etc.) will perceive the work differently than someone who lacks 
that knowledge. Information-rich perceptions of an artwork help us to evaluate it; the informed 
viewer may be capable of making more appropriate aesthetic evaluations than the novice.  
I am neutral on Stokes evaluative claim. I am more interested in the case he makes for how 
cognitive penetrability impacts our perception of both and high and low level properties. 
Perceptible high level aesthetic properties include the “standard aesthetic properties of being 
graceful, serene, vivid, or delicate (ibid, 15). The expert’s internalized knowledge of a work’s 
category, historical context, and artist, will affect her overall perceptual experience so that she 
perceives it in terms of these aesthetic properties, as well as others. She will perceive Picasso’s 
Guernica not just as a painting with certain colors and shapes, but also as violent, disturbing, or 
sorrowful.  Stokes suggests that it is also possible for the expert to perceive additional high level 
properties that pertain to the work’s category: “One may just see the impressionism or just hear 
the Brahmsianism in a work” (ibid 16). In both cases, the expert’s knowledge of the work 
influences her perception of it. 
Stokes makes a similar argument concerning the cognitive penetration of low level 
perceptual properties (for those skeptical of high level property perception). What we know about 
an object may change how we perceive its color, shape, or size. For example, we associate certain 
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objects with stereotypical colors (a blue Smurf, a red Coca-Cola icon, a yellow banana).6  We 
expect to see these objects as being a certain color, so when we are put in a situation in which we 
have to experimentally match these objects with a color, we tend to identify it with the expected 
color. This occurs even when this particular object actually possesses a unique color-property, like 
a pink Smurf instead of the standard blue (Siegel 2011). Stokes (and others) takes this as evidence 
for cognitive penetrability effecting our perception of low level properties; our belief that a Smurf 
is typically blue shapes how we see Smurfs. We will expect them to be blue and perhaps even 
perceive them as blue when they are not. 
 The same basic principle can apply to artworks. It could be that an expert perceives the 
organization of low level properties differently than the novice—it’s not that they see a different 
color, but rather that the expert sees how those properties are organized while the novice does not 
(Stokes 2014, 21). For example, the expert will see the relation between the lines and colored 
rectangles of a Mondrian Composition piece differently than a novice will. The expert sees the 
same colors and shapes as the novice, but also the “lack of negative space and the dominance of 
colored rectangles,” because the expert is familiar with Mondrian’s oeuvre and the novice isn’t 
(ibid, 21). Stokes also suggests that it is possible that the actual low level properties themselves 
might be differently perceived by the expert and the novice. We learn to associate certain colors 
with certain paintings (bright red for Matisse, blues and grays for Picasso’s blue period, pinks and 
creams for his rose period, black and white for Motherwell, etc.). These learned associations may 
influence how we expect to see a work, just like the blue Smurf. In Stokes’ example, a Rothko 
expert who is familiar with the painter’s monochromatic multiforms, such as the all-black 
paintings in The Rothko Chapel, will likely perceive subtle variations in each painting—unusual 
                                                          
6 See Witzel et al 2011 for the empirical study. See Deroy 2013 for a discussion of these studies. 
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patterns in the all black canvas, for example—whereas the novice will not, even though they are 
both looking at the exact same painting that has the exact same properties.7 
The cognitive penetrability of perceptual experience may motivate the idea that knowledge 
that the object of our perception is a nonexistent object, rather than an actual one, may influence 
how we perceive it—both in terms of what low level properties we notice, expect, and perceive as 
well as how we categorize the image. For example, an expert may notice aspects of van Gogh’s 
Bedroom in Arles that make her perceive the image as being impressionistic, highlighting the 
visual discrepancy between the representation of the objects in the painting and how they would 
appear in real life. Someone who is competent at watching film fictions may note that the use of 
sound and shade in a film-noir are overly dramatic, much more so than they would be in real life. 
Does this mean that we perceive the property of “being fictional”? I do not think so. It does 
mean, however, that our perception of fictional entities will be slightly different than our 
perception of actual entities, because of the properties that we are inclined to notice. Experts may 
have the capacity to perceive both high level properties of a fictional object and low level 
properties in a different way due to their knowledge of the fictional status of the object. This 
suggests that the illusion would not obtain in such cases, if the cognitive penetration of perception 
is possible. The expert may not perceive fictional entities as actual ones. The differences between 
perceiving an object as fictional or actual may be subtle (and maybe unconscious), but they will 
nevertheless be there. Our background knowledge that the object we perceive is fictional may 
shape how we perceive it. If that’s true, then we may not fall prey to a perceptual illusion. Our 
                                                          
7 It’s important to distinguish a genuine case of cognitive penetration from that of perceptual 
learning, according to which one can learn to recognize particular properties and objects. In a case 
of cognitive penetration, the subject directly perceives a property in a different way due to her 
knowledge of a particular object—so, for instance, she sees the Matisse painting as redder than 
she would if she did not know about Matisse’s work and associate it with the color red. 
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knowledge that an object is fictional will make us perceive that object differently than we would 
if we were actually in its presence.  
 
 
 
6. Resisting the illusion thesis 
 
Let’s return to the three versions of the cognitive illusion thesis that we encountered in §2. They 
state: 
 
CIT#1). We have a conscious, occurrent belief that the objects of fiction actually 
exist. 
CIT#2). We have an unconscious belief that the objects of fiction actually exist. 
 CIT#3). We have a perceptual belief in the existence of fictional objects. 
 
I have argued that the standard functionalist/phenomenological responses to the CIT provide 
sufficient evidence to block CIT #1 and CIT#2. We generally lack both conscious and unconscious 
beliefs in the existence of fictional objects. If we did, we would likely act in different ways towards 
fictions than we actually do.  
However, the behavioral evidence left open the possibility that we have an perceptual belief 
in the existence of fictional objects. This could mean that we are, in fact, motivated to act based 
on our belief in the existence or presence of a fictional entity. CIT#3 rests on the further claim that 
we perceive fictional entities as existing—in other words, that we fall prey to a perceptual illusion 
concerning the actuality of a fictional entity. I have argued that the PIT is largely a question 
concerning the types of content that we can perceive: high level or low level properties. But neither 
view suggests that we can perceive objects as existing or not. Finally, research concerning the 
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cognitive penetrability of perception, if possible, may also support my rejection of the perceptual 
illusion thesis. It is possible that our thoughts and beliefs concerning the existence of fictional 
entities actually effect how we perceive them, as fictional. 
I will now briefly sketch my alternative explanation of the low level behavioral and 
emotional data, based on what I called the “no distinction in perception” view in §4. On my view, 
perception itself is silent concerning the actuality of an object; it only allows us to recognize 
objects. This means that there really is no perceptual illusion thesis; if there is an illusion, it comes 
in at the cognitive level of belief. It is more likely that our perception of fictional entities is neutral 
concerning the objects’ existence and that later judgments (or top-down beliefs and thoughts) later 
come into play to determine their existence. Generally speaking, these judgments will determine 
that the fictional entity is, in fact, fictional. 
This view further implies that unconscious, automatic dispositions to act are not actually 
based on beliefs, but rather stem straightforwardly from perceptual processes. We may perceive 
the fictional entity as being a certain type of object, but we do not form a perceptual belief that the 
object is real, that it actually exists. Basic perceptual processes (combined, perhaps, with some 
associative processing or inferences from stored concepts, as well as cognitive judgments) allow 
us to recognize objects in visual fictions. Perceiving something as a being particular object may 
prime certain actions—that is, there may be a direct link between the perceptual processes involved 
in object recognition to action priming. For example, I will behaviorally respond to a coiled up 
piece of rope if I recognize that object as being snake-like. This does not entail that I perceptually 
believe that I am in the presence of a snake. The perceptual system does not distinguish between 
existing and non-existing objects on this view, but rather will respond to both similarly; I will 
defensively react to both the coiled up rope and a snake. Later, cognitively meditated judgments 
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may prevent some primed actions from arising. I may step around the coiled object rather than flee 
once I realize that there is no snake in front of me. 
I think that this position can make sense of our behavioral and psychological responses 
towards fiction. Perhaps the reason why we fear fictional monsters, snarling dogs, and serial killers 
is because we perceive them in much the same way that we would the real thing—not as 
perceptually identical to the object, but as possessing enough recognitional cues for us to visually 
recognize it. Some quick, automatic behavioral responses to these objects are the direct result of 
our perception, before later judgments kick in to influence them. This could mean that we have 
automatic affective responses to a fictional entity before we have another belief (conscious or 
unconscious) to the effect that the entity is not real. We would be primed to respond to fictional 
entities, at least until later cognitive processing kicks in to halt those behaviors. On the other hand, 
slower, more complex actions—like getting up from one’s seat and leaving the theater—would be 
blocked by the judgment that an object is fictional.  
 As a result, we also do not form a perceptual belief that what we perceive in a fiction is 
real, because we do not perceive it as such. But what about our low level behavioral priming? One 
way to interpret this data suggests that we are primed for action when we perceive a character’s 
movement in a painting or on a screen even though we consciously know that the character is not 
real. It could be that these areas of the brain—the so-called mirror neurons in motor cortex—are 
not influenced by top-down knowledge, unlike visual perceptual areas. Thus we will often be 
primed to act even when we do not believe that the objects we perceive are real things with which 
we can interact. Again, this means that action priming may arise directly from our perceptual 
experience. It’s likely that we automatically react to certain value-laden objects in our environment 
even before we make any judgment concerning that object’s existence. This would be a good 
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survival strategy. Behavioral priming results from purely brute, causal recognitional cues; anything 
remotely resembling a person or animal (for example) may prime us for action in one way or 
another.  
 I resist calling this a cognitive illusion; belief does not seem to play a role in the 
perceptual/recognitional capacities that prime us for action. This seems to be the case for our 
affective reactions which may lead to behavior even without this neural representation reaching 
cortical areas of the brain that mediate beliefs (see LeDoux 1996 & 2012; Damasio 1994 for just 
some evidence of this). This basic framework may also apply for non-emotional perceptual 
processes as well. Of course, one might say that these low level responses are irrational even if 
they are not illusory, because they contradict what we consciously know and endorse about the 
world. Better yet, they are arational because they are not shaped by cognition. We will be primed 
to respond to certain objects whether we believe that these things are real or not. Generally we do 
not believe that fictional entities are real. As I suggested above, our beliefs coincide with our actual 
behaviors, or, as the case may be, how we do not behave. If we do not act as if a fictional character 
is real, then we probably do not believe that it is.  
 
I have spent some time reviewing and arguing against the illusion theses in order to thwart 
a potential worry for the SAV. One could argue that illusory perceptions or beliefs are sufficiently 
different from non-illusory ones to constitute a different type of mental state. I have attempted to 
show that this worry is unfounded. Even if the illusion thesis is true, it does not entail that the 
distinct attitude view is correct. We perceive fictional objects in the same way—by the same 
mechanisms and in terms of the same broad types of mental states—as we do actual things. We do 
not need to posit a distinct cognitive attitude to explain our perceptual experiences of fictions. 
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Chapter 3: Taking the Fictional Stance 
 
 
1. Two foundational questions of fiction 
 
Imagine watching a local performance of Much Ado About Nothing. You see actors playing 
Benedict, Beatrice, Claudio, and Hero, the scaffolding representing an Italian villa, and papier-
mâché rocks and trees portraying the country landscape. Whether in a bustling theater or lounging 
on a park lawn, what we see on a stage is nothing more than this: scaffolding, papier-mâché, fake 
wooden tables and chairs, and actors. But it also seems like we “see” something more than the 
mere stuff on a stage: the fictional world of the play.  
There is a sense in which the second type of seeing is perceptual; I see Benedict and 
Beatrice. How is this possible, if physically, there are only actors on the stage, and not fictional 
entities? I contend that “fictional seeing” of this sort involves a kind of transformation. Of course, 
we cannot physically transform a papier-mâché tree into a fictional one. The transformation must 
occur mentally. There is much debate concerning the type of mental activity is involved in an 
audience’s capacity to see physical materials as the fictional entities they represent. It requires the 
capacity for object recognition: we recognize the objects on a stage, screen, or painting as people, 
tables, trees, etc. But the capacity to see things as objects is not enough for us to see the actors on 
a stage as the fictional entities, Benedict and Beatrice. For what we seem to see does not actually, 
currently exist. How is this transformation possible? Call this the question of fictional 
transformation.  
Another issue arises here. We generally know that the object of our engagement isn’t real. 
How, then, do we take the objects of fiction as the types of things that we can respond to and 
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judge—emotionally, morally, and otherwise? In other words, why is it that we have mental 
attitudes towards the objects we encounter in fiction? Call this the question of fictional response. 
 Together, these two questions capture the foundational characteristics of our psychological 
interactions with fiction: how we understand objects as fictional objects, and why we respond to 
them as we do. Ideally, we can develop answers to both the question of fictional transformation 
and the question of fictional response with one theoretical framework, as other philosophers have 
attempted (see, for instance, Currie 1990 and Walton 1990). My goal in this chapter is to do just 
that.  
Let’s begin by considering several possible answers to the two questions. We encountered 
these positions in chapter 1; I will discuss them in more detail here.  First, it may be that we pretend 
that the objects we perceive onstage are fictional characters, places, and things (see Searle 1975 & 
Kripke 2013). Our mental states about fictional entities are pretend mental states; we pretend to 
believe that Benedict secretly loves Beatrice, but we do not actually believe this. Likewise, we 
pretend that we see Benedict and Beatrice, but we know that we don’t actually do so. Second, we 
may just imagine that we see fictional objects before us; we imagine that something is the case 
when, in fact, it is not (see Weinberg & Meskin 2006; see Van Leeuwen 2013 for more on different 
types of imagining). Finally, theories of make-believe involve the application of both pretense and 
imagining. According to these theories, we make-believe that the objects on stage are actual in a 
fictional world (see Currie 1990 & Walton 1990). Theories of both imagination and make-believe 
posit that we have imaginary mental states about fictional stories (e.g. we have an imaginary belief 
that Benedict loves Beatrice). 
Pretense theories, imaginative theories, and theories of make-believe each posit that we 
utilize mental states during our engagements with fiction that are different in kind from those used 
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during our everyday interactions with people and things. These theorists also generally hold that 
pretense, imagination, etc. are a part of other capacities as well, such as pretend play and 
hypothetical thought. I will focus here on our interactions with fictions, although many of my 
arguments will transcend to these other areas. The distinct attitudes allow us to mentally transform 
the actual objects we encounter into fictional ones. They also explain how we can mentally respond 
to fictional entities that we know are not real.  As we have seen, I call this general position the 
distinct attitude view (DAV). Our emotions, beliefs, judgments, and desires about fictional objects 
can be easily explained insofar as we pretend (etc.) that these are the types of objects that we can 
respond to. We have pretend mental responses to fictional entities.  
I argued against the main motivations behind the DAV in chapter 1.  One concern with the 
DAV is that many accounts build their theory on a flawed notion of the nature of the mental states 
in question.  Once we have a clear grasp on the functional role and ontology of mental states then 
it is unlikely that we will find a distinct attitude warranted to begin with. Furthermore, one can 
argue from a principle of parsimony that there is no need to posit distinct mental attitudes if 
ordinary ones have the same explanatory power. I will attempt to show that we simply do not need 
to posit a DAV to answer the two foundational questions of fiction. Finally, the DAV cannot 
account for our phenomenological—that is, conscious, possibly introspectable—experiences with 
fictions. Our emotions, beliefs, desires, and other mental states towards fictions feel natural and 
relatively automatic, not like we are playing a game of make-believe, simulating, or even 
imagining a possible course of action. In fact, our mental states about fictions often do not seem 
any different than those about actual things.  
Because of worries like these, I argue that the answers to the questions of fictional 
transformation and response are compatible with a standard attitude view (SAV). This is the idea 
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that the mental state types involved in our interactions with fiction are not unique to those contexts, 
but rather are of the same type as those in ordinary, real-life contexts. We have standard beliefs, 
emotions, desires, etc. about fictional entities and states of affairs. Rather than positing unique 
mental states for our interactions with fictions, I will argue that we can explain the two questions 
in terms of a difference in the intentional objects of our mental states (i.e. fictional objects vs. real-
life ones). 
The SAV can take many forms. In what follows, I will develop my own version: the 
fictional stance. In brief, we take the fictional stance when we recognize that the object of our 
engagement is fictional. Doing so allows us to see representations of fictional entities as fictional 
entities. We do not pretend or imagine that Benedict is on the stage before us; we (in some sense) 
see and think of him there. Taking the fictional stance also means that we treat fictional objects as 
the kinds of things that are appropriate objects of our mental engagement.  By taking the fictional 
stance, we see the fictional objects as the real objects that they represent, objects that we would 
normally pity, care for, feel with, and judge.  The fictional stance does not count as an instance of 
the DAV. Rather than explaining our behavioral and attitudinal responses towards fictions in terms 
of distinct mental state types, I explain them in terms of a particular kind of intentional content. In 
other words, we utilize the same types of mental states and mechanisms during our engagements 
with fictions that we do in our everyday lives, but these mental states are about fictional objects.  
The following sections flesh out the fictional stance as an alternative to the DAV. The 
arguments in each section are cumulative, building off each other until we garner a complete 
picture of our psychological engagements with fictions. The full explanation of the fictional stance 
will not be complete until §4. The central tenets are as follows: 
 
1.) We know that the representation meets three conditions for being a fiction: is non-
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actual, is created, and depends on particular objects and people in order to persist. 
 
2.) We can recognize representations as of or about particular kinds of objects. 
 
3.) We recognize these represented objects as being fictional objects. 
 
 
 I will present each of these points in §3, thus establishing the foundation of the fictional stance, 
after critiquing the DAV positions in §2. My own view builds off a commonsense ontology of 
fiction, an account of representational seeing, and a variation on Arthur Danto’s concept of the ‘is’ 
of artistic identification (Danto 1964). None of these individual positions can answer the two 
foundational questions on its own. Nevertheless, together they form the foundation for the fictional 
stance which, I argue, can both answer the two questions and serve as a general framework for a 
psychology of fiction. In §4, I will lay out the fictional stance and show how it answers the 
questions of fictional transformation and response. I will consider two other versions of the 
fictional stance in §5. §6 applies the fictional stance to several ubiquitous metaphysical and 
semantic questions concerning fictions. I conclude with a brief comment on the explanatory power 
of the fictional stance. 
 
2. Pretense, make-believe, & imagining 
 
I have argued that we are under neither a perceptual nor cognitive illusion while engaged with 
visual fictions. A more plausible possibility is that we pretend, make believe, or imagine that 
fictional objects are real. These terms are often used interchangeably in the literature. I suggested 
in the first chapter that doing so is a mistake. As we will see, we can differentiate between these 
types of mental activity in various ways. I will attempt to make these distinctions clearer in this 
section. 
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 The DAV can be cashed out in terms of one of two claims. First, we want to know whether 
there is a unique mental state that is utilized solely in fictional contexts—a pretend or imaginative 
belief, for example, that is similar to, but cannot be identified with, a stereotypical belief. Second, 
we want to know whether pretense, imagining, or make-believe are necessary to make of what a 
narrative fictional. I deny both claims. But it is worth noting that one can deny the first, concerning 
mental state types, without denying the second. The idea there would be that imagining, for 
example, is not a mental state type that is unique to fiction, but it still is a necessary part of a 
engaging with fictions. This would make our engagements with fictions distinct from our 
engagements with non-fictions. We need to deny both claims in order to properly combat the DAV. 
I will consider the different versions of the DAV in turn. We encountered the pretense 
thesis back in the first chapter. This view states that an appreciator of fiction pretends that the 
fictional story, characters, and world are real for the duration of her engagement with it. This 
position has important ramifications for the ontology and semantics of fiction. Fictional objects, 
places, and characters are not actual things (either concrete objects or abstracta). Rather, we merely 
pretend that they are real, like the objects of pretend play. We speak, feel, and think about fictional 
entities as if they are real things, but we know that they are not. This view makes the most sense 
in terms of dramatic art. Actors pretend to embody the character that they portray. In so doing, 
they represent a fictional story; for instance, the development of a romance between Benedict and 
Beatrice in Much Ado About Nothing. The actors pretend that they are certain fictional characters 
and the audience joins in their pretense. We pretend that we see real events and people, even though 
they are actually fictional representations of events and people. 
Semantic considerations may be the greatest motivation behind pretense theories. Pretense 
theories state that speech acts about fictional entities are neither genuine assertions of propositions 
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nor do they refer to actual objects. Rather, we pretend to make assertions about fictions and pretend 
to refer to nonexistent things. Saul Kripke (2013) claims that pretense is also involved in the 
composition of fictions. An author pretends to refer to an actual person when she creates a 
character. The character itself can either be understood as an abstract entity, possible object, or 
definite description. In each case, when we say the name ‘Benedict’ or ‘Beatrice’ we pretend to 
refer to a real, existing person. For some sentences, we may refer to the abstract entity, possible 
object, or utilize a definite description. This is the case when I say “Emma Woodhouse was created 
by Jane Austen.” But for other sentences, we merely pretend to refer to a character. The author 
pretends that the name refers and the reader/audience goes along with this pretense. Kripke calls 
this the pretense principle, arguing that it applies to sentences internal to a fictional story, such as 
“Beatrice is in love with Benedict, but she won’t admit it to herself.” According to Kripke, the 
pretense principle holds no matter what one thinks about the nature of fictional propositions or 
fictional names (ibid, 24). 
 Pretense theory can also explain the two questions we raised in the first section: the 
question of fictional transformation and the question of fictional response. Our response to the first 
question will differ slightly depending on the art form. When we engage with a stage production 
of Much Ado, we pretend that the actual, physical objects on stage are the real thing—the papier-
mâché boulders are real boulders and the living, breathing actors are the characters in the story. 
When we watch a film production of the play, such as Kenneth Branaugh’s 1993 version, we 
pretend that the images we see on the screen are actually the Italian villa and countryside as 
opposed to wherever the film was shot. We pretend that Branaugh is Benedict and Emma 
Thompson is Beatrice, even though we know that they aren’t really. Comparable stories could be 
told for video games and opera, and maybe even fictional representations that we encounter in 
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pictures and photographs (though I will not focus on those art forms here). 
 Pretense theorists can answer the question of fictional response in a similar way. Because 
we pretend that fictional entities are real ones, we emotionally respond to, morally judge, believe, 
and desire things about them in much the same way we would if they were real. These responses 
will always be in the context of the pretense and so will not engender the same kinds of behavioral 
responses as they typically would. Our mental states are run “offline,” disconnected from their 
standard functional role. 
So pretense theories seem to have a great deal of explanatory power when it comes to our 
psychological interactions with and speech acts about fictions. Still, many philosophers have 
argued against pure-pretense theories and have instead incorporated pretense into more 
sophisticated theoretical frameworks. I will not review these argument here (but see Currie 1990, 
Walton 1990). Instead, I will review general arguments against pretense theories, arguments that 
apply to other versions of the DAV as well. 
  One approach that utilizes pretense is a theory of make-believe. Theories of make-believe 
hold that our engagement with fiction is a part of an elaborate game of make-believe, similar to 
games we play as young children (Currie 1995, Walton 1990). These games involve an element of 
pretense, but also another, distinct kind of mental activity: imagination.  
I will focus on Kendall Walton’s theory of make-believe from his text Mimesis as Make-
believe (1990). This remains the most detailed, comprehensive, and influential version of the view. 
Walton argues that all representations involve make-believe, including fictions. An important 
application of make-believe concerns a definition of what it means for a representation to be 
fictional. In typical games of make-believe, the subject stipulates certain rules concerning objects 
that we take to be a part of the game. For example, when children pretend-play house, they stipulate 
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that a mud pie is a cherry pie; the mud pie in a box is a cherry pie in an oven; the tree house in the 
backyard is a cottage in the woods.  
Derek Matravers (2014) explains how this applies to fiction. One makes a stipulation that 
there is some truth about the actual world that, somehow, will take us to a truth about a fictional 
world (eg. there is a glob of mud  there is a pie; there is an actor  Henry V). But it is not 
enough that we create or understand this stipulation. Walton argues that we also need a particular 
kind of mental activity to get us from the actual to fictional world: imagination. Stipulated truths 
about the actual world are prescriptions to imagine—or, alternatively, principles of generation, 
propositions that mandate the reader/audience to engage in a game of make-believe. Audiences 
understand fictional representations, including both verbal and depictive representations to serve 
as props in games of make-believe. They are objects that call for us to imagine the fictional story, 
respond to it, and even think of ourselves as a part of it. 
Matravers describes Walton’s position in terms of two criteria. Each describe the 
imagination’s role in transforming an actual object or proposition into a fictional one. First, the 
transformation criterion states that “something is a fiction if the imagination is required to 
transform a proposition true in the actual world into a different proposition true in the fictional 
world” (Matravers 2014, 13). During the game of make-believe, we imagine that the objects in a 
dramatic representation, the images in a picture or on a screen, or the propositions in a novel each 
generate fictional counterparts. We make-believe that the stage actor Ian McKlellan is Macbeth on 
the stage, that Kenneth Branaugh is Benedict in the film, or that the propositions in Much Ado 
make genuine assertions about a real person named Beatrice. 
Second, Walton argues for the engagement criterion: “something is fictional if it engages 
our imagination as only the imagination can account for facts concerning our engagements with 
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fiction” (Matravers 2014, 16). The idea is that an imaginative game of make-believe is required to 
explain the perspective that readers/audiences take of the fiction as well as the vivacity of our 
psychological responses to it. Walton argues that we do not merely imagine the objects in a fiction. 
We also imagine ourselves in the fiction, as a part of the fictional world that observes the action 
(Walton 1990, 29). This helps to explain why our affective responses, judgments, and simply our 
engagement itself feels so intense—or, as Matravers puts it, why it possesses such vivacity. 
These two criteria answer the question of fictional transformation and even suggest an 
answer to the question of fictional response. We use our imagination during the game of make-
believe in order to transform the objects on a stage or on a screen into the actual objects in a 
fictional story. Just as children imaginatively transform a mud pie into a cherry pie during their 
games, so do adults imaginatively transform McKlellan into Macbeth and Branaugh is into 
Benedict.  
Our intense participation in games of make-believe leads to equally intense psychological 
responses to fictional objects: emotional responses to fictional characters, judgments about them, 
desires concerning their well-being, etc. According to Walton, though, the mental states that 
function within the game of make-believe are not genuine mental states, because they lack 
behavioral motivation. This is so even though they feel the same as non-imaginative mental states 
(Walton 1990). The audiences’ speech acts (e.g. “Watch out for the slime!” or “Mr. Knightley is 
so charming”), emotional responses (fear towards a fictional villain or compassion for a 
protagonist), and other mental attitudes (believing that Firefly’s Captain Reynolds is a good person 
despite his gruff exterior; wanting Desdemona to survive even if we know that she won’t, etc.) 
should all be understood as acts of pretense within the world of make-believe.  
We should compare our psychological engagements with fiction to a child’s pretend-play. 
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A child creates a world of make-believe around props in her environment and she acts and speaks 
from within that world. A couch and set of chairs become a dungeon, a box becomes a house, a 
high heeled shoe becomes a ruby slipper (see also Harris 2000). Indeed, Walton suggests that one 
of the reasons why fictions are so important and entertaining for adults is because they are an 
extension of our childhood pretending. Creating such a rich make-believe world requires a fair 
amount of imaginative labor from both the audience and creator, but it’s an ability that is readily 
undertaken and mastered by both adults and children. 
Theories of make-believe have a certain appeal. They can explain our mental states towards 
fictional entities, our speech acts about them, and even the nature of those entities. Nevertheless, 
some of the implications of these theories have been called into question. For example, some 
philosophers argue, like me, that pretend or imaginary states—i.e. non-standard ones—should be 
resisted (see especially Matravers 2014 and Carroll 2008). Furthermore, several philosophers have 
argued that theories of make-believe cannot capture our actual first-person experiences with 
fictional stories; it does not feel as if we are involved in a game of make-believe (Carroll 1990; 
Neill 1993).   
There is one more view to consider: that we imagine that fictions and fictional entities are 
real, but without pretending or make-believing that they are. On the imagination view, watching a 
stage production of Much Ado involves imagining that there is a world in which Benedict falls in 
love with Beatrice. This is a different kind of mental activity from pretense. Pretense involves 
taking some state of affairs to be true or some object to exist in the actual world. As I noted in the 
first chapter, imagining does not necessarily have this tie to truth. Imagining may be more like 
entertaining a proposition, or supposing that something is true, without thinking that it actually is 
or merely considering something not present. We can imagine what it would be like for some state 
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of affairs to occur without thinking that it actually does, either in this world or a fictional one. This 
applies to attitudinal (or, propositional) imagining in which imagining that something is the case 
is analogous to believing that it is the case. 
Some imagination theorists contend that our imaginings about fiction constitute a distinct 
attitude. I imagine that there is a world in which an Italian lord visits an old friend and marries his 
daughter when I watch Much Ado. My mental attitudes are imaginative. I seem to have genuine 
beliefs about Henry, desire things for him, and emotionally respond to him. But imaginative beliefs 
(etc.) are not genuine beliefs, again, because of the distinction in motivation for behavior. 
We must be careful here. I am not denying that we ever use our imagination when engaged 
with fictions. Nor am I denying that imagining is a different kind of mental act than believing. 
Clearly they are different. What I do deny, however, is that there are distinct types of states called 
“imaginative beliefs,” “imaginative emotions,” etc. I also deny that propositional imagining, make-
believing, etc. is necessary for our engagement with fiction, even though we may sometimes take 
up these mental activities.8 Unfortunately, not all philosophers are careful to make these 
distinctions.  
Let’s consider several general arguments against pretense, make-believe, and imagining. 
First, it is questionable that these theories can accurately explain our conscious experience of 
fictions. Alex Neill (1991) has argued that anyone who plays a game of make-believe knows that 
she is doing is. Children make conscious stipulations concerning actual objects and are aware of 
the resulting make-believe world in which they insert themselves. The same may go for our 
engagements with fictions; if we begin a game of make-believe while engaged with a fiction, then 
                                                          
8 It may be that imagistic imagining is necessary for our engagements with fictions. But this hardly 
counts as a distinct type of state; we imagistically imagine all the time, in all sorts of contexts. See 
chapter 1 for more on the different types of imagining. 
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we will know that we are doing so. The problem is that most people would probably deny that they 
are, in fact, “make-believing” or “playing pretend” or even “imagining that something is the case” 
while watching a film, attending a play, or reading a novel. Their conscious experience of the 
fictional story will generally be more loosely experienced than this, lacking concrete stipulations 
or rules to generate imagining. In fact, it often feels like we are in the direct presence of fictional 
entities, or at least their representation—not that we have created a fictional world of make-believe 
(see Wilson 2011). 
A reader or audience member may, if pressed, concede that she imagines or pretends that 
that something fictional is actually true. But we generally do not have this conscious experience 
during the time of our engagement with the story. This is especially persuasive if we consider our 
psychological response towards fictions, which feel the same as any typical emotion, desire, belief, 
etc. This kind of phenomenological point is not a knock-down argument against the DAV, for it 
could very well be that games of make-believe, pretense, or imaginings typically occur without 
conscious initiation or continuation. Still, one would suspect that if make-believe, pretense, or 
imagining is a necessary part of our engagement with fictions then it would at least sometimes be 
consciously experienced by some people. And that often doesn’t seem to be the case for a general 
experience of fictions. 
 A second critique of the DAV concerns our reference to fictional entities and the use of 
fictional names. Recall Kripke’s pretense principle: we make pretend assertions about fictions and 
pretend to refer to fictional entities, when in fact there is nothing to assert and nothing to which 
we can refer. There is a question, though, about whether the pretense principle can really do the 
work that the DAV needs it to. Consider a point raised by Nicholas Wolterstorff (1980): pretense 
theory puts the “fictioneer” (the author, playwright, filmmakers, etc.) in a role of pretending to 
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make an assertion and pretending to refer. Who, for example, does Nikolai Gogol refer to when he 
writes “Chichikov set out to look the town over”? One might naturally think that it is Chichikov, 
who or whatever that might be. But why think that pretense escapes the referential problem? Why 
can we pretend to refer to something that doesn’t exist if we can’t actually do so? What’s so special 
about pretense, such that it bridges this ontological gap? Wolterstorff’s point seems to be that any 
kind of reference—whether actual or pretend—requires that its object exists in some way. 
I leave this as an open challenge for the pretense/imaginative views concerning fictional 
names. It need not be the case that these theories utilize the pretense principle, although Walton’s 
own view (amongst others) maintains that we make pretend assertions and references to fictional 
entities.  
Finally, we can ask whether pretense, make-believe, or imaging entails a distinct attitude. 
On one reading, they do. By definition, pretending, making-believe, and imagining are distinct 
kinds of activity that we use during our engagements with fictions, but not in real-life. We pretend 
(etc.) that an image is a person; we do not (generally) pretend anything about the nature of a real 
person. On another reading, however, it could be that these views to not require a distinct attitude. 
It could be that we pretend that fictions are real while still maintaining that throughout this pretense 
we have genuine mental states that are processed in roughly the same way that a genuine state 
would be (barring differences in content and keeping in mind my points concerning motivation to 
act). The idea would be that I pretend that Hamlet is real while genuinely believing that he is the 
prince of Denmark, that his mother was involved in his father’s death, etc.  
One might still worry that imagining, pretending, etc. mark a distinctive activity that is 
used solely in our engagements with fiction. But this is not the case. We imagine, pretend, and 
make-believe about actual or possible objects, as well as fictional ones. Derek Matravers makes a 
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relevant point here (Matravers 2014). It is not only fictions that stimulate pretense, imagining, and 
make-believe. These activities can be stimulated by historical narratives, news broadcasts, and 
biographies in the same way they would by fictional stories. Furthermore, we attitudinally imagine 
outcomes for day to day decisions: what we will have for dinner this evening, where we would 
like to attend graduate school, what kind of car we would like to purchase. We might even pretend 
that we have a new fancy car or make-believe that our current clunker is a Porsche. These mental 
activities are not strictly relegated to fiction and so they are insufficient as general accounts of our 
psychological experience of them. Matravers argues that if there is a distinct attitude at work in 
fiction, then that attitude also is at work in our engagements with narrative representations in 
general as opposed to just fictions.   
 My own view contends that not only are imagining, pretense, or make-believe insufficient 
for our experiences with fictions, they also are unnecessary for those experiences. We can 
plausibly explain our engagements with fictions without appealing to these notions. It’s not that 
these capacities are never involved in our engagements with fiction. Rather, I argue that they do 
not need to be. There does seem to be clearly something psychologically interesting going on when 
we engage with a work of fiction. If we shouldn’t explain our behaviors, emotions, beliefs, and 
desires in terms of a distinct attitude, then how should we?  
 
 
 
3. Foundations of the fictional stance 
 
We spend a great deal of our lives engaging with fictions: films, novels, TV shows, etc.  So it is 
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important to develop an account of these engagements that appeals to commonsense ideas and 
mental capacities. The fictional stance provides just that. Each of the following three concepts may 
seem like a special skill or type of knowledge. However, I argue that they capture aspects of our 
experiences with fictions that are easily understood in terms of standard cognitive capacities. 
 
 
3.1 Works of fiction 
It is well beyond the scope of this paper to present a fully articulated ontology of fiction. 
Nevertheless, it will be important in what follows to understand what we mean by a work of fiction 
as opposed to nonfiction.  
There are three ways (at least) to distinguish between fiction and nonfiction. First, the 
objects of our engagement are not actual. By this, I mean that we do not engage with a concrete 
object that we can encounter in our spatio-temporal world. This condition leaves open the 
possibility that fictional entities are abstract artifacts (Kripke 2013, Thomasson 1999, Schiffer 
1996, Salmon 1996), possible objects (Lewis 1978, Plantinga 1974), definite descriptions (Russell 
1905; see also Quine 1953), or even eternally existing abstracta (Priest 1997; see also Meinong 
1904/1981). It also leaves open the possibility that fictional entities could exist or existed in the 
past. 
Second, fictional entities, as well as the fictional world in which they are found, have been 
created by an actual person or group of people (author, playwright, filmmaker(s), etc.)—or, at least 
have been called into being by some person or persons. I think that the more commonsensical 
claim is that fictional entities (or representations or descriptions of them) are created by an author 
(etc.), but at this point I will grant that fictional entities may be eternally persisting abstracta for 
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the sake of theoretical neutrality (i.e. fictional entities may be denizens of a Platonic heaven that 
authors draw upon but do not, strictly speaking, create; see Wolterstorff 1980; Meinong 
1904/1981). 
The two previous conditions are implicit in how we treat and talk about fictional entities. 
If asked, I think that audiences would readily grant them.  There is also an implication of the first 
two conditions that is worth stressing. Fictions have dependence conditions. They depend on other 
things in order to exist (or, if not exist, then in order to be represented). Fictional entities depend 
on creators in order to come into existence. They also depend on particular media in order to 
persist, to continue in existence. Represented objects in a painting depend on that painting in order 
to persist. Film characters depend on tokens of the film, literary characters on tokens of novels, 
dramatic characters on tokens of plays. A fiction’s persistence also depends on everyday people. 
If every token of Hamlet was destroyed Fahrenheit 451-style, and every person who knew about 
Hamlet passed away or had their memory erased, then, arguably, the character Hamlet would cease 
to exist (again, barring the idea that fictional entities are Platonic abstracta). We think of fictions 
as depending on particular media and people.  
In contrast, nonfictions are about actual events and entities (either present or past). The 
subjects of nonfictions are not created by an author, filmmaker, etc. even if the representation of 
them are. Furthermore, the subjects of non-fiction do not depend on a particular medium, creator, 
or audience in order to persist. I argue that we distinguish between fiction and nonfiction in these 
three ways. Indeed, it is part of our experience of fiction that we understand the object of our 
engagement to meet these conditions. We are either engaged with a fictional medium, creating 
one, or recollecting a previous engagement with one.  
Three challenges immediately arise here. First, a reader (or viewer) may mistake a fictional 
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representation for a non-fiction. Second, a reader may not know whether a representation is 
fictional or non-fictional. Finally, it is unclear how the three conditions can deal with fictions that 
contain actual people, places, or events, such as Napoleon Bonaparte or London, England. I will 
return to these three questions in the final section, after completing my discussion of the fictional 
stance. In fact, I think that the fictional stance can handle these concerns quite easily. 
The first feature of taking the fictional stance involves recognizing that the representation 
with which we are engaged is a fictional one. We must know that we are engaged with a fiction 
before taking the fictional stance. This does not mean that we must always consciously keep in 
mind that the objects with which we are engaged are fictional; the point is that this knowledge is 
consciously accessible. Indeed, as we will see, this knowledge permeates and influences the 
judgments and emotional responses that we have towards fictional entities.  
 
 
3.2. Seeing fictional objects 
In the opening of this chapter, I claimed that there is a sense in which audiences “see” the fictional 
characters Benedict and Beatrice during a stage performance of Much Ado. The question of 
fictional transformation presents us with the challenge of explaining how this is possible, if all we 
actually perceive are actors on a stage. A further question concerns the difference between seeing 
a fictional character and imagining seeing that character, or even merely seeing a representation 
of a character. 
 I maintain that there is a sense in which we literally see fictional entities in visual fictions 
(film, plays, opera, TV shows, video games, even some paintings and photographs). In the case of 
nonvisual fictions, we can be said to hear fictional entities (i.e. listening to an audiobook or radio 
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story) or think about fictional entities (as in literary fictions). I will focus on visual fictions for now 
and return to literary works and auditory fictions in the following subsection. 
 Consider William Blake’s illustration of Milton’s Paradise Lost: Satan Watching the 
Endearments of Adam and Eve. Imagine that a friend turns to you, asking: “What do you see when 
you look at this painting?” Setting aside any metaphorical interpretations of this question, there 
are still several ways you could answer. First, you see brushstrokes on a canvas. Even more 
reductively, you perceive splashes of color, fine lines, and a variety of shapes. Both of these 
answers are true, but they do not really answer your friend’s question. You may respond by saying: 
“I see objects: two entwined figures, another flying above with a snake wrapped around him.” This 
is also a correct answer. Finally, there is a natural sense in which you can respond that you see 
Satan—you perceive the Prince of Darkness flying over Paradise, looking longingly down on 
Adam and Eve.  
 I understand each of the above responses as characterizing different senses of ‘seeing.’ 
First, there is strictly perceptual seeing. Second, we see objects. Third, there is identification of 
that object as being a particular thing, or kind of thing. We can straightforwardly refer to the first 
sense as perceptual. Call the second object seeing.  I will refer to the third as recognitional seeing. 
I will also discuss seeing a representation as an object. Here, ‘seeing as’ can require either the 
object seeing, recognitional seeing, or both. I will try to make this clear in what follows. The 
question is, which senses of ‘seeing’ explains our interactions with visual fictions?  
Let’s examine the three types of seeing in further detail. Recalling my discussion of the 
perception of fictional entities from the previous chapter, we might ask ourselves what it is that 
we ever perceive, in real-life or fictional contexts. Philosophers of perception have extensively 
debated this point. According to many theorists, we only perceive very basic kinds of properties, 
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such as shapes, colors, depth, motion, location, and illumination (e.g. Clark 2000, Brogaard 2013, 
Dretske 1995,Tye 1995; see Siegel 2010 for an overview). On this view, we do not perceive 
objects, but rather just the surface of objects (Clark 2000). Low level properties result from retinal 
stimulation. All other visual properties, including objecthood or object-type, are the result of later 
cognitive processing (thoughts and judgments) of this basic sensory information (O’Shaughnessy 
2000). Our perception of Blake’s painting only includes lines, basic shapes, and shades of green, 
tan, and red. Further judgments and inferences are required to see the representation as Satan. In 
contrast, other theorists hold that we do, in fact, perceive properties beyond color, shape, etc. (e.g. 
Bayne 2009, Peacocke 1992, Siewert 1998, Siegel 2006). We can perceive objects and higher-
level natural and/or artificial kind properties (e.g. dog or chair, respectively), causal properties 
(e.g. seeing A cause B), and emotional properties (e.g. being scary). In this case, we may see 
Blake’s painting as representing certain objects (people, snake, etc.) and not merely shapes, lines, 
or colors. 
 We can be neutral concerning the content of visual perception. It is an open question 
whether object seeing is perceptual as opposed to a cognitive judgment.  In our terms, recognitional 
seeing may go beyond mere object seeing. Recognitional seeing requires further cognitive 
processing, including a judgment that the perceived object is of a particular kind. Our capacity to 
recognize part of the Blake’s painting as the Angel of Light involves a mixture of perceptual and 
cognitive processes, such as judging or inferring that the figure at the top of the painting is Satan. 
The knowledge that the object of our perception is a fictional representation plays a role here; 
contextual information, including the title of the painting and a basic familiarity of Paradise Lost, 
clues us in to the fact that we see Satan, as opposed to some random figure. 
 Once we break down our experience of Blake’s painting in terms of the above capacities, 
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it seems plausible that we see Satan. Seeing a representation as an object utilizes the same 
perceptual and cognitive capacities as seeing objects in our everyday lives. I must perceive and 
judge that an object is our neighbor’s dog. Seeing an object as being a particular kind requires that 
we perceive it its properties and perhaps also judge it to be of that kind. There is nothing 
perceptually unusual about seeing a representation as Satan. In the fictional case, I do not merely 
see a representation of Satan; I see the representation as Satan.  
So there is a sense in which we see an object before us when we perceive its representation. 
The upshot of seeing fictional entities—as opposed to imaginatively seeing them or merely seeing 
a representation of them—is that it can explain the immediacy of our visual experience. We do not 
pretend to, make-believe, or imagine that we see Satan; we do see Satan! That is not to say that we 
do not also see the representation as well; again, we perceive brushstrokes, lines, colors, shapes, 
etc., as well as the painting’s canvas, frame, and wall surrounding it.9 We never forget that the 
object we encounter is a representation; we are not deluded into believing that the object of our 
engagement is real. This will allow us to act in certain ways towards the fictional object, but not 
others.  
 The task of this subsection is to show that there is a way in which we can be said to see 
fictional entities and, further, that seeing fictional entities does not require imagination, pretense, 
or make-believe. Instead, our capacity to see a fictional entity be entirely explained in terms of 
standard perceptual and cognitive processes. I grant that this is not the same as perceiving an actual, 
physically present object. Our seeing a representation as an object lacks many of the qualities that 
actual seeing possesses. However, object-seeing/seeing as is an important part of normal 
                                                          
9 See also the Ernst Gombrich’s discussion of ‘seeing as’ (Gombrich 1960) and Richard 
Wollheim’s ‘seeing-in’ (1980). See also Dominic Lopes (2005) for a discussion of representational 
seeing. Nelson Goodman (1976) also discusses these issues, and critiques Gombrich’s position. 
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perceptual processing, both in this case and in real life. This is also not to say that we never use 
our imagination while engaged with visual fictions; surely we do in many cases. The point is that 
imagination does not play a necessary role in how we see fictional characters.  
 
 
3.3. The ‘is’ of artistic identification 
In his seminal article, “The Artworld,” Danto asks us to imagine the artistic neophyte Testadura, 
who encounters Rauschenberg’s Bed for the first time (Danto 1964). Testadura doesn’t quite know 
what to do with the piece. It’s actually a bed, after all, even if it is an odd one. Should he sleep on 
it? Why would a bed be in an art gallery? Why does it have splotches all over the comforter, and 
why is it so oddly shaped? Testadura looks at Bed and all he discerns is a bed, not an artwork. 
However, as Danto points out, that’s really all there is (ibid, 575). Nevertheless, Testadura has 
gotten something wrong. Danto contends that understanding just how he went wrong is greatly 
important for understanding what makes an object an artwork, when the artwork is (physically) 
nothing but the object. 
Danto introduces Testadura’s response to Rauschenberg’s Bed in order to motivate his art 
historical/theoretical view of the nature of art. To recognize that Bed is an artwork, and not a mere 
bed, we need “something the eye cannot decry—an atmosphere of artistic history, a knowledge of 
the history of art: an artworld” (ibid, 580). To recognize Bed as more than the bed that it is, 
Testadura needs knowledge of the artworld: art theory, history, artistic intention, the works role in 
the current art scene, etc.  
 I am interested in Testadura for a slightly different reason. There is an interesting similarity 
between Danto’s ‘is’ and my notion of seeing represented objects. As Danto points out, we may 
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see a blob of paint as well as see that blob of paint as a person. While watching a film, we see 
colored, seemingly moving images and see them as people—fictional people. Most interestingly, 
at a play we see a real person and, somehow, also see that person as a fictional character. How do 
we do this? The first step is to perceive the object before us. We then see the representation as 
representing objects (this may involve purely perceptual or a mixture of perceptual and cognitive 
capacities). But this cannot be the whole story. We need to understand how we see the figure in a 
painting, the person in a film, and the person on stage not only as objects, but as of fictional objects. 
This is not, strictly speaking, a perceptual capacity. We do not perceive properties like “being 
fictional,” even on theories of perceptual content that grant that we can perceive some higher-level 
properties. Nevertheless, we do see fictional entities. The ‘seeing’ here is more like what I have 
been calling recognitional seeing, involving a judgment about the particular object that we see. 
Part of this involves judging that the object is fictional; that is, that it meets the three conditions I 
posited in §3.1. 
Let’s further draw out the analogy between seeing fictional objects and the ‘is’ of artistic 
identification. Imagine standing in front of Brueghel’s Landscape with the Fall of Icarus. You 
scan the painting for the doomed young man. He isn’t easy to find.  You finally spot him and, 
pointing to the painting, you proclaim: “That white dab of paint is Icarus.” Danto notes that this 
“is” needs explaining:  
There is an is that figures prominently in statements concerning artworks which is 
not the is of either identity or predication; nor is it the is of existence, of 
identification, or some special is made up to serve a philosophic end. Nevertheless, 
it is in common usage, and is readily mastered by children. It is the sense of is in 
accordance with which a child, shown a circle and a triangle and asked which is 
him and which his sister, will point to the triangle saying "That is me"; or, in 
response to my question, the person next to me points to the man in purple and says 
"That one is Lear" (ibid, 576). 
 
Danto calls this the “is of artistic identification.”  Mastering the ‘is’ of artistic identification is 
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required for us to understand that Rauschenberg’s Bed is not merely a bed, that Warhol’s Brillo 
Box is not merely a Brillo box, and that Duchamp’s Fountain is not merely a urinal. It allows us 
to understand that these are artworks. In fact, recognizing any artwork as not merely the physical 
stuff of which it is composed, but also as an artwork requires that we master the ‘is’ of artistic 
identification. Danto argues that the ‘is’ of artistic identification is essentially the ‘is’ of metaphor, 
not of predication or identity (Danto 1981). When we hear that “Juliet is the sun” or “All the world 
is a stage,” the special use of is in each cases invites the audience to consider the subject of the 
sentence as something else. Likewise, recognizing that an object is also an art object “transfigures” 
the object into a new, glorified status: an artwork. We now consider the object in a new way. 
Danto’s ‘is’ has garnered a fair amount of critique. For instance, it is unclear that 
recognizing an object as an artwork does, in fact, require application of a metaphor. I want to be 
neutral here, especially since I think that Danto’s suggestion depends on a theory of metaphor, a 
determination of which is beyond the scope of the current discussion. Luckily, I think that we can 
distance ourselves from this debate for our present purposes. I understand the ‘is’ of artistic 
identification in terms of representation rather than metaphor. When I say “that is Icarus” or “that 
one is me” I mean that Icarus is represented there, by that white dab of paint, or that the stick 
drawing represents me. In each case, some transfigurative process occurs; I now consider the object 
in a way I didn’t before. The same basic idea applies to Rauschenberg’s Bed. What I once thought 
of as merely a (physical) bed, I now know to be an artwork. I understand now that the object 
represent certain artistic ideas or intentions. 
 I want to make the case that the ‘is’ of artistic identification is a special application of 
seeing represented objects. Awareness of a representation as a fictional representation requires 
knowledge of a particular kind.  According to Danto, to think of an artwork as an artwork will in 
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each case require that the audience master the ‘is’ of artistic identification. I want to make a similar 
claim about how we see objects in artworks as fictional entities and, likewise, we see 
representations as representations of fictional things. During every encounter with fiction we 
perceive whatever physically comprises the fictional representation (film, paint, physical person, 
or even words on a page). We also see the representation as presenting objects. Finally, applying 
our knowledge that the work is fictional, we recognize that the objects we see are fictional. My 
proclamation that “That white dab of paint is Icarus” not only points out where the subject is 
located in the painting, but also implies that I see and understand Icarus as a part of the 
representation (as a part of its fictional world, if you will). 
 When watching a production of Much Ado, I may point to a brown-haired actress on stage 
and tell my companion, “That one is Beatrice.” Statements like this indicate that I have mastered 
a special kind of ‘is.’ Following Danto, let’s call this the ‘is’ of fictional transformation. I see the 
represented object as a fictional entity. I judge that the representation before me is fictional. This 
allows me to think and speak about the represented objects in terms of their being fictional. As I 
noted in chapter 1, there is an implicit fictional operator in our speech acts about fictions. When I 
say “I believe that Demetrius treated Helena very poorly” after watching A Midsummer’s Night 
Dream, I mean “I believe that Demetrius treated Helena very poorly [in the fiction]” (see Kripke 
2013 and Thomasson 1999). The same holds for our mental attitudes; the fictional operator is 
implicit in our beliefs, thoughts, and desires about fictional entities (see also Matravers 1991 & 
2014, Neill 1993). So I may believe“that Beatrice secretly loves Benedict [in the fictional world].” 
The recognition that the object of our mental attitudes is fictional forms the backdrop against which 
these attitudes are formed. 
The ‘is’ of fictional transformation doesn’t only apply to visual representations. It also 
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explains how we interact with non-visual fictions, like literature. Unlike paintings, films, or 
photographs, you cannot point to anything in a novel and proclaim “There is Elizabeth Bennett.” 
We would never mistake a word on a page for a fictional character. However, we still need to 
recognize that the object of our engagement is a fictional representation in order to get our literary 
experience off the ground.  One needs to recognize that the words on a page are designed to be 
taken up and considered as a fiction. This requires utilizing the ‘is’ of fictional transformation; we 
perceive the words on a page and also recognize that those words represent fictional objects that 
we can directly think about and respond to. This causes us to treat the statements found in the 
literary work as representing a fictional story.  
 
 
 
4. The fictional stance 
 
The three concepts we have discussed so far—the ontology of fiction, seeing represented objects, 
and the ‘is’ of fictional transformation—form the backbone of the fictional stance. I offer the 
fictional stance as a general account of our psychological interactions with fictions, including how 
we understand objects as fictional and how we come to mentally respond to them. By taking the 
fictional stance, we recognize a work as fictional. This recognition shapes our mental states and 
allows us to understand and interpret the story. It also allows us to have beliefs, desires, and 
emotions towards fictional objects even while we know that those objects are not real. We know 
that the objects of fiction are not actual denizens of our world, but we think of and respond to them 
in similar ways notwithstanding.  
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 In sum, by taking the fictional stance we recognize, both perceptually and cognitively, that 
a representation is fictional. This means: 
1. We know that the representation meets three conditions for being a fiction: is non-
actual, is created, and depends on particular objects and people in order to persist 
(the ontology of fiction). 
 
2. We can recognize representations as of or about particular kinds of objects 
(representational seeing). 
 
3. We recognize the represented objects as fictional objects (the ‘is’ of fictional 
transformation). 
 
When we engage with a fiction we perceive objects, images, and words: the physical medium of 
which the fiction is constructed. We also see fictional entities. We do not pretend to see them or 
imagine that we do—we actually see representations as fictional objects. I see the actor who 
portrays Benedict and Benedict the fictional character. I see the physical stuff that makes up the 
dramatic props: the scaffolding, the papier-mâché, the painted wood comprised the furniture, even 
the actors’ bodies. It’s not that I ever stop seeing those materials. Rather, I also see them as fictional 
entities. I can identify each physical thing as a fictional one; that boulder is a rock in Italian 
countryside, that brazier is a torch on the walls of the Italian villa, that man is Benedict. I have 
argued that an extra step is needed in order for us to understand these objects to be representations 
of fictional entities, beyond object recognition. This step is the ‘is’ of fictional transformation, 
through which we come to understand that the object of our engagement is fictional.10 
 We see representations as fictional entities. We also have emotional responses towards 
these entities, morally judge them, desire things for them, and believe certain things about them. 
Importantly, nothing about the fictional stance requires that we analyze these mental attitudes as 
                                                          
10 This is similar to Robert Hopkin’s notion of “collapsed seeing in” according to which film 
audiences typically see the events represented in the film’s story, but not the representation of 
those events (the actors, props, etc.). (Hopkins 2008). 
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being different in kind from ordinary mental attitudes. I contend that our mental attitudes towards 
fictions are standard mental states. Our mental states contain fictional content (they are about 
fictional entities), but are of the same type as typical mental states and they utilize the same 
cognitive mechanisms. 
  That is not to say that there are no differences between how we respond to fiction and real-
life objects. Consider, for example, the differences in how we would behave towards fictional and 
real-life objects. As Katherine Thomson-Jones (2008) points out, I do not run screaming from a 
movie theater when I see a frightening serial killer hiding in the shadows, as I likely would if I 
encountered the killer in real-life. Such discrepancies in our behaviors towards real-life and fiction 
are typically used to motivate the DAV. Assuming functionalism about mental states (mental states 
are individuated, at least in part, by their functional role), then a lack of motivation to act suggests 
that the mental state itself is not present, or runs ‘off-line’ (Currie 1995; Currie & Ravenscroft 
2002). This amounts to a pretend or imaginative belief in the presence of the fictional killer, but 
not a genuine belief. Genuine beliefs motivate action, fictional beliefs do not. 
 The fictional stance offers a different interpretation of these behavioral discrepancies. We 
do have ordinary mental attitudes towards fictional objects. Our mental processes are not taken 
off-line. Instead, behavioral discrepancies can be explained in terms of a difference in the 
intentional content. We recognize that the objects of our engagement are not literally present to us 
(they are non-actual). This recognition informs our responses to fictional entities. As I stated in 
§2, our mental attitudes towards fictions have a kind of fictional operator; we have beliefs, 
emotions, desires, etc. about a fictional character/fictional world. My belief about the serial killer 
on the movie screen states: “I believe that there is a serial killer lurking in the shadows [in the 
fictional world].” This belief does not functionally motivate a fleeing response, as it likely would 
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in real-life contexts. It may, however, motivate other kinds of behaviors, such as covering one’s 
eyes, turning from the movie screen, etc.  
 I think that the same sort of story can explain all of our mental attitudes towards fictions, 
including emotions. A further worry arises here in terms of the question of fictional response. If 
we know that the object of our engagement is fictional—non-actual, created, dependent—then 
why do we have any responses to it at all? This question concerns the appropriateness of our 
mental attitudes towards fictional entities. I have two thoughts here. First, I have argued that we 
see representations as fictional characters. We see the actor portraying Hamlet, but we also see the 
fictional character Hamlet. This means that see Hamlet as a person. We do not stop seeing him as 
a person when we also acknowledge that he is a fictional character. It is likely, then, that we will 
interact with Hamlet as we would if he were a real person—if not physically, then at least in terms 
of our psychological engagement. This means that we will emotionally respond to Hamlet, judge 
his actions, etc.  
 Perhaps this is all that we need to get our psychological responses off the ground; we 
recognize fictional characters as the types of things that we would typically respond to in our 
everyday lives. This may take place subconsciously and unintentionally. Recall that object-seeing 
can take place before we judge whether the object is fictional or not. Maybe some emotional 
responses, behavioral motivation, and even judgments also occur before we make that judgment. 
I proposed this in chapter 2 and will flesh out this possibility in the following chapters. We also 
have beliefs and desires about fictional entities while, at the same time, we acknowledge that the 
object of our belief and desire is not real. 
 In sum, taking the fictional stance involves the application of several mental abilities. First, 
we see representations as objects. To make this the fictional stance, we must also realize that the 
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object with which we interact is fictional, that it has non-actual content, was created by someone, 
and depends on particular people and things in order to persist.  All this occurs implicitly and 
naturally upon learning the conventions of fiction. We then apply the ‘is’ of fictional 
transformation which allows us to see representations as being of fictional entities. Our mental 
engagements with fictions rely upon our general capacity to see objects in fictional representations 
and respond to such objects; we see the representation of the fictional entity as an object that thinks, 
feels, acts—in short, as an object that we would respond to in our everyday lives. We mentally 
interact with fictional entities in much the same way we would real-life entities even though we 
acknowledge that, strictly speaking, fictional entities are not the sorts of things that possess mental 
states or have things happen to them.  
 I grant that the fictional stance is not a complete explanation of our mental responses to 
fictions, especially our emotional and moral responses. Simply recognizing an object may 
sometimes be enough to bring about a moral or emotional response, but it often won’t be. The 
fictional stance lays the foundation for further explanations of why we respond to fictional objects 
as we do; it makes such responses possible. I will explore other aspects of our engagements with 
fictions in greater detail in the chapters to come. 
 
 
5. Variations on the fictional stance 
 
In my terms, taking the fictional stance is a matter of seeing and mentally responding to fictional 
entities while at the same time acknowledging that those entities are fictional. This is not the only 
way to characterize the fictional stance. There are at least two other prominent versions of the 
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fictional stance, or, as they call it, the fictive stance. In this subsection, I will compare my account 
stance to Lamarque and Olsen’s and Wolterstorff’s positions. I will also determine whether my 
version commits me to the DAV. 
 Let’s begin with Lamarque and Olsen’s fictive stance. These authors grant that the 
distinction between fiction and nonfiction is fundamental. It is of utmost importance to both 
creators of fiction and audiences that they are dealing with a fiction, for this knowledge shapes 
how they approach it and the responses they have to the objects within it (see also Currie 1990). 
So far, this view is quite similar to mine. But the authors go further, stating that fictions in general 
are defined in terms of how an audience takes the fictive stance:  
 
The fictive story-teller, making up a story makes and presents sentences (or 
propositions, i.e. sentence-meanings) for a particular kind of attention. The aim, at 
first approximation, is this: 
 For the audience to make-believe (pretend or imagine) that the standard speech 
act commitments associated with the sentences are operative even while knowing 
that they are not. 
 Attending to the sentences in this way is to adopt the fictive stance towards them 
(Lamarque and Olsen 1994, 43; quoted in Matravers 2014, 54-55). 
 
 
This view conforms to what I have been calling the DAV and what Matravers calls “the consensus 
view.” Understanding a work as fictional requires a distinct mental state, either imaginary, pretend, 
simulated, make-believe, or some variation of one of these. Matravers denies this requirement and 
also denies that there is a fundamental difference between fiction and nonfiction. In making the 
first claim, he seems to argue against fictive/fictional stances in general. Could it be that any 
version of the fictive stance requires a unique mental state? If so, that would be a serious challenge 
for my position. 
 The main difference between Lamarque and Olsen’s fictive stance and my fictional stance 
is that my view is not primarily a theory of fiction, but rather how we recognize and respond to 
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fiction. In taking the fictional stance, we recognize that the object of our engagement has the three 
conditions I listed in the previous subsection: it is about something non-actual, it is created, and it 
has certain dependence relations. These conditions make a narrative a fictional one whether we 
know that it is or not. We take the fictional stance in response to our acknowledgement of a 
narrative meeting those conditions. So if imagination or make-believe is involved in our 
engagement with fictions, those aspects of our psychological engagement do not, on my view, 
make the narrative a fictional one. This means that there is no essential connection between 
imagination or make-believe and fiction. This should eliminate any worry that Matravers’ might 
have that my fictional stance conforms to the consensus view.  
 Nevertheless, a worry may remain that the fictional stance commits me to some kind of 
DAV, as Lamarque and Olsen’s does. I think that this worry can partially be eliminated by the 
previous point, but it is worth examining more closely. The fictional stance is not primarily a kind 
of mental state. It is a way of treating a particular kind of intentional content. The fictional stance 
does not utilize a distinct or unique kind of mental state or process. In fact, we utilize the same 
kinds of mental states and processes as we would for a nonfictional representation, or, indeed an 
everyday object with which we are confronted. Here Matravers and I part ways; he argues that our 
mental states towards representations are run offline. I deny this. Our mental states are run online, 
but with fictional content. Asymmetries in behavior and motivation can be explained accordingly; 
difference s result from the content of those processes and states. We have genuine perceptions, 
beliefs, desires, etc. about fictional objects. By “taking the fictional stance” I simply mean that we 
recognize the fictional nature of the object with which we are interacting.  
 The second version of the fictive stance that I want to consider comes from Wolterstorff’s 
Worlds and Works of Fiction. Wolterstorff proposes that the fictive stance is something that an 
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author does when she projects (creates) a fictional world. Wolterstorff’s theory of the nature of 
fictional worlds is quite complex and can be ignored for present purposes; suffice it to say that 
fictional worlds are sets of particular propositions. We can already see one main difference 
between this position and my own. Wolterstorff argues that authors take the fictive stance during 
acts of creation. In contrast, I take it that both authors and audiences take the fictional stance during 
their interactions with fictions. 
 Wolterstorff equates the fictive stance with a kind of linguistic force. We can treat the same 
state of affairs—e.g. “The king is dead”—with different moods. We can assert that the king is 
dead, wish that the king is dead, promise that the king is dead, ask whether the king is dead, etc. 
(ibid, 231). Creators of fiction take ordinary sentences but do not assert them, or even pretend to 
assert them. Instead, the creators present or offer sentences for an audience’s consideration. This 
allows us to reflect on, ponder over, and wonder about the content of the fiction without pretending 
or make-believing that it is real: 
 
[The author] does this for our edification, for our delight, for our illumination, for 
our cathartic cleansing, and more besides. It’s as if every work of fiction were 
prefaced with the worlds ‘I hereby present that…’ or ‘I hereby invite you to 
consider that…’ Of course all of us on occasion invite others to take up this stance 
toward some state of affairs. But most of us do so only incidentally. The novelist 
and the dramatist make a profession of what for the rest of us is only an incidental 
diversion. That is what makes them fictioneers (ibid, 233). 
  
Thus, like Lamarque and Olsen, Wolterstorff contends that the essence of fiction depends on an 
author taking up the fictive stance, by presenting material in a certain kind of way. Presumably, 
the audience would know that this is what the author intended to do, and so realize that the narrative 
they are considering is a fictional one.  
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I think that understanding a fiction as a fiction, as opposed to a nonfiction, concerns the 
properties of the work itself rather than a mood we take toward it. Nevertheless, I agree with 
Wolterstorff that the fictional stance should apply to what authors to create fictions. I disagree, 
though, that this is the sole application of the fictional stance. This may just be a stipulation on 
Wolterstorff’s part. He does have an account of an audience’s engagement with fictions, but does 
not include it in the fictive stance. This also separates Wolterstorff from other philosophers, like 
Currie (1990) and Walton, who argue that fiction is essentially a kind of linguistic force we take 
towards certain representations. I think that this is the path to the dark side, for it easily allows us 
to posit unique attitudes for our engagements with fiction. In contrast, I would argue that authors 
and audiences are doing basically the same thing while they are creating or responding to fictions, 
respectively. They are considering, thinking about, responding to a certain kind of content.  
 Finally, Wolterstorff is at pains to show that the fictive stance applies to a variety of 
fictional art forms. I admire this aspect of his view. I, too, argue that the fictional stance applies to 
all fictions—not just literature, but also film, drama, opera, video games, and maybe even 
nonfactual objects represented in the visual arts. One might think that this is impossible on my 
view, since I have characterized the fictional stance in terms of seeing as. But the fictional stance 
also applies to non-visual fictions. Paramount to the fictional stance is the idea that we recognize 
the fictional object as fictional. I put this recognition in terms of visual perception above, but it 
need not be. This would be true in the case of literature. We read a literary work and take the 
fictional stance. We typically know that the work is a fiction and that the words on the page 
represent fictional entities and events. This knowledge shapes our interactions with it: we know 
that the objects represented in the fiction are non-actual, are created, and depend on people and its 
particular medium. Nevertheless, we are still able to think about the fictional objects as 
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representations of objects: as people, places, and things.   
 
 
6.  Ontological housekeeping 
 
Let’s return to the three challenges to my account of fiction that I discussed in §3.1 and explore 
their implications for the fictional stance. 
 First, it’s possible that an audience mistakes a fictional representation for an actual one. 
For example, we can imagine a viewer watching a film that is shot as if it were a documentary, but 
actually is a realistic fiction, like The Boondock Saints example from chapter 1. In this case, I 
would argue that the viewer does not take the fictional stance. However, while the viewer does not 
know that she is reading a fictional work, the work itself still meets the three conditions, and so 
still counts as a work of fiction. She will treat the objects in the narrative as if they were a 
documentation of real-life, actual events. The reader may come to have different responses towards 
the representation later on if and when she finds out that she was watching a fictional story. 
 That was a relatively easy case for the fictional stance to explain. But there are two further 
cases that prove to be more of a challenge. First, there may be situations in which a reader does 
not know whether the narrative she is reading is fictional or real. Perhaps she is reading a well-
researched crime drama and the book jacket, preface, and reviews are ambiguous concerning 
whether the book is based on a fictional murder or a real one. Typically one of these cues will 
indicate that a story is fictional, if we didn’t know already. Or there could be any other number of 
contextual clues about the fictional status of a work: what we know about the author, how the book 
is marketed, what our friends, social media, newspaper, etc. have told us about it, even where we 
101 
 
find the book in the bookstore and how it is marketed online. If these fail, then the content of the 
story will often indicate that it is a work of fiction. All of these cues will be indications for us to 
take the fictional stance. But we can still imagine that a reader simply finds a book and neither the 
context nor the content of the narrative indicates whether the book is fictional or not. Does she 
take the fictional stance in this case? 
 I think she doesn’t. In general, it may be best to be skeptical about the fictional status of a 
work if we lack any indication to treat it as such. This is also Matravers’ position and, perhaps, 
Kendall Walton’s. Matravers’ follows David Davies’ fidelity constraint: we assume that an 
author’s desire to be faithful to how actual events took place constrains nonfictional narratives. 
We do not have the same assumption with fictions; we think that the author was guided by some 
other story-telling purpose (Davies 2007). Walton’s reality principle states that we should treat 
fictional worlds like the actual one except in places where we are indicated otherwise (Walton 
1990). The fidelity constraint and the reality principle both suggest that fictional worlds may be 
like the actual one in many respects, but differ in others. In fact, we can assume that the fictional 
world is like the actual world unless we are explicitly told otherwise. This may not be true for 
some genres, such as fantasy or science fiction, as both philosophers acknowledge, but these will 
probably not be ambiguous cases to begin with. But in many other cases these principles hold. If 
so, we should not take a narrative that seems to be very much like the actual world as fiction unless 
we have some good reason to do so. This means that we should not take the fictional stance towards 
a truly ambiguous narrative.11 
 The second difficult case concerns fictions that contain propositions, objects, places, and 
                                                          
11 See Matravers 2014 for a nice list of narratives that blur the lines between fiction and nonfiction 
narratives. In these cases, it may be best to be skeptical about the fictional status, and to recognize 
the aesthetic purpose behind writing a narrative that is ambiguous between fiction and nonfiction. 
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characters that are a part of the actual world. Two favorite examples in the literature are Conan 
Doyle’s Sherlock Holmes stories, which take place in London, and Tolstoy’s War & Peace, which 
features Napoleon’s land invasion of Russia. London is a real place and, arguably, we need to 
recognize it as such while we are reading the stories in order for them to make sense. The same 
with Napoleon; Tolstoy’s philosophy of history is based on the idea that the narrative he presents 
is based on events the reader knows actually happened. 
 There are two possible ways that the fictional stance can deal with the actual objects (etc.) 
that occur in works of fiction. First, it may be that we take the fictional stance towards the entire 
work, including the objects and propositions that correspond to actual world objects and states of 
affairs.  On this view, we take the fictional stance towards something that is true in the actual 
world. We treat the actual object as part of the world of fiction, as something that fits together with 
all the rest of the created, non-actual objects. This weaves together the (actually) true and (actually) 
false propositions in the story into one fictional narrative. The challenge for this view would be to 
explain how we see the proposition or object as fictional and also as true in the actual world.  
A second possibility is that we only take the fictional stance towards the clearly fictional 
elements in the story and not the actual ones. This view has the advantage of keeping separate the 
(actually) true and (actually) false aspects of a narrative. It may seem like this advantage comes at 
the expense of a disjointed narrative. If we treat the non-actual events in a story separate from the 
actual ones, how do we understand them to be part of the same fictional narrative?  One way to do 
so is to keep in mind that works of fiction are created by authors who themselves take the fictional 
stance. Authors create a representation of a fictional world that bears some resemblances to our 
own. The reader should keep in mind the real aspects of the story for aesthetic reasons.  Readers 
compartmentalize the actual content in a narrative so as not to confuse it with the fictional content. 
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We draw upon our knowledge of London to inform ourselves about Watson and Holmes’ antics, 
but we nevertheless know that the events in the fiction are mainly fictional and so non-actual. Still, 
both elements work together to create a fictional world that bears many resemblances to our own, 
perhaps according to Walton’s reality principle. 
I won’t decide here which of these two positions is correct. The solution may boil down to 
whether readers actually do compartimentalize actual truths separately from merely fictional ones 
(Matravers 2014). It may be that readers do not compartimentalize the actually true information in 
their mental model of the fictional world. Nevertheless, they are able to tell which propositions are 
true of the actual world and which only of the fictional one while engaged with the fictional story. 
Both positions, I think, are compatible with the fictional stance. It’s also worth noting that the 
actual people, places, and things involved in fictional stories are slightly different from their real 
world counterparts; they are fictionalized versions of actual things. Napoleon says and does 
slightly different things in War and Peace than he did in real life, different events take place in 
Sherlock Holmes’ fictionalized London. We bring information about these characters and places 
to our engagement with the fiction, but then let the fiction guide our further thoughts and responses 
to them. This may be a point in favor of the view that we take the fictional stance towards the 
entire narrative, including actual objects contained in it. 
Another major area of debate in the philosophical literature concerns the ontology of 
fictions and fictional entities. Do fictions, and the objects presented in them, actually exist? Clearly 
they are not concrete objects, but do they exist in some other way? There are several possible 
answers to this question. First, it could be that fictional entities are pretend objects; we pretend or 
imagine that they exist, but they actually do not. This is the view held by many theorists of make-
believe, including Walton (1990; see also Sartre 1940/2004). Second, it could be that fictional 
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entities are not actual objects, but rather possible ones; they exist in some other possible world 
(Lewis 1978 & Plantinga 1974). Third, perhaps fictional entities are linguistic constructs, such as 
Russellian definite descriptions (Russell 1905). This is an anti-realist position; fictional names do 
not refer because there is no actual thing for them to refer to. We speak as though fictional entities 
exist, but they do not really (see also Quine 1953). Fourth, fictional entities might be eternally 
existing abstracta, as Meinong famously posited (1904/1981). Fictional entities are not created by 
authors. They also do not exist, but rather ‘subsist’ (a different kind of existence) in an abstract 
realm and are drawn upon by writers of fiction (Wolterstorff holds a similar position, 1980). 
Finally, fictional entities might be abstract artifacts: abstract in the sense that they are not concrete 
particulars, artifacts in the sense of being created (Kripke 2013, Salmon 1998, Schiffer 1996, 
Thomasson 1999 & 2003). 
 Three of these views are inconsistent with the fictional stance and one would be a challenge 
to incorporate. The first is the Meinongian thesis that fictional entities are abstracta that exist like 
Platonic forms—they are eternal, not created. The other inconsistent view is that fictional entities 
are possible objects. In the first chapter, I argued that fictional entities are probably not possible 
objects belonging to possible worlds, because possible worlds are complete and consistent, and 
fictional worlds need not be. That is, for any proposition A, in a possible world B, A must be either 
true or false. This is not so in fictional worlds. To use the famous example, the question “how 
many children does Lady Macbeth have?” has no answer. One can say that “Lady Macbeth has 
fourteen children” but this proposition is neither true nor false in the fictional world, because there 
is nothing in Macbeth to indicate an answer. The number of children that Lady Macbeth has had 
is indeterminate, so the fictional world is also indeterminate. If Lady Macbeth was a denizen of a 
possible world, then there would be an answer to this question (see also Thomasson 1999 and 
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Wolterstorff 1980 for similar arguments; see Priest 1997 for a counterargument). Finally, the 
pretense view directly appeals to distinct mental attitudes and make-believe. Perhaps there is a 
way to have a pretense-based view that denies any non-standard mental states for fiction, as we 
saw in §2, but this view may still commits us to a weaker form of the DAV according to which 
distinct processes and states (pretend ones) are used in our engagements with fiction. 
This leaves the Russellian-type definite description view that denies existence to fictional 
entities and the abstract artifact view that grants it. Both theories have their virtues and both have 
their potential flaws. Both also seem to be compatible with our basic understanding of fictions as 
created by authors.  I mentioned in chapter 1 that I favor the abstract artifact theory. The question 
is whether the fictional stance entails this view. I do not intend for it to do so. Although questions 
concerning the ontological status of fictions and our psychological interactions with them are 
related, I do not think that there is anything about the fictional stance that requires us to be a realist 
about fictional objects. In fact, it might not matter which of these two positions is right if one is 
solely concerned with the psychology of fiction. This is because both of these views deny that 
fictional characters possess spatiotemporal existence. All of the issues concerning our 
psychological interactions arise from the fact that fictional entities are not directly present to us. 
How we feel about the ontology of fiction may not matter for our psychology of fiction, at least if 
we accept the descriptivist or the artifactualist theories, both of which seem compatible with the 
fictional stance and how we tend to think of and interact with fictional entities. 
So the antirealist position is compatible with the fictional stance, at least in principle. In 
practice, however, most antirealists appeal to some version of pretense in order to explain our 
mental attitudes and speech acts about fictions due to issues concerning reference to nonexistent 
entities (I will return to these momentarily). This gives us some reason to be wary of joining with 
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the antirealists. 
Let’s examine Thomasson’s realist artifactual theory more closely to see if it fares better. 
This view states that fictional entities are abstract artifacts, objects which have no spatiotemporal 
location (and, so, are abstract). They exist, but as neither as objects of make-believe, a la Walton, 
eternal abstracta according to Meinongians, nor as real (but non-actual) citizens of another possible 
world. Fictional entities are not alone in being abstract artifacts. Thomasson lists everyday objects 
such as theories, laws, governments and literary works as similar constructed abstracta (see also 
Kripke 2013). Like fictional characters, these objects are “tethered to the everyday world around 
us” by their relation to their creators and copies of their instantiation onto a physical object (e.g. a 
written down or spoken law).  
Fictional characters can be found “in” literary works, but here a similar question arises—
where are literary works, if anywhere? We possess copies of Emma, but the work itself does not 
exist in a particular location and the character Emma exist in the location of a copy of the novel 
(Thomasson 1999, 37). Furthermore, we must treat fictional characters as abstract artifacts 
because they cannot be located in the locations or time they are purportedly supposed to be. We 
would be disappointed if we were to drive the thirty some-odd minutes south from London to the 
manor Hartfield in Surrey and hope to find Emma Woodhouse waiting inside. We would not find 
Emma there and we would also have committed a strange categorical mistake. Competent readers 
understand this as they engage with fictions. As Thomasson states: “[i]n our everyday discussion 
of literature we treat fictional characters as created entities brought into existence at a certain time 
through the acts of an author” (ibid, 16). The sense in which fictional characters do seem to be real 
stems from their created nature: “We do not describe authors as discovering their characters or 
selecting them from an ever-present set of abstract, nonexistent or possible objects. Instead, we 
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describe authors as inventing their characters, making them up, or creating them, so that before 
being written about by an author, there is no fictional object….a work of fiction is necessarily tied 
to its particular origin” (ibid, 6-7).  
 The abstract artifact view is one possible way of understanding the ontology of fictional 
characters, a view that is compatible with the fictional stance and the SAV. There are two main 
issues worth addressing here: whether sentences in fictions possess truth values and, relatedly, 
reference to fictional entities. We already saw that one reading of the fictional stance states that 
some propositions in a fiction do possess a truth value—that is, they can be true or false about the 
actual world. These are sentences like “Napoleon and his army invaded Russia” and “Baker Street 
is in London.” Other sentences do not possess a truth value for the actual world, but rather for the 
world of the fiction. They can be true or false in or according to the story. This is the reading that 
I am inclined towards because it seems to fit nicely with the SAV. But it is not the only possibility. 
Again, I do not think that there is an essential relation between the view that our mental states 
towards fictions are genuine and a positive answer to the question of whether fictions have truth 
values and authors make genuine assertions. The alternative might be that authors pretend to make 
assertions when constructing a fiction. But considering my general anti-pretense position, I am 
disinclined to take this route. 
 Here’s another way in which we can understand the semantic content of a fiction. Kripke 
(2013) and Thomasson (1999), amongst others, have each argued that there are two general kinds 
of sentences we can construct about fictional entities: internal and external sentences. Some 
sentences possess content that is internal to the fictional world. “Claudius killed his own brother,” 
“King Joffrey was a tyrant,” and “Frodo carried the Ring to Mordor” are all sentences internal to 
a fictional world (Hamlet, A Song of Ice and Fire, and The Lord of the Rings, respectively). Other 
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sentences possess content about the actual world, a world external to the world of the fiction. 
“Sherlock Holmes was created by Sir Arthur Conan Doyle” and “Emma Woodhouse does not exist 
in this world”12 are both external sentences, sentences about fictional entities (or definite 
descriptions) but not about the world of the fiction. External sentences are genuine propositions 
that are actually asserted and possess a truth value (both true, in this case). They also possess names 
that refer to fictional entities; on both of these philosopher’s views, fictional entities are abstract 
artifacts. “Frodo” refers to the abstract artifact Frodo, “Claudius” to Claudius the fictional 
character, etc. 
Internal sentences are trickier. Kripke argues that the internal sentences possess the 
implicit, unspoken fictional operator “in the story.” This means that when we say “Claudius killed 
his own brother” what we really mean is “Claudius killed his own brother [in the fictional world 
of Hamlet]”. Kripke does not think that these are genuine assertions (see Kripke 2013, lecture II). 
Instead, he thinks that the speaker pretends to make assertions about states of affairs internal to a 
fictional world. Only external sentences are genuine assertions. We also pretend to refer to a 
fictional character. This is because fictional entities, if they exist at all, are not the types of things 
that can kill, think, etc. They are abstract artifacts, which cannot possess the right kind of properties 
(having a body, being about to think, etc.) 
 I want to resist the pretense move if at all possible. Unfortunately, most realist philosophers 
have adopted some kind of pretense to explain certain types of sentences about fictions (including 
Thomasson, Searle, & Schiffer; Salmon 1998 being an exception).  
Why propose that fictional entities exist and can be referred to for some sentences, but not 
                                                          
12 This is a negative existential, a sentence type that has plagued philosophers for decades. See 
Thomasson 2003 and Kripke 2013 for a discussion. 
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all of them? As Nathan Salmon says, “it is like buying a luxurious Italian sports car only to leave 
it garaged” (Salmon 1998, 298).  This means that one would have to propose a different way to 
make genuine assertions about fictions and refer to fictional entities.  I am inclined towards a view 
that we refer to actual, abstract artifacts in both external sentences and internal sentences. The 
main challenge for this view is to explain how we speak about fictional entities as possessing 
properties that they don’t seem to actually possess. Abstract artifacts cannot possess properties like 
“being rich” or “living in London” because they are not concrete objects. Only concrete objects 
can have these kinds of properties, because only concrete objects can live in London and have 
money (etc.).  
This is an area that is fraught with controversy. As Kripke notes, we need to be able to say 
that a student is speaking the truth when she says that “Emma Woodhouse is rich” (even if she is 
pretending) and false when she says that “Emma Woodhouse is poor.” One possibility is that the 
abstract artifact really does possess the property of “being rich.” But this stretches the notion of an 
abstract entity; how can something that doesn’t take up space have a lot of money? Another, better 
explanation stems from the fictional stance itself. I agree with Kripke and Thomasson that 
statements made in internal fictional contexts—sentences that take the fictional world as their 
content—should be understood as implicitly describing what is true to the story. Hence the notion 
of a fictional operator. When I say that “Emma Woodhouse is rich,” my statement is true according 
to the story but false in the actual world.  
So far this agrees with most realist philosophers’ theories of reference and predication. But 
where other realists propose pretense in order to explain our mental attitude during these 
statements, I deny this. When I make statements like “Emma is rich” I am taking the fictional 
stance: I represent this object as having properties that I know that it does not really, physically 
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possess. Just like speaking about lightning as desiring to strike in a certain location is, strictly 
speaking, a categorical mistake, so too is it a mistake to say that Emma is rich if we do not include 
the fictional operator (see Dennett 1997). Neither speech act necessarily requires pretense. When 
I say that the lightning wants to strike the metal pole, I do not pretend that the lightning possesses 
mental states. I am treating it as if it actually does possess those states—and, more than that, I am 
accepting that it does have that desire. A scientifically-minded friend might come along and say, 
“Well the lightning doesn’t really want to hit the pole. Lightning can’t want anything, after all.” 
The likely response would be that this was “a manner of speaking.” I talk about the lightning as if 
it desires certain outcomes, but I know that it doesn’t really. Still, I speak and think about the 
lightning as if it really does possess mental states. 
The same may apply to our speech acts about fiction. I do not pretend that the fictional 
character Emma Woodhouse is rich. I really do think that this character is rich in the context of the 
story.  In the fictional story, Emma Woodhouse has all sorts of properties. By taking the fictional 
stance I treat the representation of the fictional character in some ways as if Emma is an actual 
person. I do not do this by pretending that Emma is real, since I simultaneously treat her as a 
fictional entity, but rather in terms of how I speak, think, and respond to the character. Moreover, 
when I speak about Emma Woodhouse, I refer to Emma the fictional character—the character that 
actually lacks properties concerning wealth. But I still refer to that character. 
My claims concerning the ontology and semantics of the fictional stance need further 
explanation and elucidation. It is well beyond the limits of this dissertation to do so. I leave it as 
an exciting and philosophically rich project to develop an ontology and semantics of fiction that is 
fully compatible with the fictional stance. For the rest of this dissertation I will explore the 
psychological side of our interactions with fictions, now that we have established how we come to 
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see fictions as fictions and how it is possible to have psychological responses to them. In the next 
three chapters, I will explore different ways in which we psychologically participate with fictions: 
attributing mental states to fictional entities (chapter 4), our emotional responses to fictions 
(chapter 5) and our moral judgments of fictional characters (chapter 6). The fictional stance is the 
foundation for each of these chapters, as well as the following chapters that dissolve the sympathy 
for the devil phenomenon, the puzzle of imaginative resistance, and the question of moral learning. 
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Chapter 4: Understanding fictional characters 
 
 
 
1. A fictional mind-meld 
 
Navigating our social climate would be so much simpler if we could be a little more like the 
Vulcans. Star Trek’s Mr. Spock simply places his fingers against someone’s temples and instantly 
accesses her thoughts, memories, feelings, and past experiences. This allows the Vulcan to 
immediately understand (or, at least, become familiar with) another’s experiences and mental 
states in a deeply personal, intimate way.  
Unfortunately, we are not Vulcans. We can’t simply mind-meld with another person to 
learn what she is thinking and what she has been through. But that does not mean that we mere 
humans are unable to access the mental lives of others. It is often relatively easy to tell what another 
person is thinking. We attribute mental states to others on the basis of their behaviors, verbal 
reports, facial expressions, body language, and even bodily reactions like perspiration, muscular 
tension, etc. For example, I guess that my friend is thirsty if she goes to the kitchen to get a glass 
from the cupboard. I also guess that she believes that the third cupboard from the left contains 
glasses if that’s the one she reaches toward. I predict that my friend will then go to the sink and 
turn on the tap. This requires that I attribute beliefs, desires, and intentions to my friend.  
We can also attribute emotions to others. You watch as your sister gets increasingly irritated 
and angry with her colleague’s insensitive comments about a coworker. She crosses her arms, 
frowns, and scoffs at her colleague’s remarks. You may watch as your friend becomes frightened 
and anxious as he watches a Hitchcock thriller, as he grabs the sides of his chair or clutches his 
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face in nervous anticipation, eyes wide.  Indeed, we are generally quite good at telling when 
someone feels irritated, scared, sad, etc. The same goes for other mental states; we often have little 
trouble attributing both mental state types and content based on another’s facial expressions, bodily 
responses, and behaviors.  
In fact, we seem to have an advantage over the Vulcans when it comes to certain kinds of 
social cognition, our ability to attribute mental states to other people (aka, mindreading) and to 
predict their actions. It is unclear whether Mr. Spock can really understand those around him (at 
least, the non-Vulcan around him!). This is obviously true in the Star Trek series, when the sayings 
and antics of Captain Kirk and the rest of the Enterprise crew continuously puzzle and annoy him.  
This chapter explores our human capacity to understand the mental states of fictional 
entities. While watching a film or reading a novel, we want to know what a character thinks, 
feelings, and believes. This isn’t always explicitly told to us by a narrator or voiceover, so we have 
to use our own general social cognitive abilities to glean a character’s thoughts, beliefs, emotions, 
and desires. This understanding takes the shape of propositional “knowledge that” (for instance, 
knowledge that another person is sad) as well as experiential knowledge (I have the same kind of 
sorrowful feeling as another and so have a similar, but not identical, emotional experience). 
The proponent of the DAV has a ready explanation of our social cognition of fictional 
characters. We encountered it back in the first chapter: simulation theory (ST). Consider one 
example from the opening of this chapter: we watch our sister becoming annoyed with her 
colleague who is spreading rumors about another coworker. How do we know that our sister is 
annoyed, and what she is annoyed about? Simulation theorists argue that we imagine (roughly) 
what it would be like to be in our sister’s situation: her beliefs, thoughts, emotions, perspective. 
Doing so allows us to understand how we would feel if we were “in our sister’s shoes.” From there, 
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we judge that our sister must feel the same way: annoyed about her colleague’s callousness.  
This is a rough sketch of how we simulate more generally; we imagine ourselves in a 
target’s position, imaginatively adopting their mental states, and judging that they must feel and 
think as we do while engaged in the imagining. ST also applies to fictional characters. We can 
imagine ourselves in their situation just like a real person’s. Moreover, we can see how ST is 
compatible with the DAV. ST proposes distinct mental processing during our social cognition of 
both actual and nonactual targets. So we may have imaginative beliefs, imaginative emotions, and 
imaginative desires about our target, but not stereotypical ones. Our simulated mental states are 
supposedly run offline, disconnected from their typical functional role. Indeed, ST has become the 
dominant theory of mindreading in contemporary aesthetics (see Currie & Ravenscroft 2002, 
Freedberg & Gallese 2007, Goldman 2006, Harris 2000, Nichols 2004, and Walton 2006). 
We will explore the question of whether ST is committed to a distinct cognitive attitude in 
§3. If so, and an empathy-based ST is the best explanation of our social cognitive capacities for 
fictional entities, then the SAV is in trouble. The SAV is committed to the idea that we utilize non-
imaginary, stereotypical mental states during our engagements with fiction. This is incompatible 
with the basic principles of ST. 
There is hope for the SAV. In this chapter, I will reject ST as the best theory of how we 
understand the mental states of fictional entities. In fact, ST faces several challenges as a theory of 
social cognition in general: it doesn’t seem to be able to explain the breadth of our social cognitive 
capacities and, on many versions of the theory, it leads us to an undesirable conclusion concerning 
our ability to introspect our own mental states. Even if ST could surmount these difficulties, it 
faces challenges when applied to fiction, as we will see.  
I will propose a different theory of how we understand the mental states of fictional entities: 
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a modified version of theory-theory (TT). Philosophers of art do not typically appeal to TT in order 
to explain our social cognition of fictional entities. This is likely because, unlike ST, TT does not 
appeal to imagination and imaginary mental states. While TT does not appeal to the consensus 
DAV, it is perfect for a proponent of the SAV. TT states that we attribute mental states to others 
through a process of inference-drawing from tacit folk psychological knowledge about mental 
states and particular perceptions and judgments about a target’s behaviors and bodily expressions, 
to conclude that the target must think or feel a certain way. TT faces several standard objections 
in the social cognition literature, most notably that it proposes an overly complex cognitive 
architecture. Perhaps we can directly perceive the mental states of others, as opposed to inference 
or simulation. Direct perception theorists (DPT) argue just that. It certainly feels like we can 
directly perceive when another person is angry or sad, or even that she has certain intentions or 
desires. TT also faces the challenge of explaining the immediacy of or social cognitive capacities. 
I will supplement the traditional account of TT with an account of social referencing: a 
heuristic model of how we quickly understand our social surroundings (see Bermudez 2005).  I 
argue that this updated version of TT can adequately account for the challenges the standard 
account faces. It will also be a solid foundation for explaining how we understand the mental states 
of fictional entities in a way that is completely compatible with the SAV. We use stereotypical 
mental states and mechanisms when we theorize about fictional minds. 
In §2, I will explore a scene from Steve McQueen’s 12 Years a Slave and present the basic 
explananda for a theory of how we understand fictional characters’ mental states. I will then 
consider ST more thoroughly and how it applies to our engagements with fictions before critiquing 
it.  §4 discusses two alternatives to ST: DPT and TT. I present challenges to both views before 
moving on to my modified TT and social referencing. I conclude by showing how my version of 
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TT can best explain our social cognition of fictional entities. 
 Social cognition has its own extensive literature in philosophy, psychology, and 
neuroscience, with implications ranging from childhood development and autism, basic cognition, 
language, evolution, and animal cognition. It is impossible for me to do justice to the extent and 
intricacies of the debate in this chapter. Nevertheless, I think that my arguments in this chapter are 
enough to show the extent and importance of mindreading for our understanding of fictions. We 
can also make some headway in explaining an extremely significant aspect of our social lives in 
general. 
 
 
2. A case study in mindreading 
 
Let’s consider a scene that compels its audience to mindread a character’s mental states. I will use 
this scene as an explananda for an adequate theory of fictional social cognition throughout this 
chapter. If a theory cannot explain how and why we engage with this character, then we should 
look elsewhere for a theory that can. 
 The scene I have chosen occurs late in Steve McQueen’s 2013 film, 12 Years a Slave. 
Solomon Northrup (played by Chiwetel Ejiofor), is a free black man living in New York with his 
family. He was tricked, captured, and forced into slavery in the Deep South. Northrup is shipped 
from plantation to plantation and master to master and eventually finds himself picking cotton on 
a plantation owned by the cruel, violent, drunken Edwin Epps (Michael Fassbender). Northrup has 
cautiously formed friendships with several of the other slaves, including the pretty, innocent, hard-
working Patsey (Lupita Nyong’o). Patsey has already asked Northrup to end her life after Epps 
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repeatedly rapes and beats her. Northrup refuses. Northrup’s constant fear and anxiety reaches its 
zenith when a white man named Treach comes to work on the estate. After the two men converse, 
Northrup begs Treach to bring a letter to his friends in the north, men who can vouch for Northrup’s 
freedom. Treach agrees to take the letter. Sadly, Northrup later discovers that Treach did not 
deliver the letter, but rather disclosed the scheme to Epps—no doubt to raise his own favor and 
gain some easy money in the process. Northrup cleverly talks his way out of trouble when Epps 
confronts him, but the damage is done.  
 This is Northrup’s bleakest hour. Northrup quietly, resignedly continues his work on the 
plantation, not outwardly communicating his despair. But at the funeral of a fellow slave, Edward, 
Northrup finally breaks down. A fellow slave woman sings “Roll, Jordan, Roll” over the burial 
site. The other slaves’ faces are passive, seemingly resigned to their fate on the plantation. But as 
the camera focuses on Northrup, we see another story entirely. A complex emotional narrative is 
expressed in his face. The other slaves sing in the background, but Northrup does not join in. 
Instead, we see a look of bewilderment pass over him, as if he doesn’t quite understand what has 
happened or where he is. There is some shock there as well, perhaps from Treach’s sudden betrayal 
and his own rapid transition from hope to despair. There is also sorrow, but at first it is rather 
subdued. Finally, Northrup joins the others in song. Only then does he break down, quickly 
expressing grief and even anger as he looks skyward, perhaps appealing to a seemingly-absent 
God. The scene ends with Northrup’s voice rising above the other singers’, his face expressing the 
deep hurt that arises from the hopelessness of his situation. 
 It is impressive that a relatively simple scene—one long, close-up shot of a singing man’s 
face—is able to communicate so much and so effectively. How am I able to understand so much 
about Northrup’s mindset from this brief shot, one in which no linguistic communication occurs?  
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Context helps; I am quite familiar with Northrup by this point in the story. I know where he has 
been and what obstacles he has faced. I have developed a strong bond with him, a bond that this 
scene both relies on and reinforces. 
What’s interesting is how easy it feels to glean Northrup’s current state. I must pay attention 
to the story as it unfolds, as well as Northrup’s face throughout the scene. However, I do not seem 
to engage in a great deal of deliberation, thinking through and weighing potential options about 
what Northrup might be thinking at that time—at least, not consciously. Instead, I make quick, 
fairly accurate guesses about Northrup’s thoughts and mood. On some occasions I might have to 
consciously and deliberately consider a target’s facial expression, behaviors, etc. in order to 
appropriately attribute mental states to her.  I may even have to put myself in her shoes, taking her 
perspective and imagining that it is my own. However, it often seems like we can immediately tell 
what someone thinks and feels, as I could with Northrup. How is this possible? 
  One way to access a person’s mental state—and especially emotions—is by examining 
her face. This scene in particular would be far less effective at communicating Northrup’s state of 
mind if the audience viewed a full-body shot instead of a shot framing his face. There is something 
about the human face that effectively communicates and expresses how one currently feels. Alvin 
Plantinga (1999) calls the face of a film character a “scene of empathy”; a direct, basic source of 
our understanding and feeling with her. That certainly seems to be the case here. Indeed, this scene 
is extremely emotionally powerful the experience is for the viewer.  If others are like me, then 
watching Northrup will have elicited a range of strong emotions, such as sorrow and compassion 
for Northrup and anger and betrayal on his behalf.  
 I take our responses to this scene as data concerning how we understand fictional 
characters’ mental states. There are several points in need of explanation. First, we seem to have 
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propositional knowledge of Northrup’s mental states automatically, without conscious deliberation 
or inference-drawing.  I just know that he feels sorrow and believes that he has been betrayed. 
There is a sense of ease and immediacy to our ability to know how Northrup thinks and feels, and 
why. 
 It could be that our quick, seemingly automatic understanding of a target’s mental states is 
caused by equally quick, automatic neural processes. These include mirroring, mimicry, and direct 
association (see Hoffman 2008). Mimicry is an “innate, involuntary, isomorphic response to 
another’s expression of emotion” (ibid, 441). There are two steps involved in mimicking the 
emotion of a target. First, there is an automatic change in the subject’s facial expression, voice, 
and posture at the same time as a corresponding change in the target’s facial expression, vocal 
intonation, posture, etc. These changes then trigger the same feelings in the target as those present 
in the target. There is also some evidence that subjects can mirror the motor intentions of a target; 
witnessing movement in another (or even in a statue!) results in the subject’s motor cortex to be 
activated, as if she were the one moving (Freedberg & Gallese 2007). 
 Mirror neurons may be the neural basis of mimicry. These neurons are triggered when one 
person observes the actions or emotional expression of another. This results in the same kind of 
neural pattern in the subject as if she were actually performing the observed action or having the 
same emotion herself (ibid, 441; see also Freedberg & Gallese 2007, Clay & Iacoboni 2011, and 
Decety & Meltzhoff, Goldman 2006).  
  Direct association occurs when we perceive a target who undergoes an event that is similar 
to one that we have experienced in the past (ibid, 441). For example, a friend of mine has recently 
lost her pet dog and displays sorrow-related signals (crying, having a “long-face,” slouched 
posture, etc.). My memory of a similar situation in which I lost my pet parrot makes me also 
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express these signals and even consciously experience sadness. I make this association 
unconsciously, without thinking about it or planning to do so.  
 Mimicry, mirroring, and direct association might all serve as the basis of how we quickly 
recognize and know about another’s emotional state. The perception of another person causes us 
to have our own emotional responses. We then attribute particular emotions to the target on the 
basis of our own feelings. 
While some of our social cognitive abilities seem to occur automatically, there are other 
cases in which understanding a target’s mental state requires a slower, more thoughtful and 
deliberate processes. Sometimes we may need to take on a character’s perspective in order to know 
how she feels or what she will do next. Perspective-taking seems especially important in 
ambiguous scenes in which we do not know enough about a person or her context, and so we have 
difficulty in judging how she feels, believes, or desires. 
Sometimes perspective-taking is equated with empathy. When a subject X empathizes with 
a target, Y, she imaginatively takes on Y’s mental states as closely as possible.  X shares in Y’s 
mental state and, further, that X’s responses are caused by and involve the same type of state as 
Y’s. In taking another’s perspective, I “put myself in her shoes,” and imagine what she must think 
or feel in a particular situation. 
Like mimicry, empathy can also engender similar emotional states in the subject. Martin 
Hoffman (2008) lists three types of perspective-taking. The first is self-focused; imagining that the 
subject’s situation is happening to ourselves evokes an empathetic response in us. For example, I 
think about how my friend Sarah must feel after she lost her pet dog. Putting myself in her position 
also makes me sad, as if I were the one whose dog has gone missing.  Next, perspective taking can 
be other-focused, during which we attend to the victim’s feelings, behavior and “current life 
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condition” (ibid, 442). In such cases, the observer’s empathy may feel more cognitive than 
affective. I may observe Sarah’s sorrow and imagine how she feels without (consciously) feeling 
the sorrow to the same extent, or imagining that I have gone through the same experience. Hoffman 
argues that self-focused perspective-taking is more intense than other-focused perspective taking, 
perhaps because it is more likely to lead to direct association from past events in our own lives 
(ibid, 442). Finally, perspective taking can focus on both the self and the other person, a mixture 
of the previous two types in which we focus on both how we would feel in a situation and how the 
target must feel. 
Perhaps we have to take on Solomon’s perspective in order to fully appreciate how he feels 
and what he has been through. Indeed, empathetic perspective taking is also sometimes equated 
with simulation. In both cases, we imagine ourselves in the situation of a target (Goldman 2006). 
It would be a major win for the DAV if perspective-taking requires imagination and, further, 
perspective taking of this kind is required for understanding fictional characters. I will reject the 
identification of perspective taking, empathy, and simulation in the following section—
importantly, by denying that perspective taking requires imagining. My challenge, then, is to 
explain how we can understand difficult and ambiguous fictional scenes without appealing to 
imaginative processes. It could be that some other mental process—such as association, theorizing, 
and inference-drawing—can explain our conscious, deliberate thinking about a fictional 
character’s perspective. 
 The scene from 12 Years a Slave captures the intricacies of our relationships with fictional 
entities: we attribute mental states to them, attempt to understand their past and current context, 
and try to determine their prospects for the future. We also seem to have a direct connection to 
characters through our perceptual capacities. I will repeatedly return to this scene as a test case for 
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the main theories of social cognition, as well as my own. It may be that one of the theories is 
particularly effective at explaining mirroring and direct association, but not deliberate perspective 
taking. Ideally, though, we can discover a theory that is capable of explaining all of them together. 
For ease of reference, I will call the seemingly automatic processes (mimickry, mirroring, 
direct association) “low level mindreading” and the slower, deliberate processes “high level 
mindreading.” I will now turn to ST and determine whether it can adequately explain how we 
understand fictional characters.  
 
 
3. Simulating fictional characters 
 
3.1. Varieties of simulation 
Simulation theory arose in the late 1980’s with the work of philosophers like Alvin Goldman 
(1989, 1993 & 2006), Robert Gordon (1986 & 1996), and Jane Heal (1996). ST holds that we 
utilize our own perceptual, emotional, and cognitive mechanisms while mindreading. We project 
or imagine ourselves in the situation/context of the observed person. These mental mechanisms 
are run “offline,” disconnected from their typical functional output (see Currie & Ravenscroft 
2002). This results in imaginative mental states that are distinct from stereotypical mental states. 
 ST has become immensely popular in aesthetics, as well as the social cognitive literature 
in general. This is partly due to the breadth of ST’s explanatory power. ST seems to explain child 
development and autism spectrum disorder (ASD) (Harris 2000, Currie 1996, & Goldman 2006). 
It also may be able to handle questions concerning high and low level social cognitive capacities 
that I discussed in the previous section.  Finally, in the aesthetics literature, many proponents of 
the DAV adopt some version of ST (see Nichols 2006, Currie 1995, Goldman 2006, Walton 1997). 
123 
 
We utilize pretend input (non-genuine beliefs, for example) and garner pretend output (a pretend 
belief about what a character will do next) when we simulate the mental states of a fictional entity.
 There are many different varieties of ST. I will briefly discuss two: Alvin Goldman’s 
enactive imagining and Robert Gordon’s radical simulationism (Goldman 1993 & 2006, Gordon 
1987 & 1996; see also Harris 2000, Nichols & Stich 2000, Heal 1996, Currie 1995, Currie & 
Ravenscroft 2002, Walton 1997, etc.). Central amongst these theories is the idea that simulation is 
the key to understanding mental concepts, mental development, and social interaction. 
 Let’s first consider Goldman’s theory of enactive imagining (1993 & 2006). Goldman 
argues that we attribute mental states to another after we recognize our own mental states under 
actual or imagined conditions. I do not pretend to be the target person; rather, I transform myself, 
imaginatively, into her. I imaginatively take on her relevant beliefs, desires, emotions, and 
perspective.  This is called enactive imagining—or, e-imagining, for short—because I utilize my 
own mental processes for simulative imagining. Imagining the mental states of another involves 
enacting certain perspectives and states, especially when we deliberately take another’s 
perspective. Once I e-imagine myself as the target, I can introspect what I feel during this particular 
situation. I then judge that the target feels the same way. So there is some amount of folk 
psychological knowledge and inference drawing done in the service of simulation. However, such 
knowledge could not be developed without first engaging in imaginative, simulative capacities 
(compare this interpretation of the role of folk knowledge and theorizing to TT, below). 
 There is a further question about how the simulator infers the target’s mental states. 
Goldman (1993) argues that the recognition of one’s own mental states requires introspective 
access to our own thoughts, emotions, beliefs, judgments, etc. One implication of this position is 
that all mental states must have some consciously introspectible property. Indeed, Goldman argues 
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that we introspect the conscious, qualitative feel of each mental state. Just as the taste of chocolate 
has a particular conscious taste, and the color red has a particular qualitative perceptual appearance, 
so too for all of our mental states including beliefs and intentions.  If this is true, then we can 
recognize our own e-imagined mental state by its conscious qualitative features. 
 This is a controversial position, as we will see in the following subsection. Some versions 
of ST seem to rely on a subject’s clear and reliable introspective access to her own mental states. 
Without this access we wouldn’t be able to understand what another person thinks or feels based 
on our own simulated feelings (see Carruthers 1996 for a critique).  
Not all ST’s require conscious introspection. Gordon (1996) offers his radical simulation 
theory as an alternative to such theories. On Gordon’s view, the subject projects herself into the 
situation of another person, makes the relevant adjustments for differences between herself and 
the other person, and then sees how she would react. This sounds quite similar to Goldman’s 
position, but there are several important differences. First, Goldman’s view does not require that 
the simulator possess knowledge of mental concepts, such as beliefs and desires. This is important, 
since very young children can take the perceptive of others without knowledge of mental states 
(Nichols 2004a). Second, the view does not appeal to conscious introspection of our own mental 
states. Gordon takes these two points as benefits of his view, since it does not align him with view 
of self-knowledge according to which our knowledge of our own mental states is incorrigible (we 
cannot be wrong about what state we are in) and transparent (we always know what type of mental 
state we are in while we are in it) that may plague introspective accounts like Goldman’s (Moran 
2001).  
 How can we simulate without the recognition of conscious qualitative states? Gordon 
suggests that simulation utilizes “ascent routines” from one higher, introspective semantic level to 
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another, non-introspective level. Let’s say that I am trying to determine whether my friend thinks 
that the film that we are watching is any good. I imaginatively transform myself into her state, 
taking on her perspective and accounting for relevant differences between us, such as her lack of 
expertise in this film genre compared to my relative abundance, as well as her current emotional 
state, energy level, etc. Now that I have transformed myself into my friend, I simply have to ask 
myself whether I think that the film is any good. I don’t have to ask whether I have a particular 
belief about the film—or, more accurately, that I have formed a particular aesthetic judgment of 
it. There is no higher-order mentalizing at work here, no introspection at all. Rather, I ask a direct 
question about the world—in this case, about the film. Is the film any good? Yeah, it’s good for 
what it is (a zombie apocalypse flick, let’s say). I then remove myself from the ascent routine and 
conclude that this must be what my friend thinks as well. Note that I have attributed a particular 
type of mental state as well as its content; my friend has made a positive aesthetic judgment about 
the zombie film. 
 Goldman and Gordon—as well as other simulationists, like Nichols & Stich (2000), Harris 
(2000), and Currie & Ravenscroft (2002)—both adopt a “hot” simulative methodology. This 
means that we utilize our own mental state processes while attributing mental states to others. It 
draws upon our own capacity to form beliefs, desires, emotions, and intentions while imagining 
how another person feels. The important question for us is whether the imaginative state involved 
in simulating different in kind from typical, non-simulative states. In other words, does ST imply 
the DAV? 
There are two places where simulation may involve a distinct attitude type: the mental 
states used in imagining the target, and the resulting mental states. Currie (1995) and Walton 
(1990) both argue that the imaginative state involved in simulation and the resulting mental states 
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are of distinct in kind. This, as we’ve seen, is due to the fact that they are run offline and possess 
different functional roles than stereotypical states. Goldman (2006), in contrast, argues that the e-
imagined states are not stereotypical beliefs, desires, etc.—also for functionalist reasons—but that 
the mental state that results from e-imagining is. We have a genuine belief that our friend feels a 
particular way or makes a particular kind of judgment. Finally, still other theorists distinguish 
between different kinds of mental states. Currie & Ravenscroft (2002) deny that the beliefs, 
desires, intentions, and judgments involved in simulation (at both stages) are genuine. But 
emotions are. These authors adopt a feeling theory of emotions according to which emotions are 
constituted by affective feelings.  Affective feelings are certainly present during simulation, so the 
emotion is a genuine one.  
So it seems generally accepted that some distinct kind of mental state goes into or is the 
result of the simulative process. This makes ST a good psychological basis for the DAV because 
it explains our understanding of fictional entities in terms of the imagination. Indeed, many writers 
on the psychology of fiction either explicitly (Feagin 2011, Freedberg & Gallese 2007, Goldman 
2006, Harris 2000, Nichols 2004b, Walton 1997, etc.) or implicitly (e.g. Kieran 2010) buy into 
some version of ST. This makes sense given the assumption that imaginative processes require 
that we run our standard mental states and processes offline, and, further, that this requires 
simulation.  
 I will now examine Gregory Currie’s prominent simulation-based psychology of fiction. 
In much of his early work on fiction, Currie (1990 & especially 1995) adopts a version of the ST 
that holds that mental processes must be run offline, disconnected from their typical 
motor/behavioral output and, further, that offline mental states are of a different type from online 
mental states. Currie has backed away from a strong simulative approach in some of his recent 
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work, but the general assumption of offline ST remains the same (see Currie & Ravenscroft 2002). 
Like Walton, Currie argues that our basic psychological interactions with fictions involve games 
of make-believe, games which are based on imaginatively simulating fictional actions and the 
minds of fictional characters: 
I take on, temporarily, the beliefs and desires I assume someone in that situation 
would start off by having; they become, temporarily my own beliefs and desires. 
Being, thus temporarily, my own, they work their own effects on my mental 
economy, having the sorts of impacts on how I feel and what I decide to do that my 
ordinary, real beliefs and desires have. Thus I might start off my imagining by 
taking on in this way the beliefs and desires and also the perceptions of someone 
who suddenly sees a fierce and enraged lion rushing towards him. These beliefs 
and desires then operate on me through their own natural powers; I start to feel the 
visceral sensations of fear, and I decide to flee. But I don’t flee; these beliefs and 
desires—let us call them pretend or imaginary beliefs and desires—differ from my 
own real beliefs and desires not just in being temporary and cancellable. They are 
also, unlike my real beliefs and desires, run ‘offline,’ disconnected from their 
normal perceptual inputs and behavioral outputs…The function of the simulation 
is not to save me from a lion, since I am not actually threatened by one, but to help 
me understand the mental processes of someone who is (ibid 252, 253). 
 
Here Currie presents a standard simulative account: we imaginatively take on the mental states of 
another as closely as possible, and run our “mental economy” in order to see how we would feel 
in that situation. This makes Currie’s view more like Goldman’s e-imagining, rather than Gordon’s 
radical simulation. Note, also, how Currie explicitly adopts the DAV; our mental attitudes about 
imaginings are not stereotypical mental attitudes, but rather pretend/imaginary ones. This is 
because these states lack their typical functional role.  
 Currie’s account depends on two further features of simulation: imagination and 
identification. According to Currie’s ST, audiences are intended to adopt imaginative attitudes 
toward fictional characters and situations (Currie, 1990). Currie distinguishes between primary 
imagining and secondary imagining. Primary imaginings involve what is true in a story, “those 
things which it makes fictional” (1995, 255). We adopt the fictional beliefs necessary to maintain 
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a coherent fiction, while disregarding those which contradict it. I disregard my real belief that no 
objects can move faster than the speed of light while I am watch Star Wars. I also adopt the 
imaginative belief that there is a supernatural Force that guides all things. When I watch 12 Years 
a Slave and come to learn that Treach has betrayed Northrup, I do not acquire a new belief that 
“Treach has betrayed Northrup.” Instead, I acquire a “belief-like imagining” about Treach’s 
betrayal. I may also imaginatively desire that Northrup’s letter plot succeeds.  My imaginings run 
offline in each case. They are simulations of the real mental processes that take place when I 
acquire beliefs and desires about the real world (ibid, 256). 
 Currie’s ST plays a more prominent role in our secondary imaginings about fictions. 
Secondary imagining is a form of simulation that occurs when we engage in an empathetic 
reenactment of a character’s situation (ibid, 256). First, I put myself into a fictional character’s 
position: I imagine what it would be like to be Solomon Northrup during the funeral scene, singing 
amongst the other slaves. I imagine that I, too, have been wrongfully enslaved and taken away 
from my family for years, beaten, over-worked, and finally betrayed by someone I trusted. Then I 
reflect on what I currently feel as the result of this imagining: betrayed, downtrodden, and hopeless. 
Once I identify my thoughts, desires and feelings, I then imagine that that is how Northrup feels 
as well.  In this sense, secondary imagining helps us to identify and empathize with fictional 
characters. I then remove myself from the simulation, so to speak, and attribute these same feelings 
to Northrup. 
  
 
 
3.2. Complications with ST 
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ST provides us with a comprehensive psychological foundation for our engagements with fictions 
if Currie (and others) are right. However, ST also faces several problems as a theory of our social 
cognition of fictional characters—besides the fact that it appeals to imaginary mental states, which 
I criticized in the previous chapters. In this section, I will discuss two problems facing ST in 
general, and two facing ST as a psychological foundation of fiction. 
First, perhaps secondary imagining—or e-imagining—can help us to discover how a 
character like Northrup thinks and feels. But in order to achieve this understanding we must first 
be able to recognize and identify our own mental states. As we have seen, high level perspective 
taking seems to require that we consciously recognize and identify our own mental states through 
their qualitative feel. This means that we should be aware of our simulation as we do it. Two 
questions arise here: a) is simulating a part of our conscious experiences with fictions? and b) is it 
a part of our experience of mindreading others more generally? 
I suggested in chapter 1 that we do not consciously engage in a game of make-believe while 
we watch a film or real a novel. The same goes for simulation; I doubt that most audiences 
consciously enter into a simulation or go through the simulative process in order to understand 
how a character feels or what she believe. Of course, the simulation theorist could reply that 
simulation occurs unconsciously. Note that Currie and Walton both take imaginative simulation to 
be the foundation of our emotional engagements with fictional characters in general. Certainly the 
simulation should be conscious some, or even most of the time. Moreover, how can we square 
unconscious simulation with the idea that we understand the mental states of others based on our 
own state’s conscious, qualitative character? 
 Goldman argues that there are some mental states that are necessarily conscious, and it is 
in virtue of their qualitative character that we can introspect these states (see 2006, §9.6). We can 
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challenge both of these claims. First, there is significant philosophical and empirical support for 
the idea that mental states—including qualitative ones, like perceptions and emotions—can occur 
without conscious awareness (LeDoux 1996, Rosenthal 2005 & 2008, Prinz 2004a, etc.). Goldman 
argues that our social cognitive capacities generally take place without conscious awareness. But 
it is hard to see how this is possible for his theory of e-imagining, since e-imagining requires 
deliberate perspective-taking that we use to recognize our own mental states. The states that we 
introspect must be available, in some way, to consciousness. How can we square this last point 
with Goldman’s assumption that e-imagining can occur unconsciously? It seems that Goldman 
must either give up the idea that the possession and recognition of our e-imagined states necessarily 
have a qualitative feel, or that e-imagining can occur unconsciously.  
Second, people tend to be quite poor at introspecting their mental states, even for seemingly 
intense states like emotions (see Carruthers 2010, Mandelbaum 2013, Rosenthal 2008, & 
Schwitgebel 2007, among others). We often do not know what we currently feel or what our 
occurrent beliefs are.  Goldman seems to be perfectly willing to accept that our introspection is 
fallible. We may not correctly recognize our own mental state or we may misrepresent the target’s. 
The challenge is to show that our introspective capacities are reliable enough to account for the 
ease and regularity with which we navigate our social landscape. Some philosophers, though, are 
skeptical that they are (Carruthers 2010; Schwitzgebel 2007). 
So there are problems involved with our capacity to simulate others. Gordon’s radical 
simulation might serve us better; recall that his theory does not require conscious introspection in 
order for us to understand a target’s mental states. This is true; I have not provided knock-down 
arguments against ST here. Rather, I have considered one aspect of ST that contradicts our actual 
social experiences: we do not always consciously consider other’s mental states by introspecting 
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our own. My other, more general critique of ST concerns its appeal to imaginative mental states: 
ST faces the same functional and inferential challenges that “offline” theories of make-believe, 
imagination, and pretense face. 
I also think that there are several problems facing ST as a general psychological basis for 
our engagements with fictions. Even assuming that ST doesn’t face problems concerning 
conscious experience, it still may be questionable that simulation is required for understanding 
fictional characters. Recall the connection between simulation and empathy: both require that we 
put ourselves in another’s position, taking on their beliefs, desires, and emotions as closely as 
possible. Empathy also involves a kind of emotional state, in which we “feel with” another on the 
basis of imaginatively taking on their perspective. I will have similar emotions to the target if I am 
successful at imagining her mental perspective—and my emotional state will be caused by hers 
(Gaut 1999, Hoffman 2008). For instance, I may imagine what it is like to lose a close relative 
after my best friend’s mother passes away. I imagine that I have lost my mother and feel sorrow 
as a result. My sorrow was caused by witnesses my friends and by empathizing (simulating) her 
perspective. 
Indeed, when people describe our capacity to empathize with fictional characters, they 
often mean that we undergo some kind of simulative process. Does empathy adequately capture 
the ways in which we understand fictional characters? If so, then ST might still be a good theory 
for fictions, if not for social cognition in general. 
 Noël Carroll argues that empathy is generally both unnecessary and insufficient for 
explaining our emotional engagements with fictional characters (Carroll 2008). First, our 
emotional state is generally not type-identical to a character’s, even if our emotions are about the 
same thing (they take the same object). Consider my example from 12 Years a Slave. I had very 
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strong emotional responses to the funeral scene. But were my feelings type-identical to 
Northrup’s? Maybe some of them were—both Northrup and I felt sorrow and despair concerning 
his unfortunate situation. But I mostly felt compassion towards a character that I greatly admire, 
whereas he felts betrayal, confusion, and hopelessness. I do not feel any of those things; I am not 
the one betrayed, even if I do feel anger towards Treach. I do not feel hopeless or confused about 
Northrup’s position. Carroll calls this an “asymmetry of affect” (ibid, 168); there is a significant 
difference between the character and audience’s perspective, situation, and knowledge. This means 
that our emotional responses will often be radically different.  
Furthermore, even if our emotions are type-identical, that does not mean that the 
character’s emotion causes the audiences.’ While watching Star Trek, both Kirk and I fear the 
Romulan ship. Our emotions are type identical and have the same object: we feel fear about the 
approaching Romulans. But that is not to say that Kirk’s fear caused mine. My fear was caused by 
the prospect of a Romulan attack. 
 Carroll introduces the notion of criterial prefocusing in place of ST. Popular film fictions 
are created to be understood by wide audiences. In order to get such diverse groups of people to 
understand and respond to fictions, filmmakers prefocus the narrative—they provide us with 
certain information about the characters, show them  in a certain light (literally and figuratively), 
and deploy features of the medium to guide our thoughts and responses. In fact, virtually every 
controllable factor of a fiction can be utilized to guide an audience’s emotional responses.  If we 
accept the notion of prefocusing, then, Carroll suggests, we generally do not need to introduce the 
notion of simulation. Our emotional responses and allegiances will already be present without it. 
According to Carroll, what we have are “vectorially converging emotive states” with a character 
(ibid, 171). Our emotions are often similarly valenced to the characters, but not type-identical to 
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them. That is, they will both be qualitatively positive or negative. Both Kirk and I experience 
negative emotions, as do Northrup and I, but not always the exact same type of negative emotions. 
 I contend that the same basic arguments apply to other mental states besides emotions. We 
do not generally need to simulate a fictional characters to understand their beliefs, desires, or 
intentions. Narratives are constructed in such a way that much of the guess work is already done 
for us. Characters explicitly tell us how they feel or how they intend to act. We are given plenty of 
information about a character’s personality and context so that their beliefs about a situation are 
often the same as ours—except in cases of dramatic irony, for instance, or when information about 
a character or situation is deliberately withheld from the audience for some kind of narrative effect. 
We may simulate characters in some cases, but it is generally not necessary to do so. 
Carroll rejects ST as the primary type of emotional attachment that we form with fictional 
characters (2008 & 2011). I think that this rejection is warranted, at least in terms of how we take 
on the perspective of fictional characters.  What about the low level feeling with, such as mirroring, 
mimicry, etc.? Can ST explain them? 
In fact, Shaun Nichols (Nichols et al 1996 & Nichols 2004a) denies that simulation is 
involved in either low or high forms of mindreading. Empathy need not be based on simulative 
processes, so Goldman and other simulation theorists’ equation of the two concepts is misleading. 
Nichols argues that some empathy is caused by information that the subject already possesses 
about a particular target. He calls this “information-based empathy.” Consider direct association. 
This holds that we feel with a target when we perceive or hear of her emotion. This triggers an 
association with a stored representation of one of our own past experiences. Recalling this 
experience triggers a similar type of emotional response in us. On this view our own empathetic 
response is at best only indirectly caused by the target and may not require any kind of simulation.  
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Furthermore, Nichols (2004a) is skeptical that mirroring is a kind of simulation (see also 
Carroll 2008). Mirroring and mimicry are best understood as basic, roughly automatic responses 
to certain triggers in one’s environment, not as a simulation of that person’s emotional state. 
Nichols argues that the latter interpretation assumes a significant amount of folk psychological 
knowledge that must be internalized before simulation occurs. But, again, Nichols cites significant 
evidence that mirroring and mimicry occur at very young ages, including in newborns (ibid, 64; 
Decety & Meltzhoff 2011).  
Simulation theorists could respond that humans and some other mammals are 
neurologically hardwired to simulate in this way, and so folk psychological learning is not required 
for very basic kinds of emotional mindreading. Still, I agree with Nichols that it seems implausible 
that simulation is at play in mirroring, mimicry, and direct association. We could construe 
simulation as the representation of another’s mental state that then automatically triggers a similar 
mental state in us. But why think that this is simulation as opposed to a brute, associative 
neurological process? It seems that in order to construe low level mindreading as simulation we 
must water down the concept to make it significantly less interesting and informative.   
I think that we have enough reason to reject ST as the primary explanation of how we 
attribute mental states to fictional entities. I will now turn to two other prominent theories of social 
cognition to see how they fare: direct perception theory (DPT) and theory-theory (TT). 
 
 
 
4. DPT: Social cognition without mindreading 
 
I will begin by briefly explaining DPT. This theory seems to capture the immediacy of our social 
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cognitive capacities about fictional characters as well as the theoretical basis of mirroring, 
mimicry, and association. However, as we will see, this view also faces several problems as a 
general account of social cognition. 
Perhaps we have gone about trying to understand our capacity to understand fictional 
characters in the wrong way. So far, we have been exploring theories of mindreading: how we 
think about and attribute mental states to others. But what if we can just see a target’s mental 
states? 
 This is the claim put forth by direct perception theorists. Shaun Gallagher (Gallagher & 
Varga 2013, Gallagher forthcoming), a leading proponent of DPT, notes that the current trend in 
the social cognition literature frames the debate as a problem of accessing another’s mind. He calls 
this the “principle of imperceptibility”: other people’s mental states are hidden away from outside 
observers and so are perceptually inaccessible. Attributing mental states and predicting their 
behavior thus requires the capacity to mindread. The perception of facial expressions and bodily 
movements may serve as a starting point for mindreading; it is the basic information that gets taken 
up in inferential or simulation processes. According to ST (and TT, see below), we can only 
perceive “mere bodily activity, patterns of mechanical movements that warrant the inference or 
suggest the correct simulation to the other’s intentional states” (Gallagher & Varga 2013, 186). 
Direct perception theorists deny this, arguing instead that perception may go beyond the 
recognition of mere bodily movement to the meaning or intention behind those expressions and 
movements. Gallagher & Varga state: “On this account, in our everyday interactions with others, 
we are able to directly perceive their intentions and emotions; perception can grasp more than just 
surface behavior—or to put it precisely, it can grasp meaning—the intentional in intentional 
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behavior and the emotion in emotional expression” (ibid 186, 187).13 
Theory-theorists like Carruthers and simulation theorists like Goldman deny that we can 
directly perceive another’s emotions and goals (see Carruthers 2013 & Lavelle 2012). Our own 
phenomenological experience may be that of direct perception—that is, it feels like we can directly 
perceive the mental states of other people without mindreading capacities. In actuality, though, a 
great deal of unconscious, rapid simulation or theorizing is required before we can attribute mental 
states to others.  
It may be quite difficult to determine which of these views is correct, at least if we use our 
own conscious experiences as data points. It does seem quite easy for us to glean the emotional 
state of another person through directly perceiving them, as in Eckman’s famous pictures of the 
six basic emotions (Eckman 1999; see also Plantinga 1999). A curl of the lip, broad smile, or 
furrowed brow can all indicate a particular emotional state. DPT states that the perception of these 
expressions is the perception of the mental state itself. This requires that emotions are at least in 
part constituted by bodily reactions, including (but not limited to) facial expressions. Contrast this 
position with the weaker claim that we directly perceive the expression of another’s emotion, and 
then unconsciously infer that she is in a particular emotional state. However, if emotions are 
defined in part by their perceptible bodily reactions, then it makes sense that we can directly 
perceive another’s emotional state. If not, then some kind of inference may be required in order 
for us to move from a perception of a facial expression to seeing a person’s state. 
                                                          
13 Gallagher and Varga are further committed to the embodied cognition, the view that cognitive 
processes extend beyond the central nervous system to movements and responses from the whole 
body, and maybe even beyond the physical body to involve one’s physical and social environment 
(see also Noë & O’Regan 2001, Noë 2004; see Block 2005 and de Vignemont 2011 for critique of 
the embodied thesis). The authors note that one can buy into their DPT without this further 
commitment.  
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 A further worry, as Gallagher and Varga admit, is that sometimes perception leaves both 
the type and content of mental states underdetermined. But, they contend, that does not mean that 
we must appeal to inferential or simulative processes to explain them. Social context and 
knowledge of a target will also add specification. Unfortunately, the authors do not discuss just 
how social context plays this role in mental state attribution. The challenge would be do show that 
background information and social context play role in mental state attribution without also 
requiring mindreading.  
There are two further challenges that face DPT, both as a theory of real-life and fictional 
social cognition. First, what, exactly, does it mean to directly perceive a mental state? Second, can 
we really eliminate mindreading altogether? 
To begin, directly perceiving a mental state seems mysterious. Suppose that we directly 
perceive a facial expression, such as a smile. On some views of perceptual content (as we saw in 
chapters 2 and 3), even recognizing a smile requires the inference or judgment that the object we 
see is of a particular kind. Other theories of perception, such as Susanna Siegel’s, hold that we can 
perceive emotion-kind properties. This means that I can literally perceive happiness in a smile.  
Perceiving emotion-kind properties may work for some straightforward cases. But what 
about opaque situations, or even relatively straightforward cases of social cognition that do not 
necessarily feature obvious emotional expressions? These situations may require even further 
inference-drawing and judgments about how another person feels.  Indeed, the theory-theorist 
would counter that “direct perception” actually involves another kind of inference-drawing, this 
time from a heuristic to a behavior prediction.  
Furthermore, Siegel’s theory of high level perceptual content is controversial; perception 
does require inference drawing of some kind on many views. If that’s so, then direct perception of 
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emotional states is not so mysterious: it’s just inference drawing from stored information about 
emotional expressions to a particular perceptual case. However, on this view, the perception isn’t 
so direct.  
This leads to the second worry: we cannot eliminate mindreading altogether.  Gallagher 
and Varga admit that there will often be situations that do not fit a particular frame and we cannot 
place a person into a particular role. DPT extends only to emotional expressions and bodily 
movements that correspond to emotional states and action goals. It does not tell us about mental 
attitudes such as beliefs, judgments, and desires. These cannot reliably be directly perceived. If 
that’s true, then we may need some kind of high level mindreading capacity to help up in opaque 
or novel situations. We sometimes need to take the perspective of others in order to understand 
their mental states.  It seems unlikely that we can learn all about Northrup’s feelings and beliefs, 
for example, just by perceiving his face.  
At best, DPT can explain some cases of social cognition about certain types of mental 
states. It cannot help us in opaque social situations, or sometimes even about the content of mental 
states in simple ones. Furthermore, the nature of the “direct perception” is mysterious and, quite 
possibly, inferential. However, DPT does seem to capture the sense of immediacy and automaticity 
of both our feeling with fictional characters and understanding their emotional states. 
 
 
5. Theory-theory 
 
The concerns I raised in the previous section about DPT may suggest that we shouldn’t eliminate 
mindreading altogether if we want to know how to understand another’s mental states. In this 
section, I will examine theory-theory (TT). TT is often seen as the main competitor to ST. 
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However, aestheticians rarely appeal to TT as a psychological basis of our engagements with 
fiction. As stated previously, I suspect that this is because TT does not appeal to our power of 
imagination, while ST does. 
Theory theorists argue that our mindreading capacities—our ability to attribute mental 
states to others and predict their behavior—stem from our deployment of a folk psychological 
theory of mind. Some argue that this theory is learned and developed early in life; others argue 
that it is innate, stored in specific modules dedicated to mindreading. In either case, our theory of 
mind includes a variety of general social platitudes concerning our folk psychological concepts. 
These include states like beliefs, desires, intentions, emotions, and perceptions and the typical 
consequences and basic inferences that arise from their combination. We draw upon this 
theoretical knowledge and make inferences from particular tenets to a conclusion about what an 
individual thinks, feels, or intends to do.14 
 TT was born out of work by philosophers such as Wilfred Sellars (1956) and David Lewis 
(1972), both of whom denied that knowledge of our own mind is the result of direct introspection. 
Rather, it is a matter of understanding folk psychological knowledge concerning the functional 
roles of particular states. Sellars intended for this view to combat a Cartesian “Myth of the Given” 
by which we have direct, infallible access to our own mental states, including both qualitative 
states and mental attitudes. Similarly, David Lewis argued that folk theory of mind is implicit in 
our everyday talk about mental states. We regularly discuss and consider platitudes regarding the 
functional and inferential roles of our mental states. This requires that we have a basic 
understanding of what kinds of actions and further mental attitudes may result from a particular 
                                                          
14 See Carruthers 1996 (ed) for a comprehensive overview of different theories of mind and 
Carruthers 2000 for a discussion of the modularity thesis. See also the Internet Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy “Theory of Mind” article for a less biased approach. 
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belief, desire, intention, or pairing of mental attitudes (e.g. belief + desire). We encountered this 
basic functionalist idea in chapter 1. We have a basic understanding of the sorts of behaviors that 
will result from our occurrent beliefs and desires.   
Contemporary theory theorists include Alison Gopnik (1993), Jerry Fodor (1983), Peter 
Carruthers (1996a), Alan Leslie (1996 & 2000), and Simon Baron-Cohen (1995). Each of these 
theorists argues that our social cognitive abilities arise from a capacity for utilizing folk 
psychological knowledge and drawing inferences about our social environment based on that 
knowledge. 
The two dominant versions of TT are the “child-scientist” theory held by Gopnik and the modular 
theory favored by Carruthers, Baron-Cohen, and Fodor. The difference between these two versions 
of TT concerns how we acquire our folk psychological theory of mind. Gopnik argues that this 
knowledge is internally represented by normally functioning persons and has much the same 
structure as a scientific theory, including theories, postulates, and observations. Our theory of mind 
is used in much the same was as scientific theories are, as bases for our own observations and 
methods to help guide our inferences. The theory starts out early in life as quite limited but 
develops and becomes more sophisticated at regular periods throughout a child’s cognitive 
development—as seen, for instance, in the child’s ability to pass theory of mind and false-belief 
tasks around age four, but not previous to that age (Gopnik 1993; Gopnik & Schulz 2004; see 
Wimmer & Perner 1983 and Harris 2000 for overviews of the task). 
 Carruthers and other modularity theorists find the child-scientist view untenable. He points 
out that it is remarkable that almost every child develops roughly the exact same theory of mind 
at the exact same stages of development. The child-scientist theory lacks the precision to explain 
these regularities in development—on that view, why wouldn’t individual children develop quite 
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different theories based on their unique environment and personal idiosyncrasies? The best way to 
explain developmental regularities is by positing an innate theory of mind module, a psychological 
mechanism that represents certain specific information and may be separate, or encapsulated, from 
other modules, so that each module specifically pertains to a particular task (Fodor 1983).  The 
theory of mind module gradually becomes more functionally activated throughout development, 
similar to a Chompskian notion of a language module that allows us to acquire a first language at 
regular intervals throughout our development. 
Like ST, TT also developed from research on the childhood development of social 
cognition, and particularly from research on children with ASD. The cognitive, imaginative, and 
social deficiencies that plague children with ASD may be the result of a deficient theory of mind, 
whether learned or innate (see Gopnik & Schulz 2004 for the former position, Baron-Cohen 1995 
& Carruthers 1996b for the latter; see Currie 1996 and Goldman 2006 for a denial of theory of 
mind in ASD). These children often have great difficulty in navigating their social environment 
because they lack the typical folk psychological knowledge that is required for maneuvering their 
social environment. Contemporary theory theorists include Alison Gopnik (1993), Jerry Fodor 
(1983), Peter Carruthers (1996a), Alan Leslie (1996 & 2000), and Simon Baron-Cohen (1995), 
each of whom holds that our social cognitive abilities arise from a capacity for utilizing folk 
psychological knowledge and drawing inferences about our social environment based on that 
knowledge. 
 Maybe we do possess a great deal of folk psychological knowledge. But it certainly doesn’t 
seem like it during our actual, first-person experience of our social interactions. Surely we 
generally don’t deliberately or consciously draw inferences about another’s mental states and 
behavior. Again, mindreading often seems to take place automatically, without deliberation, 
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inference, or any kind of conscious theorizing. Carruthers believe that a modular TT can 
accommodate this first person experience. From an early age, we internalize a great deal of 
knowledge about the mental lives of others, supplementing this knowledge to our innate theory. 
We practice implementing this theory on a regular basis, eventually becoming so good at mental 
state attribution that it seems automatic and can occur very quickly. Furthermore, much of the 
mental processing that occurs during this process takes place a subpersonally and unconsciously. 
We may only be consciously aware of the end result. Consider, for example, how I come to be 
consciously aware of a tree outside my window. I have no knowledge of, or access to, the variety 
of processes and mechanisms involved in my perception. I am only consciously aware of the 
product of all that processing. The same may be true of our social cognitive capacities; the 
knowledge of our own and other minds may feel automatic, but it is always the result of some kind 
of theoretical inference (Carruthers 1996a, 27). 
 So TT is able to sidestep the worry concerning consciousness that plagues ST. However, 
TT is not typically used as a tool to explain our engagements with fictions. This is surprising, 
considering the vast literature on fiction and simulation.  
Mental theorizing about fictional entities would arguably be roughly the same as how we 
theorize about real people. There may be some differences in terms of the intentional content of 
our theorizing between real-life and fictions. We never have the experience of traveling through 
space and fighting Sith Lords, for example. There may also be some limitations in terms of what 
we have the folk knowledge to theorize about; e.g., some situation that is wholly unfamiliar to us 
in the real-world. But this is no different than if we encountered an unusual or unfamiliar person 
or circumstance in our daily lives. Finally, mental theorizing about fictional entities may require a 
reader or viewer to understand the conventions of a particular fictional media. I will return to these 
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points momentarily. 
So far, TT sounds quite compatible with taking the fictional stance. This makes it worth 
exploring as a psychological foundation for the SAV. The key to understanding how we mindread 
fictional characters requires us to understand how we do so in real-life cases.  
 Let’s begin with an example. Suppose that you are having dinner with some friends. 
Everyone at the table is laughing merrily, eating and drinking with gusto. Everyone, that is, except 
for your best friend. She sits at one end of the table, barely eating and not joining in with the others’ 
frivolity. You want to understand how your friend currently feels (remember that this can take 
place consciously and deliberately, but generally will not). Your perception of your friend—her 
slouched shoulders, crossed arms, tense facial expression, quietness, untouched plate of food and 
glass of wine, etc.—all serve as data points that you use in your inferences to draw a conclusion 
about her feelings and beliefs. Perhaps your folk psychological knowledge tells you that, generally 
speaking, that kind of facial expression and those kinds of behaviors often correspond to an 
anxious emotional/mood state. Deploying your theoretical knowledge about emotions, you may 
put together all that you perceive about your friend, as well as some information about social 
context and your friend in general, and conclude that she is anxious about something. 
We can apply this basic TT framework to our engagements with fictions. We do not project 
or imagine ourselves in Northrup’s situation in order to understand what he is feeling. All we need 
to do—after taking the fictional stance—is call upon our folk psychological knowledge of 
emotional expressions. This squares with my discussion of Northrup in §2.1.  On this view, I watch 
Northrup’s face at the funeral and draw inferences from my knowledge of facial expressions and 
Northrup’s relevant beliefs and desires to conclude that he feels bewildered, angry, sorrowful. I do 
not need to imagine myself as Northrup, a slave in the Deep South who was recently betrayed by 
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a man named Treach, in order to gain access to what he is thinking and how he feels.  This also 
implies that if I feel anything towards Northrup, it will not necessarily be the same emotion-type 
as he feels, but rather whatever emotion that one would experience upon learning about Solomon’s 
situation, which may be similar to Solomon’s but not type-identical.   
There’s another positive feature of applying TT to our social cognition of fictional entities: 
TT can explain how our knowledge that an object is fictional affects our responses to it.  
Understanding fictional entities requires that we have some knowledge of fictional and medium-
specific conventions. Recall that when we take the fictional stance that we do not forget that the 
object of our engagement is non-actual. For example, we know that Northrup is a fictional 
character and does not exist in our world (even if he is based on an actual person). This knowledge 
carries with it certain information. We know that individual time-slices of Northrup are supposed 
to correspond to one unifying fictional person. We know, if we are watching a film, that we cannot 
reach out and touch Northrup. We also know that Northrup’s story will probably follow certain 
conventions. We know things about his past, although not as much as we would if we were to be 
as emotionally close to an actual human embodiment of Northrup. Basically, knowledge of fictions 
may be developed and employed as a special kind of theoretical knowledge, knowledge that is 
fairly easily acquired for almost every human. If we consider our engagements with fictional 
characters a kind of social cognition, then it may be that our knowledge of fictional characters to 
be a highly specialized kind of mental theorizing. 
 According to TT, mirroring, mimicry, and direct association may not be a matter of 
simulating another’s mental state, which implies that we ourselves must copy the observed state 
of another. Instead, we take our perception of another’s facial expression or movements as data 
points to be explained. A theory-theorist would argue that, once we deploy our theoretical 
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knowledge about facial expressions, movements, and intentions, our own motor and emotional 
systems are triggered, leading to the kind of effects that mirroring/mimicry researchers have 
reported. Direct association implies that we would draw comparisons between our own 
experiences of a particular type of emotional situation and what we felt in that instance, and then 
infer that the other person must feel the same way. Or, as Carruthers (1996a & 2010) points out, 
even if these low level mindreading does involve simulation, theoretical knowledge and inference-
drawing may still be required for us to get from the perception of another, to a representation of 
her emotion, to our own simulation of that emotion, and back to mental state attribution. Granted, 
these inferences and knowledge will be subpersonal and unconscious—they will not feel at all like 
deliberate inference-drawing. The important point is that, prima facie anyway, folk theory and 
inference-drawing can explain low level feeling with without appealing to simulation. 
 High level feeling with may pose more of a problem if it is necessarily imaginative. Recall 
that simulation theorists argue that perspective taking involves imagining ourselves to be in the 
situation of another person. For a short time, I imagine myself to be my friend, with all of her 
relevant properties. I then conclude that she feels a certain way based on what I imaginatively feel. 
In contrast, Carruthers and other theory-theorists argue that perspective taking draws upon a great 
deal of knowledge about minds and mental processes. The ability to recognize the mental states of 
another based merely on facial expressions and body language seems to require us to have a great 
deal of knowledge about bodily expressions and behaviors. We also need to draw inferences from 
what we know about emotions and our simulated imagining to a conclusion about the mental state 
of another.  
Perhaps both high and low level feeling with are primarily associative processes, and 
inferring another’s mental states on the basis of those. Inferring the emotional state of another may 
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be an after effect of recalling situations that are meaningful to us. Do basic mindreading capacities, 
like mimicry and mirroring, require inference drawing? The theory-theorist argues that they do 
(Carruthers 2013; Lavelle 2012). On their view, even these basic perceptual and affective 
processes are inferential—for example, we must draw an inference from the perception of a face 
and our stored representations of those kinds of faces in order to conclude that the current 
perception is of a certain kind.  
One potential issue with this explanation is that TT is supposed to appeal to folk 
psychological knowledge—i.e. Lewis’s mental platitudes. Like other critics of TT, I find it 
implausible that our basic knowledge of mental processing includes information concerning 
perceptual and affective processing (see, for example, Currie 1996 & Heal 1996). If that’s true, 
then TT faces a serious challenge regarding low level mindreading.   
 There’s a further worry about TT in general that is worth noting. The examples of mental 
theorizing that I have used up to this point have been fairly general. In general, we can learn of a 
target’s mental state type by theorizing from our (innate or learned) folk psychological knowledge 
about behaviors expressions, body language, social context, etc. We then draw a pretty good 
inference concerning the generic mental state the observed person is in. So TT may give us a fair 
idea about general mental state types. But can theorizing from general knowledge and platitudes 
tell us the content of a particular state? Some critics are skeptical that it can. Jane Heal (1996; see 
also Perner 1996) makes this point. She notes that TT faces a problem similar to the ‘frame 
problem’ in computer science. Very briefly, this implies that we have a limited capacity to store 
and deploy folk psychological knowledge, but our social interactions require a vast amount of 
stored information about the mental lives of others and ourselves that we deploy on a regular basis. 
Our innate or acquired theory would have to be incredibly complex to deal with any particular 
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situation in which we find ourselves.  
Part of the problem is that the folk psychological theory has to be general enough to apply 
to a great deal of situations. But then we face another problem—the theory is not specific enough 
to be able to help us understand the content of another’s mental state at a particular moment. If we 
really want to understand Northrup’s mental states, for example, we not only need to be able to 
explain what type of emotion he feels (for example), and why he feels that way. Perhaps a folk 
psychological theory could explain the content of a mental state, but then the theory would be far 
too complex to be realistically mentally stored. According to theorists like Heal, Perner, and 
Nichols (Nichols et al 1996), the frame problem suggests that TT must either be discarded or 
supplemented by another, simpler mechanism, such as a simulative one. 
 
 
6. A Modified TT 
 
I am sympathetic to the critiques raised concerning both TT and DPT. However, I also think that 
TT is the best kind of theory for explaining how we understand the mental lives of fictional 
characters. Moreover, DPT captures the prima facie immediacy of our ability to perceive the 
mental states of others.  
 In this section, I will spell out my own account of mindreading fictional entities: a modified 
version of TT that, I hope, makes up for its downfalls. I achieve this by supplementing the standard 
TT model with a theory of social referencing, another way in which we attribute mental states to 
others that does not require high level mindreading. However, it still requires inference drawing, 
as we will see. 
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6.1. Social referencing 
José Bermudez’ “social referencing” model contends, like Gallagher’s DPT, that social cognition 
often does not require mindreading per se; rather, it is often enough that we understand certain 
social scripts, roles, and schemas and make use of basic cognitive heuristics to understand a 
target’s mental states and to predict her behavior (Bermudez 2005). 
 The idea that cognitive processes involve heuristics has become pervasive in cognitive 
science. A traditional view of human cognition is that we are “rational actors”; we choose what 
options to pursue by assigning and assessing the probability and results of each possible outcome, 
determining the utility of each to the best of our ability, and then combining these assessments. 
The option we choose—either for our own actions, judgments, and beliefs, or for understanding 
another’s—is the one that maximizes probability and utility (Gilovitch and Griffin 2002). But there 
is a decent amount of recent evidence that humans do not always think like this (see Nisbett & 
Wilson 1977, also Damasio 1994 & Sloman 2002). We take shortcuts that minimize the amount 
of cognitive strain and energy required to reach a decision, judgment, or solution to a problem. We 
have “bounded rationality”; there are processing limitations to the human mind (Simon 1955). 
People may reason and choose rationally within the constraints imposed by their limited search 
and computational capacities. We are also “cognitive misers.” We utilize as little cognitive power 
as possible that is needed to efficiently reach some conclusion or result in some action (Eiske and 
Taylor 1991). We are not cognitively lazy. Rather, we have developed problem solving shortcuts 
that generally allow us to quickly and effectively maneuver our social environments, freeing us to 
pursue other activities. 
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 One method of achieving this comes from the implementation of cognitive heuristics. Very 
basically, a cognitive heuristic is a problem solving capacity that allows us to make a judgment or 
reach some conclusion by utilizing simple devices in lieu of more costly reasoning processes. For 
example, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong and his colleagues define heuristics as unconscious attribute 
substitutions: we determine that X has a target attribute by unconsciously using information about 
another, different attribute that is easier to detect (Sinnott-Armstrong et al 2010). For example, by 
using the availability and representativeness heuristics, one forms a belief about a relatively 
difficult attribute of a situation or object based on a more accessible one. In one study, participants 
were asked many seven-letter words whose sixth letter is ‘n’ (_____n_) occur in the first 10 pages 
of Tolstoy’s War and Peace. They were also asked how many seven-letter words ending in “ing” 
(____ing) occur in the first ten pages of War and Peace. Interestingly, the average answer to the 
first question was significantly lower than the answer for the second. But, as Sinnott-Armstrong 
and his colleagues note, the correct answer to the first question cannot possibly be lower than the 
answer to the second since every seven-letter word ending in “ing” is also a seven-letter word with 
‘n’ as the sixth letter! Participants tend to make this mistake by using the availability heuristic—
their guesses are based on how easy it is for them to come up with examples, and some examples 
are more readily available to us. It is significantly easier to come up with examples of the seven-
letter “ing” words; less so for seven letter words with ‘n’ in the sixth spot (ibid, 249).  
The recognition heuristic is similar to the mere exposure effect, according to which we 
choose and tend to prefer things that we know over those with which we are unfamiliar (Zajonc 
1968). An important heuristic for our purposes is the affect heuristic. Thinking about an action or 
person, whatever it is, may make us feel positively or negatively. We take these feelings in turn to 
constitute judgments that the action or person is morally wrong (Sinnott-Armstrong et al 2010; 
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Slovic et al 2002). Our moral beliefs are based on these emotional responses instead of deliberate 
reasoning processes. I will return to a discussion of the affect heuristic in chapter 6 when we 
discuss our moral judgments of fictional entities. 
 Each of these heuristics may provide us with quick, efficient means of judging a situation, 
whether we are in a social context (as with the affect heuristic) or trying to solve some problem 
(as in the availability and representativeness heuristics). There is a sense in which simple heuristics 
“make us smart”; they allow us to come up with judgments that we wouldn’t normally be capable 
of making, or at least not as quickly or easily (Gigerenzer et al 2002). On the other hand, cognitive 
heuristics are fallible and, because they are not always under our deliberate control, they can be 
unduly influenced by biases or implemented without sufficient information (see Kahneman & 
Tversky 2002). Still, many researchers agree that cognitive heuristics are accurate enough in 
typical environments; problems arise in difficult or atypical ones. 
 Returning to social cognition, authors like Bermudez hold that we can utilize cognitive 
heuristics to help us understand our social environments. We do not always need to go through 
cognitively expensive high level mindreading processes to understand the mental states and actions 
of others; rather, we can make use of simple generalizations and rules that will key us into what 
another is most likely thinking.  Bermudez highlights two ways in which we can utilize heuristics 
for social cognition. We have already encountered the first in terms of Gallagher and Varga’s DPT: 
emotional perception. Our perception of the emotional state of another person depends on cues 
outside of conscious awareness. We recognize these cues, such as facial expression and body 
language, without consciously or deliberately identifying them. This perception acts as a kind of 
heuristic by which we attribute a more complex mental state to another based on something that is 
relatively easy for us to recognize (Bermudez 2005, 199).  
151 
 
 Second, we can base more complex social interactions on simple social rules, scripts, and 
frames. Bermudez asks the reader to imagine that you are sitting in a restaurant, about to order 
lunch. A server walks towards you. We can ask ourselves what the server is thinking at this 
moment and why he acts as he does (walking to the table). Do we need to go through a mindreading 
process to answer these questions? Bermudez suggests that we don’t. Instead, we can put into 
practice information that we already possess concerning our current social situation and social 
roles we fill. In this case, you are in the ‘diner’ role. There are standard norms of behavior for how 
to act in this role: you sit down, you are quiet, you do not shout across the restaurant to grab the 
server’s attention, etc. There are also typical mental attitudes: intentions, desires, beliefs, etc. The 
server also fills a role: his job is to seat you, bring you what you need when asked, take your order, 
etc. Together, this information makes up our restaurant ‘frame’—a general template for a particular 
social situation—and your server follows a general behavioral ‘script.’ To answer our questions 
about what he will do and what he is thinking we do not need to engage in mindreading. We just 
need to recognize and apply the right frame to the situation and roles for the person. In this instance, 
we would probably be correct in determining that the server is walking towards me because he 
wishes to take my order.  
 How would social referencing help us to understand the mental states of fictional 
characters? Carroll’s own view appeals to something like Bermudez’s social referencing. Carroll’s 
view of how we understand the mental states of fictional film characters, the cognitive heuristic 
model, blends DPT and social referencing (Carroll 2008). Carroll discusses the heuristic model in 
light of complications with both ST and the TT. Instead of simulating the mental states of another 
person in order to understand their mental states (as in ST) or employing a mini scientific theory 
to do so (TT), Carroll suggests that we glean the mental states of others on the basis of schemas, 
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encoded scripts, prototypes, contextual cues, exemplars, and other heuristics (ibid, 174-175).  He 
notes that: 
  
When we hear that a relative has secured a long-sought-after job, all things being 
equal, we suppose that she is happy and we rejoice for her. There is no need for 
simulation. We have access to a body of prototypes regarding emotional responses 
in certain contexts as well as recognitional cues, such as facial expressions and 
postures, which enable us to assess the emotional states of others. These are not 
theories and they are not applied by subsuming particular situations under 
nomological generalizations as the theory-theory might have it. Rather, they are 
prototypes—schemas, scripts, and recognitional cues—employed by analogy 
(analogy rather than subsumption) (ibid, 175). 
 
Like Bermudez, Carroll suggests that frames, heuristics, scripts, roles, etc. are enough for us to 
understand the mental states and predict the behaviors of others. This is especially true in situations 
like the restaurant, according to which there are clear normative guidelines for how one should 
behave. Other examples come to mind: our behaviors and feelings at sporting events, in museums, 
on the subway, in a doctor’s office, at the family dinner table, etc. Perhaps Carroll is right in saying 
that fictions present us with even greater range of scripts and frames. We can generally guess, 
based on prefocusing techniques as well as the narrative, how a character will act, how she feels, 
and what she is thinking even without engaging in mindreading. Much of the information has been 
provided to us by the filmmakers. 
However, social referencing also faces similar challenges to DPT. First, it’s not entirely 
clear that the use of scripts, frames, etc. is non-inferential. Second, the scripts and frames we do 
possess may not help us in ambiguous, opaque, novel, or complex social situations. Any social 
behavioral that is run “off-script” will not be understood. It seems, then, that we cannot completely 
do away with mindreading. 
Consider our attempts to understand Northrup. This scene is opaque; we need to engage in 
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some kind of mindreading in order to fully understand how Northrup feels.  Indeed, our social 
frames may not be specific enough to apply in each particular scene that we encounter. We may 
not possess the requisite knowledge of which scene to apply in a specific case. For 12 Years a 
Slave, we would need to have a fairly general script about the social interactions between slaves 
and masters, and slave life in general. Even if we do possess these frames, it is not clear that even 
this script would apply in Northrup’s case.  We would need to supplement our heuristic abilities 
with mindreading in order to fully understand how Northrup feels. 
 
 
6.2. TT with social referencing 
Neither TT nor social referencing can explain the full range of our social cognitive capcities on its 
own. I propose combining the two theories to form a modified TT that makes up for the challenges 
each face on their own. Recall the explananda for a theory of social cognition of fictional entities. 
We often find ourselves in social situations where we consciously desire to know more about what 
another thinks, feels, or intends to do. Our social cognitive capacities seem to occur automatically, 
without telling them too. It’s as if we are constantly on the lookout for social cues concerning what 
other people are thinking and feeling and our social cognitive capacities are deployed without 
forethought. Low level mindreading techniques may help explain how this is possible; processes 
like mirroring and association take place without deliberation or thought. In other occasions, we 
may need to consciously and deliberately engage in high level mindreading, like perspective 
taking. This would help us in ambiguous and novel social situations. 
 I think that we can account for these explananda with a modified TT. On the one hand, we 
think of ourselves as fully rational, deliberate thinkers that consciously work through steps of a 
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problem, weigh potential outcomes, and draw conclusions. TT has a ready explanation for this. 
We make associations between our current social climate, including the mindreading target, and 
our folk psychological theories about how people typically act in such situations. We draw a 
conclusion about what a target thinks or feels based on our beliefs, contextual information, and 
knowledge about the type of situation at hand. This includes a target’s behaviors and bodily 
expressions. 
On the other hand, it seems quite clear that many thinkers do not typically solve problems 
this way, or at least not consciously. Quite a bit of our problem solving occurs unconsciously and 
automatically, utilizing quick and efficient cognitive tricks and tools that maximize efficiency and 
minimize cognitive expenditure. TT can help us here as well. As I suggested in 5, even low level 
mindreading, such as mirroring and mimicry, may require some kind of inference drawing from 
tacit theories about social interactions and mental states. Even the ability to recognize facial 
expressions and conclude that a target feels happy, sad, or anxious requires inference from stored 
information to a particular case. On this view, “direct perception” isn’t that direct. Our ability to 
perceive emotional and/or intentional states may actually involve some kind of inferential 
judgment, even if it doesn’t consciously feel like it. 
The problem was that TT seems overly complex. It requires us to hold a great deal of tacit 
information about social interactions. Heal compared this to the frame problem in computer 
science; the human mind cannot store as much data as TT seems to require in order for it to be 
specific enough to account for complex social situations and to reveal detailed information about 
the type and content of a target’s mental states. 
But what if TT doesn’t require us to have detailed information about particular social 
situations? What if there is a cognitively “cheaper” version of it? This is where social referencing 
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enters the picture. At least some of our tacit knowledge about social situations comes in the form 
of mental heuristics like scripts, frames, and social cues. When we find ourselves in commonplace 
or familiar social situations, we draw upon those scripts and frames in order to understand how the 
people around us think and feel. We draw inferences from our tacit scripts and frames to what we 
perceive and believe about our current circumstances. We then infer what a target will do, how she 
feels, or what she believes on the basis of this knowledge. 
Understanding and predicting behaviors will often require us to draw upon perceptual 
capacities, background information we have about the particular person, and mindreading. It may 
be that in stereotypical situations we can call upon social referencing cues, frames, and scripts to 
explain another’s behavior. Low level mindreading and social referencing help us here.  
In other cases, particularly opaque or challenging social interactions, our seemingly 
immediate mental state attributions will have to be supplemented by more deliberate social 
cognitive abilities, like inferential perspective taking. Sometimes social referencing will give us a 
good idea of how a target feels. However, we sometimes want to delve deeper into another’s 
perspective or we just can’t tell what to think of her.  This will require further, more cognitively 
sophisticated, mindreading based on our tacit folk theoretical knowledge. 
Let’s reexamine the scene from 12 Years a Slave, this time in terms of my modified TT. 
Upon perceiving Northrup’s own highly expressive face, I come to recognize that he is in a 
negative emotional state, such as deep sorrow. This judgment may arise from low level 
mindreading processes like mirroring, inferred from tacit knowledge about what facial expressions 
reveal about emotional states. I may also understand that Northrup feels betrayed and believes that 
his situation is hopeless.  I will acquire this knowledge based on the information I have about this 
character and, again, what his behavior and facial expression reveal about his inner states.  
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As Northrup’s expression changes, so too does my own interpretation of what he feels. I 
may infer (through either low or high level mindreading) other kinds of emotions in his face, such 
as anger. At the same time, I also consider what I know about Northrup and what I know about the 
history of the American slavery, any other information that might be relevant to my understanding 
of what Northrup feels, and why he feels that way. I may be surprised and perplexed by his sudden 
look towards the heavens and then need to take on his perspective momentarily to understand why 
he did this.  
I argue that both low and high level mindreading processes inform our knowledge of 
Northrup’s mental states. Both are inferential, some resulting from tacit knowledge of social scripts 
and frames, some from more general folk psychological knowledge about human behavior and 
mental states. Ultimately, I argue that this view avoids the problems that plague each of the 
individual theories that we have previously encountered, and especially ST. We do not need to 
posit distinct mental states, like imaginative beliefs and emotions, in order to understand how a 
target feels. This is true for both real-life and fictional objects. All we need is our tacit folk 
psychological knowledge about mental states and social situations. 
This chapter built off the promise of the previous one. By taking the fictional stance, we 
both recognize fictional entities as fictional and as the kind of thing that we would normally 
attribute mental states to. That is, we see fictional representations of people as people, possessing 
beliefs, desires, and emotions. At the end of the day, I do not think that there is much of a difference 
between how we attribute mental states to real-life people and fictional characters. The main 
difference, of course, is that the content of our mental states towards fictional entities will contain 
a fictional operator from taking the fictional stance. That is, I recognize that this is a fictional 
character that I can respond to. I will make similar claims concerning our emotions and moral 
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judgments about fictional entities; we use roughly the same cognitive capacities and processes 
when we feel for and morally judge both fictional entities and real people. Differences in reactions 
will be the result of differences in the content of our mental attitudes. 
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Chapter 5: Genuine, Rational Fictional Emotions 
 
 
 
1. Emotions & fiction 
 
One of the main reasons why we engage with fictions is to experience certain emotions.  We enjoy 
feeling fear while watching a horror flick. We revel in experiencing the joys of a new love along 
with our favorite characters. We are excited to “visit” interesting and foreign locales. This chapter 
addresses the nature of these emotions. In chapter 1, I argued that the three main arguments in 
favor of the DAV—the arguments from function, inferential role, and neuroscience—are unable 
to establish that we utilize a distinctive mental state in our engagements with fictions. Many 
contemporary aestheticians argue in favor of the DAV for emotions even if they do not explicitly 
do so for other mental states. Perhaps there are unique features of emotions that we have not yet 
covered that would justify this move.  
We individuate mental states, including emotions, according to various components. This 
includes emotional feelings, emotions’ impact on cognition and behavior, and emotions’ semantic 
and normative implications. Each of these favors is potential fodder for the DAV. If it can be 
shown that the feelings, functional role, etc. of a fictional emotion are different than those involved 
in emotions about actual objects, then it could be that we do not have stereotypical emotions about 
fictional ones. 
The paradox of fiction, one of the puzzles of fiction we encountered in chapter 1, famously 
embodies the debates concerning the nature of our emotions about fictional objects. Here I show 
how we can dissolve the paradox by questioning the functionalist assumption inherent in the 
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typical responses to it. These assumptions also motivate the DAV; without them, the DAV loses 
much of its theoretical pull. 
My goal is also to understand, as best as possible, how and why we experience the 
emotional responses towards fictions that we do. So my discussion of fictional emotions will go 
beyond the paradox to a discussion of the nature of emotions. I discuss the paradox of fiction in 
§2.  In §3, I will present a multi-level appraisal theory of emotions that I believe can best explain 
our emotional responses towards fiction. It is also fully compatible with the SAV and the fictional 
stance.  Finally, in §4 I will discuss the semantic and normative implications of our emotional 
responses towards fictional objects. I will attempt to thwart one final potential argument in favor 
of the DAV for emotions: our emotional responses towards fictions are not genuine because 
genuine emotions have certain semantic and normative implications, and those towards fictions do 
not. I will argue that we can have genuine, rational emotional responses towards both real-life and 
fictional objects. I will summarize my conclusions from this chapter in §5. 
 
  
2. Genuine fictional emotions 
 
2.1. The paradox of fiction 
The paradox of fiction offers a succinct summary of the claims involved in the DAV/SAV debate 
concerning emotions. Cognitive belief-based theories of emotions were in full-sway when the 
paradox was first introduced (Radford 1975, Walton 1978, Currie 1990).  According to these 
views, an emotion about an object X requires that we have some relevant belief Y concerning X’s 
relation to our well-being. For example, experiencing fear requires that I believe that there is an 
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object in my environment that could harm me or someone I care about. We lack the emotion if the 
relevant belief is absent (Solomon 1993).  
 The wording of the paradox reveals an adherence to a belief-based theory of emotions. 
The paradox states: 
1. We have genuine emotions about fictions all of the time. 
 
 2. We do not believe that fictional characters exist. 
3. We can only have genuine emotions about things we believe to exist. 
 
The paradox captures a very natural thought concerning our emotions: if we know that we are 
engaged with a fiction, then we should not have the emotionally relevant belief. No emotion should 
arise. Nevertheless, we have emotional experiences with fictions all the time, whether these are 
genuine emotion-states or not.  
One interpretation of the paradox states that there is something fundamentally irrational 
about our responses towards fictions. Colin Radford (1975) accepts each of the paradox’s 
propositions, notoriously arguing that our emotions towards fiction force the reader into adopting 
two contradictory beliefs: we both believe and do not believe that the fictional object of our 
emotion exists. 
Alternatively, it could be that our beliefs concerning fictions are different kinds of beliefs 
than those we possess about the real world. This is the motivation behind the DAV: there are 
significant differences between our emotional responses to fictional and real life objects. The 
difference is so great that they are actually distinct kinds of mental states.  Thus, a proponent of 
the DAV would solve the paradox by denying the first proposition while maintaining the 
cognitivist position that emotions are constituted by beliefs.  
 Few contemporary philosophers opt to eliminate the second proposition. Doing so implies 
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that a reader or viewer of a fiction would actually believe that the fiction is real while she reads or 
watches it (Coleridge 1985, Hurka 2001). Theorists who opt to reject the second proposition of the 
paradox must somehow square the “suspension of disbelief” with the contradictory beliefs and 
actions we seem to have in response to fictions. This proposal may work if we accept the cognitive 
illusion thesis, the idea that we are deluded into believing that fictional content is real during our 
engagement with it. I have already argued against this position in chapter 2. 
 Many philosophers opt to eliminate the third proposition. There are several ways to do 
this. First, one can deny that beliefs are a necessary component of emotions, but still maintain a 
cognitivist position that emotions are comprised of thoughts (Carroll 1990 & Lamarque, 1981) or 
judgments (Solomon 1993). For example, when we engage with a fiction, we generally have 
various thoughts about the characters. While watching The Conjuring, I may contemplate the 
nature of the demon that possesses one woman. This thought fills me with terror.  Importantly, 
thoughts do not have the same assertoric requirement that beliefs do. We do not need to believe 
that the object of our thought actually exists in order to contemplate and respond emotionally to it.   
Alternatively, one can deny that any higher-order cognition is required for emotions. This 
is the route taken by non-cognitive perception and feeling-based theories of emotions. According 
to these views, an emotion does not require that we have a thought, judgment, or belief about an 
object in our environment. Conscious feelings, bodily changes, or perceptions of those changes, 
constitute an emotion (Goldie 2000, James 1890, LeDoux 1996, Prinz 2004a, Robinson 2005). 
The ontological status of the emotion’s object is more or less irrelevant to whether or not the 
emotion itself is a stereotypical state; if the feeling or perception of bodily changes is genuine, then 
the emotion is as well.  
 My own theory of emotions is in line with rejecting the third proposition. I argue that 
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beliefs, judgments, and thoughts are not necessary components of emotions. However, it is not my 
goal here to solve the paradox by showing that one of the propositions is false. Instead, I argue that 
the proponent of the SAV should reject the paradox altogether. Philosophers and psychologists 
typically attempt to dissolve the paradox by appealing to one or another theory of the nature of 
emotions. They argue that emotions are constituted by beliefs, thoughts, feelings, etc., and show 
how this eliminates one of the propositions. My approach is slightly different. I think that most 
philosophers writing on the paradox already assume the DAV assumption that we are only 
motivated to act by our encounters with real-life objects in our environment. I already developed 
a response to this claim in the first chapter by reevaluating what we mean by motivation towards 
fictions.  
The same type of argument also applies to emotions. One benefit of this approach is that it 
applies to any theory of emotions—cognitive or non-cognitive—because each holds that emotions 
have a functional role in virtue of their constitutive cognitive or bodily component. So in order for 
the DAV to be correct, one would have to show that our emotions towards fictions do not play the 
right sort of functional role as real-life emotions do, just as beliefs towards fictions purportedly do 
not.  
What is the functional role of emotions? The best candidate would be the actual expressive 
and behavioral responses that our emotions elicit. Emotions are often associated with certain action 
tendencies. These include such reflexive and automatic behaviors as a fight or flight response, 
freezing, running, screaming, or covering one’s eyes in fear, clenching one’s teeth or striking out 
at a foe in anger, or smiling, laughing or jumping for joy.  We might also add more complex action 
tendencies or dispositions, which are caused by an emotion but require further beliefs, thoughts, 
desires, or judgments in order to be manifested. The moral emotions might be included here: we 
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shun, blame, and punish those who are the objects of our contempt or anger. We comfort, protect, 
and in other ways care for those who are the objects of our pride, pity, or compassion. If we feel 
shame or embarrassment, we may withdraw from society or attempt to make amends for our 
wrongdoings. 
Consider an emotional response to an act of injustice. We learn that a seemingly innocent 
person has been falsely accused and convicted of a crime. We emotionally evaluate the situation 
and conclude that the court’s decision was unjust. Our indignation motivates us in several different 
ways. First, we may express our anger via our facial expression and bouts of shouting. Second, our 
indignation plays a role in our further cognitive processing, shaping, influencing, and regulating 
later thoughts and decisions. Finally, our anger may help motivate us to act: perhaps you organize 
a peaceful protest, sign petitions, or reach out to a local member of congress. Or maybe you simply 
condemn the court’s decision amongst your close friends and family. Your emotional response to 
the situation motivates you in each case.  
However, if the innocent person you care for is actually a fictional character, it seems like 
you cannot be motivated to act in any of these ways. This leads us straight to the heart of the matter 
for supporters of the DAV. Our emotions towards fictions are not genuine because they do not 
display the right kind of behavioral output. They do not lead to the same sorts of actions as a 
genuine emotion would.  
I contend that it is possible that we are somehow motivated to act on our emotions towards 
fictions. If my favorite character in a film dies, I may be strongly motivated to leave the theater, 
turn off the television, or close the book and go mope in my room for an hour, just as I would if I 
learned of the death of a popular politician, sports figure, or musician. A complex fictional story 
may provoke a thoughtful conversation between friends, just as the unjust court decision does. It 
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is also possible that we are in some ways motivated to act on the basis of our emotions about 
fictional objects, but other information and circumstances—especially the knowledge that the 
object of our emotion does not physically exist in our world—blocks or regulates the action. We 
may be automatically and unconsciously primed to act, but contradictory beliefs and judgments 
may put a halt to that action before it reaches fruition. 
 So it is possible that we are sometimes motivated to act on our emotions about fictional 
objects.  This does not require that we suspend our disbelief about the reality of a fiction; rather, 
we must reconsider what we mean by emotional motivation. We can also side-step the paradox of 
fiction. Most responses to the paradox buy into the functionalist argument that we will only act in 
light of things we believe to exist. My view shows how we can diffuse the paradox without that 
assumption, by eliminating the functionalist motivation that inspired it. 
This would be a major win for the SAV. There is nothing about our emotional behaviors 
that suggests that our emotions towards fictions are not stereotypical states. The proponent of the 
DAV could continue attempt to show that some other feature of emotions makes them distinct 
from genuine emotions. I will consider four more emotion properties that might be different in our 
emotions about fictional and real objects: inferential role, emotional feelings, emotional 
evaluations, and issues concerning emotions’ semantics and normativity. 
 
 
2.2. Emotions’ inferential role 
The proponent of the DAV can argue that our emotions about fictional objects serve a different 
inferential role than emotions that are about real things. Perhaps the distinct inferential role is 
enough to constitute a different type of state.  
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 We must first try to understand the inferential role of emotions. In order for emotions to 
play a role in cognition they must have some sort of cognitive content. What might that be? If 
emotions are constituted by propositional attitudes, then we could say that their inferential role 
arises due to this. For example, if an emotion is constituted by a thought with certain content—a 
thought that, say, “it really irks me when my sister forgets my birthday”—then the emotion’s 
inferential role would be determined by the role of that thought. The same could be said for 
cognitive judgments and beliefs. The story would be slightly different for theories of emotion that 
do not hold that emotions are constituted by propositional attitudes (e.g. feeling theories and 
perceptual theories). But even these theories tend to accept that emotions have intentional objects; 
they represent something or someone in the subject’s mental or physical environment. An 
emotion’s inferential role stems from this representation. Let us suppose, then, that an emotion 
plays a certain inferential role in virtue of its intentionality, however understood. 
 An emotion’s intentional object may be something out in one’s environment, such as a 
person, animal, or state of affairs that we witness in real-life or while engaged with a fiction. The 
intentional object may also be another mental state, such as a belief, thought, desire, judgment, or 
perception of the environment or one’s own body. The emotion may in turn play a role in causing 
or influencing further mental attitudes. For example, suppose that it’s your best friend’s birthday. 
Everyone in your friend’s family has called to wish her well—everyone except her older sister. 
The sister’s carelessness is both the cause and intentional object of the great annoyance you 
experience on your friend’s behalf. You must have other mental attitudes in order for you to 
undergo this emotional response: the desire for the sister to call, the desire for your friend to have 
a nice birthday, the belief that a sister should call her sibling on her birthday, the belief that the 
sister has not done so, etc. All of these attitudes contribute to your current emotion. Furthermore, 
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your annoyance causes other cognitive responses: the desire to call the sister and give her a piece 
of your mind, the belief that your friend would like to be cheered up, the desire to comfort your 
friend, and so on.  
 Now consider an analogous fictional case: you are watching a film in which your favorite 
character’s older sister forgets to call her on their birthday, even though everyone else remembered 
to do so. Just like the previous case, you adopt beliefs about both your friend and her sister. This 
in turn causes you to feel great annoyance and frustration towards the older sister and pity for your 
favorite character. We can even say, like in the American Psycho example from chapter 1, that the 
filmmakers created a story that is perfectly similar to your real-life best friend so that the content 
of your emotional state is roughly the same. We can stipulate that the content of the story and our 
beliefs about it are similar enough that they do not significantly impact our emotions’ in inferential 
role—except, of course, the belief that the fictional characters are not real. This belief makes a 
difference in the emotional response we have towards the characters. It requires that we take the 
fictional stance towards the object of our emotion. This means that there is a difference in the 
intentional content between our beliefs about the real-life and fictional cases. 
Our emotions about fictional objects have a different intentional content than those about 
real things. This accounts for differences in an emotion’s inferential role. We do not need to posit 
the existence of imaginary or make-believe emotions to explain the differences between our 
emotions about fictions and real-life.  
 
 
2.3. Genuine feelings 
Emotions usually involve a conscious feeling.  Prima facie, we identify our emotions by how they 
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feel; sorrow, anger, joy, jealousy, pride, etc. all feel a certain way to us. For our purposes, feelings 
are the qualitative bodily responses that are potentially consciously experienced. Chocolate has a 
particular conscious taste and red has a specific qualitative look; similarly, emotions have 
conscious qualitative characters. As William James (1890) noted, feelings put the “emotionality” 
in the emotion, making it salient and important to our lives.  Some theories of emotions—call them 
feeling theories—hold that emotional feelings are necessarily conscious; every time we experience 
an emotion, we feel it (Block, 1995, Goldie 2004, James 1890, LeDoux 1996). According to some 
views, however, emotional feelings need not be conscious (see, Prinz 2004a, Berridge & 
Winkielman 2003, Rosenthal 2008). This distinction is not crucial for our current discussion, but 
it will be relevant in the proceeding sections and chapters when we discuss our actual emotional 
responses to fictions. 
 We seem to have genuine emotional feelings towards fictions. The DAV challenge 
concerns whether these feelings are somehow unreal. It is worth noting that even Walton—who, 
along with Currie, is perhaps the most ardent supporter of the DAV—does not deny that our make-
believe emotions towards fictions elicit genuine feelings. He only denies that those feelings are 
necessary components of the emotion (Walton 1990).  
One way to support the claim that our emotional feelings towards fictions are non-genuine 
would be to show that these feelings are merely illusions. Call this the illusory feeling thesis. 
Consider two other bodily feeling illusions: phantom limb pain (PLP) and the rubber hand illusion 
(RHI).  A phantom limb can be defined as “the continuous awareness of a (or part of a) non-
existing or deafferented body part with specific form, weight, or range of motion” (Richardson 
2009, 137). There are records of phantoms corresponding to virtually every body part, including 
arms, legs, teeth, tongue, breasts, bladder, etc. The phantom limb is embodied and felt. The patient 
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has the sense that the missing limb remains a part of her body and she may also have sensations in 
the missing limb. The patient might experience the limb as moving (kinetic illusion) or in a 
particular orientation (kinesthetic illusion). The patient may experience PLP—pins and needles, 
itches, dull pains, or acute pains—in the missing limb. While there is no universally agreed upon 
cognitive or neurological mechanisms associated with phantom limb, potential causes include 
cortical reorganization or pain memory after the limb is lost (ibid, 141).  
The RHI is another bodily feeling illusion. In a study by Botvinick and Cohen (1998), a 
subject sits in front of a table with one hand hidden behind a screen and the other under the table. 
A rubber hand is placed on the table directly in from of her. If both the real hand under the table 
and the rubber hand are stroked synchronously by a brush, the subject may feel the touch of the 
brush on the rubber hand, not her real hand under the table. In some cases, subjects might even 
have the impression that the rubber hand is their own. When this occurs, the subjects will flinch 
and show a stronger than normal skin conductance response when the rubber hand is hit with a 
hammer (de Vignemont 2007). 
 Here we have two examples of bodily feeling illusions. They each result in a feeling in the 
subject’s body part or an inanimate object that does not belong to them—even though the subject 
knows that the limb/hand does not belong to them. Perhaps one could argue that our feelings 
towards fictions are illusory in a similar fashion. Our emotional feelings towards fictions are not 
genuine feelings, but illusory, just as the feelings of the phantom limb and the brushstroke on “our” 
rubber hand are illusory.  We feel like we experience some emotional feeling, but we actually do 
not. It may seem strange that we have illusory emotional feelings—but, then again, PLP and RHI 
are equally strange to those who have not experienced them firsthand. 
 Both PLP and RHI engender false beliefs in their subjects.  In PLP, the sensations of pain 
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and movement in the phantom limb cause a false belief that there is a sensation of pain in my (non-
existent, deafferented) limb when, in fact, the patient lacks is missing the relevant body part. The 
RHI engenders the false belief that I either a) feel a sensation in the rubber hand, or, b) that there 
is a sense of embodiment in the rubber hand (the rubber hand is really my own).  So both PLP and 
RHI create false beliefs concerning the origin and locations of sensations in body parts that, in 
actuality, are not one’s own. 
Is there a comparable false belief in the case of fictional emotional feelings? I argue that 
there isn’t. When we experience joy, fear, anger, etc. about a fictional object, we “feel” the emotion 
in the same way we normally would if we felt a genuine emotion about a real object. That is, we 
experience the emotional feeling as our own, taking place within our actual body, not in a phantom 
or fake body part. We are not tricked or deluded into having emotional feelings about fictional 
objects, as in the RHI. There is nothing wrong with our brains, as in PLP. Our emotional feelings 
are natural reactions to objects that we know do not exist. 
  
 
2.4. Emotional evaluations 
Philosophers, psychologists, and neuroscientists alike all generally accept that emotions involve 
some kind of judgment. Emotions are evaluative. When we have an emotion, it is because 
something in our environment—or something that we think, remember, or imagine—bears  
significance on our lives or the life of someone we care about. This may be a very quick, automatic 
evaluation, like when we suddenly fear a loud noise behind us or are afraid that we will slip on an 
unseen staircase. Or the evaluation could be quite complex, like when we experience jealousy 
towards someone in our workplace. A proponent of the DAV could argue that our feelings towards 
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fictional objects are not stereotypical states because they are the result of a fictional evaluation.  
One could argue that we do not have the right kind of evaluative relationship with fictional 
objects in order for us to make genuine judgments about them. Fictional characters may not be the 
kind of thing that we can care about, empathize with, feel sympathy for, etc. Again, we seem to 
care about and identify with fictional objects all of the time. We feel very strongly for our favorite 
television, film, and literary heroes. We want them to succeed and we feel frustrated, sad, or angry 
when they do not. Still, one could argue that those judgments are not real judgments because the 
judgment’s object does not exist. 
This is a big bullet for the DAV theorist to bite. On this view, we cannot genuinely evaluate 
nonexistent objects. This means that we do not make genuine evaluations of fictional objects, but 
also of any other non-literal or nonexistent object, including hypothetical, imaginary, future, or 
past objects. This seems intuitively implausible. But since the DAV is ready to deny that we have 
a genuine emotions towards these objects, then they may be willing to deny that these are genuine 
evaluations as well. We need some independent reason for thinking that the evaluation is genuine. 
We need to know whether the object of our emotional evaluation must exist in order for 
the evaluation to be genuine.  It seems like they must, in order for our evaluation to “refer” and 
not be “empty.” My response requires a brief foray into the ontology of fictional objects (see 
Tullmann & Buckwalter 2014). Specifically, we need to understand the sense of ‘exist’ found in 
both the paradox of fiction and similar discussions of emotional responses towards fictions. In 
other words, how do fictional entities exist? This is not a topic that is typically addressed in the 
paradox literature. In fact, most philosophers take it for granted fictional entities don’t exist, in a 
standard sense of the word. But examining this question more closely will help us to see how we 
can take fictional entities as the objects of genuine emotional evaluations. 
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Recall my discussion of the ontological implications of the fictional stance. There are at 
least three ways in which a fictional object exists.15 First, an existent object might be a concrete 
particular. This is the sense of exist we use when we say that a comet, person, rock, or painting 
exists. They are all a part of our actual, corporeal reality. This is clearly not the sense in which 
fictional objects exist (if they do at all), but it is assumed by the paradox. Consider the standard 
responses to the paradox’s second proposition: we do not run screaming from the theater when we 
see a zombie on a movie screen, so we do not genuinely believe that the zombie exists. Zombies 
are not actual, physical creatures in our world.  
Second, a fictional object could possibly exist in another world. In other words, fictional 
entities might be possible objects in our (actual) world, but actual objects in another possible world. 
David Lewis (1973), Alvin Plantinga (1974), and Saul Kripke (1980) all held versions of this view, 
although Kripke has rejected this view in his more recent work (Kripke 2013). There are many 
problems with the possibilia thesis, as we saw in chapters 1 and 3. Descriptions of fictional entities 
are incomplete in detail, whereas possible objects are taken to be complete. For example, it is 
indeterminate whether or not Conan Doyle’s Sherlock Holmes had a mole on his back. If Holmes 
were a possible object, then he either would or he would not (Thomasson 1999). We are also 
unable to distinguish between possible objects (Quine 1953). Finally, fictional objects are created 
and causally dependent upon authors and audiences. Even if Sherlock Holmes was a denizen of 
another possible world, it would not be the same Holmes that Conan Doyle wrote about in his 
stories (Sainsbury 2010). 
                                                          
15 I have not discussed Meinongianism here (Meinong 1960, Priest 2005) or the Sartrean sense of 
imaginary entities (Sartre 1991). See Thomasson 1999 for an overview. One can also deny that 
fictional entities exist in any sense. See my discussion of pretense theories in chapter 2, as well as 
Quine 1956, Russell 1905, and Sainsbury 2010. 
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So we should be skeptical of the view that fictional entities exist in this sense of the word. 
But there is another, more plausible sense in which fictional entities may very well exist. The last 
sense of ‘exist’ is the inverse of the first two: a fictional object is neither a concrete particular nor 
possibly a concrete particular. Instead, fictional objects might be abstracta of some kind, as I 
suggested in chapter 3.  They are created and dependent on people and conventions. Fictional 
entities would go out of existence if everyone forgot about them and there was no record of them. 
We even, in a way, interact with fictional entities. Discussing a fictional object can be used to 
justify one’s actions and form non-assertoric propositional attitudes (see also Carroll 1990). We 
can also form thoughts about and respond unconsciously and non-cognitively to fictional 
characters. 
With this last sense of ‘exist’ in mind, we can turn back to the question of how we can form 
genuine evaluations of fictional entities. Importantly, this sense of ‘exist’ should appeal to any 
theory of the nature of emotions. First, consider feeling theories. On this view, emotions are non-
cognitive in the sense that they are not comprised of thoughts or beliefs. Yet emotions are also not 
brute. They are evaluative—they involve judgments of objects in one’s internal (mental) or 
external (physical) environment. Because the feeling theorist claims that emotions are basic in this 
way, the object of the emotion need not be a concrete particular. I will examine these ‘affective 
appraisals’ in more detail in the following sections; for now, it is enough to note that we will 
respond emotionally to any object—real or unreal—that we perceive to bear on our well-being or 
that of someone we care about. If this is the case, then we may have genuine emotional evaluations 
of entities that only exist in the last, minimal sense. 
We can give the same sort of explanation for cognitive theories of emotions. Like feeling 
theories, cognitine theories of emotion hold that our emotions involve an evaluation of an object 
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in our internal or external environment that bears on our well-being. Walton argues that this 
emotion is not genuine because we are not motivated to act in the right way. We have already seen, 
however, how we can eliminate this kind of functional argument about emotions. It is perfectly 
possible to be motivated to act based on our emotional responses towards fictions.  
Consider an example:  
 
The unlucky-in-love Becky [thinks about] the character Mr. Darcy, just as 
he is described in Jane Austen’s novel. It is this Mr. Darcy that serves as the 
object of her emotions (longing, wistfulness—but also, this time, a strange 
jealousy for Elizabeth Bennett and regret that such a man doesn’t exist). 
These emotions may even cause Becky to engage in certain peculiar actions: 
she places her copy of Pride and Prejudice on her nightstand in an oddly 
affectionate manner and makes caustic remarks about Elizabeth Bennett’s 
contrariness to her friends (Tullmann & Buckwalter 2014, 792). 
 
Becky emotionally responds to a fictional entity, forming evaluations of the characters Mr. Darcy 
and Elizabeth Bennett; for example, that she and Darcy would make a good couple and that 
Elizabeth is a threat and is clearly up to no good. As strange as this example may seem, it shows 
how we can be motivated to act based on our judgments of fictional entities—not just general 
actions caused by our beliefs about fictional characters, or to people that we think are like those 
characters, but actually based on our beliefs concerning fictional entities themselves. Mr. Darcy is 
neither a concrete or possible object. If he exists at all, it is in the sense of being an abstract object. 
If we can have genuine judgments of Mr. Darcy in this sense, then there does not seem to be a 
strong argument against the idea that we can form genuine emotional evaluations of any fictional 
entity.  
I have considered, and rejected, three arguments against the SAV of emotions, and will 
return to a fourth (about the semantics and normativity of emotions) in §4. My arguments should 
apply to any theory of the nature of emotions. Emotions could be beliefs, judgments, feelings, or 
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some other kind of appraisal.  Regardless of what constitutes an emotion, one would have to show 
that it is that feature which makes the emotion non-genuine in order to show that the emotion itself 
is not genuine. The best way to do this is to argue that the emotion does not lead to the right kind 
of behavioral output. And this argument fails.  Importantly for our purposes, my conclusion makes 
it easy for us to sidestep the traditional talk of the paradox of fiction altogether. 
 
 
 
3. An appraisal theory of emotions 
 
The purpose of the previous section was to dissolve the paradox of fiction and, in so doing, 
motivate the SAV of emotions. I did not rely on a particular theory of emotions to do this. 
However, there remain several questions concerning our emotional responses towards fictions that 
do require some theoretical commitment: What sorts of mental states are involved in our emotional 
responses to fictions? Are we always aware of our emotions toward fictions? Why do we consider 
fictional entities to be worthy objects of our emotions?  For that matter, how do we emotionally 
respond to fictions in the first place? Of course, similar questions arise when dealing with real-life 
emotions. Indeed, these are important questions faced by any general theory of emotions, not only 
theories of fiction.  
So far, I have treated emotions as a kind of evaluation without specifying the nature of that 
evaluation. In this section I will try to get clearer on what I mean by this. I argue that emotions are 
constituted by multi-level appraisals. Emotions are not brute reactions to stimuli. While I hold that 
emotions are comprised of non-cognitive content, they can be understood as cognitive in some 
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other sense: they are intentional (about something), they are evaluative, and they carry information.  
While I think that our emotional responses are constituted by multi-level appraisals, I want 
to stress that a proponent of the SAV may adopt virtually any theory of emotions. I favor an 
appraisal theory because it can explain the interesting and difficult features of our emotional 
experiences, both about fictional and actual things. It is not my goal here to fully motivate my 
multi-level appraisal theory, or to fend off every potential argument against it. But, as we will see, 
I do think that my theory may be the best for explaining a moral psychology of fictions. 
 
 
3.1. Fictional objects as emotional objects 
 Emotions play a strong motivational role in our lives. They help guide our actions, shape our 
relationships, and inform our decisions. Appraisal theories attempt to capture the motivational 
aspects of emotions. We can think of emotional appraisals in terms of biological fitness. An 
organism constantly evaluates its environment for features that might bear on its survival and 
flourishing. Emotions clue us into these features, both consciously in terms of emotional feelings, 
and unconsciously in terms of behavioral priming and automatic physiological responses. 
 I will discuss three important features of appraisal theories before turning to my own 
account of emotions: the content of our emotional appraisals, the causal and constitutive 
components of our emotions, and whether an emotion is best understood as a process or discrete 
mental state. Finally, I will address two general objections to multi-level appraisal theories that 
can be found in the emotion literature. 
First, appraisal theories of emotions need some story about how a subject evaluates an 
object. For my purposes, this story must also apply to fictional objects. It is easy to see how a real 
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life object, like a snarling dog or a person with a weapon, is a worthy emotional object. It is less 
clear how and why a fictional object would be, since the fictional object does not bear on our well-
being in the same way as the real life object does.  
 A traditional way of understanding the intentionality of emotions—what an emotion is 
about—relies on the cognitive stance that emotions are comprised of propositional attitudes. 
According to a belief-based theory, our emotion is constituted by the belief that X. Other cognitive 
theories could replace the belief state with a thought or judgment that X. This could explain how 
fictions could be the objects of emotions; we make a judgment that a fictional villain is evil or 
terrifying, believe that the villain is trying to harm the protagonist, or merely have the thought that 
the villain is up to something no good.  In turn, these cognitive states may lead to feelings of fear 
and apprehension. 
Unfortunately, this approach is not available to any theory that denies that the initial 
appraisal of the stimuli is non-cognitive and non-propositional (as mine will). So before we can 
understand how fictions can be the objects of our emotions, we must understand how non-cognitive 
theories of emotion explain intentionality.  Two proposals include Richard Lazarus’s “core 
relational themes,” (Lazarus 1991, Smith and Lazarus 2000), a concept also adopted by Jesse Prinz 
(2004a & b) and Peter Goldie’s “emotion-proper properties” (2004). Goldie describes these as the 
property that things must possess in order to cause a certain bodily state associated with a particular 
emotion (Goldie 2004).  Core relational themes work similarly. According to Lazarus, we respond 
emotionally to certain stimuli because those stimuli represent certain themes. For example, we feel 
sad when we encounter a situation in which we experience a loss of some kind. We fear a snake 
because it represents the core relational theme of causing harm to us or one we care about. The 
same applies to other emotions, including complex emotions like jealousy: romantic jealousy 
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arises when we perceive or imagine that that one’s significant other has been unfaithful (Prinz 
2004a). 
Neither the emotion-proper property nor the core relational theme requires that we have an 
assertoric belief about the object, situation, or state of affairs the emotion is about. They do require 
us to be able to perceive emotion properties, or at least be able to make low level judgments about 
our perception of emotional expressions. We can also be seriously wrong about what causes an 
emotion. We might, alone in our dark bedroom, think that a quick-moving shadow is a burglar 
attempting to break into our room, when in fact it is was caused by a car passing outside our 
window. Just the perception of this shadow may be enough to set off an emotional state. But our 
fear does not require any thoughts or beliefs about what this shadow actually is or the potential 
harm it can cause. This is the key to understanding how we can have genuine emotions about 
fictions. We associate objects on a screen, or in a play, or even imagistically (as when reading a 
novel) with an emotionally relevant property.  
There is one last point we need to emphasize here. An emotional appraisal is generally 
about the subject’s own well-being. But there are obvious counterexamples to this. Our emotional 
responses often concern other people: we may feel pride on behalf of a family member’s 
achievement, anger at an injustice committed against a friend, or joy at a partner’s success. None 
of these emotions involve appraisals that directly involve applying a core relational theme to an 
object in terms of one’s own well-being. 
Most theories of emotion extend the notion of ‘well-being’ to include those people and 
objects that we care for and about. I doubt that we need to think of others as an extension of 
ourselves in order to emotionally respond on their behalf. Nor must we empathize or identify with 
them. I discussed this in the previous chapter; empathy is not necessarily the basis of our emotional 
178 
 
responses about fictional objects. Instead, I think that concern for another might be enough for us 
to emotionally respond on their behalf. We must make some kind of positive evaluation of the 
person or object. This is also why we feel anger, sorrow, joy, hope, pride, embarrassment, shame, 
etc. on behalf of fictional characters: we care about them.  
As we have seen, many theories argue that emotions either involve cognitive, propositional 
attitudes such as beliefs, thoughts, judgments, or non-cognitive states like feelings or perceptions 
of bodily changes. In general, appraisal theorists occupy a middle ground between the 
cognitive/non-cognitive extremes. The challenge is to determine which psychological processes 
are involved in our emotional appraisals. 
 
 
3.2. Appraisal theories 
Different appraisal theorists have different ideas about what constitutes an emotional appraisal. 
However, there are some features that all appraisal theories share, besides the fact that they all 
emphasize a subject-environment relationship (see Moors et al 2013). First, appraisal theorists 
generally deny that propositional attitudes are sufficient for emotions, even if they are necessary 
for them (Arnold 1960, Ellsworth 1994, Roseman 1996, Smith & Kirby 2001, Scherer 1984, Smith 
& Lazarus 1990, Stein et al 2000). So appraisal theories may escape the brunt of the evidence from 
neuroscience and psychology that has recently come out against belief-based theories of emotion 
(Prinz 2004a). However, the appraisal theorist may still run into trouble in this regard if they hold 
that a cognitive appraisal precedes and causes sub-personal bodily reactions to emotional stimuli 
(Scherer 1984). This does not mean that the appraisal must be deliberate. We do not have to 
consciously evaluate an object. Instead, the appraisal may be fast, automatic, and “virtually 
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instantaneous” (Smith & Lazarus 1990). This leads to my next point. Appraisal theorists also deny 
that emotions are necessarily conscious. This makes sense; we do not always think of ourselves as 
consciously evaluating objects in our environment. 
 Third, each appraisal theorist posits some kind of low level monitoring system that tracks 
emotionally relevant properties and objects in one’s environment. The monitoring system may 
track objects in one’s environment (or objects of a thought one considers) that are relevant to one’s 
goals, motives, or well-being (Scherer 1984, Roseman & Smith 2001, Smith & Lazarus 1990, Stein 
et al 2000). Positive emotions like joy and pride arise when the object is appraised as goal-
congruent, promoting, or compatible. Negative emotions like anger or shame interpret their object 
as goal-incongruent.  
Finally, appraisal theorists agree that we can individuate emotions in terms of appraisals. 
This is a problem that has plagued noncognitive theories of emotions: it does not seem like each 
emotion has a unique qualitative feel or set of bodily reactions. Appraisal theories accept this. 
What makes an emotion a token of anger, indignation, rage, or annoyance is the particular appraisal 
that one makes with respect to an emotionally relevant property or theme.  This leaves room for 
emotional valence—the positive or negative qualitative feel of emotions—to also play a role in 
emotion individuation. But valence alone is not fine-grained enough to determine the difference 
whether a particular emotion is anger or indignation, sorrow or grief, joy or elation. 
 It is sometimes unclear whether an appraisal constitutes an emotion or merely causes it. 
Scherer (1984) seems to argue that appraisals elicits the emotion. The nature of the emotion itself 
remains a mystery. Paul Griffiths (2002, 2004) makes this point in his extensive work on the 
different types of emotions. To be fair, Scherer does point out that the causal/constituent question 
depends on what one means by an ‘appraisal.’ Part of a solution here will depend on whether one 
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thinks that emotions are an extended process or a discrete mental state, which I will address 
momentarily.  
 Appraisal theorists agree that emotions involve the ability to perceive, mentally represent, 
and process sensory information and other occurrent mental states. My multi-level appraisal theory 
will draw specific lines concerning each of these aspects of the emotional appraisal.  I think that 
appraisals constitute an emotion, rather than merely cause them. I agree that emotions are not 
necessarily conscious, are generally non-propositional, and require some kind of monitoring 
device.  
 Appraisal models also differ with respect to whether emotions are best understood as 
continuous processes or discrete, categorical states. Again, most appraisal theorists think that we 
continuously subconsciously monitor our environment for significant stimuli. The main 
controversy within appraisal theory concerns whether there is a set structural procedure that each 
emotion must necessarily follow in order to be classified as a particular emotion or whether the 
process is more flexible and open ended. Here I will examine one prominent process-oriented 
model from Richard Lazarus and C.A. Smith’s (Smith & Lazarus 1990). 
 Lazarus and Smith’s argue that the appraisal of a core relational theme may be automatic 
and unconscious (ibid, 629). There are two basic parts of the emotional appraisal. The first is 
schematic: the subject appraises a stimulus in terms of how it bears on its well-being, on the basis 
of past experiences with similar encounters. This requires that associative memory networks are 
activated, drawing upon relevant information about the object and past responses to it. The same 
stimulus information is sent for cognitive conceptual processing. This involves more abstract, 
deliberate, and conscious cognitive processes through which the subject is able to evaluate the 
adaptational significance of the stimulus more actively and accurately (ibid, 630). 
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 Importantly, Lazarus and Smith do not think that there is a set sequence or structure 
specifying how the stimulus information is processed. Conceptual processing will generally follow 
the initial schematic processing due to the nature of the neurological components involved. But 
the conceptual processing will also be available for further schematic processing. This may result 
in multiple feedback loops in which subconscious schematic processing impacts and modifies 
conceptual processing and vice versa. 
 I am highly sympathetic to Lazarus and Smith’s process-oriented emotional model, 
although their theory has come under scrutiny for being empirically implausible. Like them, I will 
argue that emotions are temporally extended, involving multiple different appraisals almost at 
once, each impacting the other in a feedback loops (see Damasio 1994). However, we can still 
isolate emotions in terms of discrete states. I want to suggest that the major emotion categories 
(joy, sorrow, anger, pride, curiosity, etc.) are “somewhat crude attempts” to describe our emotional 
experiences (Scherer 1984, quoted in Roseman & Smith 2001, 14). In fact, I think that our 
emotions are, to a certain extent, epistemically indeterminate. This means that we do not always 
have access to what causes a particular appraisal or how stimulus information is processed. It may 
be a matter of interpretation of one’s environment and internal milieu that determines which 
emotion one currently experiences, or experienced in the past.  
I will not spend a great deal of time defending my appraisal theory against its foes.16 
However, there are two general objections to traditional appraisal theories that I wish to eliminate 
right away. There has been a general trend in recent years towards theories of emotions that 
emphasize bodily (somatic, phenomenal) features of emotions. One objection against appraisal 
                                                          
16 See the Appendix at the end of this chapter for a discussion of four more potential objections to 
my multi-level appraisal theory. 
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theories is that they are too cognitive. Traditional appraisal theories hold that an emotion must be 
caused by or constituted by a cognitive judgment of something in our environment, where 
‘cognitive’ here means more than simply possessing an intentional object (see Prinz 2004a). In 
light of my discussion here, however, we can see that this objection does not necessarily hold. 
Most appraisal theorists argue that the appraisal that constitutes or causes the emotion can be fast, 
automatic, unconscious, and non-propositional. They also generally leave room for later cognitive 
processing. Most appraisal theories discuss the role of cognitive processes in our emotions, but 
they do not posit that cognitive or propositional evaluations are the emotion.  
Griffiths (1997, 2004) raises the objection that appraisal theories are “ecological,” 
primarily concerned with explaining the significance of the environment for an organism. In doing 
so, such theories do not adequately concern emotions as mental states and “[abstract] away from 
the details of any particular psychological process” (Griffiths 2002).  By emphasizing the way in 
which emotions are brought about via core relational themes or emotion-proper properties, 
appraisal theories ignore the cognitive and subpersonal mechanisms that are involved in actually 
bringing about a discrete emotion. This objection also strikes me as missing the point of appraisal 
theories. Griffiths is correct in thinking that appraisal theories emphasize the conditions that bring 
about the emotion, but, each appraisal theorist also generally has a story about the psychological 
processes and neural mechanisms involved in discrete emotional states (see, in particular, Laxarus 
1991 and Scherer 1984).  
I will now turn to a discussion of my own multi-level appraisal theory which, I argue, 
adequately surmounts these two objections.  
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3.2. A multi-level appraisal theory 
I want to propose a multi-level appraisal theory that is similar to Lazarus and Smith’s process 
model, but differs with respect to the nature of those appraisals and how we individuate specific 
emotions. I will also draw on Scherer’s point that emotion individuation is largely a matter of 
interpretation. 
 I suggested that we can understand appraisal theories along three different dimensions: the 
nature of the appraisal itself, the components of the emotion, and whether the emotion is structural 
or process-oriented. I will present my own view along the same guidelines. I agree with the other 
appraisal theorists that we should understand emotions as responses to objects possessing 
emotionally relevant properties. However, in light of Griffith’s ecological objection, I want to be 
more specific about the psychological and neurological mechanisms that may be involved in a 
subject’s recognition of these properties.  
 Following Lazarus, I argue that emotions generally involve two different appraisals. The 
first arises when a stimulus in one’s external (physical) or internal (mental) environment causes a 
mental representation of something that bears on one’s well-being. The mental representation 
comprises the emotive value of the stimulus, which may be learned or innate. For example, humans 
may have an innate predisposition to fear heights or looming objects and a learned fear of monsters 
under the bed, certain people or social interactions (Damasio 1994). When we perceive, imagine, 
or think about the looming object or monster (or something like it), we form a mental 
representation that triggers an emotional response.  
 I understand this initial representation as a kind of appraisal that is subconsciously and 
subpersonally implemented.  We respond to perceived objects (in our environment, or intentional 
184 
 
objects of mental attitudes) as pleasant or unpleasant, or as things to avoid or approach. 
Information about the stimulus is transferred to areas of the brain that are involved in encoding 
emotional reactions, such as the sensory thalamus, the affective division of the striatum, the 
orbitofrontal cortex and, finally, the amygdala (LeDoux 1996, Mello & Villares 1997, Rolls 2000; 
see Schroeder & Matheson 2006 for an overview), each of which are involved in initiating bodily 
reactions and behaviors, such as an increased heart rate or freezing response.  
 At the same time, the sensory stimulus information takes a slower track to cortical regions 
of the brain for further processing and input from cognitive faculties. LeDoux (1996 & 2012, also 
LeDoux & Phelps 2000) call the initial pathway the “low-road” of emotions, and the slower 
pathway the “high-road.” The sensory information involved in the initial appraisal reaches the 
amygdala or hippocampus after first being processed by the sensory thalamus. The same 
information is processed by the sensory thalamus, and also sent to the sensory cortex for cognitive 
processing and availability for consciousness. Here, the subject’s knowledge about the stimulus, 
her beliefs about her current environment, and desires concerning her future goals may all 
influence how the stimulus information is processed. She may also deliberate, draw inferences, 
and make decisions concerning the potential value of the object. 
 Let’s say that a subject perceives a potential threat in her environment: something she finds 
fearful. Any number of objects could possess a “fearful” property, from a snake that crosses our 
path to an important test that looms in the near future. Our subject perceives the snakes, drawing 
on information from long-term memory that allows the subject to appraise this particular specimen. 
The value of this appraisal may vary from person to person: our subject may be quite fond of 
snakes and consider them fascinating, beautiful creatures. Her stored information of snakes may 
include these features, whereas another person might associate snakes with harm or icky-ness. The 
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stimulus information is also sent via the cortical pathway for cognitive processing.  Our subject’s 
beliefs about her surroundings may correspond or disagree with her initial appraisal of the snake. 
She might be particularly fond of this breed of snake, or, alternatively recognize that this is not a 
pet snake and so should be avoided.  
 The multi-level appraisal theory posits that there are generally two different appraisals 
involved in our emotions, one precognitive and one cognitive (call them affective and cognitive 
appraisals, respectively). But emotional processing may not stop there. Once the stimulus 
information is processed by different cortical regions, it may be sent back to the low level 
precortical regions, such as the amygdala and hippocampus. Several different things can happen 
there. The initial reactions resulting from the initial affective appraisal may be extended, 
intensified, modified, regulated, or even eliminated in light of information from cognitive 
processing. 
 This forms a feedback loop in which subcortical information processing influences 
cognitive processes, and vice versa (see Damasio 1994 and Smith & Lazarus 1990). This may 
occur over the course of a second or two, or perhaps even longer as more information about one’s 
environment is evaluated and weighed with respect to our affective and cognitive appraisals. All 
the while, one’s perceptual systems monitor the environment for relevant objects or information 
which may further impact one’s affective processing. I do not argue that there is a set, structured 
method in which different appraisals follow one after another, resulting in a specific emotional 
state. My view is similar to Smith and Lazarus’s process-oriented account, in which schematic and 
conceptual processing occurs continuously.  
 In some cases, the cause and object of our emotion may not be known to us or we may 
misattribute it (as in the famous Schacter and Singer studies, 1962). I would argue that these 
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emotions are epistemically indeterminate; we are unaware of or lack access to the causes and/or 
object of our affective responses such that we cannot accurately identify what emotional or 
affective state we are (or were) in. Determining the identity our emotional state may be post hoc, 
like when we say that a film is “happy” or “sad” even though it, in fact, involved a wide variety of 
emotional appraisals and responses. 
 Scherer (1984) argues that identifying particular emotions is largely a matter of 
interpretation. I agree. Like other appraisal theorists, I argue that we respond to stimuli that 
correspond to an emotionally relevant property. But which objects correspond to which property 
will vary from person to person; each subject will interpret different things as fearful, anger-
inducing, or joyous.  Moreover, whether we identify an emotion as anger or rage, sorrow or grief, 
shame or guilt largely depends on contextual information and our relationship to the emotional 
object. For example, I might describe my downcast feelings, thoughts, and bodily responses as 
embarrassment or shame depending on what sort of norm I have violated. So we not only identify 
emotions in general in terms of appraisals, we also identify our own emotions in a similar way.  
 Note that I have not argued for particular necessary conditions that are jointly sufficient for 
an emotion. My position leaves open the possibility that an emotion involves only one appraisal, 
affective or cognitive. This implies that there might be completely “cool” emotions that do not 
result in bodily reactions of any sort. This may be theoretically possible. If stimulus information 
proceeds along two pathways, it is possible that the lower pathway becomes blocked while the 
cortical pathway remains intact (but disconnected from the amygdala and other brain areas that 
lead to physiological responses; see Figure 5.1). Some variation on this idea would help to explain 
cases of flattened affect in which we see cognitive processing with lessened non-cognitive 
processing, as well as phobias—non-cognitive processing without cognitive processing (see 
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Roseman and Smith 2000). However, I do not think that many such cases will occur in everyday 
emotional responses. Even phobic or flattened affect cases will involve some kind of affective and 
cognitive processing, even if they are irrational or inconsistent thoughts or beliefs. And the mere 
thought of an emotion-laden stimulus may result in some bodily reactions—such as a galvanic skin 
response, increased pulse, or dilated pupils—even if these reactions are not consciously felt. 
 This means that the traditional bifurcation of cognitive versus noncognitive emotion 
theories may be largely defunct. It should be clear that, on my view, both noncognitive and 
cognitive processes play valuable roles in bringing about one’s overall emotional state. This theory 
is non-cognitive in the sense that emotions are not caused by an initial belief, judgment, or thought, 
but rather by perceptual processes. Both the initial and later appraisal may occur quite rapidly and 
without conscious awareness or feeling. However, emotions generally involve cognitive 
information processing of environmental or internal stimuli. This means that emotions are 
intentional; they are about something.  
 Finally, I argue that a multi-level appraisal theory of emotions is well-suited for bolstering 
the SAV. My comments against the DAV functional argument strongly rely on the notion of 
emotional regulation and modification.  It is possible that we are initially motivated to act or 
respond emotionally to fictional stimuli when we are engaged with a fiction, but due to other 
cognitive judgments, beliefs, etc., we do not actually follow through with an action. This process 
can now be characterized in terms of the multi-level appraisal view. The regulation and 
modification of the emotion occurs with the later, cognitive appraisal which, in a sense, blocks any 
action that we might be primed to take. Of course, neither appraisal need be conscious, so this is 
consistent with our actual experiences of engaging with fictions. 
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4. Rational fictional emotions 
 
There is one more hurdle to scale before we have clearly established the SAV for emotions: 
explaining emotional rationality. This follows from the idea that emotions are evaluative; we tend 
to think that our emotions can get things right about the world. Our anger, fear, sorrow, etc. pick 
out some feature in our environment, and they do so correctly. Explaining emotional rationality is 
a troublesome business in its own right. The challenge is propounded with fictional emotions. But 
how could it be that our emotions concerning fictions are rational in the way that our real-life 
emotions often are? If we cannot develop some account of rational fictional emotions, then we can 
perhaps say that these emotional responses are distinct in this way. 
I will argue for an account of rational fictional emotions in this section. There are several 
different ways in which we can characterize this. Here I borrow concepts and terms from two 
sources: Ronald de Sousa’s work on the semantics of emotions (their truth-conditions) (2002, 
2004) and Justin D’Arms and Daniel Jacobson’s extensive work on emotional normativity, norms 
concerning when and how we should experience emotions (2000a, 2000b, 2008).  
There are several ways in which emotions can be understood as being rational. First, an 
emotional response may fit its object. An emotion fits its object if we have some reason to feel it. 
We can compare the fit between an emotion and its object to that of a true belief and a state of the 
world.  Both spiders and battlefields may be fitting objects of fear; this evaluation is apt in some 
way, as being proper formal objects. Our colleague’s promotion may be a fitting object of jealousy. 
An off-color joke may be a fitting object of amusement. On my view, emotions fit their object in 
case we have some reason to have them for that particular object (compare this to D’Arms and 
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Jacobson’s slight different account of fit, which they characterize in terms of a response-dependent 
feature of the object that does not require reasons or norms).  
Second, emotions may have truth values. De Sousa explains emotional truth in terms of the 
success and satisfaction conditions. An emotion’s success corresponds how they describe their 
object; there is something that bears the relevant emotional property. In order for an emotion to be 
satisfied, however, implies that the emotional property actually obtains in some object.  
Finally, we can also speak of an emotion’s propriety. I take propriety to carry morally 
normative implications; it suggests that there are appropriate contexts in which we can or should 
have certain emotions. Importantly, fit, truth and propriety may not always match in any particular 
object. An emotion may fit its object, or even be successful in de Sousa’s terms, but not necessarily 
be the proper response to take. For example, even if a battlefield is a fitting object of fear, it may 
not be proper for a soldier to feel if he or she has an important task to fulfill. If our colleague is 
also our friend it may be improper for us to be jealous of her promotion—we should be happy for 
her—even if it is fitting for us to be, since, perhaps, we were also due for a promotion and did not 
get one. When we conflate the fit and propriety of emotions, we commit the moralistic fallacy: 
taking the morally normative implications to be built into our emotional responses towards things 
in our environment (D’Arms & Jacobson 2001a).  
 I will discuss each type of emotional rationality in the course of the following sections, 
focusing particularly on the special issues that fictions present. Ultimately, I will argue that we 
should characterize the rationality of our emotional responses in terms of fit (apt reasons we have 
for justifying a particular emotion) rather than truth (success conditions). 
 
 
190 
 
4.1. Is it epistemically rational to have emotions about fictional objects? 
Since Plato and the Stoics, many philosophers have held that some emotions are epistemically 
harmful and thwart our ability to reason clearly. However, recent literature in cognitive science 
has begun to debunk the traditional bifurcation between rationality and emotions, showing that 
emotions are often necessary (or at least useful) for planning, making important decisions, and 
making moral judgments (Ben-Ze’ev 2001, Damasio 1994, Gordon 1987, Nichols 2004, Solomon 
1993, etc.). It is debatable that these benefits extend to our emotions about fictions. For instance, 
Currie (1995) points out that the concept of epistemic emotional rationality is puzzling because 
fictions generally present a reader with a great deal of false information. This could undermine her 
ability to function in the real world if she takes it literally.  
We have already encountered Radford’s argument that fictions commit us to inconsistent 
beliefs.  Most theorists now reject the notion that emotions necessarily involve beliefs, especially 
the belief that the emotional object exists. According to the multi-level appraisal theory that I have 
presented, we can experience emotional responses towards fictional objects even if we know that 
these objects do not exist in our world. We can eliminate Radford’s worry that fictional emotions 
involve us in a rational inconsistency by denying that emotions require a belief in the existence of 
the object of the emotion. However, one might still worry that our emotional involvement with 
fictions somehow hinders our everyday epistemic capacities, since, as Currie points out, fictions 
do not present us with factual information about the world. If our goal is to gain new information 
and align our thoughts with the truth, then why are we wasting our time with fictions? Interestingly, 
though, we also tend to think that we can learn something valuable from fictions. Fictions would 
be epistemically useful in this sense.  
Of course, we are not always concerned with gaining factual information from ficitons. We 
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read novels and watch movies for entertainment, to relax, and to escape our everyday lives. We 
may not expect to acquire factual truths from fictions. Interestingly, many philosophers argue that 
fictions have something to teach us even in these capacities. Instead of factual truths about the 
world, we learn about emotional, moral, and psychological tendencies and trends, while also 
honing our own moral and emotional capacities.  
Our emotional responses to the characters in a fictional often clue us in to significant 
features of a work. Jenefer Robinson (2005) argues that we can may gain a sentimental education 
by engaging with fictions. When reading a novel or watching a film, we witness the exploits of a 
character, access his thoughts, and analyze his behavior. Robinson claims that fictions can teach 
us important and interesting folk psychological facts if we are aware of and reflect on our 
emotional reactions to a character.  We may be surprised by the emotions we experience in the 
course of a story and how our opinion of a character shifts as the plot progresses. We can learn 
about our own emotional preconceptions upon later reflection of our emotional experience. 
Robinson also suggests that our actual experience of reading a novel helps our sentimental 
education. We learn to focus our attention on various details about a person or character, shift our 
points of view between different characters, and reflection on our responses. 
I agree that the emotional content of fictions can be highly useful for informal emotional 
training. I would also like to add the idea that emotions provide meaning and context to the fictional 
scenarios. Robert Gordon (1987) argues that we are often unable to correctly interpret a scene if 
we are unable to understand the emotional expressions and displays of the people in it. I argued in 
the previous chapter that we understand another’s behaviors, decisions, and mental states partly 
by understanding their emotional reactions. Gordon’s point is that some fictions would make less 
sense to us without our own emotional responses toward them. 
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Consider the Heider and Simmel movie in which several triangles move about a screen and 
the participant in the study is invited to narrate what takes place. Participants generally describe 
the scene as if the objects moving about had mental states, referring to the triangles as “he” or 
“she” and interpreting their behaviors in terms of the triangles’ desires and emotions. This exam 
is utilized to test the participant’s social cognitive capacities, their ability to recognize and interpret 
the mental states of others (Baron-Cohen 1990, Frith & Happé 1994).  It may be that the participant 
recognizes emotional behavior in the objects and, in turn, experiences emotions themselves. The 
participant may fear for a particular triangle, feel anger toward another, and be happy and relieved 
when the big triangle is thwarted in the end of the clip. These emotions are the basis of our feeling 
with fictional characters, as well as people in our real lives. Emotional responses illustrate who 
and what we find important and imbue a situation with significance.  
A study by Heberlein and Adolphs (2004) further suggests that we project meaning onto 
the world via our emotions. In their study, they examined the ability of patient SM, who has 
complete, bilateral damage to the amygdala (which is generally associated with processing 
emotional information) due to Urbach-Wiethe disease. SM has normal visual perception, attention, 
language ability, and IQ, but seems to be impaired in making some emotional and social judgments 
about human faces. In the study, SM was compared with nine other healthy controls (matched for 
age, gender, and education) as well as subjects with damage to the OFC (orbito-frontal cortex, also 
associated with emotional and social processing) in her responses to the Heider and Simmel film. 
This test was specifically designed to examine the role of the amygdala in influencing social 
meaning, ruling out other factors such as intelligence or damage to other parts of the brain that are 
associated with emotions. Heberlein and Adolphs found that, in comparison to both control groups, 
SM described the movie in less emotional and socially significant terms. SM discussed the 
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movement of the shapes in the film instead of using social and emotional descriptions; for instance, 
saying that “the big triangle moves inside the square” instead of “the bigger triangle was in 
control…he wanted to destroy things.”  
 In sum, our emotional engagements with fictions may have practical and educational value 
even if fictions are not truth-seeking. Our emotional responses towards fictions are epistemically 
rational in the sense that they help us to develop cognitive skills that are useful in real-life cognitive 
processes.   
 
 
4.2. True emotions 
One way of understanding the rationality of emotions is in terms of their potential truth-aptness. 
Consider how the multi-level appraisal theory understands emotional appraisals: we perceive some 
object in our environment as bearing on our well-being (or that of someone we care about) because 
it embodies an emotionally relevant property. The fact that emotions have truth conditions would 
suggest that the emotional property must actually correspond to the object it describes. De Sousa 
(2002, 2004) has developed an account of emotional truth that may shed light on emotional truth. 
According to his schema,  
 
E(p) is satisfied iff p is true; 
 
 E(p) is successful iff p actually fits E’s formal object, 
 
in which E is the emotion and p is the corresponding state of affairs (de Sousa 2004, 170).   
Suppose that the formal object of fear is “the dangerous.” It is appropriate to feel fear 
towards objects that we evaluate as dangerous to us or someone we care about. An emotion is 
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satisfied if it refers to an object correctly; it is successful if it evaluates its object correctly. 
Consider the fear of falling off the side of a cliff when you are on a hike. This fear is satisfied if 
you recognize that there is some object (the cliff) that is the proper object for fear. Perhaps we are 
quite close to the cliff so that it is a real possibility that we could take a tumble and doing so would 
be harmful. Our fear is only successful if that evaluation is correct. If it is likely that we could trip 
and fall off the side of the cliff, then our fear is successful. But we can imagine a situation in which 
it is very unlikely that we would fall because there are guard rails along the cliff edge or our path 
never comes within fifteen feet of the edge. In that case, our fear would be satisfied, but 
unsuccessful.  
 Could we have a successful, but unsatisfied fear? Since satisfaction is a reference relation, 
de Sousa argues that it requires that there is some actual object that is the target of one’s emotions. 
It is unclear what sort of ontological status the object must have (concrete, possible, or abstract). 
Could the fear of a monster be satisfied? De Sousa doesn’t specifically address this issue; however, 
he does refer to the fear of a monster as unsatisfied, meaning that the fearful object doesn’t exist. 
Consider my discussion of ‘existence’ in §2.3. I argued that a fictional entity may exist as an 
abstract entity. If that is the case, then it would seem that a fictional object could be satisfied 
because it does actually exist and is represented in a certain way (as having emotional properties). 
It just isn’t a concrete particular. Furthermore, fear of a monster may still be successful even if we 
do not recognize that it exists. This is so if we recognize that the fictional monster is represented 
as a dangerous creature.  
Even if the emotion is unsatisfied, it could still be true on this schema. De Sousa argues 
that emotional truth only requires success. When successful, we have made an appropriate 
evaluation of the formal object of the emotion even if it does not map on to an actual, concrete 
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object. This is perfectly compatible with my multi-level appraisal theory. I have argued that the 
initial affective appraisal of a fictional object, like a monster, may occur in spite of one’s 
knowledge that the monster is not real. This is because the recognition of the potentially dangerous 
stimuli automatically results in an affective appraisal as if the monster were real. It isn’t until a 
later, cognitive appraisal that we evaluate the object of our fear in terms of its existence (see Harris 
2000).  We may initially experience all the tell-tale signs of fear as though the monster were real: 
sweaty palms, covering our eyes, racing heart, etc. Slower cognitive feedback influences, controls, 
or regulates the initial appraisal and its behavioral responses. Our initial affective appraisal of the 
object of the emotions is similar to de Sousa’s success condition: it evaluates a stimulus as 
dangerous even if it is not real. The second, cognitive appraisal works like the satisfaction 
condition, evaluating whether or not there actually is an object to be feared, and regulating the 
emotion accordingly.  
 
 
4.3. Truth vs. fit 
Emotional truth is based on whether the emotion appropriately describes its object; whether our 
emotion evaluates its object successfully. In order to see how an emotion can be true, we must also 
explain how it can be false. One might think that emotions are completely subjective and vary 
from person to person. Can we have a relative notion of emotional truth? 
The challenge for this view is to explain how the emotional success is not merely, or 
completely, subjective. Emotional truth cannot be like (gustatory) taste, in which there is no way 
to determine whether a taste is incorrect, because taste cannot be incorrect. Taste is subjective; 
you either like ice cream or you do not. We cannot claim that my dislike of ice cream is false.   
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De Sousa saves his conception of emotional truth from complete subjectivism by arguing 
that an emotion’s success does not merely depend on an individual’s idiosyncratic evaluation of 
an object. Three factors are involved in evaluating an emotion’s success: an individual’s 
personality and background values, biology, and society/culture. According to de Sousa, only the 
first of these lends itself to a subjectivist reading. First, how one responds to a perceived act of 
injustice depends on one’s personal context, history, beliefs, and values. Second, biological 
factors, such as innate or basic core relational themes or emotion proper properties, will likely play 
a role in the correctness of an emotion. For example, it may be that we are innately predisposed to 
respond with anger towards certain acts that we witness (e.g. violence). However, biology alone 
cannot tell us how to successfully emotionally respond to certain objects. Social and cultural norms 
will set a standard of truth as well. Every culture may associate anger with perceived harm and 
sorrow with loss, but different cultures with count different instances and circumstances as 
examples of harm and loss. The responses of our collective social group will also factor into a 
standard of emotional truth. 
 De Sousa leaves his notion of truth purposefully open ended, with no set rules for 
determining truth in any particular situation. He does not see this as a problem for his account. 
However, even with the various personal, biological, social and cultural norms in play, it is likely 
that the truth of an emotional response cannot be generalized across objects for different people. 
Rather, different people will determine the success of an emotion on a case-by-case basis. If that 
is so, then in what sense is emotional truth really truth, unless it can be conceived of as relative to 
persons? 
Consider an example in relation to fictions. In chapter four I introduced Carroll’s notion of 
criterial prefocusing, the notion that our emotional responses towards fictions are guided by 
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features of the narrative. Maybe prefocusing is enough to establish true emotional responses. 
Is there a way in which my emotion toward a character could be false, by unsuccessfully 
characterizing its object? I have never really liked the character Brutus in Shakespeare’s Julius 
Caesar.  I was horrified that he would betray his friend, even though his friend was an egotistical 
despot. I remain unconvinced even at the end of the play when Marc Antony praises Brutus’s 
honor and love of Rome. In other cases, one might sheepishly admit to admiring a wholly 
unsympathetic fictional villain. I am perversely intrigued by Nurse Ratched from One Flew over 
the Cuckoo’s Nest (both the novel and the film) even though I know that you are not really supposed 
to like her. She is never presented in a sympathetic light, even when the patients on the psyche 
ward debate the merits of raping her. Perhaps due to my horror at this and other allusions to sexual 
violence, along with my empathetic feelings towards the nurse as the sole woman in a position of 
power in a male-dominated arena, I feel some compassion for Nurse Ratched. And yet, this seems 
like the exact opposite of how the narrative is intended to guide my feelings. 
 Prefocusing presupposes that there is some emotional guide to our experience of a fiction. 
An author, playwright, or movie production team intends for their audience to respond positively 
to certain characters and negatively towards others. This is what makes the fiction work.  It seems 
like something has gone wrong for me emotionally if I watch The Dark Knight and do not feel 
sympathy for Batman and repulsed by the Joker. The information we are given about a character, 
the perspective and point of view of the narrative, the symbolism, language, lighting, music—
basically every controllable aspect of a fiction—all work together to guide the audience to a certain 
response. Perhaps if we do not respond in the way the authors intended, then our emotion is false. 
In De Sousa’s words, my emotion towards the protagonist or antagonist of the fiction would not 
be successful. 
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 I think that prefocusing often does play an important role in shaping an audience’s response 
to a fiction. However, I am skeptical that it can ground a theory of emotional truth—nor, indeed, 
does Carroll intend for it to do so. It is quite possible that a reader is sensitive to all of the narrative 
and linguistic ploys that an author incorporates into his or her work. No matter how clever and 
playful Nabokov portrays Humbert Humbert or how protective and caring Dexter Morgan 
becomes throughout his show, some audience members will simply never like these characters. 
This relates to a point I raised earlier with de Sousa’s theory of correctness: each individual 
audience member approaches the fiction with his or her own values, beliefs, and personal/social 
history. These background features shape how we emotionally respond to the fiction. My strong 
conviction that a true friend should never betray their companion bars me from admiring Brutus’s 
honor. This is so even as I recognize that Brutus was trying to do what was best for Rome, he acted 
honorably in the face of death, etc. 
 I remain unconvinced that there is a way to define emotional truth for fictions.  
Furthermore, it may be questionable that real-life emotions can have universal truth conditions, 
especially since our commonplace emotional responses lack any kind of prefocusing. Perhaps 
some other theory can help us to define emotional truth. However, any such theory runs the risk 
of overgeneralizing emotional responses and ignoring the diversity of potential responses that 
people can take.  
I think that emotional fit can take the place of truth for explaining the rationality of our 
emotional responses towards fictions. The appropriateness of our emotions can be explained in 
terms of whether or not we have reason to respond in a certain way. Emotional fittingness may 
vary from person to person and context to context. This is important if we think of emotions as 
appraisals; not everyone will evaluate a particular person or situation in the same way, and so they 
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will not necessarily emotionally respond to it in the same way. 
An emotion’s fit can also be evaluated in terms of its shape and size (D’Arms & Jacobson 
2000b). Shape refers to how an emotion represents the properties of its object. This can be a source 
of error in an emotional appraisal, when one’s emotion presents an object as having (or lacking) a 
property that is does not (or does) actually have. An emotion’s size refers to its intensity.  I can be 
either annoyed or irate that my friend broke her promise to me, slightly downtrodden or 
overwhelmed by grief upon the death of my favorite movie star.  We can also make errors in terms 
of an emotion’s size, such as when the strength of an emotional response is out of proportion with 
its object.  
Emotional fit helps us to understand when it is reasonable to have an emotion, but makes 
no claims concerning when we ought to have one. So fitness avoids the subjectivity problem that 
bothers theories of emotional truth. Whether or not our real-life fear is fitting will depend on 
context, our beliefs about the object, social norms, and its relation to us. Note that this is a different 
notion than the fittingness of displaying certain emotions, which may also be subject to social 
norms, both for real life events and in response to fictions (see Prinz 2004a, chapter 6). It might be 
strange to display intense anger when we are watching a film with relatives or people with whom 
we are not very close. But if we are having fun with friends and trying to make a point, then our 
angry display might be just fine. In some situations, it may be perfectly appropriate for us to 
respond angrily to a perceived slight in the real world, such as when we are with close friends. In 
other situations, the emotional display might not be fitting and expressing it would be extremely 
inappropriate.  
Emotional fit can also explain my unusual emotional responses to Brutus from Julius Cesar 
and Nurse Ratched from One Flew Over the Cuckoo’s Nest.  I had decent justifications for my 
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feelings about Brutus Nurse Ratched. In that sense, my emotional responses were rational. My 
emotions fit their object. Part of the rationality of my emotions is due to my own personal 
background beliefs, values, and assumptions that I bring to my experience of the fictions. Not 
everyone will share my positions and so not everyone will have the same emotional responses that 
I do. These responses are rational—that is, reasonable—even if they are abnormal. 
 
 
4.4. Emotional propriety 
Virtually any scenario, person, or thing—real or fictional—can serve as the object of our emotions. 
As we saw in the previous subsections, the context in which we find ourselves will make those 
emotions fitting. Our understanding of emotional rationality goes beyond this distinction, however. 
Not only do we wish to know if it is appropriate or understandable that we experience an emotion, 
we also may want to know which situations we should or should not have particular emotional 
responses, as well as whether we can be held praise or blameworthy for doing so. I call this 
emotional propriety: the conditions under which we should be held morally accountable for our 
emotions towards fictions or real-life objects.  
Consider the following example. A recent episode of Game of Thrones (“The Rains of 
Castamere”) presents a gruesome and heart-wrenching scene in which several major characters—
the heroes and moral compasses of the series—are brutally betrayed and murdered, marking the 
end of an honorable family’s just rebellion. Distraught fans displayed their dismay online and on 
television immediately after the episode aired. They were outraged by the “Red Wedding” and 
what it implied for the rest of the series. These fans felt shocked, sad, angry, and betrayed, just as 
if someone they knew in real-life had met the Stark family’s fate. In an interview after the episode 
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released, Martin commented that the scene was “like murdering two of [my] children. I try to make 
the readers feel they’ve lived the events of the book. Just as you grieve if a friend is killed, you 
should grieve if a fictional character is killed. You should care. If somebody dies and you just go 
get more popcorn, it’s a superficial experience isn’t it?” (Hibberd 2013). 
 Fans of the television show certainly did feel very strongly about the Red Wedding. The 
question is whether they should have. Martin clearly indicates that we should feel powerful 
emotional responses towards fictions. Otherwise our engagements with fiction constitute “a 
superficial experience.” Indeed, we might find it odd and slightly off-putting to learn that a friend 
of ours finds a story interesting and enjoyable, but nevertheless remains totally disconnected from 
the characters. On the other hand, one might think that those of us who react very strongly to 
fictions are wasting “emotional energy” that might be put to better use towards things in the real 
world that deserve our attention, such as social injustices, real-life friends, natural disasters, etc.: 
the real sufferings of real people.  
On what basis can we justify or condemn such emotions? One way to understand this is in 
terms of the responsibility for our emotions. It is often understood that we can be held morally 
praise or blameworthy only when we are responsible for our actions and moral judgments. Perhaps 
the same idea can apply to our emotions.  
It might seem strange to hold someone responsible for their emotions. After all, it often 
feels like emotions are uncontrollable, and control may be a minimal requirement for 
responsibility. Robert Solomon argued that we can hold people responsible for their emotions 
(Solomon 1993 & 2004; see also Ben Ze-ev 2001). He notes that emotions are judgments; they do 
not happen to us. They are something that we do. Certain aspects of emotions are clearly 
involuntary.  Alas, we cannot help blushing from embarrassment or experiencing the pangs of 
202 
 
grief. But other aspects of an emotion are voluntary. We can control the situations in which we 
put ourselves, the knowledge and information that we seek out, and our behaviors towards others. 
All of these influence our emotions. We can control the actions we perform on the basis of 
emotions (to a certain extent), like yelling when we are angry or wallowing in self-pity.  It seems, 
then, that we can be held responsible for some aspects of our emotion. Note that according to the 
multi-level theory, emotions first arise as the result of an affective appraisal. All that I have said 
to this point suggests that this preliminary appraisal is not under our conscious, cognitive control. 
However, one could argue that the second, modifying aspect of our emotional may be under our 
control. In fact, there is a great deal of empirical and theoretical work on emotional regulation that 
suggests that our emotions can be modified, influenced, and controlled by cognitive feedback (see 
Gross 2007). If that is the case, then maybe we can be held responsible for them in some cases. 
I will make one (perhaps obvious) suggestion: we should hold people responsible for their 
emotions when they cause (or are caused by) morally praiseworthy or blameworthy behaviors. Of 
course, what counts as praise or blameworthy will vary depending on the situation. Typically, 
though, I think that our responses can be evaluated in terms of the actual or potential harm or 
happiness they may cause. We can relate this back to the notion of fit. We can be held responsible 
for unfitting emotions as well as for fitting ones. Others may find our misshaped emotions 
blameworthy if they distort a situation inaccurately.  We can also be held praise or blameworthy 
for an emotion’s size: if a friend’s anger is way out of proportion with its object (say, snapping at 
another friend for accidentally spilling coffee on her book), then we may blame our friend for her 
inaccurate emotion. Finally, the very reasons that we have for a particular emotion may be subject 
to praise or blame.  We do not take accidentally spilled coffee on a book as a good reason for anger 
(especially extreme anger). We would say that this is not a good reason for a particular emotion; 
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the reason does not justify the outburst. 
If I’m right, then there are situations in which we can hold people responsible for their 
everyday emotions. What about our emotions towards fictions? They seem to be a particularly 
interesting case, because their object does not actually exist in our world. Perhaps this is an 
ontological difference that makes a difference for emotional responsibility. 
Actually, I don’t think that it does. I think that we should hold people responsible for their 
emotions towards fictions in the same types of situations and for the same types of reasons that we 
would hold them responsible in the actual world. Consider a young woman whose sorrow over the 
death of a fictional heartthrob causes her to mope, lose sleep, or do poorly on a school exam.  I 
think that many people would contend that she lacks control of her emotional responses and should 
be held responsible for the resulting actions. We would likely say the same thing if the woman’s 
sorrow was the result of a real person’s death, someone like a movie star or athlete with whom she 
has no personal relationship. The fact that the object of her emotion isn’t a concrete particular does 
not seem to make much of a difference in this case. We will hold people responsible when their 
emotions lead to bad results or themselves or others. 
 We can finally return to Red Wedding example. Are our strong emotions appropriate in 
this case? First, we must ask whether the emotions fit their object. If we grant that the death of a 
beloved character may be an acceptable reason to feel sorrow, then the emotion is fitting and has 
a proper shape. One could argue, however, that it is mis-sized; the emotion may be far too strong 
for what the case warrants. To determine whether this is true, I think that we need to turn to our 
notion of emotional responsibility. Are we so caught up in the story and so distraught that we 
ignore other pressing duties?  If so, then perhaps we do not feel as we should. Otherwise, I am 
inclined to say that the emotional response is appropriate. 
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5. Summary 
 
I have argued in this chapter that we have genuine, rational emotional responses towards fictions. 
There were three distinct claims. First, our emotional responses towards fictions are genuine 
mental states. My arguments here involved dissolving the paradox of fiction. I argued that the 
functionalist assumptions that are implicit in the paradox are unfounded because we can be 
motivated to act in response to fictions. I also argued that emotions towards fictions play the same 
type of inferential role as real-life emotions, that our emotional feelings are genuine and non-
illusory, and that we make genuine emotional evaluations of fictional objects. These claims paved 
the way for the SAV, but left open the question of the nature of our emotional responses to fictions. 
 My second major claim in this chapter is that our emotions in general should be thought 
of in terms of a multi-level appraisal of emotionally relevant objects. Our emotional responses 
involve low level perceptual and affective processes and slower cognitive processes that work 
together in a feedback loop. These processes combined make up a temporally extended emotional 
process, including conscious qualitative feelings. Because I do not think that our emotions require 
a belief in the existence of an object, we can say that our emotional responses towards fictions are 
genuine emotions. 
Finally, I have argued that our emotions towards fictions can be rational. It makes sense 
that we should have emotional responses towards objects that we know do not exist. Indeed, our 
emotional interactions with fictions are often epistemically fruitful. Our emotional responses 
towards fictions are often appropriate—or, in my terms, fitting—according to an individual’s 
personal experiences, background, beliefs about the fiction, as well as the content of the fiction 
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itself. Our emotional responses about fictions can be sometimes be proper or improper. This means 
that we can be held responsible for them in some cases.  
The overall purpose of this chapter was to understand the nature and expression of our 
emotional responses towards fictions, especially those emotions that may be involved in our moral 
evaluations of the fiction.  This was important to my project for several reasons. First, I suspect 
that emotions play a role in our moral judgments, an idea that I will further develop in the following 
chapter. Second, we saw in the previous section how propositional attitudes like beliefs can be 
understood to be genuine. This chapter solidified the SAV in terms of emotions as well as dissolved 
the elusive paradox of fiction. Finally, explaining my views on genuine, rational, fictional 
emotions will prove to be quite useful in chapters 7, 8, and 9 when I explain the three remaining 
puzzles of fiction: the sympathy for the devil phenomenon, the puzzle of imaginative resistance, 
and the question of moral learning. 
 
 
Appendix 
 
I would like to consider four potential objections to my multi-level appraisal theory of emotions. 
Several of these objections present challenges to any theory of emotions (2, 4) and some to 
appraisal theories in general (1, 3). Luckily, my theory can handle each of them.  
 
Objection 1: Appraisal theories cannot explain emotional responses to novel stimuli. 
All appraisal theories hold that emotions are responses to stimuli in one’s internal or external 
environment that bear on one’s wellbeing, or the wellbeing of a person or object on cares about. 
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The appraisal is typically understood in terms of a response to an emotion-proper property; we 
appraise stimuli with respect to the associations we make between them and past experiences that 
we have had with similar objects, people, or situations. 
 But what about entirely novel stimuli, objects that are not yet associated with a particular 
emotionally relevant property? How do we respond emotionally to them? 
 Novel stimuli would be a problem for any theory of emotions that has no argument for how 
we acquire knowledge and concepts of emotionally relevant properties. In §3.2, I suggested that 
some emotional information may be innate (as in the case of looming objects or darkness; see 
Damasio 1994, LeDoux 2012) and some may be learned.  At least some of our emotional 
associations are likely acquired through social learning and experience. It has been the task of child 
development researchers to discover how this learning process takes place. The psychologists Dare 
Baldwin and Louis Moses (1994) studied how very young children gain emotional understanding 
from their parents (see also Stein 1996). Between the ages of 2 to 3 months, children are able to 
discriminate between happy and sad facial expressions. At the same age, they are able to track 
another person’s line of vision by noticing that a parent is looking away from them. They can also 
follow pointing gestures to objects that are close by. These are three examples of early 
communicative capacities. Put together, they lead to a social referencing phenomenon which 
develops at around 8 to 12 months: when a child is presented with an unfamiliar object or person, 
she will typically glance toward a parent and then behave toward that object or person in terms of 
the affective cues that the parent displays. Based on these observations, Baldwin and Moses 
conclude that infants often spontaneously seek emotional information from a parent in order to 
help them know how to interact with the new object.  This involves an implicit recognition that 
emotions have intentional and referential qualities (Baldwin & Moses 1994).  
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 So we may not be able to respond emotionally to novel stimuli until we learn more about 
object and how our social group typically responds to them. Or, in other situations, if we learn to 
associate objects with certain positive or negative qualities through our own individual 
experiences. This is a question that bears on all theories of emotions, not just mine. 
 
 
Objection 2: Emotions vs. moods vs. startle responses vs.… 
One of the challenges facing emotion theorists is to define the difference between emotions and 
other sorts of affective states. What is the difference between full-fledged emotions and moods? 
Are startle responses full-fledged emotions? I have not presented answers to these questions in this 
chapter. However, I think that my process approach may help us to sketch a response to both. 
 Startle responses are sometimes not taken to be genuine or “full-fledged” emotions because 
they are short-lived and cognitively impenetrable (Carroll 2008). On my view, a startle response 
would be a quick, automatic appraisal of an object that results from low level processing 
(LeDoux’s “low road”) and so does count as a real emotion. A loud noise may trigger a sub-
cognitive appraisal of something potentially dangerous, for example. The response may initially 
be processed by the same neural structures (the sensory thalamus and amygdala, in this case) but 
without the slower, cortical processing. Cognitive processing happens slightly later. This is when 
we will consciously experience fear—perhaps only for a few seconds, before we realize that it was 
just a car back-firing that made the loud noise, and not a gun. Perhaps the same sort of idea can 
apply to other low level affective responses, such as mimicry, mirroring, and emotional contagion. 
 Moods are a bit more challenging to explain. Moods are sometimes thought to be longer-
lasting than emotions, free-floating and lacking an intentional object—in my case, not associated 
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with a core relational theme or emotion-proper property, or dispositional states as opposed to 
occurrent ones (see Prinz 2004a for an overview of positions).  
 There are problems with each of these views. Sometimes emotions can last a long time and 
moods can be short lived. They can also be dispositional; I may be disposed to undergo an angry 
state whenever I witness my neighbor going through my mail or an affectionate state whenever I 
see a French bulldog. The intentionality proposal would be the most difficult for the multi-level 
appraisal theory: how can we make affective appraisals if there is no thing to appraise? Yet it is 
difficult to explain how moods can be caused if they lack intentionality. Surely there has to be 
something that triggers a mood. Carroll (2003) proposes that moods may “spillover” from 
emotions so that we experience a state that is similar to an emotion, but applies to many different 
objects as opposed to just one (see also Prinz 2004a). This would help to explain how moods are 
caused and also how they come to be associated with certain feelings and appraisals; for example, 
we associate a cranky mood with something annoying or offensive and a cheerful mood from a 
random act of kindness or sunny day. 
 We can explain this in terms of my multi-level appraisal theory. Recall that, on this view, 
emotions are temporally extended. They involve different non-cognitive and cognitive appraisal 
processes in a feedback loop. We have an emotion when an object is initially appraised both via 
cognitive and non-cognitive processes. This may generate physical and physiological responses, 
including feelings. Some of these responses/feelings may be long-lasting and continue to influence 
our mental states throughout the day. Thus, if our original emotion was positive-valenced, we may 
continue to take in new information and process it in light of that earlier positive state. The result 
would be continued positive affect, but without a specific object: a good mood. 
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Objection 3: What about drug-induced emotions? 
Imagine that there is a drug that you can take that will make you consciously experience the exact 
same phenomenological feelings you would if you were elated, ashamed, or enraged. Would these 
feelings be genuine emotions? It does not seem like they could they be if an appraisal theory is 
correct—after all, there is no appraisal occurring in this case. And yet many people will want to 
claim that drug-induced states are genuine emotions. 
 It looks like my any appraisal theory will just have to bite the bullet on this one and deny 
that drug-induced feelings are actual emotions. However, I don’t see this as a problem for my view. 
I think that part of the appeal of cases like the drug induced affective state stems from our implicit 
commitment to a feeling theory of emotions. We generally have access to our emotional state 
through our emotions through their conscious feel: the positive, good feeling of joy, the uplifting 
feeling of pride, and down-trodden feeling of sorrow, or the frenzied feeling of anger. These 
feelings seem like the most important part of our emotion because they are the most salient. 
However, there are at least some reasons why we can question whether feelings alone constitute 
an emotion. We do not individuate emotions by their feelings alone. Rather, we tend to think that 
emotions play certain functional and inferential roles as well.  
 Imagine that you take a drug that makes you feel just like you would if you suffered some 
irreconcilable loss—but, in fact, no sorrowful event has taken place. That means we have an 
affective feeling without an appraisal, and so no genuine emotion. Does this go against our 
commonsense notion of what it means to experience an emotion? I doubt it. If someone were to 
ask you if anything is the matter, you may respond “I feel sad.” The concerned friend would likely 
follow up by asking why you are sad. She would ask you to make some appraisal of an event or 
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object. You would likely respond by saying “Oh, I’m not really sad, I just took this pill that’s made 
me loopy. I’ll be better soon.” 
 Compare this to an actual case of sorrow. When your concerned friend asks if anything is 
the matter, you say “I am sad” and then, perhaps, go on to explain the object or cause of your 
sorrow: “My best friend just moved to Prague and I’m afraid that I won’t see her again for a very 
long time.” The point is that genuine emotions may play certain functional and inferential roles 
that are explained by some object or cause of our feeling, not merely by the feeling alone.  
 
 
 
Objection 4: How to explain pure-instrumental music? 
Imagine listening to Mozart’s Clarinet Concerto. You are in a particularly reflective state of mind, 
so you decide to keep track how this piece makes you feel: you find the tempo of the first 
movement uplifting, the introduction of the clarinet a pleasant change, the somber, doleful tones 
of the second movement rather disheartening.  
We describe music as having emotional qualities. We also think that we have emotional 
responses to purely instrumental, non-representational musical works. But why? What is the 
source of these emotions—if they are emotions at all? This is especially puzzling if we think that 
emotions are a kind of appraisal since there does not seem to be anything to appraise. 
Questions like these have forced philosophers and cognitive scientists to scramble to find 
a way to explain our emotional responses to music. No one denies that we do have affective 
responses towards music. The question is whether these responses are genuine emotional states 
(denied by both Davies 1994 & Kivy 1999), illusory states (Prinz 2004a), some other kind of 
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affective state, such as a mood (Carroll 2003), or an “ineffable feeling” (Robinson 2010; see also 
Renero & Tullmann, in prep). 
There are actually three related questions here. The first concerns whether or not our 
affective responses towards music constitute a genuine emotion (call this the genuine emotion 
problem). Second, we need to know in what way music can be expressive of emotions. Call this 
the foundational problem. Finally, we need to be able to explain the intentionality of our affective 
responses towards music. If most theories of emotions take them to be some kind of evaluation of 
our environment, we need to understand the nature of that evaluation. Call this the intentionality 
problem. 
These problems are interrelated: an answer to the foundational problem will explain the 
intentionality problem, and the answer to the intentionality problem will explain the genuine 
emotion problem. A full explanation of these issues would, sadly, require a chapter (or book) in 
itself. Here I would just like to mention some possible responses to the foundational problem, each 
of which would be compatible with my multi-level appraisal theory. 
What is it that we affectively respond to in pure-instrumental music? We often respond 
affectively to formal features of a piece: timbre, dynamics, pitch, tone, instrumentality, etc. The 
difficulty here would be to explain how it is that these formal features of music are capable of 
causing emotions (the intentionality problem). There are several ways in which we can explain 
this (Robinson 2010). 
First, it might be that we have appreciative emotional responses towards music (Kivy 
1999). We respond to the beauty of a work or the craft involved in constructing it. These 
appreciative responses take the work as a whole as their intentional object, but do not need to 
explain how one aspect of music causes a particular affective response. Another possibility is that 
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we respond affectively to instrumental music because we associate the sounds of the music with 
other emotional situations or objects (see Prinz 2004a). We associate marches with patriotism and 
hymns with piety. Or, we might associate a particular sound with a particular object, like an animal 
or human voice. Finally, we might have an aesthetic response to understanding the structure of a 
music work. We might feel relieved, surprised, satisfied, or unsettled by the introduction of certain 
instruments, themes, or dynamics (Robinson 2010). 
I think that all of these possibilities are compatible with my multi-level appraisal theory. 
Importantly, our responses towards formal qualities of a piece—whether through association, 
appreciative emotions, or structural qualities of a work—each involve a kind of appraisal of the 
work or some related associated object. That is enough for the emotional appraisal process to get 
off the ground. I think that it is also enough for us to explain why these are genuine emotions with 
intentional objects. Unfortunately, that is a story for another day. 
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Chapter 6: Moral Appraisals of Fictions 
 
 
1. Zombies, trolleys, & footbridges 
 
Judith Jarvis Thompson’s “trolley problems” have become just as famous as the ethical theories 
they were intended to comment on (Thompson 1986). The first trolley problem runs as follows: 
 
 A runaway trolley is headed for five people who will be killed if it proceeds on its 
present course. The only way to save these people is to hit a switch that will turn 
onto a side track, where it will run over and kill one person instead of five. It is 
okay to turn the trolley in order to save five people at the expense of one? (Greene 
2007). 
 
Researchers have found that approximately 90% of participants who are presented with the trolley 
problem agree that it is morally acceptable to flip the switch, thereby killing the solitary person 
while saving five (Bucciarelli et al 2008).  
Interestingly, the responses flip in the footbridge problem, a variation on the trolley 
problem: 
 
A runaway trolley threatens to kill five people, but this time you are standing next 
to a large stranger on a footbridge spanning the tracks, in between the oncoming 
trolley and the five people. The only way to save the five people is to push this 
stranger off the bridge and onto the tracks below. He will die as a result, but his 
body will stop the trolley from reaching the others. Is it okay to save the five people 
by pushing this stranger to his death? (Greene 2007). 
 
In this case, only about 10% of participants choose to push the stranger (Bucciarelli et al 2008). 
Why are the responses so drastically different in these two cases?  
The neuroscientist Joshua Greene and his colleagues have drawn several important 
conclusions about the nature of morality from these two thought experiments. Greene and social 
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psychologist Jonathan Haidt (2002) take the responses to these cases as evidence that emotional 
intuitions play a role in our moral judgments, how we make moral evaluations. In another analysis 
of these studies, Cushman, Young, and Greene (2010; see also Greene et al 2001 & Paxton et al 
2011) take the divergence in responses to the two problems as evidence of a dual-process theory 
of morality in which emotions and conscious reasoning play separate roles in our moral judgments.  
Greene (2007) further concludes that the participants’ responses to the thought experiments 
reveal the rational basis of utilitarianism and the emotional basis of deontology—a surprising 
conclusion considering Kant’s own emphasis on reason. Greene explains his conclusion as 
follows: we are able to rationally calculate the costs and benefits of saving five people over one in 
the impersonal trolley problem because we are removed from the victim (the utilitarian response). 
However, the up-close-and-personal footbridge problem evokes a strong negative emotional 
reaction about the thought of pushing the stranger onto the tracks. It is challenging to rationally 
overcome this reaction. Thus, respondents tend to make the deontological judgment that it is 
unacceptable to kill an innocent person, even if doing so results in the preservation of five innocent 
lives.   
 If we take these researchers at their word, then it seems that thought experiments can play 
a significant role in gleaning ethical intuitions from everyday people. These intuitions are 
paramount in providing counterexamples to normative ethical theories, support for others, and 
evidence for how we actually make moral judgments. 
 Consider one more thought experiment: 
It’s the zombie apocalypse. You and your band of survivors stumble upon a 
secluded farm in the woods. To your relief, the farm is safe, quiet, and free from 
wandering “walkers.” The only problem is that the owner of the famer has decided 
to keep every walker he has encountered precariously locked in the barn near were 
your group sleeps each night. Tension and fear mounts amongst your group. A few 
members of the group do not want to destroy the walkers; they were people once, 
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after all, and your group are guests on the farm. Others think that the walkers are a 
threat and need to be eliminated for the sake of the group. You have to make a 
decision—and fast. Do you agree to shoot the walkers, thereby breaking your 
promise to the farmer? 
 
Here we have another thought experiment in which one person must decide the fate of a group. 
We must decide whether we should kill a few in order to save the many, or let the few live (even 
if they are walkers) with the high risk that the group will be destroyed as a result. The additional 
complication is that killing the walkers violates a promise the group made to the farmer. 
 This is not, strictly speaking, a thought experiment. It is a fiction (although I will argue that 
some fictions are thought experiments in chapter 9). Fans of the television show The Walking Dead 
will recognize this vignette as the central dilemma in the episode “Pretty Much Dead Already.” 
The protagonist, Rick Grimes, must make a decision concerning the fate of his ragged band of 
survivors. Like the trolley and footbridge cases, this episode tests our moral values. Some viewers 
may take the rational response in the beginning of the episode (kill the walkers and break a promise 
for the greater good). However, as Greene’s analysis would predict, these same viewers may 
change their decision after they emotionally connect with the farmers. We learn that one of the 
zombies is the farmer’s wife, another is his daughter, another is his son-in-law, and (most 
importantly for the viewers) one is the young girl Sophia, who was separated from their group 
days before.  Some viewers may switch their decision from a rational response to an emotional 
one upon receiving more personal information about the walkers and the farmer. Emotional 
closeness in this case takes the place of the physical closeness implied in the trolley/footbridge 
problems. 
 I have presented the trolley, footbridge, and “walker in the barn” cases to highlight the 
similarities between our moral evaluations of traditional ethical thought experiments and the moral 
scenarios presented in fictions. Most thought experiments just are fictions; they do not describe 
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actual people or events. It is plausible, then, that the audiences’ responses to this case would likely 
have the same sort of normative and metaethical implications as the trolley problems.  In fact, most 
fictional narratives are probably more realistic than standard philosophical thought experiments 
because they capture the complexity and messiness of real world moral situations. 
The fact that we may be able to learn about morality from fictional thought experiments is 
important implication of the SAV.  If we reason, judge, and feel about fictional event and people 
the way we do towards real-life situations. My goal in this chapter is to integrate what we have 
learned from previous chapters concerning our perception, social cognition, and emotional 
responses towards fictions into a comprehensive moral psychology of fiction. In previous chapters, 
we have determined that the mental states that could potentially be involved in our moral 
judgments of fiction—our beliefs, thoughts, emotions, judgments, feelings, etc.—are all 
stereotypical mental states. All that we have left to do is show that our moral judgments of fiction 
are also genuine.  
A moral psychology of fiction shouldn’t just concern itself with establishing whether or 
not our moral judgments towards fiction are genuine mental states. It must also explain our actual 
moral experiences. So establishing the SAV of moral judgments will only take up a short part of 
this chapter. The rest will be devoted to explaining our moral judgments in general and those 
towards fictional characters in particular. 
 In §2, I will make the case for a SAV of moral judgments about fictions. Next, I will sketch 
a version of multi-level sentimentalism, the idea that both affective and reasoning processes are 
involved in our moral judgments, based on the multi-level appraisal theory of emotions I presented 
in the previous chapter. We will then be ready to address another puzzle of fiction: the problem of 
moral motivation. I then bring together the various components of our emotional and moral 
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responses to fictions that I have argued for in the past several chapters, presenting a unified account 
of the moral psychology of fiction.  I will conclude this chapter by returning to our discussion of 
the semantic and normative implications of emotions in order to see how this bears on the 
rationality of our moral judgments about fictions. 
 
 
2. Genuine moral judgments 
 
In the previous five chapters, I have established the SAV for our beliefs, perception, emotions, and 
social cognitive capacities. Our mental engagements with fiction utilize the same types of 
psychological states that we use in our everyday experiences. Any differences in our emotions, 
beliefs, and motivations to act towards fictional objects can be explained in terms of the intentional 
content of those states. This is what I mean by taking the fictional stance; we acknowledge that the 
objects of our engagement are fictional. This affects how we mentally respond to them.  
 We can make the same claims about our moral judgments about fictional characters and 
events. I will argue that moral judgments are constituted by both emotional and rational processes, 
including moral beliefs and judgments. There is no reason why our moral judgments are non-
stereotypical if emotions, beliefs, and judgments about fictional objects are all stereotypical states.  
 Still, a proponent of the DAV could contend that there is something unique about moral 
judgments. Why would we make moral judgments about something that doesn’t exist? 
Furthermore, aren’t moral judgments supposed to be motivating? If that’s right, and we have 
genuine moral judgments about fictions, then shouldn’t we be motivated to act on them? I will 
address these questions in what follows.  I will begin by discussing the nature of moral judgments. 
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I contend that our moral judgments about fictional things are genuine. This is true on any theory 
concerning the constituents of our moral judgments.  
It is important to understand the nature of moral judgments so that we can make sure that 
there is nothing unique about moral judgments that might render those about fictions non-
stereotypical. Most of the controversy concerning our moral judgments centers around three 
questions.17 First, where do moral beliefs and motivations come from? We need to know whether 
our moral values are learned or innate, culturally influenced, or deduced from rational principles 
or emotions. Second, how does moral judgment work? Here, we wish to determine which mental 
processes and mechanisms are involved in how we actually go about making moral judgments 
(Haidt and Bjorkland 2007). Finally, what is different about our moral judgments about fictions, 
if anything? 
 I will primarily focus on the second and third question in this chapter, although I will 
mention the first when relevant. To begin, I will discuss moral judgments as types of occurrent, 
internal states or processes. There are two general views concerning how we make moral 
judgments. The first is rationalism. Rationalists argue that moral judgments are based on conscious 
reasoning and deliberating. Rationalism has a long philosophical tradition. Plato believed that our 
souls should be governed by our reason and that emotions bar us from making good moral 
decisions (Plato 1985). Contra Greene, Kant argued that the Categorical Imperative was both a 
universal and logical means of deliberation that a rational agent could employ to determine whether 
                                                          
17 One issue I do not address in this dissertation concerns the difference between moral and other 
norms. In particular, I do not describe the moral/conventional distinction, a notion introduced by 
Eliot Turiel and his colleagues (Turiel, Killen, & Helwig 1987; see also Nichols 2005. They argued 
that moral norms differ from conventional ones in that they are serious, authority independent, and 
considered wrong due to reasons of fairness and harm to others. Although the moral/conventional 
distinction has been heavily criticized by moral psychologists (Bacciarelli 2008, Prinz 2007), it 
remains one of the few systematic methods for separating moral from other norms. 
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an action was morally acceptable (1785/1959). Contemporary Kantians like Christine Korsgaard 
follow suit; ethical judgments are based on practical reason (Korsgaard 1986). Utilitarians like J.S. 
Mill (1861/2002) and Peter Singer (1995) hold that our reasoning capacities allow us to weigh the 
costs and benefits of a moral decision in order to maximize utility. Finally, the social psychologist 
Lawrence Kohlberg conducted a series of (now highly controversial) studies that seemed to 
indicate that children and young adults develop increasingly objective and universal moral 
principles and can justify their moral decisions through conscious deliberation (Kohlberg 1981). 
 The details of how we actually can and should make moral judgments vary between 
rationalists. However, they are all committed to the idea that moral judgments is necessarily based 
on reason. We can contrast rationalism to sentimentalism. Sentimentalists argue that emotions play 
a significant role in how we make moral judgments. Contemporary sentimentalists trace their roots 
to David Hume, who famously stated that “Morality…is more properly felt than judged of” (quoted 
in D’Arms and Jacobson 2000b).  
There are several different approaches to how emotions are involved in our moral 
judgments. I’ll mention three of them here (but see also Hauser 2006, Huebner et al 2008, Nichols 
2005, 2005, & 2008, Roedder & Harman 2010, amongst others).  The social intuitionist model 
developed by Jonathan Haidt is one influential sentimentalist theory (2001; see also Haidt and 
Bjorklund 2008). This view states that we arrive at moral judgments through triggered emotional 
intuitions as opposed to conscious reasoning processes, although post hoc rationalization may be 
employed when people are called upon to justify their moral judgments in social contexts. In 
contrast, Jesse Prinz’s constructive sentimentalism (2006, 2007) holds that emotions are both 
necessary and sufficient for moral judgments; the mere presence of certain emotions can make a 
neutral judgment a moral one (see Wheatley & Haidt 2005) and those who possess emotional 
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defects—i.e. psychopaths—do not make actual moral judgments (Blair 1995, Nichols 2005, Prinz 
2007). We have already encountered Joshua Greene’s dual-process model (Greene 2002, Cushman 
et al 2010). According to Greene, moral judgments are a non-natural kind; they involve both 
emotional and rational processes. Emotions act as a kind of “alarm-bell” for moral transgressions 
and are associated with personal actions. As we have seen, emotional responses typically lead to 
deontological appraisals. Cognitive moral reasoning is generally based on impersonal evaluations 
and is associated with consequentialist responses. 
 Like the rationalists, each sentimentalist has his or her own proposal on how emotions 
relate to reasoning processes and how they bring about moral judgments and motivate action. 
Nevertheless, they are all committed to the idea that emotions play some role in our moral 
judgments and behaviors. In the following section, I will propose a type of multi-level 
sentimentalism that is similar to Greene’s dual-process model. 
My own view is based on my multi-level appraisal theory of emotions, as well as the 
distinctions I have made throughout this dissertation between perceptual and cognitive processing. 
While that the proponent of the SAV need not adopt the theory of moral judgments that I propose 
here, it is beneficial for three reasons. First, I think that is good empirical support for some form 
of sentimentalism, but also both empirical and theoretical reasons why cognitive reasoning 
processes are also a significant part of our moral deliberation.  Second, multi-level moral appraisal 
theory squares nicely with my previous arguments concerning social cognition and emotions. 
Finally, my view has great power to explain the remaining puzzles of fiction as well as capture our 
actual moral experiences with fiction. 
 
 
221 
 
 
3. A multi-level appraisal theory of moral judgments 
 
While reading a novel or watching a film, you might have a vague sense that a character is morally 
vicious or has done a bad thing. You might have fast, seemingly automatic negative reactions 
towards that character for what she has done. This captures one sense of our moral judgments 
about fictions: they are quick, non-reflective or deliberate, and often emotionally-laced. However, 
our moral judgments of fictions can also be quite complex. Watching a realistic social drama like 
The Wire may cause a viewer to consciously, deliberately, and thoughtfully weigh possible 
judgments before reaching a firm conclusion as to the moral worth of a character or action. Our 
moral judgments about fictions may generally be a mixture of the two types: both automatic, non-
reflective and emotional as well as deliberate and thoughtful. My goal is to develop a theory of 
moral judgments about fictions that accounts for the variety of our moral reactions. 
 In this section I will lay out one potential theory that can accommodate the depth of our 
moral judgments about fictions. I call it a multi-level appraisal theory of moral judgments because 
it is so closely related to my multi-level appraisal theory of emotions. I will spend the next two 
sections discussing moral judgments in general before exploring the implications of my theory for 
fictions. 
 
 
3.1. Multiple appraisals 
Like some other sentimentalists, I argue that our moral judgments are the result of both affective 
and rational processes. Moral appraisals can be basic, automatic, and unconscious, just like our 
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emotional appraisals. They may also be complex, deliberate, and conscious. Recall that my multi-
level appraisal theory of emotions posits at least two separate appraisals that work together in a 
feedback loop.  There was an initial affective appraisal of a stimulus in one’s external environment 
or thoughts. At the same time, slower cognitive reasoning processes evaluate the stimulus through 
conscious judgments and inference drawing, the implementation of context sensitive information, 
background knowledge, and personal traits that promote, enhance, regulate, or modify the original 
affective appraisal. Cognitive processing is sometimes required in order to identify a state (this 
state is indignation as opposed to rage; guilt as opposed to shame) or the cognitive processing 
influences the initial affective appraisal so as to become an entirely different state. 
I think that the same sort of process occurs with moral appraisals. Following other 
sentimentalists, I contend that we undergo an automatic affective appraisal of a stimulus, which is 
quickly followed by another cognitive appraisal and other cognitive processes, often including 
conscious reasoning. I hesitate to call the affective appraisal an emotional intuition, as Haidt does. 
First of all, I do not think that all of our affective appraisals are innate or genetically determined. 
As I suggested in the previous chapter, we can learn to respond to certain objects with emotions. 
Furthermore, ‘intuition’ is used by various authors in a myriad of ways. Haidt thinks that intuitions 
are unconscious emotional reactions (2002; Haidt and Bjurkland 2008). Walter Scott-Armstrong 
argues that intuitions are unconscious beliefs (2008). Cushman et al (2006) describe them as 
unconscious principles. Johnson-Laird and his colleagues define intuition as reasoning from 
unconscious premises (Bacciarelli et al 2008). Because of these various meanings, the term 
‘intuition’ has the potential to engender obfuscation in the moral judgment debate. It is possible 
that theorists are talking past each other—e.g. Scott-Armstrong and Johnson-Laird, who argue that 
reasoning can be unconscious and Haidt, who thinks that reasoning is necessarily conscious. I will 
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return to this point momentarily. 
I have argued that emotions are intentional; they are about something. Specifically, 
emotions are about an emotionally relevant object or property in one’s environment. The objects 
that trigger an emotion are fixed independently of the response. An emotion is not solely 
individuated in terms of its characteristic phenomenology or expression, but rather by an appraisal 
of an object or scenario as having certain characteristics. For example, we feel guilty when we 
have performed some blameworthy action that causes others to feel contempt towards us. The 
affective appraisal of our action is both a reaction to external features of our environment and our 
response-dependent interpretation of it. 
An initial moral appraisal is very similar to an initial emotional appraisal. Moral judgments 
may involve automatic affective responses to a stimulus after we think about or perceive it. This 
is similar to Greene’s characterization of the “alarm bell” emotional response; we may have an 
automatic appraisal of a disgusting action as “bad!”, “dislike!” or “avoid!” or an appraisal of a 
kind action as “good!”, “like!” or “approach!” Some moral judgments may just consist of the initial 
emotional response, like when we passively watch a film and are too absorbed in the story to 
engage in further thought about a disgusting action (at least consciously). But further cognitive 
processing is often involved in our moral judgments. It is here that the differences between 
emotional and moral appraisals might appear. 
 Here’s an example highlighting the difference between typical anger and morally 
significant anger. Suppose that your best friend dropped your laptop, shattering its screen and 
rendering it unusable. This makes you angry. Now suppose that you witness your friend drop your 
laptop as a way to get back at you for forgetting a date that you had set up ages ago. This also 
makes you angry. 
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Even though you experience anger in both cases, it seems to me that the first case is not an 
instance of moral anger. Rather, you just experience everyday anger at your friend’s carelessness. 
You probably wouldn’t say that your friend has deeply and unjustly offended you. The second 
case does seem to be a case of moral anger. Your friend has acted in a way that seems morally 
reprehensible. What’s the difference, in terms of emotional and rational processing? The initial 
affective processing will be roughly the same in both cases; you perceive some event in which 
someone has caused you harm. This triggers an automatic negative appraisal. Other information 
makes the latter a case of moral anger—for instance, background information about the responsible 
agent and the context of the action. In the second case, we know that our friend intentionally acted 
offensively as a means of retaliation in the second case. We recognize that our friend has violated 
some moral norm, such as “do not intentionally harm another’s possessions.” The same may not 
be said about the previous example; your friend has not violated a moral norm and your knowledge 
of her action and intentions does not indicate that she has acted in a morally reprehensible way, 
even if she did make you angry! 
I think that moral situations will likely be a matter of interpretation that vary on a case by 
case basis (see also Bachiarelli 2008). These examples show that the initial, automatic responses 
to value-laden stimuli in both moral and non-moral situations may be very similar. However, there 
are differences in later stages of cognitive processing of emotional appraisals and moral appraisals. 
The social context in which each arise may also be quite different. Both emotional and moral 
appraisals may involve an interpretation of the implications of an object or event. This draws upon 
our knowledge and beliefs about the case at hand.  
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3.2. Moral reasoning 
Suppose that you are watching a superhero film. You experience a range of negative reactions 
towards the film’s evil villain, including automatic emotional response. You may also make moral 
judgments about the villain’s actions. These may be automatic emotional appraisals, as we saw in 
the previous subsection. These appraisals may never result in later cognitive reasoning. Generally 
speaking, though, some cognitive reasoning will take place when we morally condemn the film 
villain.  We interpret the moral significance of the agent or event; we understand an action or event 
as morally significant and assess that significance in terms of a judgment. Assessing the moral 
worth of an action includes reasoning processes in which we (consciously or unconsciously) apply 
moral principles and background knowledge to a stimulus or scenario, draw inferences from prior 
knowledge, and make decisions based on our understanding of a situation.  
My multi-level appraisal theory places cognitive reasoning processes in a much more 
prominent position than, say, Haidt’s social intuitionist model. Haidt argues that reasoning in 
moral judgments involves mere “post hoc rationalization.” Haidt considers moral reasoning to only 
involve conscious inference-drawing processes. I think that this begs the question against the 
rationalists.  
Haidt’s main justification for the conclusion that reasoning processes are unnecessary for 
moral judgments arises from his work on moral dumbfounding (2001). Consider Haidt’s infamous 
vignette of brother/sister incest: 
 
Julie and Mark are brother and sister. They are travelling together in France on 
summer vacation from college. One night they are staying alone in a cabin near the 
beach. They decided that it would be interesting and fun if they tried making love. 
At the very least it would be a new experience for each of them. Julie was already 
taking birth control pills, but Mark uses a condom too, just to be safe. They both 
enjoy making love, but they decide not to do it again. They keep that night as a 
special secret, which makes them feel even closer to each other.  What do you think 
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about that? Was it OK for them to make love? (ibid, 814). 
 
Many participants quickly make a negative moral judgment of the siblings’ action when they are 
first presented with this vignette. However, participants were unable to justify their judgments with 
reasons when they were asked to do so. Many concluded by simply repeating that the action was 
“just wrong,” which, as Haidt notes, is not really a reason. 
It seems like participants in this study were unable to consciously reason to a moral 
judgment. It is possible, though, that they reason unconsciously—a possibility that Haidt does not 
consider. Thus, Haidt concludes that the moral judgment against incest could not have been reason-
based. He then concludes that the judgment must be caused by an emotional intuition. This 
inference is invalid. If unconscious reasoning is possible (and there is good reason to think that it 
is) then the subjects could have quickly and unconsciously reasoned from a basic moral principle 
as the vignette unfolded. However, when called upon to justify their judgment, the subjects may 
not have access to their unconscious reasoning, or even why they hold a particular moral principle 
to begin with. Do we have a good justification for thinking that incest is wrong in the vignette? 
Some people probably do not; they simply conclude that it is wrong. This does not mean that this 
principle cannot be involved as a step in moral reasoning (e.g. “this is a case of sibling incest.  But 
I think that sibling incest is wrong. Therefore, the action is wrong.”). The basic worry is that Haidt 
conflates reasoning in judgment with reasoning in justification, which are two very different 
processes.  
A sentimentalist could object that it is unrealistic to think that we make moral judgments 
via deductive processes, even if it is done unconsciously. The deductive model just does not match 
our actual experiences of making moral judgments (Harman et al 2010).  Deductive reasoning may 
play a small role in our reasoning processes, moral or otherwise.  It could be that moral reasoning 
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is a process of belief coherence according to which we attempt to make our information about a 
moral situation cohere with our moral values and principles. 
Gilbert Harman, Kelby Mason, and Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (2010) describe such a 
process in terms of a connectionist model of reflective equilibrium. They propose that internal 
moral reasoning proceeds through a process of “adjusting one’s beliefs and plans, in the light of 
one’s goals, in pursuit of…a reflective equilibrium” (ibid, 239). This view is inspired by 
coherentist models of justification, in which a new belief must cohere (be consistent) with the 
subject’s standing beliefs (Quine 1951). If it does not cohere, then either the proposed belief or the 
standing beliefs must be altered until a “fit” is achieved.  
 The authors base their theory on the psychologist Paul Thagard’s theory of constraint 
satisfaction (Thagard 2000; see also Baljinder and Thagard 2003 and Daniels 1979). Constraint-
satisfaction models of decision making predict that an emerging decision will be accompanied by 
a general shift towards coherence across any aspects of a dispute that are relevant to the matter at 
hand (Simon et al 2001). We base our practical and moral decisions on the relevant information of 
a situation in which we find ourselves or that we observe. This could include our beliefs, goals, 
emotions, and desires. We make use of all of these background features in coming to the 
appropriate answer to important decision. Our beliefs about a particular case at hand are weighed 
in light of our other relevant beliefs, emotions, etc. The shift towards coherence is the result of 
taking these various aspects into account. Our conclusion is that which fits best with all the relevant 
factors of a case from our own perspective. 
On this view, we can change even our most firmly held beliefs. Each new proposal or 
occurence must be weighed and considered against our other beliefs, goals, etc. if any 
inconsistency arises between the information we have about the situation and our standing beliefs. 
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Some of our beliefs might need to be rejected in light of new information. This includes moral 
beliefs. When faced with Haidt’s sibling incest case, for example, it’s possible that participants 
must realign what they believe about incest to account for the information given about the case 
(there is no possibility for pregnancy, neither sibling was hurt, etc.). In some cases, participants 
eschew their former belief that incest is morally wrong; others will stick to their original belief 
because their negative emotional responses and negative stance towards appraisal weigh heavily 
on their judgment. Their moral appraisal would be very difficult to change. 
The constraint satisfaction model applies to both thought experiments and real-life 
situations. We try to fit our information about a situation with our moral beliefs, even while 
engaging with a thought experiment like Haidt’s sibling incest case. The same would be true if we 
confronted with a real-life case of sibling incest (although there may be quite a bit more 
information to take into account). If the constraint satisfaction process works in cases like these, it 
seems likely that it would also apply to our interactions with fictions. In many cases, our 
experiences with complex fictional narratives will be more similar to real-life moral situations than 
thought experiments that are relayed via short vignettes with little background information about 
the people or environment involved. 
 So while logical inference may sometimes be involved in moral reasoning, it is likely only 
one of the many types of reasoning processes available to us when making a moral judgment. 
Other types of reasoning include speculation on various outcomes, regulations or modifications of 
the affective appraisals, analyses of hypotheses and evidence, and, as we have seen, shifts towards 
coherent beliefs. All of this is done against the background of our overall goals, desires, and 
emotions, each of which may influence our final moral judgment. I think that this flexible, complex 
model of moral reasoning fits best with my multi-level appraisal theory. The multi-level moral 
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appraisal should be understood in terms of a feedback loop in which both affective and cognitive 
processes may influence the other.  
 Here is an example of what I have in mind.  In their research on the reasoning processes 
involved in moral judgments, Cushman and his colleagues discovered that there were some cases 
in which participants do, in fact, consciously reason to a solution in a moral dilemma. One scenario 
asked: “Is it permissible for Evan to pull a lever that drops a man off a footbridge and in front of a 
moving boxcar in order to cause the man to fall and be hit by the boxcar, thereby slowing it and 
saving five people ahead on the tracks?” (Cushman et al 2006, 1083). A majority of participants 
answered with a positive response to the question and were able to provide sufficient justifications 
for their judgments. They consciously acknowledge that norms against intended harm played a 
role in their decision.   
How did the participants reach this conclusion? Perhaps something like the following 
occurs: a participant, Jane, reads the vignette, and automatically has affective responses to it based 
on her mental representations of the information provided. This may include unconscious concern 
or distress for the potential victims and anxiety about having to make a difficult decision. The same 
information is processed via slower cognitive processes. Jane’s long term memory activates any 
of her relevant moral beliefs. She considers and weighs various outcomes in the dilemma. Jane 
finally decides that pulling the lever would be acceptable. According to the coherentist model, Jane 
makes this decision because it coheres better with her emotional responses and beliefs than the 
decision to not pull the lever. This whole process may take place unconsciously and result in a 
relatively quick response in which Jane tells the experimenter that she would pull the lever. Or, as 
Cushman and his colleagues found was often the case, Jane may think through the moral dilemma 
consciously, deliberately weighing evidence and perhaps recalling a general principle that claims 
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that one should try to maximize the number of lives saved whenever possible. 
A multi-level appraisal theory of moral judgments can best capture the underlying 
complexity and also the seeming automaticity of our moral experiences. This theory holds that 
subjects will generally have a fast, affective response towards morally good and morally bad 
actions and events. These affective responses are a relatively simple kind of appraisal of something 
we perceive or think about. An initial affective appraisal may be a positive or negative response 
that require further reasoning before arriving at an appropriate moral conclusion. Reasoning 
processes occur concurrently with the affective appraisal, but take longer due to cognitive and 
neural constraints.  
Our initial affective appraisals account for the automatic negative feeling we have towards 
immoral actions or, alternatively, the positive feeling we have towards good actions. Moral 
reasoning processes at the same time give shape to these automatic responses, lending them 
validity and normative weight. This means that both reason and emotions are involved in our moral 
judgments. This makes my view a suitable middle ground between rationalism and sentimentalism.  
 
 
3.3. Potential objections 
Sentimentalist theories like mine face several standard objections concerning the role of emotions 
in moral judgments, and metaethical issues surrounding the objectivity of moral judgments, the 
possibility of error, and moral disagreement (see D’Arms and Jacobson 2000a & 2000b). I will 
respond to the first objection here and return to the metaethical concerns in §6. 
There is plenty of evidence from empirical moral psychology literature to support the idea 
that emotions play some role in our moral judgments. Neuroimaging research suggests that 
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emotions at least co-occur with moral judgments (Greene et al 2007, Greene and Haidt 2002) and 
may influence the scope and intensity of our moral evaluations (Schnall, Haidt, & Clore 2008). 
There is even some evidence that emotions are necessary for moral judgments (Blair 1995, Prinz 
2006) as well as sufficient for them (Wheatley and Haidt 2005). However, as others have pointed 
out, neuroscientific tools currently lacks the precision to determine when emotions occur in the 
process of making a moral judgment, which neural mechanisms are involved in making them, and 
which psychological states corresponds to exactly which neural activation (Prinz 2006, Huebner 
et al 2008). If emotions cause a moral judgment, then we should see the initial emotion mechanism 
at work followed by cognitive processing. This is what Haidt and Greene’s studies purport to show. 
If emotions are necessary and sufficient for emotions, then, in theory at least, we could see 
affective mechanisms activated without the mechanisms that are typically involved in reasoning 
processes and a difficulty in making moral judgments if affective mechanisms are impaired (see 
Blair 1997). 
We cannot know for sure whether emotions influence, cause, or constitute a moral 
judgment until neuroimaging technology catches up to theories of moral judgment and we have a 
better understanding of neural processing. Luckily, this is not a problem for my view. Making a 
moral judgment is a process that generally involves an affective appraisal and cognitive reasoning. 
Determining when and how the judgment “happens” may be unimportant. We have emotional 
responses to both morally praiseworthy and morally blameworthy actions. We also use cognitive 
processes to evaluate a moral situation. Each process influences and shapes the other. Furthermore, 
how we determine our own discrete moral judgment may be a matter of interpretation, just like it 
may be for our particular emotions.  
Another rationalist challenge to sentimentalism may prove more of a problem for my view. 
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I have suggested that the initial step in moral judgments involves affective appraisals. Other 
sentimentalist theories, including emotivism (see Ayer 1952), have argued that moral judgments 
involve occurrent emotional responses. One problem here is that moral judgments do not always 
seem to be accompanied by affective responses. We can make calculated, rational judgments based 
on our moral principles without ever feeling an emotion. Other sentimentalists have explained this 
by arguing that we are disposed to feel emotions in response to morally salient actions, but that 
does not mean that we will always have an occurrent emotional state in response to them (Nichols 
2004, Prinz 2007).  
Another available response to this challenge is that our affective appraisals aren’t always 
conscious; we will not always consciously feel anything while witnessing moral situations. 
Perhaps all that is consciously available to us is the reasoning processes involved in weighing 
options and reaching a judgment. It is still possible, however, that we still have some kind of low 
level affective responses towards moral situations even if we have no conscious awareness of them. 
This explains our intuitive experience of moral judgments according to which we can coolly, 
rationally make moral judgments without feeling an emotion. The unconscious appraisal view can 
also account for the psychological and neurological data that seems to show that affective 
processing of some kind does occur during moral judgments. It is a great benefit of my theory that 
it can account for both of these features of our moral experiences. 
On my view, moral judgments are constituted by both emotional and rational processes 
and states. Importantly, there is nothing about moral judgments that would entail that we cannot 
make them about fictional scenarios. Indeed, most of the studies that cognitive scientists use to 
test our moral judgments are fictional thought experiments. Any differences between our moral 
judgments about real-life and fictional objects can be explained in terms of the judgment’s content 
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(what they are about). The knowledge that the object of our moral evaluation is fictional may play 
a role in how we interpret it. We do not need to posit a distinct attitude to explain our moral 
judgments of fictions. 
 
4. The problem of moral motivation 
 
There is another way for a supporter of the DAV could undermine the idea that we make 
stereotypical moral judgments about fictions. Moral judgments in real-life generally motivate 
behavior, but those concerning fictions do not. I call this the problem of moral motivation: we tend 
to think that our moral judgments are motivating; if we believe that a certain action is morally 
wrong, then we will not perform it and may take measures to prevent it from occurring. Yet we do 
not seem to be motivated to act on the basis of our moral judgments about fictions. If morals are 
necessarily (or even only typically) motivational, why do we rarely act upon our moral judgments 
of fictional characters and situations?  
 The obvious response is that we know that the object under consideration isn’t real. This 
explains why we won’t be motivated to act in response to our moral judgments about them. This 
claim is right in one way and wrong in another. I have argued that we are motivated to act towards 
fictions, but that many of those actions never come to fruition. This is true even if moral judgments 
are necessarily motivating. Alternatively, it could be that moral judgments do not necessarily 
motivate action. Either possibility is compatible with the SAV. 
I have already laid the groundwork for these two positions in previous chapters. In chapter 
1, I argued against the standard functionalist argument that our beliefs about fictions are essentially 
unmotivating. I dismissed similar arguments concerning our emotions in chapter 5. My central 
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claim was that our beliefs and emotions towards fictions may motivate action, but these actions 
generally do not reach fruition due to conflicting beliefs and background knowledge that we have 
about the fictional work.  
 Moral judgments are often action-guiding. If we make the moral judgment that we ought 
to donate our superfluous money to the needy, then, in general, we will be motivated to act on that 
judgment by donating our superfluous income. All parties in the moral motivation debate accept 
this much. Divisions arise with respect to whether or not moral judgments must be motivating. 
Motivational internalists like Michael Smith (1996, 2008) claim that moral judgments are 
necessarily motivating. Smith holds a form of weak internalism: “If an agent judges it right to φ  
in certain circumstances C, then she is motivated to φ  in C, at least absent weakness of will and 
the like” (1996, 175). This position contrasts with strong motivational internalism, the view that 
moral judgments are necessarily motivating and always result in action. Without the action, there 
really is no motivation. Moral judgments are intrinsically motivating on both accounts; the 
motivation to act is already implicit in the judgment. Motivational externalists, on the other hand, 
argue that moral judgments simply supply a reason that would justify one’s acting on the basis of 
that judgment (McDowell, 1978, Schafer-Landau, 2003). Moral judgments are not intrinsically 
motivating. They require the presence of some other state, such as a desire, in order generate action. 
 The challenge is to explain weak internalism’s “weakness of will and the like.” When we 
suffer from weakness of will, we know that we ought to behave in some morally praiseworthy 
way, but, for some reason, we cannot bring ourselves to do so. For example, say that you have 
many vegetarian friends and read a decent amount of applied ethical theory that has convinced you 
that it is morally wrong to eat meat. Indeed, you have no really good reason why you should eat 
meat at all, other than that this is how you’ve always eaten and you enjoy the way that it tastes. 
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You recognize that habit and taste do not justify a morally blameworthy action. But you cannot 
bring yourself to give up meat. This means that you suffer from weakness of will concerning your 
moral judgment that eating meat is morally wrong; that judgment should motivate your action, but 
it doesn’t. 
Weakness of will is not the only deterrent for morally motivated action. Motivational 
internalists claim that, ceteris paribus, our moral judgments motivate action. In contrast to strong 
internalists, weak internalists contend that we do not always go through with the motivated action. 
Maybe you don’t suffer from weakness of will about vegetarianism, but other factors prevent your 
motivation from coming to fruition. For example, you live in a place where vegetarian cuisine is 
not readily available, you cannot afford to buy sustainable products, or the rest of your family does 
not share your beliefs. All of these reasons make vegetarianism highly impractical for you. 
 Smith argues that the cognitive reasoning involved in our moral judgments motivates 
behavior. We could also think that the emotions involved in our moral judgments motivate 
behavior, as sentimentalists do. One will be unmotivated to act if she lacks the required emotional 
state. Evidence for this view comes from research on psychopathy; the psychopath lacks empathy 
and compassion, besides being defective in other basic emotions (Blair 1997). On the motivational 
internalist reading, this means that psychopaths do not make sincere moral judgments. They use 
the same words as normally functioning agents, but do not mean the same things by them (see 
Prinz 2007). Thus, they are not motivated to act morally because they lack moral concepts. On the 
motivational externalist reading, the psychopath is comparable to Hume’s “amoralist,” who has 
knowledge of moral concepts and makes sincere moral judgments, but has no desire to act on their 
basis (Nichols 2005). 
 As we have seen, both motivational internalists and externalists agree that moral judgments 
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generally motivate action. Weak internalists hold that overriding mental states and desires could 
prevent subsequent action. We can construct the following picture with this point in mind. For any 
moral judgment, we may be consciously and/or unconsciously motivated to act in some way, and 
so we do. It is also possible that we are consciously and/or unconsciously motivated to act in some 
way and fail to do so, due to weakness of will or conflicting reasons, beliefs, desires, emotions, 
etc. Finally, we will not go through with an action if we lack any sort of motivation to perform it. 
Any of these options are possible in a moral situation. For example, when we are deciding whether 
or not to take up vegetarianism, we may morally judge that eating meat is morally blameworthy 
and either act on that motivation, be motivated but fail to act (weakness of will), or entirely lack 
motivation to act (if externalism is true).  
Emotions are sometimes thought to be fundamentally motivating. So if emotions are 
involved in moral judgments, then it would be natural to think that they are responsible for our 
motivation to act in moral contexts. I agree that emotions are often motivating. But that does not 
necessarily mean that reasoning processes are not also involved in motivating behavior, especially 
on my construal of moral reasoning. Cognitive processing may regulate, modify, or completely 
eliminate a behavioral motivation that arises from an affective appraisal. Our beliefs, values, and 
knowledge weigh prominently in determining whether or not we act on a motivation (see 
Schroeder, Roskies, and Nichols 2010 for a similar view).  Conflicting desires and goals may 
prevent us from acting on a motivation. So while our affective appraisals may motivate action, 
they will not necessarily bring that action about; some further reasoning processes be also be 
required. Furthermore, understanding moral motivation in terms of affective appraisals does not 
necessarily eliminate the possibility that a belief on its own may be motivating (see McDowell 
1978). This may be the case when we dispassionately consider a moral scenario and our emotional 
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dispositions are not activated. I don’t think that such cases occur very often, if at all. But my view 
does not rule out their possibility.  
We can now apply this discussion to our moral judgments about fictions. In the first 
chapter, I distinguished between being motivated to act by fictions qua fiction and being motivated 
to act based on fictions. The same distinction applies to moral motivation. We can be motivated 
to act in response to events and characters in the fiction or as the result of what we take away from 
a fictional narrative. The former motivations generally arise unconsciously as the result of low 
level perceptual processing. We perceive representations of fictional entities and have beliefs about 
them in the world of the fiction. We also make moral judgments of fictional entities that are 
relevant to the fictional world. For example, you may negatively judge the trigger-happy detectives 
in the television show The Wire. We certainly affectively appraise the detectives’ actions. Since 
affective responses are at least sometimes behaviorally motivating, we may also have some 
unconscious low level behavioral reactions to the fictional story. These actions do not manifest 
because they are blocked by contradictory judgments and beliefs to the effect that the affective 
appraisal’s object does not actually exist. 
The Wire example shows that we can be morally motivated to act towards a fiction qua 
fiction. We may also be morally motivated to act in the real world on the basis of our moral 
judgments about a fiction.  Here is an example of what I have in mind. Say that you just saw the 
movie Fruitvale Station, which recounts the last day in the life of Oscar Grant III, who was killed 
by a Bay Area Rapid Transit (BART) police officer in 2009. The film captures the racial tension 
and discrimination that still plagues American society.  The use of real cell phone footage of the 
murder adds to the immediacy and reality of Oscar’s story.  As A.O. Scott, the New York Times 
movie critic, points out: 
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The climactic encounter with BART police officers erupts in a mood of vertiginous 
uncertainty, defusing facile or inflammatory judgments and bending the audience’s 
reflexive emotional horror and moral outrage toward a necessary and difficult 
ethical inquiry. How could this have happened? How did we — meaning any one 
of us who might see faces like our own depicted on that screen — allow it? (Scott 
2013). 
 
Scott’s point is especially relevant at the time the film was released—during the midst of George 
Zimmerman’s racially-charged trial for the death of Trayvon Martin, another young African 
American man (Fruitvale Station was released on July 12th, 2013; Zimmerman was proclaimed 
innocent on July 13th). 
A sensitive American viewer may be motivated in some way to act based on their judgment 
about Oscar’s death. How would this moral judgment motivate action? On my view, a negative 
affective appraisal of the film is a component of the moral judgment. Negative emotions (sorrow, 
betrayal, loss, etc.) may motivate real world action. It may have been the filmmaker’s goal to incite 
real world action through evoking moral emotions in an audience. Cognitive reasoning processes, 
including inference drawing from our beliefs about racial tension and profiling in America, may 
shape and influence to our affective appraisal. In some cases, a moral judgment about the film may 
incite a viewer to act. She may be motivated to take part in protests against the court’s ruling in 
the Zimmerman trial, learn more about New York’s stop-and-frisk program, or in other ways 
oppose laws that promote racial profiling. In other cases, one’s sincere moral judgment concerning 
Oscar’s story may be deterred by such factors as weakness of will—a viewer might know that 
racial profiling is wrong and that she should do something to stop it, but ask herself what she could 
possibly do in the face of such broad institutional discrimination. Or conflicting desires, beliefs, 
and other circumstances may prevent a viewer from acting on his or her judgment. Maybe the 
viewer was emotionally affected by Oscar’s death onscreen, but for political reasons does not feel 
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obliged to act in any way.  
Even though one’s moral judgment of Oscar’s story motivates us to act, it does not motivate 
us to act on our moral judgment of the fiction qua fiction. Instead, I think that our response towards 
the fiction may serve as the basis for a more general judgment along the lines of “racial profiling 
is morally wrong.” Our morally motivated action is likely based on this judgment, even though it 
was brought about by the initial moral judgment of Oscar’s story. 
The Fruitvale Station example may seem cheap. It is, after all, based on a true story, so it 
is natural that it incites morally motivated action. However, I contend that the same picture of 
moral motivation applies to fictions that are not based on a true story, like our judgments against 
the elusive Willy and the racist neighborhood representative Karl Lindner in A Raisin in the Sun 
(another story of race relations in America), or even against a story that is entirely removed from 
our actual world, like Avatar or The Lord of the Rings. In these two cases, we might form a 
judgment that it is morally unacceptable to harm innocent, sentient life forms solely for self-gain 
that may motivate later action. Indeed, we often think that fictions illustrate important cultural and 
psychological concepts and ideas that we can apply to the real world. Fictional dramas such as A 
Raisin in the Sun and The Wire may help viewers gain new perspectives on real-life race relations, 
perspectives that may motivate action in their daily lives. 
 
 
 
5. The moral experience of fiction 
 
We are finally ready to piece together the various components of my moral psychology of fiction. 
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In chapter 2, I discussed how we perceive fictional objects. Chapter 3 presented the key notion of 
taking the fictional stance, according to which we recognize that the objects of our engagement 
are fictional (they are non-actual, they are created, they have particular dependence relations) while 
we simultaneously “see” them as the objects that they represent. Chapter 4 discussed how we 
understand the mental states of fictional objects. Chapter 5 delved into our emotional responses to 
fictions in more detail. This chapter has targeted our moral judgments and actions. The three latter 
chapters have heavily relied on multi-level psychological theories in order to best capture both the 
immediacy and complexity of our moral experience of fictions. 
Let’s consider an example of how this whole process works, using a scene from the film 
District 9. In this story, a space ship stalls over the city of Johannesburg sometime in the near 
future, stranding thousands of intelligent but malnourished aliens (called “prawns” for their 
crustacean-like appearance) in the city. The frightened humans round up the aliens into District 9, 
a slum kept apart from the rest of the city by high fences, guns and missiles. The protagonist, 
Wikus Van De Merwe, executes the order to evict the aliens from District 9 to the concentration 
camp District 10, further away from Johannesburg. As he and his team go about District 9 passing 
on the eviction notice, we witness the Wikus and others commit various acts of atrocity against 
the aliens, abusing and killing them indiscriminately, even “aborting” a nest of alien eggs.  
Many viewers of District 9, recognizing the film’s not-so-subtle commentary on South 
African race relations, may experience a range of moral emotions during this scene: disgust at the 
killings of the aliens, anger at the cruelty of the humans, and sympathy for the relatively helpless 
aliens. But even without the social association, we might feel a great deal of uneasiness and anger 
at the humans’ actions. According to my multi-level appraisal theory of moral judgments, these 
emotions partly constitute our moral judgments about the characters in the film. We feel 
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indignation towards the humans’ xenophobia, constituting our moral judgment that their behavior 
is wrong. We may also reflect on our indignation and moral belief that we should not deliberately 
harm other life forms without just cause, and especially not intelligent ones. We feel anger or 
disgust at the humans and draw conclusions about their actions based on our knowledge of this 
particular scene, what we know about the fictional world, and our own real moral values and 
principles. 
Our moral judgment of the humans’ actions occurs as the result of taking the fictional 
stance. We begin by perceiving the objects on the screen in a non-illusory way; we perceive 
representations of aliens, humans, eggs, shanties, etc. We know that the humans and prawns in the 
narrative are fictional. They do not actually exist in our world, they were created by the 
filmmakers, and they depend on the film, filmmakers, and viewers in order to persist.  This 
knowledge forms the backdrop against which we take the fictional stance. We may not consciously 
acknowledge that the objects in District 9 are fictional, but that status shapes how we think about 
and respond to them. At the same time, we use the ‘is’ of fictional transformation when we think 
about the fictional objects, “seeing” fictional entities as representations of objects.   
Taking the fictional stance allows us to understand that the prawns and humans in the 
narrative are objects towards which we can have emotional responses. We also treat them as 
objects that possess mental states. My modified TT states that both perceptual and cognitive 
inference drawing are involved in how we understand fictional characters. We also may use social 
referencing and knowledge of a character’s social context, personality, and background in order to 
inform our mental state attribution. Both perceptual/affective and more complex cognitive 
processes work together to shape our understanding of fictional entities and our own emotional 
responses to them.  
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The multi-level appraisal theory of emotions goes hand in hand with my modified TT. We 
make a quick, automatic affective appraisal of the humans in District 9. We also emotionally 
appraise the humans based on our beliefs and knowledge about their character and actions. Here, 
too, the automatic affective appraisal and slower cognitive appraisal work together to form a 
temporally extended, flexible emotional process that shapes how we feel about the characters. Our 
emotional responses about the humans also set the stage for our moral judgments of their conduct.  
This is the standard process of our moral evaluations of fictions: we take the fictional 
stance, perceive fictional representations, attribute mental states to fictional characters, and have 
emotional responses to them. All of these processes shape our moral judgments of a character. All 
of the mental states involved in our engagements with fictions are genuine, stereotypical mental 
states. This means that my standard attitude approach is a viable contender to distinct attitude 
views. 
 
 
6. Normative implications 
 
I now want to return to the metaethical challenges to sentimentalism that we encountered in §3: 
the possibility of moral error, disagreement, and objectivity. I will draw upon the concepts of 
emotional rationality we discussed chapter 5 to respond to these challenges. Since moral judgments 
are constituted by emotions, it is important to understand how our emotions are used to evaluate 
the world.  
Fitting emotions are those that we have some reason to feel; they obtain in virtue of a 
response-dependent property of an object. For example, we find an object in our environment 
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frightening because we judge that it may cause harm to me or someone I care about. However, just 
because one’s emotion may fit its object does not mean that it is morally appropriate to experience 
it. Emotional truth and propriety capture the normative dimensions of our emotional responses. 
True emotions are successful or unsuccessful depending upon whether they accurately describe 
their object. For instance, feeling fear towards a harmless bunny would be unsuccessful, and so 
untrue. Finally, emotional propriety captures the moral dimensions of our emotional responses and 
how we can be held responsible for them. This was the case in instances in which our emotional 
responses were harmful to ourselves or others. 
 Sentimentalist theories hold that emotions figure in our moral judgments (D’Arms and 
Jacobson 2008). One challenge for these views is to explain which emotions are appropriate to a 
particular moral scenarios, but without implying that the emotion itself always has this normative 
implication. Another challenge lies in explaining how emotional responses can be objective. 
Emotions are subject-dependent; different people will respond with different emotional appraisals 
to particular objects according to their own knowledge, values, and beliefs. If that’s true, then it 
may be difficult to see how there can be objective, world-based or universal emotional appraisals 
that people can disagree about and get wrong. 
One worry is that if sentimentalism is true, then this subjectivity about our emotions carries 
over into our moral judgments. All sentimentalist theories adopt the “response dependency thesis” 
(RDT), which states: to think that X has some evaluation property φ is to think that it is appropriate 
to feel F in response to X” (D’Arms and Jacobson 2000b, 729).  For example, projectivist theories 
such as Mackie’s error theory (1977) and Simon Blackburn’s quasi-realism (1985) hold that moral 
evaluations to not correspond to objective features of the people or situations, but rather are 
projections of their values onto the world. Allan Gibbard’s (1990) theory of norm expressivism 
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identifies moral wrongness with the acceptance of a norm that takes anger as an appropriate 
response towards a particular action. I evaluate my friend’s broken promise to me as morally wrong 
if I have internalized a norm that it is acceptable for me to be angry with her for breaking a promise 
to me. 
D’Arms & Jacobson argue that sentimentalist theories like Gibbard’s do not distinguish 
between the different ways in which our emotion may be appropriate for its object. They conflate 
an emotion’s fit of and its propriety. But it seems like these concepts can be separated. Fear towards 
both spiders and battlefields may be fiting if it is intelligible that we should feel that way; one 
could sustain serious injury on a battlefield and we think that spiders are small and icky. Envy of 
a colleague’s promotion may be fitting if you are up for the same promotion. Feeling amused by 
an off-color joke may be fitting if the joke is told in a charismatic way. Again, the emotion need 
not be an appropriate response in order to be fitting. An emotion can be fitting even if it is morally 
unjustifiable all things considered. That off-color joke that I find so amusing might be highly 
inappropriate in certain contexts, yet I may nevertheless have a reason to be amused by it. 
This means that sentimentalist theories need some independent way of distinguishing 
between when we have a reason to respond emotionally to an object and when we should feel the 
emotion—i.e., when our emotional response constitutes a moral evaluation. To do this, an adequate 
sentimentalist theory must distinguish between and emotion’s fit and its propriety: when it is 
reasonable or intelligible to experience an emotion and when it is morally appropriate to do so. 
Luckily, the notions of emotion proper-properties and core relational themes provide this account 
for my multi-level appraisal theory. These notions provide a non-circular way of explaining the 
response-dependence of the emotions involved in moral judgments (contrast with Wiggins 1987 
and McDowell 1998; see also Prinz 2001 & Morreall 1986)). A scary object is one that causes fear 
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in us because we perceive it as a potential threat or source of harm. A disgusting object is one that 
causes a feeling of disgust in us because we perceive it as literally or metaphorically toxic, 
malodorous, unhealthy, or indigestible. A shameful act is one that causes me undergo shame 
because I believe that I have violated a moral norm or social taboo. This response depends both on 
the subject (is subjective) and on social norms. This makes it objective (at least culturally).  
On my view the original affective response of a moral judgment is an appraisal of an object. 
This is not an endorsement of the object’s moral propriety. It is an appraisal in terms of fit. When 
we appraise an object as being scary, we form a mental representation of it; part of our concept of 
this object might include properties like ‘being dangerous,’ which is then interpreted as scary. This 
will generally lead to avoidance behaviors and an unpleasant, scared feeling. But it will not 
necessarily be a judgment about whether or not we should take that stance towards the object. A 
later, cognitive evaluation will be brought to bear on the propriety of whether we should feel afraid 
of something and whether we can be held responsible for our responses to it.  
 Our moral judgments are subjective in the sense that different people will respond to and 
interpret emotional objects differently. But they are not completely subjective. We can make errors 
in our moral judgments and we can disagree with other people about how an morally relevant 
property applies to an object.  
Recall D’Arms and Jacobson’s contention that emotions have both a shape and size 
(2000a).  An emotion’s shape corresponds to how an emotion represents an object as possessing 
(or lacking) a property that is does not (or does) actually have. One source of moral error arises 
from misinterpreting the emotion’s shape. We may misattribute properties to an object that it 
actually does not have. So, for, example, my envy of my friend’s promotion might lead me to think 
that she does not deserve the promotion or that I am a better candidate than she is, when in fact 
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neither of these beliefs are true. My envy is misshaped because it fails to accurately describe my 
friend.  An emotion’s size refers to its intensity; I can be slightly annoyed that my friend broke her 
promise to me or I may be quite irate about it. I can be slightly downtrodden by the death of my 
favorite fictional character or I can be overwhelmed with grief.  We can also make an emotional 
error in terms of our emotion’s size. Consider our friend from the previous chapter, who became 
extremely involved in her favorite television shows. She was devastated when bad things happen 
to her favorite characters and elated by a villain’s undoing. We may want to say that our friend has 
made an emotional error; her emotions are out of proportion with their object. Specifically, the 
object does not warrant the intensity of her emotion.  
We can also go wrong in our moral reasoning. We can straightforwardly make errors in 
our thought-processes that lead to a moral evaluation or we can misinterpret important contextual 
information. Our emotions can also be in error if they influence us inappropriately, as in cases of 
bias, weakness of will, or self-deception (see Barnes 1997 & Mele 2001). These may all be 
instances in which our moral judgment does not cohere properly with our other standing beliefs, 
desires, and values. 
 Both the affective and cognitive appraisals involved in moral judgments may be sources of 
moral disagreement. People can disagree about how and to what object we apply an emotionally 
relevant property (see Nichols 2004 and 2008). I might think that a particular object or action is 
disgusting (like when people clip their nails in the subway car), whereas my friend might not find 
the action disgusting at all. We disagree about the emotion’s shape. And even if we do both agree 
that trimming one’s nails in a subway car is disgusting, we might disagree about the appropriate 
size of our disgust. I might be totally grossed out by the nail clippings, whereas my friend is only 
mildly put off by them. Finally, we can also disagree with respect to our background beliefs, 
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knowledge, and values concerning a moral situation. This would be the source of dispute between 
many people concerning current social and political issues like drone warfare, gun control, 
abortion, and the legalization of recreational drugs. We each come to the table with our own 
beliefs, knowledge, and emotional reactions to a particular moral scenario. These factors are all 
potential sources of moral debate because they correspond to objective features of the emotional 
object. 
We can apply this discussion to our moral evaluations of fictional characters. Recall that 
there may be a sense in which fictional narratives call for a particular emotional response. 
Following Carroll, I called this criterial prefocusing. The emotional effect that the author, 
dramatist, or film production team works to achieve is brought about by prefocusing. The author 
manipulates the themes, language, symbols, etc. of a literary work, or music, lighting, dialogue, 
editing of a film or play. However, as we noted, not every person in an audience will experience 
the intended emotional response. I explained this in terms of the cognitive factors that often go 
hand in hand with an emotion: the beliefs, values, and thoughts about the moral situation or person 
that is presented in a fiction. 
 Our moral judgments of fictional characters can be pre-focused in the same way as 
emotions. If our emotions can be prefocused, then our moral judgments can also be shaped by the 
manipulation and influence of our emotions. For example, authors may shape our moral 
evaluations of protagonists by engaging our positive pro-social emotions: empathy, sympathy, 
compassion, identification, etc. We feel compassion for and sympathize and identify with the 
likeable characters in a fiction (see Carroll 2008, Plantinga 1999, Smith 1999 etc.). This is because 
the narrative presents these characters in a positive light, emphasizing their likeable, pitiable, or 
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admirable qualities so that we desire for them to succeed in their endeavors and worry, fear, and 
mourn them if they do not. Our positive emotions make us morally sympathetic to the protagonist. 
A further interesting question concerns whether we can make inappropriate or unfitting 
moral judgments about fictions. Presumably our moral judgments about fictions can be in error in 
some way, if they can in real-life. There are three interesting types of case here.  The first type of 
incorrect moral evaluations is not, strictly speaking, an instance of moral error qua fiction. 
Sometimes we sympathize with characters that we would normally abhor in real-life: Humbert 
Humbert, Dexter Morgan, Beatrix Kiddo, Satan. This is a perfectly normal response to the fictional 
character—possibly even an appropriate one. The artists intended for their audience to sympathize 
with these morally questionable characters. Does this constitute a moral error all things 
considered? Is it morally wrong to sympathize with fictional devils? I will return to this question 
in chapter 7 when I address the sympathy for the devil phenomenon. Another question concerns 
whether our moral evaluations are improper even if they are fitting. I will address this in chapter 
8 when dealing with the puzzle of imaginative resistance. 
A second type of case of moral error about fictions occurs when our moral judgments about 
a fictional object are unfitting.  Moral judgments may not correspond to how the author portrays a 
character or event. Imagine that when I read the Harry Potter novels and, instead of admiring and 
cheering on Harry, Ron, and Hermione, I instead secretly admire the evil Lord Voldemort. Instead 
of morally condemning Voldemort, I quietly congratulate him in his renewed efforts to create a 
world of magical purity (I do not admit this to my friends, or, if I do, they think that I am just being 
intentionally, rhetorically perverse). It seems that I have made a moral judgment of the character 
that was unintended by the author. 
249 
 
Voldemort is supposed to be a highly unsympathetic character. Almost everything we 
know about him confirms this point: he kills innocent people—including children—he uses his 
followers, he is disturbingly racist, and he fits every criterion for anti-social personality disorder. 
There are very, very few instances in the story in which one might find oneself feeling sorry for 
Voldemort. There are some solitary examples of Voldemort’s difficult upbringing. Still, it seems 
clear that we are supposed to be morally repulsed by the Dark Lord and his callous, violent 
followers.  
In this case, moral error can occur in one of two ways: our emotional response may not fit 
the object—the emotion’s size or shape may be wrong—or our cognitive evaluation of the object 
may be flawed. I think that the size of our emotional appraisal of Voldemort will not much matter 
in terms of moral blameworthiness. It is either wrong to sympathize with Voldemort or it isn’t. It 
does not make much of a difference if one’s sympathetic emotions are weak or strong. The 
emotion’s shape is relevant, though. Imagine that one’s sympathy for Voldemort’s upbringing 
causes me to attribute other sympathetic features to him (like Voldemort’s loneliness and sorrow 
after being abandoned by his father) or causes one to overlook other morally questionable qualities 
or actions. 
We can also go wrong in our cognitive processing of the Voldemort’s actions. Perhaps in 
judging Voldemort’s “Magic is right” campaign (the magical equivalent of Thrasymachus’ “Might 
is right” stance in Plato’s Republic) the reader not fully consider the consequences of this position. 
Maybe she does not remember important details of what brought the campaign about. She may 
think that Voldemort’s campaign is consistent with her other moral beliefs, when in fact she has 
not fully considered my other moral principles, such as protecting the rights of others and keeping 
innocents from harm. Or maybe she suffers from weakness of will and simply concludes that this 
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is the easiest path to take for universal happiness. In any case, others will likely conclude that the 
reader has made a mistake somewhere in her moral reasoning, making her a less-than-ideal moral 
agent. 
We have made a moral error if we misunderstand a character’s qualities and misinterpret 
their actions. Yet the “sympathy for Voldemort” example raises another interesting question in 
terms of the moral propriety of our judgments of fiction. Can we be held morally responsible for 
our judgments of fictional characters? Can I be blamed for admiring Voldemort?  Let us suppose, 
unlike in the previous example, that a positive judgment of Voldemort does not arise due to some 
emotional or cognitive error.  The reader’s emotional response towards Voldemort is fitting in 
terms of both size and shape—it is not that she misattributes positive qualities to Voldemort and 
ignore others, or has a disproportionate positive response towards him. Rather, she simply thinks 
that Voldemort’s actions are justifiable and that he has been misunderstood by the other characters 
and Harry Potter fans. In other words, the reader’s moral values are incompatible with the negative 
portrayal of Voldemort and most people’s negative evaluation of him. Given Voldemort’s negative 
portrayal, I take it that many people would be uncomfortable with this evaluation, even if she never 
acted on it or in any way behaved like Voldemort or his followers. They would find this reader 
strange, morally perverse, unusual, and potentially dangerous. 
I have suggested that there might actually be a great deal of variation in how audiences 
morally evaluate fictional characters. This is because each audience member brings her own 
beliefs, values, and desires to her engagement with the fictional narrative. This variation carries 
over into one’s moral appraisal of the work; if we have different emotional reactions towards 
fictional characters, and emotions comprise moral judgments, then our moral judgments will vary 
251 
 
to the same extent that our emotional appraisals do. My view, then, seems to imply a moral 
relativism, similarly to some other sentimentalists (see Harman 1996, Nichols 2004, Prinz 2007).  
However, my theory can also accommodate moral realism.  On my view the moral 
judgment process continues beyond the affective appraisal. It involves cognitive processing and 
reasoning as well. These processes can factor in to our moral judgments and even modify the initial 
emotional responses. While our emotional appraisals are required for moral judgments to occur in 
the first place, there is no prima facie reason why we have to accept them as moral truth. Our 
reasoning can modify and guide our initial judgments. If that is the case, then moral realists can 
take heart in a theory that has a place for emotions in moral judgments. The reasoning processes 
might serve as the normative basis for one’s moral values. This could lead us to judge the pro-
Voldemort reader’s positive moral judgments of this character as inappropriate. 
 I will to conclude this chapter by addressing a related point on moral propriety. In his 
forthcoming paper, “Pleasurably Regarding the Pain of Fictional Others,” Aaron Smuts attempts 
to make the case the intrinsic wrongness of taking pleasure in an innocent character’s suffering. It 
is possible for someone takes pleasure in the portrayal of Hermione’s physical suffering when she 
is being tortured in Harry Potter and the Deathly Hallows. Smuts asks us to imagine that the reader 
takes a secret delight in Hermione’s suffering. Suppose that the reader never tells anyone about 
her delight and her delight is never manifested in her behavior. With these constraints in place, 
how could it possibly matter whether a reader takes pleasure in Hermione’s suffering? 
 Smut contends that those who think that there is nothing inherently wrong with taking 
pleasure in the suffering of fictional characters are committed to the fictionality thesis. The 
fictionality thesis holds that fictions are autonomous fantasies in which we are merely external 
spectators to the action (ibid, 5-6). Importantly, as Thomas Hurka points out, we are perfectly 
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capable of imagining that some immoral acts could potentially be acceptable in a fiction (Hurka 
2001). Unlike in surrogate fantasies, which we hope to come true, the audience knows that the 
fictional actions are generally impossible in our world. This allows her to imagine all sorts of 
scenarios that she normally would not and consider moral stances that she might typically ignore 
or abhor.  
It follows that taking pleasure in fictional suffering is “perfectly harmless” (ibid, 8). Smuts 
quotes Susan Feagin, who argues: “the freedom of imagining is freedom without responsibility. 
Pleasure in what one imagines can be as fickle or as base as one likes, without consequences” 
(Feagin 1984, 50; quoted in Smuts in prep, 8). Fictions aren’t real and even if fictional objects 
exist in some way, they are not the sorts of things that can be harmed. 
 Despite the claims of the fictionality thesis, Smuts argues that taking pleasure in the 
suffering of fictional characters is inherently wrong. In order to understand this point, imagine a 
(potentially) real-life example: 
Imagine slipping on a banana peel at the local supermarket. You spin to brace your 
fall, but on the way down the corner of your mouth catches on the sharp lip of a 
shelf. It rips your mouth wide open. Through the gaping flesh of your torn cheek, 
most of your teeth are visible. You scream in agony. The blood fills your mouth, 
pours down your face, and pools on the floor. The paramedics arrive quickly. As 
they tend to your wound, a crowd gathers. Some softly snicker; others just watch. 
Unbeknownst to you, most of the crowd admires the scene, taking pleasure in your 
sobs of pain and the sight of the red blood oozing out of your wound (ibid, 10). 
 
We are supposed to take it that no harm can come to the victim from the spectators’ pleasure: they 
do not act on their mental attitude and the victim does not even know that they feel it.  
On what basis are the spectators’ actions harmful? Smuts suggests that appealing to a 
normative ethical theory can help us understand the wrongness of this scenario. The fictionality 
thesis assumes a consequentialist theory of moral wrongness: morally wrong actions are those that 
cause harm. Yet, in the grocery store example, there does not seem to be any harm caused by the 
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spectator’s pleasure. One could argue that there is some harm done; maybe the observers who take 
pleasure in the victim’s suffering harm themselves in some way—their callous pleasure makes 
them worse moral agents, what goes around comes around, etc. But, as Smut points out, we are 
not so much concerned about the harm done to the observers. We are concerned about the victim.  
It is the harm done to him that needs to be explained. The problem is that it’s not clear that he does 
come to any harm as the result of the spectators’ pleasure. 
It could be that taking pleasure is morally wrong on other normative moral theories, such 
as deontology or virtue theory. For example, a Kantian might argue that is it always wrong to take 
pleasure in the pain of others, period. We are obligated to treat others with dignity and respect; 
taking pleasure in another’s suffering undermines their worth as a rational agent. Alternatively, 
one could take a virtue theoretic stance according to which we should model ourselves after the 
behaviors of virtuous exemplars, in our attitudes as well as in our actions. Surely an ideal moral 
agent would not take pleasure in the suffering of others.  
Perhaps the same is true for straightforwardly fictional examples. Smuts asks us to consider 
a case comparable to Moore’s Two World example: 
 
Imagine two worlds, each having just one inhabitant, say a sole survivor of a 
nuclear holocaust. In world A, the survivor spends her free time thinking nice 
thoughts. She often imagines casts playing with rubber bands on sunny window 
sills. In world B, the survivor lives a similar life, but rather than imagine cats, he 
imagines torturing children with a pair of pliers and a blowtorch. Is either world 
preferable? 
 
Smuts thinks that we would obviously prefer world A over world B. He takes this to be true even 
if we do not assume a consequentialist notion of goodness and harm. There is something inherently 
morally preferable to world A even if the inhabitant of world B couldn’t possible harm anyone. 
We might be able to interpret the wrongness of world B on a non-consequentialist moral 
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stance. From a deontological perspective, we might ask whether the survivor is thinking as a 
rational agent. A virtue theorist would argue that the denizen of world B is not adopting the 
attitudes that a moral exemplar should. The problem here is that fictional characters are not real—
so how could we construe them as rational agents? On these views, then, I contend that no harm 
is directly achieved through taking pleasure in fictional suffering. 
As Feagin points out, our engagements with fictions free us from typical emotional and 
moral responsibilities. I agree; the danger of taking pleasure in fictional suffering only arises if a 
reader adopts a moral judgment about the fictional case and then applies it to comparable real-life 
things. For example, a viewer might modify his positive evaluation of Voldemort’s “Magic is 
Might” campaign, which condones eugenics and invasive surveillance, and applies it to real-world 
politics. This is essentially Plato’s worry in The Republic—artworks do not properly engage our 
reasoning faculties and so may undermine our moral judgments. 
 My arguments in this section will be important in the following chapters, in which I discuss 
the sympathy for the devil phenomenon, the puzzle of imaginative resistance, and the possibility 
of moral learning from fictions. As we will see, I suspect that much of the confusion surrounding 
these puzzles arise due to inadequate notions of emotional and moral judgments of fiction (and in 
general) as well as a confusion the potential harm of experiencing moral wrongness in a fiction. 
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Chapter 7: Sympathy for the Devil 
 
 
 
1. Admiring devils 
Imagine reading John Milton’s epic poem, Paradise Lost. The story begins with a group of fallen 
rebel angels gathered in their dark, depressing new home. They sit, feeling downcast and defeated, 
until their stalwart, dashing leader steps forth with words of encouragement and fortitude. This is, 
of course, Satan, consoling the rebel angels in Hell. As you’re reading, it is almost impossible to 
resist admiring this larger-than-life character who shows such determination and resilience even 
in the face of certain defeat by their infinitely stronger enemy. 
 Most readers of Paradise Lost likely find Satan an intriguing, admirable, and, let’s face it, 
a sympathetic character. In a strange way, we want him to succeed in his ventures. You know that 
you are not supposed to admire Satan and his followers—in fact, you should probably feel 
disgusted by them. However, the poem sometimes makes it difficult to do so. Consider Milton’s 
description of Satan: “He, above the rest/ In shape and gesture proudly eminent,/ Stood like a 
tower. His form had yet not lost/All her original brightness; nor appeared/ Less than Archangel 
ruined, and the excess/ Of glory obscured, as when the sun, new risen,/ Looks through the 
horizontal misty air/ Shorn of his beams…” (Milton, 1667/2007, 18). There is something 
admirable about the Prince of Darkness’ sheltering attitude towards his fellow fallen angels: “Cruel 
his eye, but cast/ Signs of remorse and passion, to behold/ The fellows of his crime…” (ibid, 18). 
Recall Satan’s determination to make the best out of a remarkably bleak situation: “Is this the 
region, this the soil…this the seat/That we must change for Heaven; this mournful gloom/For that 
celestial light? Be it so!...The mind is its own place, and in itself/Can make a Heaven of Hell, a 
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Hell of Heaven” (ibid, 9). You have to admire Satan’s positive attitude.  You cannot help it; to 
your great surprise (and the consternation of many a Sunday school teacher), you feel sympathy 
for Satan. 
 Readers have been fascinated by the portrayals of immoral anti-heroes in fiction long 
before Milton.  Yet this phenomenon, albeit commonplace, raises interesting aesthetic and moral 
questions. After all, these are characters whom we would likely despise if we met them in the 
course of our daily lives, but for whom we feel startlingly strong pro-attitudes when encountered 
in works of fiction— that is, strong positive emotions, thoughts, and feelings. Milton’s Satan is 
likeable and sympathetic. To a certain extent, we want him to succeed in his quest for inner peace.  
 Following Noël Carroll, let’s call this the sympathy for the devil phenomenon (SDP) 
(Carroll 2004). This covers any of our pro-attitudes towards immoral or unlikeable fictional 
entities including, but not limited to, sympathy. Other pro-attitudes include emotions such as 
admiration, compassion, empathy, pity, pride, and joy.  There is no doubt that this phenomenon 
occurs on a regular basis. Just consider our pro-attitudes towards Mad Men’s Don Draper, Kill 
Bill’s Bride, Lolita’s Humbert Humbert, or, indeed, Paradise Lost’s Satan—immoral characters, 
all. The question is: why do we have the positive feelings and responses towards these characters 
that we do? Certainly these characters’ charming, likeable features do not outweigh their immoral 
traits and actions. Are our moral feelings so easily swayed? 
I will examine and respond to these questions in the following sections.  In the previous 
chapter, I presented an argument for our moral judgments of fictions as integrated with our real 
life beliefs, values, and emotions. The SDP seems to present a problem for this claim—our 
responses are often quite different than they would be in real life! I will first consider several 
potential solutions to the SDP, beginning with Gregory Currie’s decidedly distinct attitude-based 
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simulation theory (ST) approach of sympathy for fictional characters. I will follow that with a 
critique of Matthew Kieran’s distancing approach (Kieran 2010) and Carroll’s “best of all 
characters” view (Carroll 2004 & 2008). Ultimately, I find each of these views to be inadequate 
explanations of the SDP.  I understand the SDP as a genuine psychological phenomenon that arises 
in the course of our engagements with fictions (and perhaps in our real lives as well). If that’s true, 
then we should be able to explain the phenomenon in terms of our actual mental tendencies. In this 
spirit, I will propose an emotional pre-condition for our sympathy for immoral characters: they 
must elicit the emotion of fascination. In the final section, I will propose my own explanation of 
the SDP, the fascinated attention approach. This approach makes the SDP a matter of narrative 
content and our emotional response to that content. Thus, it is fully compatible with the SAV. 
 My view makes up for the inadequacies of the other potential theories. This includes a 
point that is often not considered when philosophers discuss the SDP: we often feel pro-attitudes 
towards immoral characters because of their viciousness and other “negative” qualities, and not 
solely their admirable ones. As Colin Radford pointed out, we sometimes love the rogue because 
of his roguishness (see Smith 1999).  
 
 
 
2. Simulated sympathy 
 
Gregory Currie’s view draws upon simulation theory (ST) in order to explain the SDP (Currie 
1997). We’ve already encountered this view in chapter 4. Despite Currie’s withdrawal from a 
strong simulative stance in recent work, this view is worthy of consideration because it remains 
one of the most thorough and articulate examinations of a DAV-based approach to the SDP. 
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Simulation theory remains a popular theoretical framework used for understanding how we 
attribute mental states to others and predict their behavior (Currie & Ravenscroft 2002). Like many 
philosophers and psychologists, Currie understands simulation as “putting oneself in the shoes of 
another” (Currie 1997, 66). We imagine what it would be like to be in the situation of another 
person and possess beliefs, desires, and emotions that are similar to theirs. Currie explains: 
I take on, temporarily, the beliefs and desires I assume someone in that situation 
would start off by having; they become, temporarily my own beliefs and desires. 
Being, thus temporarily, my own, they work their own effects on my mental 
economy, having the sorts of impacts on how I feel and what I decide to do that my 
ordinary, real beliefs and desires have (Currie 1995, 252-253). 
 
When I imagine myself in the position of another person, I imaginarily take on their beliefs, 
desires, and perspective as closely as possible. We come to understand the experiences and mental 
lives of others by recreating, as best as possible, their own attitudes in ourselves. From there, we 
extrapolate information about the target by asking how we would feel in a similar situation. 
According to ST, the same basic principles apply to our mental engagements with fictional 
characters (although there is an additional step to simulating fictional characters that I will return 
to momentarily). When we watch a film, for example, we simulate the mental attitudes of a 
character. This is typically, but not always, the work’s protagonist. We can understand how the 
character feels and predict what she will do next by imagining what it would be like to be in her 
position. We can thereby understand what the character experiences: her beliefs, thoughts, 
emotions, desires, etc. This understanding, in turn, allows us to predict the character’s actions, just 
like in real-life contexts. For example, while reading Les Miserables I may imagine what it would 
be like to be Jean Valjean after he escapes from his 19 year imprisonment working in the French 
galleys and then runs off with two silver candlesticks from a church. I imagine that I am in 
Valjean’s situation: the relief of freedom, but also destitution of poverty and loneliness. I note that 
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I feel bitter, angry, guilty, and relieved at the same time. I then extrapolate this information about 
how I would feel and attribute these feelings to Valjean in his current state.  
 ST may be able to explain how we attribute mental states to fictional characters and 
predict their behavior. But can it explain sympathy for fictional ‘devils’? 
 One could potentially take issue with Currie’s reliance on ST to explain our care for 
fictional entities, as we saw in chapter 4. Simulation may not always be required to feel pro-
attitudes towards fictional entities. In fact, Carroll has argued that simulation is generally 
unnecessary for us to understand the mental states of fictional entities (Carroll 2001a & 2008). 
This is because the narrative does much of the work for us: an author pre-focuses the story so that 
we emotionally respond in a particular way to the text and a particular character. This means that 
an author deliberately reveals certain details of a character so that we are able to interpret and 
understand the story. We are shown positive aspects of a character that causes us to respond 
positively. Of course, some fictions are emotionally or cognitively opaque, so it is quite difficult 
to understand how a character thinks or feels. It will take more cognitive work to understand them, 
including understanding the characters’ context, past actions, and personality. Generally speaking, 
however, a narrative can guide our emotional and moral responses to particular characters. 
Simulating the mental states of a fictional entity is often unnecessary; we can already tell, based 
on contextual and narrative information, how a character feels without delving into her psyche.  
It’s possible that simulation is necessary for understanding a fictional entity’s perspective 
and actions. However, it is a further question whether we must simulate the character in order to 
care for them. While Currie makes both claims, it’s worth noting that the first claim doesn’t entail 
the second. We may be able to have positive emotional or moral responses for a character without 
simulating her mental state. For example, we observe Frodo Baggins valiantly offering to take the 
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Ring to Mordor while watching the Lord of the Rings films. We may admire Frodo’s bravery even 
without understanding the mental states involved in his decision. The same works for immoral 
characters; I watch the self-described serial killer Dexter Morgan save his sister from another 
murderer. I can admire him for his actions even without delving into his intentions and beliefs for 
doing so. Emotions about other people in general don’t require simulation; for instance, I do not 
need to understand a friend’s current mental states to feel angry or compassionate about her. So 
why think that they do in the fictional case? This remains unclear on Currie’s account. Note that 
my multi-level appraisal theory of emotions does not require simulation at all. 
For the sake of argument, let’s grant Currie’s claim that we must simulate the mental states 
of fictional entities in order to care for them so that we can draw out the implications of his view. 
Assuming that Currie is right, ST can explain the care that we feel for some fictional characters: 
namely, the ones with positive and admirable qualities, like Frodo. But what about characters who 
possess many unadmirable or immoral characteristics? Currie calls this “the problem of 
personality”: I would not normally care about someone like Satan, so why do I seem to during my 
engagement with Milton’s work.   
I mentioned above that simulating a fictional entity requires one additional step. Currie 
argues that we do not directly simulate the mental states of the fictional character. Instead, we 
simulate the mental states of a “hypothetical someone who is reading a factual account of the 
adventures of [that] fictional character” (Currie 1997, 72). Simulation is transitive; I simulate 
someone who is simulating a character and who, further, believes that the fiction is real. I am able 
to understand the mental states of the fictional character by understanding those of the hypothetical 
someone. This allows me to care for a character like Frodo Baggins; I take on belief-like and 
emotion-like states as the result of the transitive simulation that gives me access to his mental 
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states. I care for Frodo because I have access to his many admirable and sympathetic 
characteristics. 
 Let’s try to make sense of this mysterious “hypothetical someone.” There is a vast literature 
in literary criticism and philosophy of art concerning the presence of an implied narrator: a fictional 
entity that is not equated with an explicit narrator, actual author, or implied author, who guides the 
audience through a fictional narrative (see Livingston 1997 and Wilson 1997). I tend be 
unsympathetic to such views, but I will not take up this argument here. However, the implied 
narrator is also distinct from the hypothetical someone we simulate. The implicit narrator may not 
necessarily do any simulating or emotional interpretation of a character. It just presents the 
fictional story. The hypothetical someone must do some emotional and moral interpretation of a 
character so that we simulate that character correctly. 
There are several other worries with this hypothesis. Following Carroll, I question Currie’s 
claim that we cannot directly simulate the mental states of a fictional character. Note that we can 
make the same point about the hypothetical someone. Why is it that we can simulate this 
hypothetical someone, but not the fictional character? This seems especially problematic, since the 
fictional character, at least, has human-like qualities that we can perceive, but the hypothetical 
someone doesn’t. In fact, there is no direct evidence of a hypothetical someone in the narrative.  
Another complication arises here. Simulating a hypothetical someone might help to explain 
our pro-attitudes towards morally praiseworthy characters like Frodo.  However, in order to 
explain the problem of personality, it is not enough that we simulate the states of the hypothetical 
someone. The audience must imaginatively take on new versions of beliefs that she currently holds 
for the duration of her engagement with the fiction. This includes moral beliefs. The reader adopts 
pretend versions of her relatively stable beliefs and preferences (Currie 1997). This allows her to 
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consider moral propositions that she normally would not. As Currie states: “I imagine myself not 
merely to be reading fact, but to be someone with an outlook different from my real one” (ibid, 
73). The greater the difference between our actual moral beliefs and those of the fictional character, 
the further I would have to adapt my current beliefs and take on new imaginary ones. In order to 
feel sympathy for Milton’s Satan, I would have to adopt the mental beliefs of a radically different 
kind of person. 
 One worry here is that it would be quite complicated and inefficient to modify our mental 
attitudes in the way that Currie suggests. In order for Currie’s proposal to work, the viewer would 
have to quickly and unconsciously switch between different moral viewpoints on multiple 
occasions as the story progresses. For example, when I watch the film The Silence of the Lambs, I 
simulate a hypothetical someone who simulates the FBI agent-in-training, Clarice Starling. 
Clarice’s moral outlook is generally very close to my own, so I do not need to drastically rearrange 
my moral beliefs while simulating her. But when I consider Hannibal Lecter, I must adopt an 
entirely new, psychopathic, hyper-intelligent, and pro-cannibalistic set of beliefs. Consider any of 
the scenes during which Dr. Lecter and Clarice verbally spar: I may, in the course of one scene, 
both pity and feel sympathy for Hannibal (consider Dr. Chilton’s bone-chilling power plays, how 
the guards dress him as a monster, how he has not seen the sun in eight years) as well as Clarice 
(she’s actually trying to prevent a death). In order to understand both Dr. Lecter and Clarice’s 
mental states, we would have to switch our simulations back and forth between them rapidly as 
the scene progresses. A viewer would have to “take on and off” different sets of moral beliefs, one 
for pro-attitudes for Lecter and another for pro-attitudes for Clarice, since these feelings may often 
be inconsistent. There is quite a bit of cognitive work going on here, none of which is consciously 
accessible to the viewer. Indeed, we often find engaging with fictions relaxing, which might be 
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surprising given the complexity of Currie’s model.  
 There is a further worry here concerning the empirical and phenomenological plausibility 
of this account. In particular, it is not clear that there is any independent support from social 
cognition literature that we are required to simulate a hypothetical someone in order to understand 
nonexistent entities. Currie introduces the hypothetical someone solely to explain the problem of 
personality. This in itself is not a problem, if the proposal captures something important about our 
experience of fiction or solves a problem that cannot be solved in any other way. Unfortunately, 
the simulation view appears to be counterintuitive, or at least phenomenologically inaccurate. It is 
not clear that any ordinary consumer of fiction would accept that they engage with a story in this 
way.  
 Currie could counter that the simulation process occurs unconsciously. That is possible in 
some cases, but one would think that the simulation must occur consciously at least sometimes.  
But it is not clear that it does. Furthermore, simulating a hypothetical someone raises a host of 
further theoretical challenges, some of which I have already mentioned. How could we pick the 
hypothetical someone that we simulate? What sorts of features would it have? Will everyone 
simulate the same hypothetical someone, or will there be unique ‘someones’ for every audience 
member? Such questions cannot be answered without complicating an already complicated theory. 
 Complexity is not in itself a criticism against a theory, but surely a simpler theory would 
be preferable if one is available. The main problem with Currie’s view is that it makes far too many 
assumptions concerning the nature of our mental states towards fictions and the ontology of 
fictional characters. Because of this, Currie (and perhaps some other simulation theorists) is forced 
to adopt a radical view of our engagement with fictions that does not appeal to our actual 
experiences. If asked, I suspect that very few readers would accept that they simulate the states of 
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a hypothetical fictional someone, or even grant that such a thing exists—let alone that they adopt, 
even for a short time, a radically different moral outlook on the world. Instead, it is more likely 
that the reader maintains her current beliefs and takes the fiction as an opportunity to explore 
alternative viewpoints and scenarios that she would not normally encounter. 
 
 
 
3. Distancing, pre-focusing & “the best of all characters” 
 
We have questioned Currie’s simulation-based approach to the SDP. Now we can explore two 
other theories that attempt to explain our pro-attitudes towards immoral characters: Kieran’s 
distancing account and Carroll’s “best of all characters” approach. 
Kieran’s proposal points out that we are able to sympathize with an immoral character 
because we suppose that the character inhabits a fictional world that is quite different from our 
own. This fictional world encompasses a different land with different rules, including moral rules. 
Call this the distancing approach. Matthew Kieran argues that imaginative distancing amounts to 
a psychological distance between an audience and a devilish character (Kieran 2010). We feel free 
to allow ourselves to feel pity, compassion, and sympathy for someone like Hannibal Lecter or 
Milton’s Satan because of this psychological distance. 
  “Other-world” distancing may go a long way towards explaining how we are able to 
become absorbed in a story, for it forces us to realize that the fictional character belongs to a world 
that is very different than our own. Still, I am unconvinced that this is the right response to the 
SDP. Satan occupies a very different world from the one I believe myself to live in, and yet I still 
think that many of the features of that world, including its moral features, track from my world to 
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that one. So I should still find Satan morally repugnant in Milton’s story. The other-world 
distancing also does not seem to work for a realistic film like The Silence of the Lambs. This 
fictional world appears to be just like our world in most ways, including local West Virginian 
geography, the president of the United States (George H.W. Bush), and the struggles that American 
women face when they work in a male-dominated field. I do not imagine that Dr. Lecter occupies 
a distant world from my own; I imagine that he occupies one that is very similar to mine in 
important respects.  
 There is another way in which the distancing thesis is found wanting. When we feel 
sympathy for Milton’s Satan, we recognize that this character is physically nonexistent in our 
world, yet we nevertheless feel profound interest, pity, and compassion for him. The point is that 
we are generally not emotionally distanced from immoral protagonists even if we are in other ways 
(physically or ontologically). There is no question that we emotionally respond to fictional objects. 
The problem for Kieran is that we are either emotionally distant from fictional worlds and 
characters (as well as physically and ontologically distant) or, alternatively, we are emotionally 
close to them despite physical or ontological distance. The SDP shouldn’t arise on the former 
position, but it does on the latter.  Yet, we have granted that it surely does occur quite often. This 
should lead us to favor the second position: emotional closeness without physical or ontological 
closeness. Kieran’s position cannot account for this; he does not explain why emotions differ from 
other kinds of imaginary engagement, why we are imaginatively distant from fictional characters 
while still emotionally close to them. 
 Consider another way of understanding distancing, one that is slightly different from 
Kieran’s approach. A fictional world doesn’t have to be very different from ours in order for us to 
be distant from it. It could be that the reason we feel sympathy for immoral fictional characters is 
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because we simply do not have to encounter them in our daily lives. I do not have to go to lunch 
with Hannibal Lecter, or the movies with Satan. Because these characters are not a part of my life, 
or even my world, I am able to feel some sympathy for them. This implies that we should also feel 
some sympathy for immoral people in our real lives. I accept this possibility and will return to it 
in the final section. The current problem with this interpretation of the distancing approach is that 
it doesn’t guarantee a positive response to any immoral people. Lenin and Ted Bundy aren’t a part 
of my life. I will never encounter them. But this does not guarantee that I will feel sympathy for 
them. We need an explanation of what triggers our sympathy to begin with.   
We have already encountered one way to explain our emotional closeness to an immoral 
character: emotional prefocusing (Carroll 2008 & Smuts in prep). An author may intend for her 
audience to feel pro-attitudes towards a particular character. This character is often morally corrupt 
or deviant in some way but, for whatever reason, the author desires for the reader to sympathize 
with her.  
I agree with Carroll that prefocusing is an important part of an explanation of how and why 
we respond to immoral characters in the ways we do. Our emotional responses to characters are 
often a matter of how a narrative is constructed and how the details of a story influence our feelings 
about particular characters. Currie’s simulation-based approach did not take advantage of this 
feature of fictions. However, prefocusing alone does not give us a complete explanation of the 
SDP. It does not tell us what it is about the immoral character that we admire, or how the narrative 
must be constructed in order for us to feel sympathy for her. The challenge is to flesh out the notion 
of pre-focusing to explain these points. 
Carroll’s own view attempts to do this. He suggests that the reason we feel sympathy for 
Tony Soprano of The Sopranos, Tyrion Lannister of A Song of Ice and Fire, or Ethan Edwards in 
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The Searchers is because, despite their flaws, they are morally better off than the other characters 
in the fiction. Tony is surrounded by an astonishing array of violent, manipulative, power hungry 
mobsters. Tyrion is a clever, witty, well-meaning louse with rotten family members. Ethan 
Edwards is gruff and brutal, but also loyal and in possession of a certain code of honor. So when 
we search the fictional world for an emotional allegiance, these are the characters we choose.  I 
will refer to this as the best of all characters solution. 
The morally best individual in a group of bad people often does seem to us like the person 
with whom we should throw in our allegiance, both in real-life and fictional worlds. Indeed, the 
best of all characters explanation may explain a great deal of our pro-attitudes for immoral 
characters.  
However, I think that there are two significant problems with this view. First, the “best of 
all characters” solution doesn’t explain why we ever have positive responses to an immoral 
character. We can grant that Tony Soprano is the least bad of a sordid group of mobsters, and so 
he wins out in gaining our affection. But this does not explain why we feel sympathy for an 
immoral character to begin with. It’s possible that we are deliberately shown features of Tony 
Soprano that are relatable and positive: his fears of growing old and impotent, his family woes, 
etc. It’s another question whether these glimpses into Tony’s psyche override the overwhelmingly 
abundant immoral actions that he performs—for instance, when Tony brutally attacks his driver 
on a whim (to use Carroll’s example). Surely we should be disgusted by this portrayal of gratuitous 
violence and turn off the television. And yet, we do not; we continue to watch Tony’s exploits 
season after season, in spite of his immorality. The best of all possible characters explanation 
cannot account for this.  
The second worry is that the best of all characters solution does not apply to all cases. 
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Perhaps we align ourselves with Tony Soprano because the other mobsters are far more immoral 
than he is. But there are other fictions that portray morally praiseworthy characters alongside 
immoral characters, as in The Silence of the Lambs. One could argue that we feel sympathy for Dr. 
Lecter because he allies himself with the morally virtuous Clarice Starling. But does this alliance 
really explain that sympathy? At best, I think that their relationship explains why we do not 
condemn Lecter the way we would if he was completely unhelpful to Clarice’s investigation. It 
does not explain the pity and compassion that we may feel for him. Or consider a reader’s 
sympathy for Nabokov’s Humbert Humbert.  Some readers may want HH to succeed in his 
seduction of the young Lolita. But why? Surely the reader thinks that pedophilia is morally 
repulsive even if it is presented to us in the guise of a clever, charming protagonist. And HH is 
surrounded by characters that are far more morally praiseworthy than he is. Finally, think about a 
story like Dexter, in which we feel sympathy for the immoral protagonist despite the fact that he 
is certainly not the morally best character in his fictional world. We cheer on Dexter in his 
murderous pursuits even as he faces the brash, morally upstanding Sergeant Doakes or even 
Dexter’s principled sister, Deb. The best of all characters solution cannot explain our sympathy 
for Dexter.  
The distancing and best of all characters explanations both fall short of fully explaining the 
SDP.  Each of the potential solutions suggests that we can explain our sympathy for immoral 
characters in terms of some kind of emotional manipulation. However, they do not propose a 
particular emotion involved in shaping our positive responses to immoral characters. Perhaps 
doing so would help flesh out an explanation of our pro-attitudes towards immoral characters. 
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4. Fascination for the devil 
 
My view explores sympathy for the devil as a psychological phenomenon. I contend that there is 
a specific emotional response that underlies our sympathy for immoral characters. There are two 
points to consider here. First, we should examine the immoral characters’ qualities to discover 
what it is that makes us have such strong positive responses to them. Second, we should consider 
the actual types of positive responses we have. This will give us a better idea of what kind of 
explanation the SDP requires. 
 Recall Milton’s description of Satan in Paradise Lost. He is physically awesome, 
intelligent, and deeply loyal to his family and friends. He has attractive mental and physical 
qualities. The same can be said for other immoral but likeable fictional characters. Humbert 
Humbert is deliberately portrayed as handsome, clever, and funny. The psychopathic serial killer 
Dexter Morgan is also handsome, highly intelligent and innovative, and embodies an admirable 
degree of loyalty to his family. As Carroll and others have noted, positive qualities like these 
examples are imperative to our sympathy for immoral characters. 
I want to push this line even further. Besides these attractive physical and mental traits, 
Satan, HH, and Dexter are all exotic; we do not often encounter people like these in our daily lives, 
if ever. They are those rambunctious “bad-boys” (to use a hopelessly gendered term; it’s an 
interesting question in itself why most prominent fictional “devils” are men) that charm and allure 
us with their daring and wild antics. In short, all of these characters possess desirable features 
alongside their immoral ones. Now imagine a bland, intellectually dull, physically unattractive, 
run of the mill Satan, HH, or Dexter. Would we still feel pro-attitudes toward such a character? 
Surely we would not admire them to the same degree, if at all. 
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Next, consider our actual responses to these characters. We find Satan, HH, and Dexter 
intriguing. We are curious to learn more about them. We pity and feel compassion for them when 
we learn about the awful things that happened in their past, or when other characters manipulate 
or exploit them. We are often glad when they succeed, and generally disappointed when they fail. 
Perhaps we recognize that our gladness and disappointment are, in some ways, perverse; we take 
a secret delight in their badness. We know that it might be inappropriate to feel sympathy for an 
immoral character, but we can’t help doing so. Such feelings may be reasonable in the context of 
the story. There are probably instances in which we have negative emotional responses about these 
characters. We feel anger or indignation towards an immoral action that appears completely self-
interested or entirely callous (e.g. when Hannibal Lecter eats the face off of one of his prison 
guards) even if we accept some other undoubtedly immoral action that is somehow understandable 
(plotting to “have Dr. Chilton for dinner”). 
Synthesizing the previous two points—the nature of the immoral characters and our 
emotional responses towards them—I want to suggest that underlying our pro-attitudes towards 
immoral characters is a particular emotional response: fascination. I claim that fascination is a 
specific type of emotion, similar to curiosity and interest, but distinct from them in terms of the 
objects that elicit it. There are two questions worth asking here: 1) is fascintion actually an 
emotion? and 2) How can this help us explain the SDP? 
If fascination is an emotion-proper, then it has the same features as other emotions. Most 
philosophers and scientists working on emotions argue that emotions are a kind of evaluation of 
an object that bears on our well-being (see chapter 5). We feel fear about something that can harm 
us or those we care about. This includes a rattlesnake basking in the sun next to a path where you 
and a family member walk; it also includes fear of an upcoming test that. Both objects, the snake 
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and the test, reflect our interests and well-being. 
Theorists also generally argue that emotions have intentional objects: they are about 
something. We do not just feel mad in general; we are angry because of a harm done to us. Many 
theorists also argue that objects may possess a particular kind of emotionally relevant property. 
For example, we will generally experience anger when we perceive an object in our environment 
that has offended us in some way. We experience pride when we take credit for a something that 
either we, or someone or something with which we identify, has achieved. We feel joy when we 
realize a goal. These properties can be quite simple (potential harm to you and yours) or complex 
(taking credit for something that you have achieved) (see Goldie 2000, Lazarus 1991, & Prinz 
2004a). 
I argue that fascination meets both of these emotional criteria: it is a reflection of an object 
that serves our interest or well-being, an object that has a particular kind of property. We are 
fascinated about particular objects that interest us in the right way; we are not just fascinated 
vaguely or in general. There is a certain phenomenological, qualitative feeling that we associate 
with fascination. There is a kind of absorption or interest that we have towards fascinated things. 
This is important, since we generally think that emotions elicit feelings. Fascination meets this 
criteria as well.  
We also need to know what types of objects generally elicit fascination. I argue that 
fascinating objects typically have three different features. First, they must be a curiosity; the object 
must be unusual, unique, different, or exotic in some way. It must be something out of our ordinary 
experience. Second, the object must be attractive. This could mean physically attractiven in the 
case of people (James Dean as Jim Stark in Rebel without a Cause or Angelina Jolie as Lisa Rowe 
in Girl, Interrupted) or concrete objects (a sculpture or building), mentally attractive in the case of 
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people characterized by their cognitive abilities (I would hesitate to deem Anthony Hopkins’ 
Hannibal Lecter a standard of male beauty. Rather, it is Lecter’s intellectual brilliance that we find 
attractive). Or perhaps the object is oddly agreeable in some way, as in the case of a fascinating 
topic that we find worth pursuing. Lastly, fascinating objects are cognitively interesting. They 
inspire us to learn more about them, and we think that by doing so there will be some kind of 
cognitive payoff; we will gain some new experience, information, or perspective on the world.  
There is no set limit to the types of things we can find fascinating. We can be fascinated 
by a philosophical idea that we find original, important, useful, or astute. We can be fascinated by 
artworks: a musical piece, painting, or story. Consider Gerhard Richter’s painting, Betty. You 
might be struck by the beauty of the painting and be curious to know more about the artist and the 
subject: who is that girl? Why is her face hidden from the viewer? Why did Richter paint her in 
that soft, muted way? Although Betty is a representational painting, one could be equally fascinated 
by an abstract work by Rothko, Pollack, or Reinhardt. Lastly, and most importantly for our 
purposes, we can be fascinated by people that we find unusual, exotic, and attractive. Who is that 
stranger at the café?  Where is she going?  What is that accent?  
In short, I argue that fascinating things are attractive, interesting curiosities. Generally 
speaking, these are the kinds of objects that we will be fascinated by; if an object lacks these 
characteristics, then we probably will not be fascinated by it. Note that each feature can be broadly 
construed so as to apply to a wide variety of cases. This is not a defect of the characterization, but 
rather a virtue. Consider the imprecision of our characterization of anger-inducing objects. We are 
angered by things that we find offensive. This characterization does not tell us which people or 
actions specifically cause us to experience anger. We can tell a similar story about fear: we fear 
objects that could potentially harm us, but this leaves open what those objects actually are. 
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Like anger and fear, I leave my characterization of fascination open-ended, yet precise 
enough to understand what we typically characterize as fascination-inducing. Not everyone will 
find the same people or objects fascinating, just as not everyone will find the same things attractive, 
anger-inducing, or scary.  
I argue that fascination, so understood, is the key to understanding our pro-attitudes 
towards immoral, fictional characters (see also Smith 1999).  Each of the immoral characters I 
have discussed so far fit my description of an attractive, interesting curiosity. Take the Count of 
Monte Cristo: a revenge-driven, almost cruel, mysterious and charming noble. He is surely not the 
kind of person we encounter on a regular basis! Perhaps we think that by taking an interest in this 
character we can expand our folk psychology to include the vengeful and obsessive mindset the 
Count represents.  Fascination is the pre-condition for our sympathy towards immoral characters.  
Generally speaking, we need to be fascinated by immoral characters before we feel sympathy for 
them. Fascination is achieved by how the character is portrayed in the narrative as possessing the 
exotic and curious traits that I have described. Once this is achieved, other aspects of the narrative 
will cause us to feel sympathy for them. 
This is not to say that fascination is sympathy. We can feel sympathy (in the narrow sense 
or wide sense I have been employing) for someone with necessarily being fascinated by them. For 
instance, I can feel sympathy for a close relative who, after many years of close contact, I do not 
feel fascinated by. I can also be fascinated by things for which I do not feel sympathy, as we will 
see in the next section. 
The fascination approach seems to explain our pro-attitudes better than the other potential 
solutions that I have considered. But is it enough to explain the SDP? The fact that an immoral 
character is fascinating may not be enough to generate pro-attitudes towards them. There is still a 
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missing ingredient in our account of the SDP.  
 
 
 
5. The fascinated attention approach 
 
Carroll denies that fascination with a character is enough to explain our pro-attitudes towards 
immoral characters. It may be that we are often fascinated by Tony Soprano, but this fascination 
does not explain our sympathy for them. There are many characters that we might find interesting 
in The Sopranos, for instance, but we only feel sympathy for Tony. It is only through prefocusing 
and the best of all characters vantage point, Carroll argues, that we feel pro-attitudes towards 
immoral characters. 
 One interesting implication of my view is that we will often be fascinated by fictional 
immoral characters, as well as real-life immoral people. Consider Truman Capote’s novel, In Cold 
Blood, and Werner Herzog’s documentary, Into the Abyss. Both of these narratives portray serial 
killers in a highly sympathetic light. We feel sympathy for these serial killers partly because we 
are fascinated by the narratives’ portrayal of violence and “evil” personalities. 
 But fascination alone will not always engender sympathy. Consider contemporary readers’ 
continued fascination with historical figures like Adolf Hitler, Mao Zedong, and Joseph Stalin, 
three people who are likely responsible for the greatest abuses of human rights in all history. Surely 
they don’t deserve our positive responses. And yet these leaders’ biographies continue to be 
popular. I would doubt, though, that the people who read these biographies would approve of or 
feel strong sympathy for them, like we do for Satan in Milton’s tale.  So what is the difference 
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between the In Cold Blood-type cases and these biographies? It cannot be that the former are 
simply told in a narrative and the latter are not. Biographies are, after all, a kind of narrative.  
 I argued in the previous section that a narrative draws out attractive, exotic features of 
characters to make them fascinating to us. This is true for morally blameworthy and praiseworthy 
characters. But our emotional and moral allegiances are not won solely based on what we are 
shown about someone. Our pro-attitudes are also shaped by what we are not shown about a 
character. What would it take for us to feel sympathy for a real-life serial killer, such as Ted 
Bundy? I think that it would require a particular kind of narrative that utilizes a particular kind of 
pre-focusing. The narrative must attract an audience’s attention towards the morally praiseworthy 
features of a person or character and a shift of their attention away from their morally blameworthy 
features. 
Let’s consider an example. We saw in chapter 6 that the Harry Potter series presents us 
with a paradigm immoral antagonist: Lord Voldemort. Voldemort is supposed to be a highly 
unsympathetic character. Almost everything we know about him confirms this point. Voldemort 
kills innocent people, including children, he abuses his followers, he is disturbingly racist, and he 
fits every criterion for antisocial personality disorder. There are few instances in the story in which 
one might feel sorry for Voldemort. Still, we may be fascinated by Lord Voldemort. We are curious 
about his past and his motivations; we are in awe of his magical power. But we do not feel 
sympathy for him. We do not wish for Voldemort’s “Magic is Might” plot to succeed, and we do 
not feel compassion for him when he meets his fate at the end of the series. 
We do not feel full-blown sympathy for Voldemort because we are also shown features of 
him that override his potentially pitiable qualities (for instance, his difficult childhood and 
loneliness). Imagine a retelling of the Harry Potter series from Voldemort’s perspective. There are 
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several examples of this: Wicked (wherein audiences are retold The Wizard of Oz from the Wicked 
Witch of the West’s perspective), Grendel (a retelling of Beowulf from the monster’s point of 
view), and Wide Sargasso Sea (the story of Jane Eyre’s “mad lady in the attic”).  In our retelling 
of Harry Potter, we would learn more about Voldemort’s pitiable childhood and his justification 
for why he began his life of crime and hatred. The story would brush over some of the more sordid 
details of his violent behavior and highlight his fascinating characteristics. We would gain new 
perspectives of the more likeable characters in the original Harry Potter series, such as 
Dumbledore, McGonagall, and even Harry Potter himself. 
The retelling may be successful in eliciting sympathy for the Dark Lord if we are shown 
the pitiable aspects of Voldemort and are kept from considering others. We can generalize this 
example. An audience must be given certain information in a story that will create pro-attitudes 
towards the immoral character as well as distract their attention from the less admirable aspects of 
his/her behavior and personality.  
 We now have the means to fully explain the SDP. Not only must we be fascinated by a 
devilish character, we generally must also be shown particular features of a character that 
deliberately focuses our attention away from her immoral behaviors or traits, and highlight the 
fascinating characteristics. I call this the fascinated attention approach. Its two components 
(fascination and attending to certain features of the character) are both in place when we feel 
sympathy for an immoral character. This is a psychological claim rather than a metaphysical one; 
fascination and prefocused attention may not always be necessary or sufficient for the SDP to 
occur. I argue, however, that they generally are. If we think of the SDP in terms of our emotional 
responses towards a character, then we can understand immoral characters with fascinating 
features as the kinds of emotional objects towards which we would respond in our real lives. Not 
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everyone will emotionally respond to the same objects, both in the case of fascination as well as 
anger, sorrow, or joy. 
The fascinated attention approach makes up for the shortcomings of the other explanations 
of the SDP that we have discussed. My view highlights a defect in the distancing explanation: that 
view is contradicted by the very phenomena of SDP, which is in part generated as a result of our 
emotional identification with the immoral character, rather than our distance from it. Furthermore, 
fascination approach tells us what it is about a character that makes us feel pro-attitudes towards 
her, and so improves upon the pre-focusing model. Finally, my view also makes up for the defects 
of the best of all characters solution. It is not just that Tony Soprano has some positive qualities 
that outweigh his negative ones, or that he is better than other bad-to-the-bone characters. Indeed, 
we can be fascinated by Tony because of—not in spite of—his negative features. His portrayal of 
an immoral mobster is unusual, intriguing, and attractive: we do not normally experience someone 
like Tony Soprano, and so we may have to gain a new perspective of a new character type by 
studying him.  
 Additionally, the fascinated attention approach can also explain allegiances that might be 
considered “incorrect” in the fiction—for example, compassion for Nurse Ratched in One Flew 
Over the Cuckoo’s Nest or the Joker in The Dark Knight. Some people may be fascinated by these 
characters while others are not; the former may be inclined to feel pro-attitudes towards characters 
in a way that isn’t intended by the author. The fascinated attention approach also explains why we 
often feel sympathy for multiple characters in a fiction, including ones that have conflicting aims. 
This was the case with Dexter Morgan and his sister Deborah Morgan. The best of all characters 
solution has difficulty accounting for these multiple allegiances.  
Clearly prefocusing helps in terms of creating a fascinating immoral character. Aesthetic 
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devices like music, point of view, editing, narration, etc. all contribute to the positive response we 
have for antiheroes and villains. It is the task of the artist to create a work with a fascinating 
character who holds our interest.  We would not care that much for Tony if it weren’t for his 
fascinating qualities. One might go so far as to say that portraying a fascinating character is the 
raison d’etre for a great many fictional narratives.  
This last point raises a question as to the moral significance of our pro-attitudes towards 
immoral characters. It might make sense that we have pro-attitudes towards immoral characters. 
But are such emotions appropriate? Should we be held morally blameworthy for having pro-
attitudes towards immoral characters? Perhaps an answer to this depends on what one means by 
blameworthy. If we mean that our fascination is potentially harmful, then I would reject this claim. 
Generally speaking we do not harm actual people by feeling sympathy for immoral characters, at 
least, not directly (see chapter 6). 
 Furthermore, contra Currie, my guess is that we often have pro-attitudes towards immoral 
characters while at the same time condemning many of their immoral actions. We do not radically 
shift our moral values for the duration of the fiction or imagine ourselves in an immoral character’s 
position. I pity Hannibal Lecter even while I am repulsed by his brutal murder of the unsuspecting 
ambulance drivers. I do not accept or condone Lecter’s immoral actions. Rather, I am fascinated 
by this character even as I condemn his actions.  It’s even likely that I’d be less fascinated if Lecter 
was merely a morally praiseworthy, brilliant criminologist instead of a sociopathic cannibal.  
Importantly, unlike Currie’s approach, my view is fully compatible with the SAV; nowhere 
along the way have I appealed to unique or distinctive mental states involved in our sympathy for 
immoral characters. In fact, I have suggested that the SDP is not uniquely fictional. 
Near the end of his discussion of our pro-attitudes towards anti-heroes, Carroll states that 
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sympathy comes cheap in real-life, but must be earned in a fiction. I disagree. I suspect that we 
will sympathize with just about anyone on a screen, a stage, or in book that is presented to us for 
any significant length of time. We do not even need much information about the character. 
Consider our sympathy for Lola in Run, Lola, Run: who is this person? Why is she in this strange 
situation? Why does she keep making such bad decisions? We care for her even before we learn 
about how much she loves her boyfriend (her most redeeming quality). It does not matter that we 
know very little about this character or that we disagree with her choices. We like her anyway. I 
would go so far as to say that the character does not need to be portrayed in a positive light, like 
Lola is. Fascination is cheap. If we are shown an interesting immoral character going about his 
business, chances are we will have some kind of positive attitude towards him (like HH). That’s 
just how we experience fictions.  
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Chapter 8: The Puzzle of Imaginative Resistance 
 
 
 
1. Resisting Humbert Humbert 
 
The sympathy for the devil phenomenon captures one facet of our moral experiences of fictions. 
We often feel pro-attitudes towards fictional characters that we would dislike or be disgusted by 
in our real lives. One of my central claims in the last chapter was that we may feel sympathy for 
these immoral people in real life if their stories were framed in the right way. We could be 
fascinated by them and attend to certain aspect of their personality and history, while ignoring 
others. 
There are also cases in which we take a profound dislike to immoral fictional characters 
even when an author may intend for us to admire them. Take the protagonist and narrator of 
Nabokov’s Lolita, Humbert Humbert. As HH tells his story, we learn of his compulsory attraction 
to young “nymphets,” and especially to the spritely Lolita. He propounds detailed arguments in 
favor of pedophilia: it has been practiced through the ages, in more “civilized” times than ours, by 
royalty, aristocracy, and many of the great artists; he is more interested in the spiritual aspects of 
nymphets than the physical; he cannot help how he feels. Some readers probably remain 
unconvinced of HH’s moral innocence despite his arguments. Others might feel torn by HH: we 
admonish his tyrannical treatment of the young girl, yet at the same time feel betrayed right along 
with him when Lolita runs away. HH is remarkably funny and clever and his storytelling is 
evidence of genius.  
Yet, for every quip, literary reference, and Quilty clue, there is some horrifying detail about 
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Lolita’s desolate condition: her quiet sobs and winces, her raging outbursts, HH’s matter of fact 
admission that she “had absolutely nowhere else to go” (Nabokov 1970, 144). Part of what makes 
Lolita work is that some readers often do feel some sympathy for HH. Some readers, though, will 
probably never feel sympathy for him. Perhaps this is an aesthetic flaw with the text; Nabokov 
hasn’t done enough to motivate HH’s perspective and, further, no text should ever portray 
pedophilia in a positive light. Alternatively, the reader herself may make a mistake by not feeling 
sympathy for HH, thereby missing out on an important cognitive point of the narrative.18  For 
whatever reason, many readers resist Humbert Humbert. 
 Generalizing this case, some philosophers have suggested that readers will resist characters 
whose immoral values and actions are sufficiently dissimilar from their own. These characters 
stretch the limits of our literary imagination, but imagining these immoral characters might be 
required for the narrative to work. As HH admonishes his readers before a pivotal scene: “Please, 
reader: no matter your exasperation with the tenderhearted, morbidly sensitive, infinitely 
circumspect hero of my book, do not skip these essential pages! Imagine me; I shall not exist if 
you do not imagine me…” (ibid, 131). 
 Near the conclusion of “Of the Standard of Taste,” David Hume makes several remarks on 
the moral status of fiction that are particularly relevant for us: 
[Where] the ideas of morality and decency alter from one age to another, and where 
vicious manners are described, without being marked with the proper characters of 
blame and disapprobation; this must be allowed to disfigure the poem, and to be a 
real deformity. I cannot, nor is it proper that I should, enter into such sentiments; 
and however I may excuse the poet, on account of the manners of his age, I never 
can relish the composition. ..And whatever indulgence we may give to the writer 
on account of his prejudices, we cannot prevail on ourself to enter into his 
                                                          
18 In a BBC television interview, Nabokov declared Lolita his favorite book (P.D. Smith 1962). In 
a Playboy interview, he joked: “I am probably responsible for the odd fact that people don't seem 
to name their daughters Lolita any more. I have heard of young female poodles being given that 
name since 1956, but of no human beings”(Toffler 1964). 
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sentiments, or bear an affection to characters, which we plainly discover to be 
blameable. 
 
The case is not the same with moral principles, as with speculative opinions of any 
kind.  
These are in continual flux and revolution. The son embraces a different system 
from the father. Nay, there scarcely is any man, who can boast of great constancy 
and uniformity in this particular. Whatever speculative errors may be found in the 
polite writings of any age or country, they detract but little from the value of those 
compositions. There needs but a certain turn of thought or imagination to make us 
enter into all the opinions, when then prevailed, and relish the sentiments or 
conclusions derived from them. But a very violent effort is requisite to change our 
judgment of manners, and excite sentiments of approbation or blame, love or 
hatred, different from those to which the mind from long custom has been 
familiarized (Hume 1757/1994, 90-91). 
 
So began the discourse on the puzzle of imaginative resistance: although we may be willing to 
accept factual or metaphysical discrepancies in a fiction, we may be loathe to accept deviant moral 
values and practices that are not treated positively by the work. 
Hume’s comments actually highlight several discrete puzzles, as others have pointed out 
(Walton 2006 & Weatherson 2004). The first is the aesthetic puzzle:  if an artwork in some way 
embodies moral defects, do those defects detract from the aesthetic value of the work? Kendall 
Walton believes that this puzzle may be only indirectly related to moral resistance (Walton 2006).  
Second, the fictionality puzzle states that: “we easily accept that princes become frogs, or 
that people travel in time, in the world of a story, even, sometimes, that blatant contradictions are 
fictions. But we balk…at interpretations of stories of other fictions according to which it is fictional 
that (absent extraordinary circumstances) female infanticide is right and proper…or that a dumb 
knock-knock joke is actually hilarious” (ibid, 140). The fictionality puzzle concerns any sort of 
value judgments, not just moral ones. People may often deny that a value that they reject in the 
real world is correct in the fictional world (or vice versa). So we may refuse to accept that the 
dumb knock-knock joke could possibly be funny, even in a fictional world. We may also be unable 
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to accept that female infanticide is morally permissible in another world because we don’t believe 
that it is in ours. 
The last part of Hume’s worry, the imaginative puzzle, does not concern what is or is not 
fictional, but rather what we can or can’t imagine at all. We might be able to imagine a situation 
in which female infanticide is morally acceptable, even if we do not accept that it could ever be 
fictionally true that it is. Alternatively, we might not even be able to imagine that female infanticide 
is morally acceptable. We are unable to wrap our heads around the moral acceptability of female 
infanticide, so to speak. The fictionality puzzle concerns what we are able to accept as true in the 
world of the work. The imaginative puzzle concerns the limits of our imagination. 
In this chapter, I will offer ways to reject each of the puzzles of imaginative resistance. I 
will begin with the aesthetic puzzle. While my SAV does not necessarily favor one particular 
solution to the aesthetic puzzle, I do think that it narrows the playing field. I will then turn to the 
fictionality and imaginative puzzles. Traditionally, these puzzles have been kept distinct from the 
aesthetic one. I think that this is a mistake. My response to the puzzle of imaginative resistance is 
threefold. First, I deny that the phenomenon of resistance is as robust as some philosophers seem 
to think it is. I will present several supposed cases of resistance and why they should not be 
considered resistance in the sense others have argued. Second, I will compare the puzzle of 
imaginative resistance to the SDP and attempt to show that supposed cases of imaginative 
resistance are actually cases of emotional resistance. Finally, I will argue that some cases in which 
we seem to resist fictions stems from an aesthetic flaw in the work or a failure on the part of an 
audience to grasp a work’s cognitive value. 
The puzzle of imaginative resistance might seem a bit innocuous after our lengthy 
discussion of the sympathy for the devil phenomenon (SDP); if we can get ourselves to feel 
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sympathy for devils, cannibals, and psychopathic serial killers, then surely we can get ourselves to 
consider the possibility of deviant moral codes.  I argued in the previous chapter that we typically 
maintain our own moral beliefs and values throughout the duration of our engagements with 
fictions. We undergo pro-attitudes towards immoral characters in spite of our moral values, 
because of our fascination with them. The difference between the puzzle of imaginative resistance 
and the SDP is that, for the latter, the work in question requires that we consider a deviant moral 
outlook and condone it.  
 
 
 
2. The aesthetic puzzle 
 
I will begin my discussion of the aesthetic puzzle with a historical anecdote about the Whistler vs. 
Ruskin libel case of 1877. This case illustrates a turning point in the theorizing about art’s purpose. 
Indeed, the clash of the devout and revered critic, John Ruskin, against the arrogant and witty 
painter, James McNeill Whistler, was less a legal case than an aesthetic one. Ruskin stood for the 
established order that held that paintings should represent nature and serve a moral purpose. He 
stated that “…fine art had, and could have, but three functions: the enforcing of the religious 
sentiments of men, the perfecting of their ethical state, and the doing them material service” 
(Ruskin 1870/2006).  He found these qualities lacking in Whistler’s controversial painting 
Nocturne in Black and Gold: The Falling Rocket (1875). Ruskin denounced the Nocturne in the 
July 1877 issue of his series of letters, For Clavigera. He stated:  
‘For Mr. Whistler’s own sake, no less than for the protection of the purchaser, Sir 
Coutts Lindsay ought not to have admitted works into the gallery in which the ill-
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educated conceit of the artist so nearly approached the aspect of willful imposture. 
I have seen, and heard, much of cockney impudence before now; but never expected 
to hear a coxcomb ask two hundred guineas for flinging a pot of paint in the public’s 
face’ (Whistler 1890/1967, 3). 
 
 
Whistler then sued for libel. During the trial, the art critic Edward Burne-Jones attacked Whistler’s 
painting on the grounds that it has “fine color” but lacked meaning, and “it would be impossible 
to call it a serious work of art” (ibid, 14-15).  
Ruskin and many of the other critics who denounced the Nocturne did not accept Whistler’s 
rejection of their moralistic aesthetic standard. Whistler promoted the view that we should value 
“art for art’s sake,” distinct from the moral, material, religious, and social obligations that Ruskin 
believed validate a work. Whistler’s aesthete position marks one extreme of the range of responses 
one can make to the aesthetic puzzle: art comprises an autonomous realm from social, moral, and 
practical considerations (Carroll 2001a). Call this view aestheticism. Whistler’s aestheticism was 
highly influential in years to come; Oscar Wilde and art theorists such as Clive Bell and Clement 
Greenberg all adopted versions of it (Bell 1914/2003, Greenberg 1940/2003). 
 Ruskin’s position lies on the other end of the spectrum: a moral defect in a work of art is 
always an aesthetic defect. Call this view ethicism. But Ruskin’s position goes to an even further 
extreme: if a work of art lacks some display of positive moral values—as opposed to positively 
presenting immoral values—then it is aesthetically defective. Plato seems to have held a similar 
view. In Book X of The Republic, Socrates argues that mimetic artwork is inherently morally 
corrupt, since mimesis is removed from reality—it does not pertain to the truth. But even an 
abstract (non-mimetic) work like the Nocturne would be considered dangerous for encouraging 
the movements of the baser parts of the human soul: the appetite and spirit (Plato 1985).  
More recently, Berys Gaut (2007) has defended a position on the relation of art and 
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morality that follows Plato and Ruskin in spirit. Gaut argues that there is an inherent connection 
between aesthetic and moral value. A moral flaw makes the work of lesser aesthetic value; a moral 
virtue in a work makes it of greater aesthetic value. To support this position, Gaut notes that we 
generally accept that cognitive features of a work are aesthetically praiseworthy. For example, we 
consider accurate portrayals of emotions and decision making, and interesting intellectual puzzles 
to be part of the aesthetically good-making features of a work. The problem is that portrayals of 
immorality are a kind of cognitive defect because it asks the audience to make moral mistakes. 
Gaut argues that it is necessarily an aesthetic failure when a work misrepresents moral actions or 
principles, solicits perverse moral responses, or condemns morally praiseworthy actions (Kieran 
2006). This is because such portrayals involve a misunderstanding of how we should treat moral 
actions or principles. They get the audience make poor moral judgments.  
 I will return to Gaut’s ethicist position in §5, when I argue that portrayals of immorality do 
not necessarily constitute a cognitive defect. For now, we should not that there are a variety of 
nuanced intermediate responses to the aesthetic puzzle, between Whistler’s aestheticism and 
Gaut’s ethicism. One position maintains that aesthetic considerations are separate from moral 
considerations in some circumstances, but not all. Carroll describes this view as moderate 
autonomism. An artwork may be critiqued both in terms of its moral and aesthetic characteristics, 
but its aesthetic features are distinct from its moral ones (Carroll 2001b). It may be appropriate to 
morally evaluate an artwork like the Nocturne. But such evaluations do not bear on the painting’s 
aesthetic value. The same can be said about fictional narratives that display moral failings. A critic 
may praise Lolita for its displays of literary genius while at the same time condemn the work for 
its positive portrayal of an immoral character. 
Carroll’s own position, moderate moralism, states that certain genres of narrative fictions 
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can be evaluated in terms of its moral features, and the work’s moral features may contribute to its 
aesthetic evaluation (ibid, 299). This is the case when the moral features of an artwork are 
paramount to our understanding the work as a whole.  We saw in chapters 5 and 6 that audiences 
often need to apply their own emotional and moral values to artworks in order to adequately 
respond to a fictional narrative. Moderate moralism captures this point; it would be an aesthetic 
flaw in some artworks for them to portray immoral actions or principles, since doing so would 
render the audience incapable of adequately interpreting the narrative. Carroll cites the films 
Natural Born Killers and Schindler’s List as aesthetically defective because of moral flaws—the 
former because it “advertises itself as a meditation on violence, but it neither affords a consistent 
emotional stance on serial killing, nor delivers its promised insight on the relation of serial killing 
to the media…” (Carroll 2001a, 289), the latter because is excessively engages our moral emotions 
to the point of sentimentality (ibid, 290).  
The last position I will consider is immoralism. In contrast to the ethicists and moderate 
moralists, immoralists argue that positive portrayals of immorality can sometimes constitute an 
aesthetic virtue (Kieran 2006, Feagin 2010). Gaut argues that ethicism arises out of the recognition 
that the cognitive virtues of artworks also constitute aesthetic virtues. Immoralists argue the exact 
opposite. It may be an aesthetic virtue for a work to display a moral defect because doing so has 
cognitive value.  
Susan Feagin (2010) uses Gone with the Wind to promote a version of immoralism. She 
argues that the moral insensitivity of a work may enhance its aesthetic features—in this case, that 
positive portrayals of slavery may actually comprise a cognitive virtue and so an aesthetic one as 
well. Both the novel and film adaptation of Gone with the Wind are generally thought to be classic 
examples of imaginative resistance. We resist the positive portrayal of slavery and enslaved 
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people. However, Feagin argues that doing so makes us miss out on the moral message of the film. 
This message is revealed when Ashley Wilkes (arguably the moral compass of the story), decides 
that he will free his slaves and turn away from the old way of life. Feagin states: “If the would-be 
appreciators are so morally repulsed by the film’s introductory scenes that they are unable to 
engage with the story, they will not be in a position to appreciate how those appearances are woven 
into the rich character studies… that emerge out of the epic nature of the film’s narrative” (ibid, 
28). Thus, Gone with the Wind’s supposed moral failings might actually be much more complex 
than is typically assumed. The narrative could even serve as an opportunity for moral learning. 
Moreover, the narrative’s cognitive virtues might also constitute aesthetic merits; the novel and 
film are aesthetically better because its positive portrayals of immorality make some cognitive 
point. 
 I will also argue for a version of immoralism in what follows. Against ethicism and 
moderate moralism, positive portrayals of immorality may sometimes be aesthetic virtues. My 
view also rules out aestheticism. Art and morality do not comprise completely separate evaluative 
realms. We cannot help but treat artworks morally and we sometimes should evaluate the moral 
features of a work for their aesthetic benefits or defects. However, the moral features of artworks 
may not always bear on a work’s aesthetic qualities. We may respond negatively to a positive 
portrayal of an immoral action and so judge the artwork as morally flawed even while recognizing 
that the work is aesthetically good in spite of the moral flaw. So my immoralist position is 
compatible with moderate autonomism. 
I agree with Carroll that sometimes our emotional and moral capacities are sometimes 
required for audiences to adequately interpret an artwork. However, Carroll’s moderate moralism 
doesn’t spell out the cases in which a moral defect constitutes an aesthetic one; he contends that 
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this will likely vary case by case (Carroll 2001a). Kieran (2006) thus contends that moderate 
moralism incomplete. Carroll’s theory would collapse into ethicism once we stipulate the 
conditions under which a moral defects constitutes an aesthetic defect.  Furthermore, moderate 
moralism cannot account for the advantages of portraying immoral values, like immoralism can. 
Responding to the aesthetic puzzle doesn’t seem to help us with the most challenging 
aspects of the puzzle of imaginative resistance—namely, why it is that we often seem to resist 
immoral characters and scenarios. Most philosophers treat the aesthetic puzzle separately from 
imaginative resistance. Whether or not an immoral feature of an artwork is also an aesthetic defect 
is irrelevant to the question of how we can imagine a world in which an immoral action is 
acceptable.   
In contrast, I think that an immoralist solution to the aesthetic puzzle plays an important 
role in answering the other two puzzles. Our resistance to immoral characters or scenarios may 
sometimes be the result of the way a story is told and what information it provides about an 
immoral character or action. One could argue, then, that some resistance we experience is an 
aesthetic failing of a work, because the narrative is incomplete or doesn’t adequately convey the 
cognitive significance of the positive portrayal of immorality. Other times, resistance may be due 
to the audience who fails to adequately appreciated a point the film is making. 
 I will now discuss the fictionality and imaginative puzzles. As I mentioned in the 
introduction to this chapter, there are three parts to my response to these puzzles. I will begin by 
attempting to undermine the intuitive motivation behind the puzzles. Most philosophers working 
in the resistance literature seem to think that imaginative resistance is a robust phenomenon. In the 
following section, I will argue that many of the examples of imaginative resistance that are 
typically appealed to are not, in fact, genuine cases of resistance. 
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3. Evidence for the puzzle of imaginative resistance 
 
Fictions often present us with unusual or seemingly impossible situations: amazingly coincidental 
romantic comedies, zombie stories, time-travel, etc. Audiences usually take the bizarre or 
impossible features of a story in stride. We often do not question historical inaccuracies or 
anachronisms and we delight in physical impossibilities, like huge explosions in space or Star Trek 
transporters that can move physical objects faster than the speed of light. There are exceptions, of 
course. Consider the heated debates over historical television programs, like the History Channel’s 
Vikings, which take artistic liberties with historical facts, or complaints about scientific mistakes 
in fictions, like Alfonso Cuarón’s film Gravity. These audiences resist the fictional world because 
of historical or scientific inaccuracies. These mistakes turn out to constitute aesthetic failings as 
well—for some people, anyway. In general, though, I think that audiences tacitly apply a principle 
of charity to fictional worlds. Scientific and historical discrepancies can be explained away 
because the fictional world is distinct from the actual one. An audience might miss a work’s 
cognitive or aesthetic qualities if they are uncharitable in this respect. 
We need to know whether there are any limits to our artistic imagination, at least in 
principle. Here are several examples that seem to push this limit to the extreme. 
 The first test case comes from obvious contradictions. This might include something as 
simple as a round-square. Other inconsistencies can be far more complex. In “Sylvan’s Box,” 
Graham Priest tells a story in which a character discovers a box that belonged to a deceased 
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friend—a box which is both empty and occupied (Priest 1997). The story makes up approximately 
two-thirds of the article. It is arguable that the background narrative is required in order for anyone 
to buy into Priest’s contention about the inconsistency of the box, although my guess is that some 
readers still will not be able to imagine the empty-occupied box (especially if they have previous 
metaphysical commitments!). Even in cases where we accept obvious contradictions, 
inconsistencies like these may be impossible to imagine imagistically. In other words, we cannot 
picture them in our mind even if we can understand what it might mean for a box to be both 
occupied and unoccupied. 
 Next, consider conceptual impossibilities. In “Coulda, Woulda, Shoulda,” Stephen Yablo 
tells a hypothetical children’s story: “They flopped down beneath the great maple. One more item 
to find, and yet the game seemed lost. Hang on, Sally said. It’s staring us in the face. This is a 
maple tree we’re under. She grabbed a five-fingered leaf. Here was the oval they needed! They 
ran off to claim their prize” (Yablo 2002, 485). A five-sided oval is conceptually impossible and, 
again, perhaps impossible to imagistically imagine without undergoing duck/rabbit-like shifts 
from one shape to another. 
 Third, there are metaphysical impossibilities. Brian Weatherson’s cites the “Restaurant at 
the End of the World” in the second installment of the The Hitchhiker’s Guide to the Galaxy:  
The Restaurant at the End of the Universe is one of the most extraordinary ventures in the 
entire history of catering. 
It is built on the fragmented remains of an eventually ruined planet which is 
enclosed in a vast time bubble and projected forward in time to the precise moment of the 
End of the Universe.  
This is, many would say, impossible… (Adams 1980/2002, 213; quoted in 
Weatherson 2004, 9). 
 
In fact, almost every futuristic sci-fi—Star Trek, Star Wars, Firefly, Battlestar Galactica—features 
metaphysical impossibilities of some kind, such as space-travel or, indeed, a restaurant surviving 
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the end of the universe. While it may be difficult to understand these impossibilities, we do not 
generally resist them.  Most viewers probably do not question warp-speed space travel in fictions. 
They simply go along with this impossibility because it is stipulated in the story. Our world and 
the fictional world of the fiction differ in this important respect. We are willing to take for granted 
whatever technological or physical discrepancies that allow for this. 
Finally, and most importantly for our purposes, we may resist deviant evaluative claims, 
including moral claims. Yablo argues that we resist deviant aesthetic evaluations like the 
following:  
All eyes were on the twin Chevy 4x4’s as they pushed purposefully through the 
mud. Expectations were high; last year’s blood bath death match of doom had been 
exhilarating and profound, and this year’s promised to be even better. The crowd 
went quiet as special musical guests ZZ Top began to lay down their sonorous 
rhythms. The scene was marred only by the awkwardly setting sun (Yablo, 485).  
 
Yablo contends that a typical reader would resist the claim that a “monster truck death match” 
could be profound, yet the sunset could somehow be aesthetically awkward. Certainly we can think 
of exceptions to Yablo’s resistance. Some people might admire monster trucks. They may think 
that there is something primal and profound about a monster truck death match and something 
rather ho-hum about a sunset. Such audiences would not resist Yablo’s short fiction, even if others 
find it strange or implausible. 
 There are other evaluative claims that we might resist. Consider Walton’s dumb knock-
knock joke: “Knock, knock. Who’s there? Robin. Robin who? Robbin’ you! Stick ‘em up!” 
(Walton 1994, 43). Walton argues that we cannot bring ourselves to think that this dumb knock-
knock joke is funny. We cannot imagine that it is, even in a fictional world. Again, I do not think 
that this is quite fair. Just because I do not find this joke funny does not mean that I cannot imagine 
that it is. I probably would have found this joke funny when I was five.  
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 This brings us to moral claims. Can we imagine a morally deviant situation and, further, 
fictionally accept its truth? Take Walton’s female infanticide example: “In killing her baby, 
Giselda did the right thing; after all, it was a girl” (ibid, 38).  Walton suggests that a reader will 
probably not be able to imagine the moral acceptability of female infanticide. The reader might 
put down her book and walk away or do something else to prevent her from engaging with the 
immoral statement. She certainly will not accept that female infanticide is morally acceptable in 
the fictional world. 
 I do not find any of the previous examples of contradictions, impossibilities, and evaluative 
anomalies to be strong evidence in support of the resistance phenomenon. As I’ve pointed out, 
many people will not resist deviant evaluations or impossibilities and we can rather easily imagine 
not resisting them. But some philosophers have taken the moral cases to be particularly 
problematic. Why would this be?  
  
 
 
4. Responding to the puzzles 
 
There are three distinctions that we must make when considering the above examples. First, we 
must be careful to distinguish between the imaginative puzzle and the fictionality puzzle. The 
former concerns what we do or do not imagine, regardless of whether it is true in a fiction. We 
resist imagining certain scenarios and propositions, including non-evaluative propositions and 
scenarios. Our task is to determine whether this failing is the result of something in the story or 
something about the subject.  In contrast, the fictionality puzzle concerns our resistance to 
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accepting that a deviant evaluative claim is true in a fictional world. This can include deviant 
aesthetic and humorous claims, as well as moral ones. In many cases it will be important for us to 
keep these two puzzles separate. As we will see, though, it is not always easy do so. 
The second important distinction concerns the type of imagining involved in our resistance 
to fictions. As the above examples show, we may find ourselves resisting to imagistically imagine 
a scenario (difficulty in visualizing it), attitudinally imagine it (take the proposition as true in the 
fiction), or constructively imagine it (create further propositions or scenarios in our imagination 
that extend beyond what we are strictly given by the fiction). Generally, only attitude imagining 
is considered in the literature on the puzzle of imaginative resistance (see Walton 1990 for an 
exception). I think that this is a costly mistake; at least some of the confusion in explaining our 
resistance could be eliminated if we distinguish between the types of imagining that we resist, as 
in the Sylvan’s Box and Oval-Maple Leaf examples. This distinction will also help us evaluate 
various different responses to the puzzles. 
Finally, it is not always clear what is supposed to be the object of our resistance. There are 
two possibilities: the particular evaluative, metaphysical, or conceptual deviance or the fictional 
story as a whole. This is an important distinction. We may be perfectly able to interpret and engage 
with a story that contains an impossibility even if we are unable to imagine a particular 
impossibility contained within it.  
Tamar Gendler (2000) argues that there are two basic ways to explain imaginative 
resistance. We can be “cantians,” “wontians,” or some hybrid of the two. Cantians about resistance 
argue that we are often unable to imagine certain kinds of impossibilities or evaluative deviances. 
Wontians hold that resistance arises because we are unwilling imagine a situation in which a certain 
impossibility or deviance is acceptable. 
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I will examine three accounts of the fictionality and imaginative puzzles. First, Gendler 
argues that imaginative barriers arise when the principles and background knowledge the reader 
has accepted in the story leave no way for the impossible or deviant proposition or situation to be 
true (Gendler 2006). This makes Genlder a cantian about the imaginative puzzle. We are unable 
to imagine some deviant moral scenarios.  However, Gendler is a wontian concerning the 
fictionality puzzle. Even if we could imagine some deviant evaluative response in a fiction, we 
often will not allow ourselves to do so. 
Walton takes the opposite approach: whereas Gendler is a cantian about the imaginative 
puzzle and a wontian about the fictionality one, he argues for the reverse (Walton 2006). I may not 
imagine a solid gold mountain or a round square, because I have an inability to imagine such a 
thing. But when I do not imagine a female infanticide, it is not because I am unable to. Rather, it 
is because I am unwilling to. So Walton is a wontian when it comes to the imaginative puzzle (see 
also Moran 1994). Priest, another wontian, argues that we are able to understand stories that 
contain inconsistencies like a both occupied and unoccupied box; if we do not imagine them, it is 
because we are unwilling to.  
For the fictionality puzzle, Walton argues that we are unable to imagine that some aesthetic 
or moral evaluation is capable of evoking different kinds of responses than those we are used to. 
This is because we cannot fully grasp what the world would have to be like for the bad the knock-
knock joke to be funny or for female infanticide to be morally acceptable.  So Walton is a cantian 
about the fictionality puzzle; we cannot imagine that evaluative deviances are fictionally true. 
There is one more potential solution to the puzzles that I would like to review in some 
detail: Gregory Currie’s notion of desire-like imagining (Currie 2002).  Like his explanation of the 
SDP, Curries suggests that positing a distinct attitude can account for our resistance to some 
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deviant fictional evaluations. Currie suggests that imaginative resistance is the result of an 
inconsistency in our desires, rather than our moral or aesthetic beliefs. I have not given our desires 
about fictions any special treatment in this dissertation. In general, I think that we can treat them 
the way we have beliefs, judgments, and emotions. Like these other states, desires play important 
functional and inferential roles. Currie suggests that our desires about fictional objects aren’t 
genuine desires they lack those typical roles. So we do not have genuine desires about fictions, but 
rather desire-like imaginings.  
Currie explains that we have both internal and external desires about fictional worlds. To 
use his example, we do not want Desdemona to perish in the fictional world of Othello, because 
we care for her and find her virtuous. This desire is internal, or about, the fictional world. However, 
we may also possess an “external” desire for Desdemona to die, because her death would make 
for a better tragedy. Currie contends that these desires are contradictory: we both desire 
Desdemona’s death and desire that she lives. I disagree. On my view, the internal desire is a 
genuine desire about the fictional world.  My external desire is about Othello as a work of fiction, 
external to the fictional world. These desires are not contradictory because they possess different 
types of content.  
Currie argues, again for functionalist reasons, that this response cannot adequately explain 
the functional and inferential roles of desire. Desires motivate action. We would act on our desire 
if we genuinely wanted Desdemona to survive.  We do not act as if we want Desdemona to live, 
so we lack the relevant desire. This is the standard DAV argument that I have rejected throughout 
this dissertation. Desires may dispose or motivate us to act, but those dispositions need not lead to 
actual behaviors. Or, if they do, the behaviors may be different than they would be if the desire 
was about a real-life person. Such differences can be explained in terms of differences in the 
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content of our desires. 
Let’s suppose that Currie is right about desire-like imaginings. How is this supposed to 
help us solve the puzzle of imaginative resistance? On this view, we lack a genuine desire for 
Desdemona to live; rather, we have a desire-like imagining that she does. The desire runs offline 
from its normal relations to beliefs and so does not result in behavioral output. Our external desire 
that Desdemona dies in the fiction is a genuine desire just like any other desire about the real world.  
Currie contends that it is relatively easy to suppose that something is true in a fictional 
world—i.e. to form a belief-like imagining that diverges from things we believe about our actual 
world. For example, we can easily suppose that a dangerous dragon named Smaug hides in a cave 
on the Lonely Mountain, sleeping amongst his golden treasure. He even argues that we can easily 
suppose that female infanticide is morally acceptable in some fictional worlds. However, it is 
difficult for us to desire that female infanticide is acceptable, or even have a desire-like imagining 
that it is acceptable in a fictional world. Currie argues that we cannot easily construct imaginative 
replacements of “wicked desires” like we can with beliefs, even if it is possible in some cases. This 
places Currie in a third camp: he is a hardian, rather than a cantian or wontian, about the two 
puzzles.  Deviant desire-like imaginings are not impossible and we may sometimes desire that an 
immoral act to be fictionally true. However, it is very difficult to get ourselves in the right mindset 
for this too occur—hence, the phenomenon of resistance. We have a very difficult time 
imaginatively desiring female infanticide is fictionally true or, or even imaginatively desiring to 
know what such a world would be like. These desire-like imagining are too far removed from our 
actual desire that female infanticide shouldn’t be practiced. 
Currie’s view may be able to explain both puzzles with one fell swoop. However, it faces 
some serious challenges. What is it about desires—as opposed to beliefs—that make them the 
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object of resistance? We can have all kinds of strange and unethical desires about real-life; why 
can’t we do the same about a world that is not even our own? Currie owes the reader some 
explanation for why we can easily construct bizarre or immoral suppositions about fictions, but 
not desires and, further, what separates fictional desires from ordinary ones. So Currie’s response 
to the puzzle of imaginative resistance fails. 
Gendler’s and Walton’s explanations also face several problems.  First, both suppose that 
resistance is a robust, commonplace phenomenon. However, my interpretations of the examples 
in the previous section suggest that resistance may not be as widespread as aestheticians think it 
is. Second, some authors—including Yablo, Weatherson, and Priest—do not adequately 
distinguish between what we imagine and what we are willing to accept as fictionally true. This 
means that they fail to distinguish between the imaginative and fictionality puzzles. Walton 
correctly points out that an inability to imagine does not equal resistance; we can try very hard to 
imagine something, but simply be unable to do so (Walton 2006). That does not seem like a case 
of resisting at all. He suggests that Gendler’s cantian response to the imaginative puzzle is mistaken 
since “resistance” as she uses it conflates ability and resistance. 
Third, some of the traditional responses trade on an equivocation on ‘imagination.’ 
Sometimes philosophers seem to be pointing out an inability to imagistically imagine a 
proposition. Priest’s box and Yablo’s leaf example (also, perhaps, Weatherson’s Restaurant at the 
End of the World) may be guilty of this. However, the real issue in the puzzles concerns attitudinal 
imagining—imagining that something is the case. As Walton suggests, an inability to imagine is 
not the same as resisting. This is true for imagistic imagining was well. We may be very eager to 
imagistically imagine a five sided oval, but simply lack the ability to do so.   
Fourth, each proposal under-specifies the source of our resistance: is it the fiction in which 
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the impossibility or normative deviance occurs, or the impossibility/deviance itself (leaving the 
rest of the story untouched)?  Gendler holds the former position; Yablo and Walton suggest the 
latter. Priest argues for both. This might seem like a trivial point, but I think that it is important for 
understanding imaginative resistance in general. Just because a story features a proposition or 
scenario that I do not imagine (either because I cannot or will not) does not necessarily mean that 
I resist the story as a whole. This is true for any other types of imaginative resistance: 
contradictions, metaphysical, conceptual, or moral. Consider the sci-fi stories from above, or even 
Gone with the Wind. They all feature instances of imaginative resistance, and yet many people will 
accept the story as a whole, perhaps by “setting aside” the impossibility, like in the Star Trek 
example. Anyone who makes the stronger claim concerning the fiction as a whole needs to explain 
why we can or will not accept a fiction if it possesses a point of resistance, especially since we 
clearly often do. 
 
 
 
5. Narrative resistance & immoral learning 
 
On the one hand, it seems like imaginative resistance is an over-blown phenomenon. On the other, 
there do seem to be some instances in which we resist works of fiction because they present us 
with deviant moral characters and scenarios. In this section, I will present the second component 
of my solution to the puzzle of imaginative resistance. Two relatively unexplored reasons why we 
might seem to resist immoral aspects of fiction are either a) the fiction itself is not constructed in 
the right way, or b) the reader does not understand a cognitive point that the fiction was intended 
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to make. Importantly, I resist explaining resistance to fictions in terms of imagination. Like 
Walton, I do not think that there is anything in principle that we cannot attitudinally imagine (see 
also Camp, in prep). But there are things that we may have difficulty supposing to be true in a 
fiction. The idea is that we can eliminate talk about imaginative resistance and instead discuss our 
emotional resistance, as we’ll see in §6. As I’ve accepted all along, imagination may be involved 
in our experiences with immoral aspects of a fiction. However, I contend that the so-called puzzle 
of imaginative resistance isn’t a matter of imagination at all. 
 
 
5.1. Narrative resistance 
Some things, like a round square, may be impossible to imagistically imagine (or, at least, are very 
difficult to imagine).  But there does not seem to be anything that we are incapable of attitudinally 
imagining. In my terms, this means that there is nothing in principle that we should not imagine in 
a fictional world. Most of the time are able to “take up” morally deviant claims and accept that 
they are true in a fictional world. It may not always be easy to do so, but it is possible. 
Consider what would be involved in order for us to accept that female infanticide is morally 
permissible. We must consider what it would be like for a person to live in certain circumstances 
and follow certain rules that are very different than our own. We must suppose that it is biologically 
true that women are inferior to men and the natural, political, and social climate is such that some 
babies must be killed after birth. It may be very difficult for us to imagine the relevant 
circumstances, but that does not mean it is impossible. 
Gendler and Walton both contend that it is an author’s task to get her reader to imagine a 
story in the right way so that she will accept the morally deviant claim. This is where the aesthetic 
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and imaginative puzzles collide. An artwork may be aesthetically flawed if it does not enable its 
audience to be able to think about and consider a deviant evaluative claim. Perhaps the artist has 
not provided her audience with enough background information about the fictional world or 
character. Perhaps the morally deviant proposal contradicts an episode that occurred earlier in the 
narrative. In either case, the audience struggles to go along with the evaluative deviance. 
Compare this to my discussion of the SDP. If an artist can get an audience to undergo pro-
attitudes towards Satan, Hannibal Lecter, or Humbert Humbert, then why would she not, in 
principle, be able to get us to imagine that female infanticide is acceptable? Given the right story, 
we should be able to go along with female infanticide in a fictional world: to think about it and 
understand what that world is like. A talented artist can get her to audience to engage with even 
the most morally deviant characters. Like Feagin argues, there may a cognitive payoff for doing 
so.  
I don’t think that we can place the blame for an audience’s resistance entirely on the artist. 
Audiences are not limited to what the author explicitly says in the text. Recall my arguments in 
chapter 5 and 6 that readers each bring their own beliefs and values to a fiction.  Our emotional 
and moral experiences with fiction are a product of our own moral beliefs and emotional 
tendencies. The same goes with our other beliefs and judgments. We may make judgments and 
think about a fictional world beyond what the author lays out in a narrative. This can be an 
important aspect of how we understand and evaluate the work as a whole. So a narrative might not 
always give us enough information to imagine a morally deviant proposition. However, that does 
not mean (contra Gendler and Walton) that we can’t make sense of the deviant proposition on our 
own. We may have to do extra cognitive work in order to understand a fictional world in which 
female infanticide is morally permissible.  
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On my view, then, the imaginative puzzle is actually a matter of narrative resistance. 
Audiences often find it difficult to accept deviant evaluative claims in a work of fiction either 
because the narrative lacks sufficient information to them to do so or because they do not properly 
engage with the story. This makes me a hardian about the imaginative puzzle, like Currie. 
There remains the question of why audiences might not want to engage with a story that 
positively portrays deviant moral actions or principles. Why would we not want to accept that an 
immoral action is acceptable in a fiction? What is the source of our unwillingness? This is the basis 
of the fictionality puzzle.  
 
5.2. Immoral learning 
There are very few cases in which we are unwilling to go along with a story and accept a fictional 
truth. Indeed, if the artist has done her job correctly, we should be willing and able to engage with 
all sorts of fictional characters and events. But even when she hasn’t, the reader may wish to fill 
in the relevant gaps so as to make the story understandable and relatable. In a sense, the wontians 
seem to think that some readers/audiences are not playing along with the fiction, just like those 
viewers of Star Trek that cannot look past the metaphysical impossibility of traveling at light speed 
in order to consider the work as a whole.  
I think that the fictionality puzzle—cases in which we do not accept moral deviations in 
the fictional world—is often the result of a worry concerning immoral learning. This occurs when 
an audience worries that going along with fictional portrayals of immorality in a fiction will cause 
us to adopt immoral practices and beliefs in our actual lives. Compare the possibility of immoral 
learning to the fictionality thesis from chapter 6. The fictionality thesis states that we allow 
ourselves to imaginatively respond to different features of a fiction simply because it is a fiction.  
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This supposedly frees us to take pleasure in all sorts of things we normally wouldn’t in our real 
lives. However, Gendler suggests that audiences often won’t accept fictional truths is because 
doing so will somehow reflect on one’s own beliefs about the actual world. We may also worry 
that there is a causal connection between a fiction and the real-world: reading about a morally 
deviant character or scenario will cause one to become morally deviant oneself. Plato famously 
cast the poets out of the ideal state in Book X of The Republic for this reason, stating: “their art 
corrupts the minds of all who hearken to them, save only those whose knowledge of reality 
provides an antidote” (595d). Fictions often influence our emotions and, in so doing, our moral 
judgments. Plato worried that audiences might learn bad moral practices from works of art if we 
are not careful.  
It’s possible that people sometimes do misattribute immoral characteristics to a person 
based on her emotional and moral responses to portrayals of immorality in a fiction. You might 
look sideways at a friend who laughs when a fictional character is harmed. However, the 
fictionality thesis contends that our friend has done nothing wrong here. Her laughing at the 
fictional character’s pain may mean that she accepts that injury is sometimes acceptable in a 
fictional world. It does not mean that our friend accepts this in the real world. The whole point of 
fictions is that we recognize that the characters and actions portrayed in a story aren’t real.  
In fact, I think that refusing to accept deviant fictional truths is sometimes a kind of 
interpretive mistake. Consider the immoralist position from §2: there may be some aesthetic 
benefit to the portrayal of immoral actions in a fiction. So if we refuse to accept the deviant fictional 
truth, then we may also miss out on that aesthetic benefit. 
Let’s go through an example. Suppose that you and an especially morally-correct friend 
have just watched an episode of your favorite show, Mad Men. This episode, “Mystery Date,” 
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portrays a great deal of sexual violence against women. The historical backdrop of the story is the 
(real-life) Richard Speck murders in the late 1960’s, in which Speck kidnapped, raped, tortured, 
and murdered eight nursing students in the Chicago area. Many of the fictional characters in Mad 
Men are equally obsessed with and frightened by the Speck murders (Don’s young daughter, Sally, 
can’t sleep after reading about Speck in the paper; her step-grandmother takes perverse pleasure 
in discussing Speck with her friend on the phone). Other characters simply carry about their 
business. The creative ad-man, Don Draper, and the young copy writer, Michael Ginsberg, 
promote a sales campaign for Butler footwear. Ginsberg’s final pitch highlights the backdrop of 
sexual violence in the episode: 
‘We were gonna come in here and talk about Cinderella, but it’s too dark…I mean 
she’s running down this dark side street, and it’s outside a castle so it’s got those 
walls and the cobblestones. And she’s running but she’s only got this one incredible 
shoe for her incredible gown, so she’s hobbling—wounded prey. She can hear him 
behind her, his measured footsteps catching up. She turns a corner, those big 
shadows. And she’s scared. And then she feels a hand on her shoulder and she turns 
around, and it doesn’t matter what he looks like. He’s handsome at that moment, 
offering her her shoe. She takes it. She knows she’s not safe, but she doesn’t care. 
I guess we know in the end that she wants to be caught’ (Mad Men episode 5.4, 
“Mystery Date”). 
 
The Butler people gobble it up, oblivious to the menacing tone of this scene. Later in the episode, 
Don has a dream in which he strangles his mistress after they sleep together. Finally, the episode 
raises the specter of the office manager Joan’s rape by her then fiancé, Greg. 
 Some people may take delight in “Mystery Date.” The whole episode is dark and gloomy, 
much more muted in both color and tone than a typical Mad Men episode. Maybe you take pleasure 
in hearing about the Speck murders, in watching Don’s bizarre dream, and Ginsberg’s haunting 
Cinderella tale. Your morally correct friend might be deeply disturbed when she realizes that you 
take delight in a show that nonjudgmentally portrays violence against women. In fact, it’s unclear 
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whether the show condones or condemns Don’s immoral behavior (how he treats women, his wife, 
his children, his employees, etc.). Ginsberg’s sales pitch is mainly used to contrast the personalities 
of the dour, stern Don and the impulsive young copy writer. Only clear judgment is against Joan’ 
husband, Greg, who so clearly disrespects his wife’s desires and ends up alone in Vietnam. The 
moral ambiguity with which the narrative presents Don and the others bothers your friend, who 
resists any glorification or even casual acceptance of the show’s portrayals of immorality. 
 Most people don’t think that violence against women is ever acceptable in the real world. 
But Mad Men’s fictional world is just that: fictional. Don and Joan’s world may be very similar to 
the actual world, but no real person suffers as the result of the events in this episode. Accepting 
the sexual violence against the women in the show does not mean that one accepts violence against 
women in the real world. You accept that this may be fictionally true, but not actually true. No one 
is harmed by your taking delight in the portrayals of immorality in “Mystery Date.” 
 Fictions often portray immoral characters or actions that are not condemned in the 
narrative. Like Kieran and Feagin, I argue that, generally speaking, these portrayals of accepted 
immorality are supposed to prove some cognitive point. The audience is supposed to take the 
portrayal of immorality as an opportunity for moral reflection and learning. You may watch 
“Mystery Date” and enjoy all of its dark, immoral scenes. Maybe you don’t think about the 
significance of the sexual violence at the time you watch it. You simply enjoy the episode. Upon 
reflection, though, you may realize that there might be a deeper significance to some of the 
violence in the episode. Mad Men is a partly a satire that reflects the social mores of both the 
1960’s and the present. The ad-men casually accept violence against women and using women as 
mere sexual objects. The show holds up the image of sexual violence in the show to reflect our 
own society, either as it was or currently is. So watching portrayals of immorality on screen should 
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cause the viewer to reflect on her own moral beliefs. 
 This, perhaps, is the cognitive point that “Mystery Date” and other Mad Men episodes 
attempt to make. Immoralists would count this opportunity for moral reflection as an aesthetic 
virtue, something that makes Mad Men a good show. Indeed, we could contrast “Mystery Date” 
with a show that simply glorifies sexual violence against women without making a similar 
cognitive point. It may be right to resist the condoned violence in this case.  
One could protest that it may be quite difficult to tell when a fiction attempts to make a 
point by portraying violence and when it’s simply portraying violence for shock value. This is true; 
it’s up the viewer to be able to draw out the cognitive point in some narratives and to decide for 
herself when portrayals of immorality are unacceptable. Here, too, the worry is that taking pleasure 
in fictional immorality will somehow transcend into real world immoral beliefs or actions. I will 
return to this point in the following chapter when I discuss moral learning from fictions.  
The Mad Men example I give here is intended to show that the fictionality puzzle may 
sometimes be a kind of interpretive mistake. Audiences are typically quite willing to engage in a 
morally deviant fiction so long as the narrative is presented to us in the right way, with a 
sufficiently detailed plot, fictional world, the right cast of characters and, most importantly, an 
interesting or important cognitive payoff. I do not think that it is a coincidence, or even a matter 
of logistics and practicality, that the morally deviant propositions in the articles on imaginative 
resistance are made-up cases by philosophers, not actual or complete fictions in themselves. If we 
take a work of fiction as a whole—as Feagin says, a temporally extended object—then my guess 
is that we will rarely resist accepting that some morally deviant proposition is true in the fiction. 
Importantly, this does not mean that we need to consider the morally deviant proposition as true 
in our actual world—even if the fiction presents us with a world that is remarkably similar to our 
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own.  
 
 
6. Emotional resistance 
 
I have tried to explain away some cases of supposed imaginative resistance. Surely, though, there 
are some genuine instances of the phenomenon. Genuine imaginative resistance amounts to an 
unwillingness to imagine deviant evaluative claims in a fictional narrative. In this section, I will 
argue that these supposed cases of imaginative resistance are really instances of emotional 
resistance.  I will focus on deviant moral claims, but my arguments apply to aesthetic evaluations 
as well. Our resistance to positive portrayals of immoral characters and scenarios are due to a 
difficulty in overcoming negative emotional responses to them. 
 Emotional resistance explains why we might only resist some immoral features of a fiction. 
This is a challenge for other explanations of imaginative resistance. None of them explain what it 
is about certain examples of moral deviances that cause us to resist them. As we saw with the SDP, 
there are many instances in which we respond positively towards immoral characters. We either 
overcome an initial resistance to the character or we experience no resistance to her at all. 
 In fact, the fascinated attention account of the SDP helps explain the puzzle of imaginative 
resistance as well. A narrative can be constructed in such a way that we will feel pro-attitudes 
towards an immoral character. We are willing to accept deviant characters and actions if the 
narrative is presented in the right way. We may emotionally resist immoral characters or scenarios 
in a fiction if we are not sufficiently fascinated by a character or if we are not shown his or her 
sympathetic features. 
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Moreover, a multi-level appraisal theory of moral judgments perfectly explains our 
resistance to immoral aspects of fictions. Resistance may be the result of fast, subpersonal negative 
reactions to portrayals of immorality.  Suppose that you are watching The Godfather, a film that 
not only presents murder, organized crime, drug trafficking, kidnapping, and theft, but often 
glorifies these actions. Do we resist The Godfather or not, and why? If so, is the resistance to the 
story as a whole, or an individual act within the story? 
At the end of the film, Michael Corleone has the Dons of the other major crime families 
sent “to sleep with the fishes,” thereby assuring his own dominance in New York mob scene. You 
watch as one man after another is killed, contrasting with the sanctimonious shots of the baptism 
of Michael’s nephew. What is your initial emotional response to this scene? Some people might 
feel a sort of malicious glee due to their sympathies for the Corleone family. Others might 
experience disgust, horror, or revulsion at the murders. According to the multi-level appraisal 
theory, one’s disgust, horror, or revulsion is the result of the initial affective appraisal of the 
murders that may or may not be consciously experienced. A positive response might suggest that 
the viewer accepts Michael’s actions, at least initially. 
From here, slower, cognitive appraisals of the murders might come about. The cognitive 
appraisal may overturn the initial affective appraisal. We automatically have a negative response 
to Michael’s actions but later decide that his was in the right. We do not resist his immoral deeds.  
Alternatively, our cognitive appraisal of the murders might not overturn the initial negative 
affective appraisal. Perhaps the viewer is sickened by the depravity of all the crime families. These 
murders mark Michael’s moral turning point and herald in a new era of morally bankrupt, 
avaricious organized crime. We resist the positive portrayal of the Don’s murders because we 
cannot overcome our initial negative reaction to them.  
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It is difficult to overcome our initial affective responses towards any situation: fictional or 
non-fictional, moral or amoral. Imagine a scenario in which you suspect that your partner has 
cheated on you. You notice all the late nights at work, the mysterious phone calls, and the 
unaccounted for afternoons. You experience intense jealousy, rage, and hurt.  But then you 
discover that your partner was not cheating, but planning your surprise birthday party. You may 
instantly feel relief while at the same time experience some residual hurt or jealous affective 
feelings. It’s challenging to overcome our affective appraisals and feelings. We may have to 
actively work towards overcoming them. This could also apply to our emotional responses to 
fictions; we may have to remind ourselves of the point of the story and take other measures to 
eradicate our initial negative response towards the murders (see Harris 2000). 
Finally, it is possible that the viewer has misinterpreted the story. It’s not entirely clear that 
The Godfather as a whole does condone the assassinations. Consider how hard Michael worked to 
prevent himself from becoming involved in the family business, the tragedy of Apollonia’s death, 
Connie’s dismay after Michael has her husband killed, or Kay’s horrified look at the end of when 
Michael receives his caporegime. Perhaps, then, our viewer does not resist the positive portrayal 
of murder because there is no positive portrayal to begin with!  
As I’ve argued, we can make a similar point can be made for many stories that portray 
immoral acts: they do so for some cognitive point, not because one is actually supposed to accept 
them. We may have difficulty in accepting a character or action in a fiction because we typically 
associate strong negative emotions towards such characters and actions in real life. It may be that 
we are not given enough information about a character to care about her or to understand how an 
immoral action—like Walton’s female infanticide example—could possibly be true. Thus, our 
initial affective appraisal of the character or scene would not be modified by later cognitive re-
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appraisals. This could lead to our resistance: we refuse to watch a film that positively portrays 
immoral actions or we cannot accept that the immoral action is acceptable partly because we have 
no reason to update our initial negative reaction. 
 
 
 
7. Dissolving the puzzle 
 
My goal in this chapter was to show that the puzzle of imaginative resistance is not really all that 
puzzling. Standard cases of imaginative resistance do not adequately motivate a robust puzzle to 
be solved. They are not genuine examples of resistance or involve imagistic rather than attitudinal 
imagining. Imaginative resistance is not as prevalent a phenomenon as is typically supposed. When 
resistance does occur, it may often be due to a narrative or interpretive failure: what I have called 
narrative resistance and the challenge of immoral learning, respectively. Finally, I have attempted 
to show that imaginative resistance is better understood as emotional resistance—or, at least, 
emotional difficulty. 
If imaginative resistance is a genuine worry, it does not concern fiction alone (see also 
Matravers 2014). We often encounter real-life stories that we resist due to moral deviances, such 
as Triumph of the Will. We resist these stories for roughly the same reasons we would resist any 
morally unacceptable action: we disagree with it. As in the purely fictional cases, we may resist 
accepting the moral deviances in these works. This may be a matter of how difficult it would be to 
change one’s moral outlook in order to accept the positive portrayal of Nazism. It may also be a 
matter of overcoming our strong negative emotions towards Nazism, which would be quite 
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difficult to do.  
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Chapter 9: (Im)moral Learning from Fictions 
 
 
 
1. Learning from Dexter Morgan 
 
The last puzzle that I will discuss concerns the possibility of learning about real-world morality 
from fiction. This is an extension of my arguments from the previous chapter: one reason why the 
challenge of immoral learning is so persistent stems from the worry that portrayals of fictional 
immorality will carry over into real world actions and beliefs.  
Take the TV show Dexter. This show portrays the escapades of Dexter Morgan, Miami 
Metro blood-spatter analyst by day, self-described psychopathic serial killer by night. Audiences 
typically want Dexter’s plots to succeed, despite his murderous tendencies and sometimes callous 
demeanor. We do not want him to be caught by the police even if his capture would be morally 
justified all things considered. This is partly because Dexter is a serial killer with a code of honor. 
He only kills people who (he thinks) deserve it: drug dealers, other serial killers, rapists, mobsters, 
etc. Dexter follows this code to the tee and rarely strays from it. In fact, Dexter blames other serial 
killers for not following his code and berates himself when he slips and impulsively harms an 
innocent.  
Another reason for our sympathy for Dexter is that he is not, strictly speaking, a complete 
psychopath. He occasionally feels remorse and he often reflects on the morality of his actions. 
“How evil could I be?” Dexter muses, as he runs off to help out a neighbor with some handy-work. 
Dexter fits my fascination hypothesis from chapter 7: he is intelligent, attractive, loyal, out of the 
ordinary, and interesting. 
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I do not think that Dexter’s viewers will take this code to heart and take up murdering 
neighborhood criminals. We discover the cost of Dexter’s type of vigilante killing—for instance, 
the death of Dexter’s wife and his isolation at the conclusion of the series. But there may be a sense 
in which we do learn something from Dexter’s immoral behavior. While some characters, such as 
his sister Debra and his friend Lumen, start out repulsed by Dexter’s behavior, they come to admire 
it. Dexter is never caught or punished by the authorities. He is portrayed as a generally nice guy 
with a bit of a killing problem, and certainly a better moral agent than many of the people he 
murders. Perhaps the worry is that accepting a serial killer—no matter his motives—will cause us 
to eventually accept similar people in real life. Feelings about violence and vigilante crime in the 
fictional world of the TV series could bleed into a viewer’s thoughts and actions about the real 
world. Call this immoral learning. 
I introduced Jenefer Robinson’s notion of a “sentimental education” from fiction in chapter 
5. She argues that fictions allow a reader to gain experience in new emotional territory and gain 
self-knowledge about emotional tendencies that we already possess. If we can learn about our 
emotions from fictions, then it seems likely that we can learn about morality from fictions as well, 
especially if morality is based on emotional responses.  
In this chapter, I will explore the possibility of moral learning from fictions. I will begin 
by discussing the plausibility of learning from fictions in general. I will examine several arguments 
both in favor of and against this possibility. In §3, I will connect the moral learning debate with 
another hot debate in the philosophy of film: the question of whether film can do philosophy. I 
offer some evidence in support of the idea that fictions can do positive philosophy, as thought 
experiments. I contend that the moral learning and film-as-philosophy debates are closely related, 
even though they have not been understood that way in the aesthetics literature. In fact, the idea 
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that some films can do philosophy is evidence that they can teach us about morality. I will end this 
chapter by reexamining the possibility of immoral learning.  
 
 
 
2. Learning from fictions: Nussbaum vs. Currie 
 
 
2.1. The optimists 
Robinson claims that readers can gain a sentimental education from fictions. Fictions engage our 
emotional systems and, if we reflect on those emotions, we may acquire self-knowledge about our 
own values and desires. We can also practice mindreading of fictional characters and consider 
various hypothetical alternatives to emotional situations. Other philosophers have argued that we 
can gain a moral education from engaging with fictions, and literary works in particular. Susan 
Feagin (1983) and Martha Nussbaum (1990) take their cues from Aristotle (1947), arguing that 
engaging with fiction plays an instrumental role in the development of one’s moral and intellectual 
character (see also Gendler & Kovakovich, 2005). 
Nussbaum claims that there are two ways in which fictions can aid moral learning. First, 
fictions often present us with interesting and original moral content. She provides an extended 
example of the character Maggie from Henry James’s novel, The Golden Bowl. Nussbaum 
explores how James presents Maggie’s idiosyncratic, perfectionist conception of goodness and 
fear of doing harm. The narrative suggests that Maggie’s absolute convictions are overly idealistic 
and simplistic. The novel-length treatment of Maggie’s personal relationships sets up several moral 
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problems and then “solves” those problems by determining each character’s fate (Nussbaum 1990, 
132). 
Of course, we could simply read about morality in a philosophy text. However, Nussbaum 
doubts that readers would learn as much about the particular moral question at hand from a 
philosophy paper as she would from James’ novel. Sometimes readers need particular cases and 
examples in order to understand the complex social and practical implications of a moral principle. 
Short, abstract philosophical works often cannot do justice to the intricacies of moral dilemmas in 
our actual lives. 
Fictions provide us with unique moral content to expand our understanding of moral values 
and principles. Engaging with fictions also develops our moral skills. Presenting moral dilemmas 
and principles in a story calls upon our moral faculties: our attention to morally relevant details of 
a situation or person, reflection on our own moral behaviors and how others act in moral situations, 
and exploring and weighing options in order to make moral decisions. Fictional dilemmas may 
also trigger our moral emotions for a kind of “knowledge by acquaintance,” what I called 
experiential knowledge in chapter 4. Fictions grant us access to situations and personality types 
that we would never encounter in our daily lives. We practice our moral and emotional responses 
on these fictional entities and learn from example. We can then apply any know moral insights we 
gain to our own lives.  
Some philosophers have argued that fictions can provide us with more general types of 
learning, besides a sentimental or moral education. Peter Lamarque (2009) lists five different 
categories of learning from fiction: vision, imagination, learning what it is like, conceptual 
knowledge, and cognitive strengthening. Note that these learning categories were originally 
thought of in terms of literary fiction, but I will make the case that they can apply to any fictional 
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medium, at least in principle 
First, philosophers such as Iris Murdoch (1970) and Hilary Putnam (1978) have argued that 
fictions educate readers by helping them picture and understand real-life situations. The vision of 
a work should be understood metaphorically; readers learn to view the fictional world in a certain 
way, and apply that understanding to the real world. We learn an author or narrator’s vision 
perspective on the world. As Putnam (commenting on Celine’s Journey to the End of the Night) 
remarks: “I do not learn that love does not exist, that all human beings are hateful and 
hating…What I learn is to see the world as it looks to someone who is sure that hypothesis is 
correct” (ibid, 89; quoted in Lamarque 2009, 241).  Perhaps I could previously imagine what it 
would be like to learn that love doesn’t exist (for example), but encountering this perspective in a 
fiction adds a new layer of experiential knowledge that I didn’t formerly possess. 
Second, readers actively engage their imaginative faculties while reading works of 
literature. In chapter 1, I discussed van Leeuwen’s three of types of imagining: imagistic, 
attitudinal, and constructive. While reading a novel, we may imagistically call to mind characters, 
constructively imagine scenarios and propositions true of the fiction, and attitudinally imagine 
fictional objects.  This kind of imaginative engagement with fictions may broaden the scope and 
power of one’s imaginative abilities in other areas, such as hypothetical or forward-looking 
thought. This is true even if, as I have argued, imaginative engagement is not necessary for fictional 
experiences. 
Third, fictions may teach us what it is like to be someone with different characteristics than 
the reader possesses, or to be in a unique or unfamiliar scenario. Nussbaum and Robinson both 
argue for this position. This is another kind of experiential learning; we may learn what it is like 
to be a certain kind of person or in a unique moral situation. For example, I could begin to learn 
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what it is like to suffer from severe depression after reading The Bell Jar. I may not learn exactly 
what such a deep depression feels like, but I would have some idea of its effects on one’s daily 
life. 
 Fourth, fictions may teach us about folk psychological concepts. We can gain self-
knowledge of emotional tendencies, desires, or values that we did not know we possessed 
(Nussbaum 1995, Robinson 2005). It may even be possible that fictions can grant us propositional 
knowledge about folk psychology, a possibility I will explore in greater detail momentarily.  
Finally, one might contend that fictions are unlikely to teach us anything new about 
morality or emotions (for instance), but they may nevertheless enhance knowledge that we already 
possess (Gibson 2003). We gain moral skills from fictions much in the way we would by practicing 
sports: through the repeated application, development and enhancement of skills. 
In sum, we can potentially gain three types of knowledge from fiction: propositional 
knowledge about psychological or social concepts, knowledge of how to apply those concepts and 
moral/emotional/social skills, and experiential knowledge of what it is like to be a particular type 
of person or in an unfamiliar situation. In what follows, I will make the case for all three types of 
moral knowledge. Each of the previous styles of learning can be applied to a reader’s moral 
education; we can gain moral perspectives, learn about moral concepts, and practice moral skills 
while engaging with some fictions. We may even gain self-knowledge about our own moral 
responses to unfamiliar people and situations. Indeed, it seems like a platitude that engaging with 
great works of fiction makes us more morally sensitive. What reasons do we have to doubt this 
claim? 
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2.2. The skeptics 
It may seem like the authors in the previous section all assume the claim that we can learn from 
fictions without putting forth any real argument in its favor. But what evidence do we have to 
support this claim? Currie (2013) notes that philosophers like Nussbaum, Lamarque, Robinson, 
etc. all assume that we learn psychological and moral truths from fictions. Unfortunately, these 
philosophers do not provide any empirical evidence to support their optimism about moral 
learning. Currie claims that there is such no empirical evidence. It may seem like reading great 
works of fiction—those we would consider to be psychologically intuitive and revealing, such as 
novels by Dostoevsky, James, Tolstoy, and Austen, or films by Godard, Mehlville, or Antonioni—
make their audiences more insightful, thoughtful, reflective, and morally and emotionally sensitive 
in the course of their daily lives. But it is equally possible that readers who are already reflective, 
insightful, thoughtful, and morally and emotionally sensitive are naturally drawn to great works of 
literature that engage these faculties.  
 The optimist might protest that recent studies show that we can learn from fiction. In one, 
the psychologists David Comer Kidd and Emanuele Castano (2013) found that people who read 
literary fictions as opposed to or pop fiction do better on empathy and mindreading tests. Engaging 
with literary fictions (such as a work by Anton Chekov) primes readers for empathetic thoughts 
and behaviors. This conclusion seems to support the Robinson/Nussbaum line that we can gain a 
sentimental and moral education from literary fictions, especially if we think that social cognition 
and empathy are important components of how we morally engage with others. 
 The skeptics have a ready reply to these results. As the researchers note, it is unclear how 
long these effects last—for a few hours? Days? Minutes?  It’s not clear that we should count this 
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as moral learning if the participants were merely primed to respond empathetically. It is also 
possible that the differences in responses to empathetic and mindreading tests stem from how the 
narrative was constructed and what faculties it employs and not necessarily from the fictional 
content (what it supposedly reveals about the human psyche, for example).  One final interpretation 
could be that people who tend to be better at mindreading and empathy tests also happen to be 
frequent or talented consumers of literary fiction. Reading the literary work draws upon a skill that 
they already have. 
The skeptics have another reason to doubt that we can gain knowledge from fictions. Even 
if we can learn about morality or psychology from fictions in principle, most authors rely on faulty 
psychological theories of character, intention, and decision-making. If this is so, then the great 
works of fiction would not help us learn about how humans think (Currie, in prep). Currie sites 
recent research in cognitive psychology on character and decisionmaking that undermines how 
standard fictional characters think and behave.  
First, some contemporary philosophers and psychologists have called into question the 
notion of character as it is employed by virtue theorists (see Doris 1998 & 2002).  Virtue theorists 
seem to be committed to the existence of persisting character traits that help explain how people 
will act: honesty, courage, loyalty, generosity, etc. An honest person will refuse to lie to their friend 
or to a stranger and will also refuse to cheat on a test or steal from a store. It is assumed that a 
person’s character trait will be reliable across various situations and over time (see Sreenivasan 
2002).  
Against this notion of character, studies like Stanley Milgram’s electric shock experiments 
and Philip Zimbardo’s Stanford Prison Experiment seem to suggest that ordinarily virtuous 
people—who might appear to possess certain basic, virtuous character traits—can be made to do 
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awful things when pressured to do so. Psychological situationists argue that our behaviors may 
vary dramatically in different situations and do not raw upon constant personality traits. In John 
Darley and Daniel Batson’s “Good Samaritan” study (1973), Princeton theological students 
(ideally the utmost empathic and caring individuals) were studied to see if they would come to the 
aid of a needy bystander. They found that self-ascribed traits such as empathy and compassion 
were not suggestive of who would help the bystander. Rather, the determinant was which students 
were in a hurry. Students who were told that they was running late for a lecture were significantly 
less likely to help the bystander than if they were early or on time.  
Based on research like this, philosophical situationists have argued that the traditional 
virtue theoretic notion of a constant moral character is misleading (Doris 1998 & 2002, Harmon 
2000). Kevin Timpe (2008) describes philosophical situationism in terms of three related claims: 
 
1. Non-robustness: moral character traits are not robust—that is, they are not 
consistent across a wide spectrum of trait-relevant situations. Whatever moral 
character traits an individual has are situation-specific. 
 
2. Consistency: while a person’s moral character traits are relatively stable over 
time, this should be understood as consistency of situation specific traits, rather 
than robust traits. 
 
3. Fragmentation: There may be considerable disunity in a person’s moral character 
among her situation-specific character traits. 
 
If these claims are true, then situationism seems to present a problem for works of fiction. Currie 
argues that great works of fiction present characters that possess constant character traits that shape 
their behaviors. Examples abound: Luke Skywalker, Harry Potter, Frodo Baggins, Ned Stark, Jane 
Eyre, even Batman all seem to act on the basis of constant character traits that are not easily swayed 
by situational features. Rather, the character brings these traits to bear on difficult moral situations. 
321 
 
Jane Eyre is honest, so she consistently acts honestly across most situations, even when she has 
the perfect opportunity to act dishonestly. Furthermore, Jane possesses a unity of virtues; she is 
not only honest, but loyal, brave, and hardworking. Her virtues are not fragmented. Situationists 
would argue that his portrayal of a young woman is unrealistic and does not capture how people 
actually behave or the values they actually possess. 
 Currie also argues that fictions present a faulty picture of decision making and causal 
reasoning. For example, a narrative may present a character as faced with a moral dilemma and 
she must reason through various options in order to reach a satisfactory conclusion. Her reasoning 
serves as the main causal basis for the choice she makes. Why does Jane Eyre decide to leave Mr. 
Rochester, the man she loves, in favor of an uncertain fate?  Because she cannot bear the idea of 
throwing aside her moral beliefs for a life of dishonesty and callousness to others. Jane seemed to 
have conscious access to all of her reasons for leaving and was able to justify her actions to others 
later in the story. 
Recent work in cognitive psychology has brought this picture of decision-making into 
question. In a famous study on the introspection illusion, Richard Nisbett and Timothy Wilson 
(1977) presented participants with two pairs of stockings. The participants were able to present 
justifications of their decision when asked which pair they preferred. For instance, they liked the 
color better of one of the pairs; one of them looked like it was of a higher quality, etc. In fact, both 
pairs of stockings were the same! The participants tended to prefer the pair on the right-hand side 
for no other reason than that it was on that side. The verbal justifications for their decisions were 
merely confabulations.  
Similarly, Daniel Wegner (2002) has argued that conscious will is an illusion. We think 
that our conscious thoughts cause our actions, when, in fact, it is possible that our brain primes 
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action before conscious thinking takes place. We do not know that brain states give rise to actions, 
of course, because these processes are conducted unconsciously. So we conclude that conscious 
thoughts must have caused our actions.  Benjamin Libet (1985) makes similar claims in his studies 
on the timing of conscious voluntary actions (see also Graves et al 2010, Haggard 2005, Haggard 
& Libet 2001). 
 Currie concludes that evidence from cognitive psychology on situationism, decision-
making, and the conscious will undermines the idea that we can learn about psychology and 
morality from fictions. Authors present fictional characters as possessing predictive character 
traits, as having access to their own intentions and deliberative decision-making processes, and as 
consciously willing to act. However, if the psychological data is correct, people don’t really think 
or act the way fictional characters do. We are mistaken in thinking that we can learn about such 
things from fiction 
Perhaps we can gain pretend knowledge from fictions, as Currie suggests.  We can 
approach a literary work as if it presents a true picture of human psychology and see what we can 
conclude on that basis (Currie, in prep). This is a natural implication of the DAV; we do not have 
stereotypical mental states about fictions, so how can we learn anything about real-life mental 
processes from them? Coupled with the skeptical evidence from cognitive psychology, it does 
seem like the best we can learn from fictions is how we think mental states might work, not how 
they actually do. 
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3. Withstanding the skeptics 
 
I want to resist Currie’s skeptical arguments. The optimist position faces two challenges. First, we 
must respond to Currie’s claims concerning character and decision making in order to show that it 
is possible for audiences to learn about fiction. We need to determine whether authors present us 
with accurate depictions of the human psyche.  But even if we can eliminate this negative claim, 
the optimist still lacks a positive account of how consuming fictions makes us better moral agents. 
I will turn to this challenge in the next section. 
 We can question Currie’s quick acceptance of the situationist literature as evidence against 
the psychological reality of character. Currie’s situationist argument that character traits are weak 
and unstable has not been universally accepted in the psychology and philosophy literature on 
virtue (Annas 2005, Sabini and Silver 2005, Sreenivasan 2002 & 2009, etc.). Many virtue ethicists 
argue that character traits need not entail inflexible or scripted behaviors. Rather, they are 
predictive. It may be that a character trait for honesty disposes a person to tell the truth, and she 
will in most circumstances. However, character traits may be flexible and context sensitive. An 
honest person will, ceteris paribus, act honestly. This does not mean that she always will. An 
honest response can be defeated by context sensitive factors and knowledge (Sreenivasan 2002).  
This means that fictions may actually present us with an acceptable picture of moral 
character. Do the brave characters always act bravely and the dishonest characters always act 
poorly? Not necessarily. Inflexible fictional characters are boring and unrealistic. We are 
fascinated by a villain with a compassionate streak and a generally honest protagonist who 
sometimes lies or cheats. We like our fictional characters to be somewhat unpredictable. There are 
also characters that seem to have stable personality traits who nevertheless change their minds due 
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to the context in which they find themselves (e.g., Huck Finn and Anna Karenina).  
 What about Currie’s argument about conscious decision making? Do characters in the great 
works of fiction always act on the basis conscious reasoning? This research presents a greater 
challenge for the optimist. Decision making and deliberation does seem to be generally 
unconscious and subject to unknown or inaccessible influences and biases. In contrast, fictional 
characters have access to their own mental processes and states.  
However, there are some literary works that show their characters acting on the basis of 
emotional feelings and intuitions, or simply not knowing why they acted as they did. Dostoevsky’s 
Crime and Punishment is my favorite example of this. Raskolnikov decides to go through with 
murder of the old pawnbroker and her sister on a whim, even though he considered it for a long 
time. He spends the rest of the novel agonizing over his motives (which vary depending on his 
mood). Consider also the stream-of-consciousness techniques in works by the British modernists. 
Virginia Woolf’s To the Lighthouse and James Joyce’s Finnegan’s Wake go to great lengths to 
show that people do not act on the basis of orderly, deductive causal chains, but rather from general 
impressions, moods, and memories. Of course, one could still argue that the stream-of-
consciousness is supposed to be conscious and so does not present a counterexample to Currie’s 
claim. But it does show that our actions do not always proceed from rational deliberation.  
Even if most literary works present us with inaccurate pictures of conscious decision-
making and deliberation, not all of them do. It is possible, then, that fictions can provide us with 
some knowledge about how we real people think and make decisions.  
Moreover, it is far from obvious that artists are really concerned with presenting 
scientifically accurate portrayals of psychological processes, or even that they take their stories as 
a source of learning (moral or otherwise). Artists may be unconcerned with presenting a picture of 
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rational thought that squares with our best cognitive psychological and neuroscientific theories. 
Instead, they write about how most people appear to act and make decisions. Artists present 
characters in terms of what appear to be, prima facie, plausible psychological processes. Artists 
offer us the building blocks of folk psychology. So the value of this approach may depend on the 
value of folk psychology in general. 
 Imagine a fictional story with an omniscient narrator that does not explain why the 
protagonist behaves as he does. The narrative would be quite confusing and chances are readers 
wouldn’t find it very engaging. The reader would have to do a lot of work to understand how the 
character thinks and feels. There may be some challenging, scientifically accurate stories out there. 
It may be purposively difficult to understand the narrative of these stories, since everything we 
know about a character typically comes from what we are told about her in the text. We don’t have 
real world context or perceptual cues to inform our understanding of the character. Perhaps such 
stories make some cognitive point about the incomprehensibility or opacity of human behavior. It 
would be an interesting philosophical and psychological case study, but maybe not the most 
engaging story. 
 We tend to treat fictional characters the way that we do real people. We assume that their 
actions are motivated by character traits and reasons. This is part of what it means to take the 
fictional stance; we recognize the character as a person like one in the real world, and doing so 
helps us to understand the character. It could be that folk psychology is wrong in general. So we 
may be mistaken about the decisions and virtues of fictional characters—but, then, we are also 
wrong about real people. This is interesting and noteworthy for those working in cognitive science, 
but knowledge of situationism and the illusion of conscious reasoning will likely not change how 
we treat either real people or fictional characters. 
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4. Fictional thought experiments 
 
I have been fended off Currie’s charge that fictions utilize inaccurate notions from folk 
psychology. There is another hurdle to cross before we can say that we can learn about morality 
from fiction. The claim that we can gain any kind of knowledge from fiction is susceptible to 
Currie’s challenge that there is no real empirical evidence in favor of the view that consuming 
fiction enhances our psychological understanding.   
In this section, I will make the case that some fictions are extended thought experiments. If 
we think that we can learn about morality from thought experiments—which philosophers and 
cognitive scientists take for granted—then there is no reason why, in principle, we should deny 
that we can also learn about moral issues from some works of fictions. 
 There is a growing literature on the relationship between philosophy and film. Some 
philosophers argue that film can do philosophy. Others deny this possibility. My arguments will 
draw from this literature, but will not be limited to film fictions. Likewise, Currie’s claims 
concerning literary fictions carry over to films. Film characters also seem to possess steady 
personality traits and use conscious deliberation to make decisions that guide their behavior. 
Indeed, many of the challenges facing film as a form of philosophy apply to literature and other 
fictional media. I will point out differences between art forms when appropriate. 
 I will begin with several arguments against the claim that film can do philosophy. Like 
many authors in this area, Bruce Russell (2000) grants that films can be counterexamples to 
philosophical points or address philosophical theses. Woody Allen’s Crimes and Misdemeanors, 
for example, presents a counterexample to Plato’s argument in The Republic that only virtuous 
people can be truly happy. The Matrix illustrates Cartesian external world skepticism. But these 
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films do not actually do philosophy. While they illustrate or present counterexamples to 
philosophical claims. But neither one presents original, unique, positive philosophical ideas. 
 Right away we can think of one good response to Russell’s skepticism. First, why is it that 
counterexamples are not “real” philosophy? Thomas Wartenburg (2007) reminds us of Gettier’s 
short paper “Is knowledge justified true belief?” (Gettier 1963). This paper presents several brief 
counterexamples to the claim that justified true beliefs are necessary and sufficient for knowledge. 
No one would deny that Gettier’s paper is philosophy even though it does not present a positive 
theory of knowledge. Wartenburg (2006) also points out that many of the philosophy papers 
published in journals each month do not make unique contributions to their area. Instead, they may 
elucidate, bolster, or reject established philosophical claims. Russell’s notion of what it means to 
“do philosophy” is too limiting. 
 Russell also points out that films cannot establish truths about the actual world. He states 
that: “[an] imaginary situation cannot supply real data” (Russell 2000, 390).  Films present us with 
specific moral examples, but we cannot learn about real-life from them. This is because the 
fictional examples cannot be generalized or the medium is incompatible with doing philosophy. 
This charge proves more difficult to argue against without some positive account of how films can 
do philosophy, so I will hold off on responding for the time being. 
 Another skeptic, Paisley Livingston (2006), also claims that film has limited philosophic 
potential. Livingston’s arguments form two horns of a dilemma. Underlying each is the notion of 
medium specificity (see Carroll 2008). In order for film to do philosophy, one would have to show 
how the film medium can uniquely capture philosophic ideas in terms of its unique qualities. These 
features of the film medium that are unique to it, such as its capacity to depict movement. The first 
horn of the dilemma accepts this medium specificity claim, but notes that “exclusively cinematic 
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insight cannot be paraphrased” in the way that a philosophical argument requires (ibid, 12). The 
medium specific qualities of a film—its ability to utilize editing, camera movement and angle, 
focus, correlations between sounds, music, and a shot, etc.—cannot capture succinct, verbally 
articulated arguments as philosophy does. This is one area in which literature may have an 
advantage over film—literature is linguistic, so there is no medium specific reason why literature 
cannot do philosophy. 
The second horn of the dilemma rejects the medium specificity requirement. However, 
doing so amounts to a trivialization of the notion that film can do philosophy. An important feature 
of film is its ability to visually and aurally represent and record ideas and stories. Livingston argues 
that these general cinematic capacities merely represents philosophy—for instance, presenting a 
character as spouting philosophical theses. The film itself cannot make a unique philosophic 
contribution in virtue of its medium specific capacities to visually and aurally represent and record 
ideas. Thus, accepting either horn of the dilemma bars film from making a unique contribution to 
philosophy. Like Russell, Livingston holds that films like The Seventh Seal can be a useful 
complements to philosophy, especially for pedagogical purposes in illustrating philosophical 
points. However, Livingston denies that these purposes amount to positive philosophy. 
In sum, there are three main charges against film as philosophy (Wartenburg 2007). First, 
there is the explicitness objection: film as a medium cannot capture the conceptual determinacy of 
philosophy (1st horn of Livingston’s argument). Second, the generality objection states that 
philosophy is concerned with general concepts about reality, whereas film can only capture 
particular examples that do not generalize (Russell’s objection). Finally, the imposition objection 
states that film can be used for philosophically interesting purposes, like providing 
counterarguments or illustrating philosophical ideas, but cannot add to positive philosophy (both 
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Russell and the 2nd horn of Livingston’s argument).  
Russell and Livingston make a universal claim against the possibility of film as philosophy: 
no films can do philosophy due to the nature of the film medium. In general, optimistic accounts 
of film and philosophy carefully avoid universal statements. It’s not that all films can do 
philosophy, but rather that some can. For instance, Carroll argues that there is at least one case of 
film as philosophy: the short structuralist film, “Serene Velocity” (Carroll 2006). Carroll argues 
that “Serene Velocity” presents an argument of sorts concerning the nature of the motion picture, 
similar to Andy Warhol’s film Empire. Structuralist films are version of minimalism. Minimalist 
visual artists like Frank Stella, Sol LeWitt, Donald Judd, and Robert Morris created works that 
attempted to capture the essence of their art form. They stripped away what they deemed to be all 
the unnecessary components of painting, such as the representations of objects. Doing so reveals 
the true essence of painting: color, form, shape, or line. Carroll argues that the goal of “Serene 
Velocity” is similar to those of the minimalist painters. It is a kind of “metafilm”; a film that 
comments on and puts forth an idea concerning the real essence of cinematic art. The way the 
narrow hallway is still, yet also seems to move with the changing camera zooms creates a sense of 
the possibility of movement which, indeed, is the essence of cinematic art (ibid 178; see also Danto 
1979).  
If Carroll is right, then we have at least one example of a film that does positive philosophy 
even to Livingston and Russell’s standards. Of course, this example might not persuade us that 
film in general can do philosophy. After all, it does not present a general philosophic idea, such as 
free will or mind-body dualism. We still need a way to respond to Livingston and Russell’s point 
that film can present us with general philosophic ideas in areas like metaphysics, epistemology, 
and ethics.  
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I think that there is an answer to this charge. Both Carroll and Wartenberg suggest that 
films can also do philosophy by acting as thought experiments. One might think that thought 
experiments can illustrate philosophical points or even draw out philosophical conclusions, but 
they are not actual works of philosophy. As we have seen, philosophers like Russell and Livingston 
deny that illustrative thought experiments can do positive philosophy. But it is unclear why this is 
so. After all, many philosophers utilize thought experiments in the course of their arguments. 
Plato’s Allegory of the Cave and the Myth of Gyges from The Republic are two such cases. 
Thought experiments are not mere illustrations of a further point. They contribute to the 
philosophical argument that the author proposes. So if fictions can be thought experiments, then it 
is possible that fiction can do philosophy both in virtue of and in spite of the limitations of its 
medium (Wartenburg 2006 & 2007). 
Tamar Gendler states that “To perform a thought experiment is to reason about an 
imaginary scenario with the aim of confirming or disconfirming some hypothesis or theory” (2002, 
388). Different philosophers use different kinds of thought experiments in order to bolster their 
own view or undermine their opponent’s. For example, a thought experiment can be used as a 
counterexample to a philosophical thesis, principle, or idea (Wartenberg 2007). Examples include 
the Gettier cases, Judith Jarvis Thomson’s trolley and footbridge dilemmas, and Frank Jackson’s 
Mary (Jackson 1982). A thought experiment may also be used to establish the possibility of a 
philosophical claim. Descartes’ first Meditation establishes the possibility that our senses can 
deceive us and that we are the victim of a dreaming or evil demon hypothesis (ibid, 60). Thought 
experiments can also confirm a theory. Wartenberg cites Plato’s long discussion of a just state as 
a thought experiment that explains and justifies his theory of a just soul. As we saw in chapter 3, 
Arthur Danto’s Testadura example in “The Artworld” helps to confirm his notion of the ‘is’ of 
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aesthetic identification (Danto 1964). Wartenberg also argues that thought experiments can 
demonstrate the impossibility of a claim, as in Quine’s “gavagai!” case, which is intended to show 
the indeterminacy of translation (Quine 1960). Finally, thought experiments can establish 
necessary connections, such as how Locke’s cobbler and the prince example aims to establish the 
necessary connection between memory and the self. 
Our goal, then, is to show how films (or any fiction) can be or contain thought experiments 
in one of these ways. Consider The Walking Dead “walker-in-the barn” thought experiment from 
the beginning of chapter 6, based on the episode “Pretty much dead already.”  We might interpret 
that as a thought experiment concerning the nature of our moral judgments. Or, my Boondock 
Saint’s example from chapter 1 could be interpreted as a thought experiment concerning the 
intuitive likelihood of the DAV. Both qualify as thought experiments according to Gendler’s 
definition: they ask viewers to consider a fictional example that attempts to confirm or disconfirm 
some theory or philosophical idea. 
These examples are not unique. Several of Christopher Nolan’s films make “metafilm” 
critiques that could be interpreted as thought experiments; Inception illustrates external world 
skepticism, but also challenges that notion that films must have a tidy conclusion that answers 
every question it raises (see Jensen 2010). Carroll (2009) argues that the way in which Leonard’s 
experiences are presented in Memento comment on film narration in general. As Russell pointed 
out, Woody Allen’s Crimes and Misdemeanors can be interpreted as an immoralist challenge to 
Plato’s virtue theory, just like Glaucon’s Myth of Gyges in The Republic. Dostoevsky’s The 
Brothers Karamazov lives up to this philosophical challenge as well, presenting an argument in 
favor of Ivan’s concept of “everything is permitted,” then arguing against that position with the 
story of Father Zossima (as well as Ivan’s fate at the end of the novel).  
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However, not every text or film that incorporates philosophical themes counts as a thought 
experiment. Terence Malick’s films The Thin Red Line, The New World, and Tree of Life each 
present a distinction between Nature and Grace that may engender philosophical thought. I would 
hesitate to count them as doing philosophy, though, partly because the films are quite vague in 
terms of presenting an argument (contrast with the above examples which explicitly mention 
philosophical themes). It’s possible that these films are designed to inspire the viewer as opposed 
to present a philosophical concept or argument.19 
If at least some fictions can do philosophy, then I argue that it is possible to learn from 
them. The “walker in the barn” case may teach us something about how we should treat other 
people, if we are responsive to it. Inception may teach us something about skepticism and how we 
interpret film narratives. As we’ve seen, Crimes and Misdemeanors may challenge us to reconsider 
Plato’s notion of justice in The Republic.  
We lack direct empirical evidence to support the idea that we can learn from fictional 
thought experiments. However, it seems obvious that we can gain knowledge from philosophy, 
including philosophical thought experiments. After all, we can learn something conceptual from 
traditional philosophical thought experiments: Putnam’s Twin Earth, Plato’s Cave, Jackson’s 
Mary, and Thomson’s trolley and footbridge problems are cases in point. These thought 
experiments are intended to teach us something about metaphysics, knowledge, the mind, and 
ethics by either presenting positive claims or rejecting others. There is no direct empirical evidence 
for the claim that reading these works makes us more psychologically or morally sensitive. 
Consider Shaun Nichols’ point that even if psychopaths were to read great works of moral 
                                                          
19 Malick studied under Stanley Cavell as an undergraduate philosophy major at Harvard. Cavell 
was one of the original supporters of the idea that films can be philosophy, or at least philosophical. 
See Cavell 1971. 
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philosophy, it is very unlikely that they would become more morally sensitive (Nichols 2004a).We 
take it for granted that studying these philosophical works will teach the thoughtful reader about 
the subject at hand. If we can learn from traditional thought experiments, then it does not seem 
like there is good reason, in principle, why we cannot learn from fictional thought experiments.  
 
 
 
5. Immoral learning 
 
I want to return to Plato’s point that fictions can engender immoral practices and values in 
unsuspecting audiences. This is also Hume’s concern in “Of the Standard of Taste”: if immoral 
actions and characters that are not condemned in a work then an unsuspecting audience may take 
an immoral attitude to be morally acceptable in his real-life (Hume 1757/1994). 
 Both Plato and Hume worry that consumers of fiction can be easily manipulated into 
believing that what they witness in a fiction bears, in some way, on reality. But does this actually 
happen? Recall my discussion of the puzzle of imaginative resistance.  Sometimes audiences fail 
to accept a proposition as true in the fictional world simply because they disagree with the same 
proposition in the actual world. I have argued that this sometimes occurs when audiences worry 
that going along with fictional immorality will make themselves more likely to be immoral.  
I also suggested that resistance to portrayals of fictional immorality is the result of negative 
emotional reactions to immoral acts. As we saw with the SDP, it is possible that we do not harshly 
judge a character like Dexter Morgan because we are drawn to him in some way. But that does not 
necessarily mean that we accept it to be true, even imaginatively, that his immoral actions are 
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acceptable in either our world or in the world of the fiction. Moreover, I think that portrayals of 
immorality in artworks generally serve some cognitive or aesthetic purpose. As such, they can 
present cases of learning from immoral actions. Ideally, acknowledging the cognitive benefits of 
portrayals of immorality should quell the worries against some fictions.  
Consider the Mad Men “Mystery Date” example from the previous chapter. This episode 
portrayed acts of sexual violence towards women and a general tendency to objectify women for 
men’s desires. I argued, though, that this episode probably used the immoral treatment of women 
to make some point: to cast a light on how women are used in the work place, how casual sexual 
violence might sometimes seem, and the power struggles that women still face on a daily basis. 
Fictions often portray immoral characters or actions that are not condemned in the narrative, or at 
least not explicitly so. I argued that these portrayals of immorality are quite often supposed to 
make some cognitive or aesthetic point. That is, the audience is supposed to take the portrayal of 
immorality as an opportunity for moral reflection and learning. 
Here’s another example. You have now just finished watching Quentin Tarantino’s latest 
film, Django Unchained. Some critics have blasted this film for its overt racist elements (Spike 
Lee is one outspoken critic of the film). There is one scene in particular that seems stands out in 
terms of its negative portrayal of African Americans. Django, a slave, has agreed to help the white 
Dr. Schulz with his bounty-hunting after the doctor promises to free him from slavery and help 
him to find his wife, Bromhilda. Dr. Schulz gives Django some money and tells him that he can 
buy whatever new clothes he would like. The next scene shows Django, on horseback, proudly 
sporting his new frock—an absurdly fancy suit made of bright-blue velvet and an abundance of 
frilly lace. You laugh.  
 Why? What’s so funny about this scene? Well, the clothes, obviously. But is the source of 
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amusement simply the ridiculousness of the suit itself? I think it is more than that. It seems like 
this scene is funny because it is a former slave—a black man—who wears the stereotypical get-up 
of a wealthy white man. There is an incongruity between what we expect from Django and what 
we actually see (Morreall 1986). 
One could straightforwardly interpret this scene as Tarantino poking fun at a former slave 
who ignorantly assumes that he can pull off the garb of a powerful white man. But there is another, 
probably better, interpretation of this scene. Along with the amusement that one might experience, 
a viewer might also feel strangely uncomfortable by his or her own amusement at Django’s new 
clothes. I think that this is the point of many of the racist elements in Django Unchained: we are 
supposed to laugh and then feel uncomfortable about our own amusement. Tarantino seems to be 
pointing out that, despite our firm denial to the contrary, many white audiences still take African 
Americans as sources of amusement that should fulfill traditional stereotypes, such as Mammy in 
Gone with the Wind. So we find it comical and a bit absurd when they try to break out of those 
stereotypes.  
If we are sensitive to this aspect of the film then, ideally, we will reflect on our own 
responses and maybe even gain some kind of self-knowledge about our tacit acceptance of harmful 
racial stereotypes. I take this to be both a cognitive and aesthetic achievement.  If Django did not 
present these racist elements in the way that it did, then one might argue that it negatively portrays 
African Americans and should be condemned. But the immoral portrayals of Django seem to be 
of both aesthetic and moral value. The worry remains, though, that many people will not get the 
lesson behind portrayals of immorality. Some of Django’s viewers won’t make the cognitive point 
that I have suggested here. They will not realize that they should feel uncomfortable about their 
laughter—they just laugh. And this might be morally troubling.  
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 I have argued in this chapter that one can learn about morality from fictions. I suggested 
that our learning from fictions can be either a type of knowhow, propositional knowledge, or 
experiential knowledge.  As the “Mystery Date” and Django examples show, it’s possible that we 
can gain these types of knowledge from portrayals of immorality in a work of fiction. Moreover, 
these portrayals will generally have some kind of meta-cognitive or aesthetic value. But surely, as 
the last point about Django suggests, there are examples of fiction that do not seem to make a 
cognitive or aesthetic point, or make a point that is lost on the audience. Should we be worried 
about them? 
 Consider the growing concern that violence in the media—including films, TV shows, and 
video games—leads to real-life violence (see Provios, Kambam & Bender 2013). Intuitively, it 
seems like exposing oneself to fictional portrayals of extreme violence is, somehow, causally 
connected to violence in real-life. We might think that there is some explanatory power to the fact 
that a serial killer’s favorite film is Scarface and his favorite video game is Grand Theft Auto. 
Others will deny this, citing anecdotal or even empirical evidence that violent films do not directly 
cause real-life aggression or anti-social personalities. Perhaps the prominent cases of gun violence 
are the product of other social factors, not watching violent films or TV. 
 The empirical evidence on the relationship between fictional and real-life violence has so 
far been inconclusive. In a meta-analysis of studies, the psychologists Haejung Paik and George 
Comstock (1994) found that there does seem to be a correlation between short-term exposure to 
media violence and actual violence. Likewise, other researchers found that watching excessive 
amounts of violent TV (more than two hours per weekday) was associated with antisocial behavior 
in early adulthood (Robertson et al 2013). Despite these results—and more like them—there does 
not seem to be any direct causal link between media and real-life violence. 
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 Perhaps the worry is that exposing oneself to immoral actions and characters will make 
one accustomed to bad things. The concern is that violence might become blasé whether it is 
portrayed positively or not. Perhaps we will not feel the horror towards real-life violence that we 
should feel if we are accustomed to seeing it in the media. And it is not just violence that we should 
be worried about: consider the potential long-term effects of sexist and racist practices (see 
Shottenkirk 2013 & Vadas 1987). The portrayal of sexism and racism may reinforce harmful 
stereotypes that are already pervasive in our society. Maybe, then, portrayals of immorality in 
artwork should be condemned.  
 For the sake of argument, let’s suppose that cognitive scientists do find a direct causal 
relation between media violence and real-life aggression or exposure to racist or sexist fictions 
cause racism and sexism in real life. What then? Should we, in a moment of Platonic fervor, banish 
all immoral artworks from our society? 
 I do not have a good response to this challenge. But I think that there are at least two reasons 
why we should not censor immoral artworks (besides appeals to freedom of choice and freedom 
of speech). First, it may be that the supposed immoral act in an artwork is trying to point out some 
immoral feature of our own society, as in my Django example. The immoral features of the fiction 
are intentionally subversive. The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn is the perpetual example of this: 
Huck knows that freeing his friend Jim from slavery is morally wrong in his society. Huck chooses 
to free Jim anyway because Jim is his friend. Contemporary audiences praise Huck’s decision 
despite the fact that he may have been found blameworthy by some readers during Twain’s time. 
A fiction can highlight the harmful tendencies of our own society by portraying them in a fiction.  
Second, there is also something to be said for being tolerant and open-minded of the moral 
practices of other people and cultures. For example, suppose that you watch a film that takes place 
338 
 
in an Arabic nation where gender relations are quite different from what they are in your society. 
Should we condemn the artwork because it portrays moral values that are different from our own? 
Some viewers will undoubtedly say that we should, but others will disagree. 
 I do not intend for either of these reasons to be a full justification against the censorship or 
condemnation of immoral artworks. However, I do think that we should be sensitive to the 
potential moral lesson that we can draw from portrayals of immorality in some artworks, like 
Django. Plato may not be assuaged, but, nevertheless, I think that there are quite compelling 
reasons to be tolerant of fictional portrayals of immorality. 
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